2025:HHC:35848 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 698 of 2025 Reserved on: 17.9.2025 Date of Decision: 29.10.2025. Arun Kumar and others ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. and another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Mr Sudhir Thakur, Senior Advocate, with Mr Somesh Sharma, Advocate. For Respondent No.1/State : Ms Sunaina, Deputy Advocate General. For respondent No.2 : None. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 21, dated 20.3.2025, registered at Police Station Rajgarh, District Sirmour, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 326(a), 303(2), 351(2), and 352 read with Section 3(5) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:35848 and Section 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. (SC & ST Act). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police, asserting that he was permitted to take water from the source as per the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sirmour, H.P. The informant connected the pipe on 17.3.2025. Arun Kumar, Rajender, Ranbir Singh, Kailash, Ranjot, Subhash, Sameesh, Yajuvinder, Abhinash, Pramod, Albail Singh, Kush and Narender uprooted the informant’s pipe on 19.3.2025. The informant requested them not to do so, but they pelted stones at him and abused him in the name of his caste. 3. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The copy of the judgment passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Rohru, was procured, which showed that the accused/defendants were restrained from removing the water pipeline installed by the plaintiff/informant over Khasra No. 215/2. The caste certificate was obtained, and it was found that the informant belonged to the Koli caste, which is a scheduled caste. The accused belonged to the Rajput caste, which 3 2025:HHC:35848 is not a scheduled caste. Accused Sameesh produced the uprooted pipeline, and the police seized it. It was found out after the investigation that the informant had connected the pipe to the existing pipeline, and the accused uprooted the pipeline and abused the informant in the name of his caste. Ram Gopal and Chaman Lal were also present on the spot. The accused had a dispute with the residents of Village Bhanath and the Irrigation and Jal Shakti Vibhag over water. Arun Kumar was not found on the spot on 19.3.2025. Hence, he was discharged. 4. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioners/accused have filed the present petition, asserting that the informant made a false complaint to settle the score. The contents of the FIR are manipulated. No case is made out against the petitioners, even if the allegations in the FIR and the result of the investigation are taken to be correct. The accused had also made a report to the police, which was entered as GD No. 28, dated 11.3.2025. A dispute about the water source is being converted into criminal proceedings. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. 4 2025:HHC:35848 5. I have heard Mr Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Somesh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Ms Sunaina, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No.1/State. 6. Mr Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners/accused, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. The informant is trying to convert a civil dispute about the water into criminal proceedings. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed. 7. Ms Sunaina, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State, submitted that the petitioners had uprooted the water pipeline to deprive the informant, being a member of the scheduled caste, of his right to water despite the order of the competent Court. The police found sufÏcient material to file the charge sheet before the Court. The competent court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise 5 2025:HHC:35848 its extraordinary jurisdiction. Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufÏciently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 6 2025:HHC:35848 (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police ofÏcers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police ofÏcer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufÏcient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efÏcacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the 7 2025:HHC:35848 proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4), and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police ofÏcer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High 8 2025:HHC:35848 Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. The allegations in the FIR are quite specific that the petitioners/accused abused the informant in the name of his caste and uprooted the pipeline connected to the water tank to deprive the informant, a member of the scheduled caste, from the use of the water despite the order of the Court. The incident occurred at a public place, and the allegations in the FIR prima facie make out a case of the commission of a cognizable offence, namely, mischief by damaging the water pipeline and depriving a member of the scheduled caste of the water because of his caste and abusing him in the name of his caste. 9 2025:HHC:35848 13. It was submitted that the civil suit is pending between the parties, and the FIR was lodged as a counterblast to the civil suit. This submission will not assist the petitioners. The pendency of the civil suit can be a reason for false implication, but it can also show that the informant is not being provided water, and he had to resort to the civil remedies to get the water. Thus, not much advantage can be derived from the pendency of the civil suit between the parties. 14. It was submitted that the allegations against the petitioners are false, which is evident from the fact that Arun Kumar, named in the FIR, was not found to be present on the spot. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 958, that the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus does not apply to India. It was observed: “36. It is, though trite and much overstated, but the maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus”(false in one thing, false in everything) is not applicable to our criminal justice system. It is for the Court to distinguish the wheat from the chaff while dealing with the depositions of a hostile witness. Courts can rely upon that part of the deposition of a hostile witness which is corroborated by other evidence on record.” 10 2025:HHC:35848 15. Therefore, the prosecution’s case cannot be doubted because of some discrepancy in it. 16. In any case, the Court exercising the jurisdiction to quash the FIR does not go into the credibility of the witnesses or the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made by the parties. It has to accept the contents of the FIR as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 17. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to 11 2025:HHC:35848 the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single 12 2025:HHC:35848 Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge sheet, documents, etc. or not. 18. It was submitted that the FIR was lodged because of the land dispute, and it may be quashed. This submission will not help the petitioners/accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, “If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.” Xxxx 39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false 13 2025:HHC:35848 complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 19. Thus, the FIR cannot be quashed because it was lodged due to enmity. 20. No other point was urged. 21. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 22. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 29th October, 2025 (Chander)