2025: JHHC: 24005 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI S.A. No. 57 of 1998 (R) 1. Hussain Mian (deleted vide order dated 28.10.2021) 1(a) Sahidan Khatoon, widow of Late Hussain Mian 1(b) Makhdum Mian, S/o Hussain Mian 1(c) Habihan Khatoon, D/o late Hussain Mian 2. Table Mian, son of Late Wahdali Mian 3. Tahsil Mian, son of Late Wahdali Mian (deleted vide order dt. 14.08.2025) 3(a) Inamul Ansari, son of Late Tahsil Khan 3(b) Sarfaraz Ansari, son of Late Tahsil Khan Both residents of village Beko, P.S. Bagodar, District Giridih 4. Sahiba Khatoon Widow of Babul Mian 4(a) Niranjan Mian, S/o Late Babul Mian (deleted vide order dt. 14.08.2025) 4(a) (i) Safutan Khatoon, aged about 71 years, widow of Late Niranjan Mian 4(a) (ii) Akhtar Ansari @ Puran Ansari, aged about 45 years, son of Late Niranjan Ansari Both residents of village Beko, P.S. Bagodar, District Giridih 4(b) Shobhia Khatoon, daughter of Babul Mian 4(c) Sairoon Khatoon, wife of Mahiuddin Mian (Wrongly mentioned as W/o Niranjan Mian) All residents of village Beko, PO Bena, PS Bagodar, District Giridih … … Defendants/Respondents/Appellants -Versus- 1. Bopati Main @ Diptiuddin Mian (deleted vide order dated 28.10.2021) 1(a) Rehana Khatoon, Daughter of Bopati Mia @ Diptiuddin Mian 1(ib) Sahadun Khatoon, Daughter of Bopati Mia @ Diptiuddin Mian 1(c) Sahabun Khaton, Daughter of Bopati Mia @ Diptiuddin Mian 1(d) Anwar Ansari, Son of Bopati Mia @ Diptiuddin Mian All residents of village Beko, PO Bena, PS Bagodar, District Giridih 2025: JHHC: 24005 2 2. Mathur Mian (expunged vide order dated 28.10.2021) … … Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents --- CORAM: HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY --- For the Appellants : Mr. A. K. Sahani, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Atanu Banerjee, Advocate Mr. Amit Kumar Verma, Adv. Mr. Ashish Kumar Thakur, Adv. --- 17/14th August 2025 1. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. 2. This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 25.04.1998 (decree signed on 12.05.1998) passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Giridih in Title Appeal No. 56 of 1990/27/1992 reversing the judgment dated 28.06.1990 (decree singed on 18.07.1990) passed by the learned Munsif, Giridih in Title Suit No. 133 of 1988. 3. This appeal was admitted vide order dated 24.09.1998 on the following three substantial questions of law: - (A) Whether the registered sale deed dated 22.4.1954 could have been challenged by the plaintiff-respondent by a suit instituted on 3.12.1988 i.e. after about 35 years? (B) Whether in view of the judgment of this Court reported in 1996 BLJR 94 the lower appellate court has misdirected itself in holding that suit is not barred by limitation? (C) The plaintiff-respondent, Bopati Mian could have maintained a suit after 3 years from the date of his attaining majority in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in 1994 (6) SCC 585? I.A. No. 10815 of 2025 4. This interlocutory application has been filed seeking substitution of appellant Nos. 3 and 4(a), who expired during the pendency of this case, by setting aside abatement, if any. There is delay in filing the petition for substitution with respect to appellant No. 4(a) which is to the extent of 521 days. 2025: JHHC: 24005 3 5. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the matter has remained pending before this Court since 1998 and earlier appellant No. 4 expired who was substituted and now appellant No. 4(a) has also expired. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the other legal heirs and successors of appellant No. 4 are already on record i.e. 4(b) and 4(c). He has submitted that the details of legal heirs and successors of appellant No. 3 and appellant No. 4(a) have been mentioned in paragraph 9 and paragraph 6 of the interlocutory application respectively. The learned counsel has also submitted that the Vakalatnama on behalf of the proposed legal heirs and successors have also been filed along with the interlocutory application. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents has opposed the prayer and has submitted that the appellant No. 4(a) died on 01.09.2023 and there is delay. He has also submitted that the concerned learned counsel was informed on 25.06.2024 but still the petition was not filed. 8. So far as the substitution of appellant No. 3 is concerned, learned counsel for the respondents has no any serious objection. 9. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that the appeal has remained pending before this Court since 1998 and initially appellant No.4 was substituted and thereafter, appellant No. 4(a) has also expired, other legal heirs and successors of appellant No.4 are already on record and it has been stated in paragraph 10 of I.A. No. 10815/2025 that appellants are residents of remote village and consequently they could not contact the counsel for the appellants for quite some time. 10. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances and being satisfied, I.A. No. 10815 of 2025 seeking substitution of the appellant Nos. 3 and 4(a) is hereby allowed, the delay in filing the petition seeking substitution so far as appellant No. 4(a) is condoned and the abatement is also set aside. There being no objection with regards to substitution of 2025: JHHC: 24005 4 appellant no. 3, the prayer for substitution of appellant no. 3 is also allowed. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants is directed to delete the name of appellant Nos. 3 and 4(a) from the cause title and insert the name of their legal heirs and successors in 8red ink9 during the course of the day. 12. With the consent of the parties, this appeal is taken up on merits. Arguments of the appellants 13. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that essentially all the three substantial questions of law are relating to the point of limitation. 14. While referring to the trial court9s judgment, the learned counsel has submitted that the suit was held to be barred by limitation and so far as the learned 1st appellate court is concerned, it was held that the suit was not barred by limitation as the sale-deed itself was void and illegal document. The learned counsel submits that both the plaintiffs are full brothers and plaintiff no. 1 was minor as on 22.04.1954, but so far as the plaintiff no. 2 is concerned, he was major at the relevant point of time. He submits that plaintiff no. 2 executed the sale deed with respect to the property in which the name of plaintiff no. 1 also figured and the deed was executed by plaintiff no. 2 on behalf of himself and also on behalf of plaintiff no. 1. 15. The learned counsel has further submitted that the suit was filed in the year 1988 and by that point of time, about 35 years had elapsed. He has also submitted that as per the records, the plaintiff No. 1 was 15 years of age as on 22.04.1954 and thereafter he attained majority, but in spite of attaining majority in the year 1957, no such steps were taken to get the sale deed declared void or for cancellation of the sale deed. He has also submitted that the plaintiffs not only prayed for cancellation of sale deed on the ground that the plaintiff no. 1 was minor, but also on the ground that no consideration amount was paid in connection with the sale deed. He has submitted that the sale deed itself indicated payment of consideration amount. However, considering the substantial questions of 2025: JHHC: 24005 5 law, the learned counsel submits that once the suit is barred by limitation, there is no question of entering into the merits of the case. 16. The learned counsel has then referred to the reliefs as prayed for in the plaint and has submitted that a declaration was sought that the sale deed dated 22.04.1954 is quite void, ineffective, inoperative and not binding upon the plaintiffs. He submits that once the deed is challenged, the provision of Limitation Act comes into play and even for a declaration of a deed as void, evidence is required. 17. So far as the judgment referred to in the substantial question of law which is reported in (1994) 6 SCC 585 (Darshan Singh vs. Gurudev Singh) is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants has referred to paragraph 5 thereof to submit that the provision of Section 6 of the Limitation Act has been considered and the suit has to be filed within 3 years from the date of cessation of disability. He submits that once the plaintiff no. 1 attained the age of majority, the disability ceased and therefore the suit was required to be filed within 3 years upon attaining majority failing which the suit itself was barred by limitation. 18. The learned counsel has also placed the judgment passed by Hon9ble Patna High Court reported in 1996 BLJR 94 as referred to in substantial question of law and has referred to paragraph 16 thereof to submit that it has been held that once a registered sale deed was obtained for adequate consideration and if someone feels aggrieved he has to file a suit for cancellation of the same within a period of three years as contemplated under Article 59 of the Limitation Act and if that is not so done, then the suit becomes barred by limitation. 19. The learned counsel has also submitted that some steps were taken by the plaintiff no. 2 on 12.07.1954 for cancellation of the sale deed, but the same was of no consequence. He has referred to Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act to submit that it speaks about void and voidable sale deed and by virtue of the same a suit is required to be filed for a declaration of the sale deed as void and voidable. The learned counsel has 2025: JHHC: 24005 6 submitted that the learned 1st appellate court has erred in law while dealing with the point of limitation and therefore the substantial questions of law be answered in favour of the appellants and against the respondents. Argument of the respondents 20. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has submitted that in a case where the sale deed is void-in-initio/nullity in the eyes of law, there is no need to challenge the sale deed and accordingly, no prayer was made in the suit seeking to set-aside the sale deed dated 22.04.1954. The learned counsel has also submitted that the plaintiffs are governed by Mohammdan Law and plaintiff no. 2 had no locus to execute the deed on behalf of plaintiff no. 1 and therefore the deed so executed was ex-facie null and void and nullity. In such circumstances, the point of limitation will not come into picture. 21. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon9ble Supreme Court reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1903 (Krishnaveni vs. M. A. Shagul Hameed & Anr.) and has referred to paragraph 7 which is quoted as under: - <7. There is no dispute on the contention raised by the defendants in the suit that the appellant was a minor at the time of the said agreement dated 03.09.2007. Therefore, such contract with a minor, was rightly found to be a void contract by the High Court. For such conclusion, the High Court relied on the ratio in Mathai Mathai vs. Joseph Mary. In this judgment, the Court opined that a 15 year old could not have entered into a valid contract in her own name and she ought to be represented either by her natural guardian or a guardian appointed by the Court in order to lend legal validity to the contract in question. The conclusion drawn by the High Court is also supported by the Privy Council’s decision in Mohori Bibee vs. Dharmodas Ghose.= 22. The learned counsel has also referred to the judgment passed by the Hon9ble Supreme Court in the case reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353 (Prem Singh & Others vs. Birbal & Others) and has referred to paragraph 16 2025: JHHC: 24005 7 thereof to submit that when a document is valid, there is no question of its cancellation, but when a document is void-ab-initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non-est in the eyes of law as it would be a nullity. 23. However, during the course of argument, it is not in dispute that as per Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, once a deed is registered its cancellation has to be through a civil suit and another deed of cancellation of a registered deed is not permissible in the eyes of law. Rejoinder argument of the appellants 24. In response, the learned counsel for the appellants has referred to paragraph 28 of the judgment passed in the case of Prem Singh (supra) and has submitted that in the said case, the deed was executed by a minor and it was observed that if a deed is executed by a minor, it is void and he has two options, either to file a suit to get the property conveyed thereunder or he could either file a suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority and if no such steps are taken, the suit will be barred by limitation. Findings of this Court 25. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that Bipati Mian and Mathur Mian had filed the suit for the following reliefs: - (i) That upon adjudication it may be declared that the plaintiffs have their subsisting right, title, interest and possession over the suit property. (ii) That it may further be declared that the sale deed dated 22.04.1954 is quite void, ineffective and inoperative and is not binding upon the plaintiffs. (iii) That the cost of the suit be awarded to the plaintiffs. (iv) Any other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiffs be found entitled, be passed. 2025: JHHC: 24005 8 26. It is not in dispute that the entire suit property was covered by the sale deed dated 22.04.1954. 27. This Court finds that the reliefs as prayed for in the plaint reveals that the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the sale deed dated 22.04.1954 was void and thus, there is a specific challenge to the sale deed. The suit was contested on various points including the point of limitation which is the bone of contention considering the substantial questions of law. A specific plea was raised that the suit was not maintainable after having filed 35 years from the date of execution of the sale deed. It was also asserted that Bipati Mian attained majority sometimes in the year 1957 and in spite of that he did not take any steps to challenge the sale deed. The fact remains that the plaintiff no. 2 who had executed the sale deed on behalf of himself and on behalf of plaintiff no. 1 was undisputedly major at the time of execution of the sale deed. 28. This Court finds that the learned trial court had framed various issues including the point of limitation and also as to whether the deed was void which were issues were issue nos. VI and VII. The issues framed by the learned trial court are as under: - (i) Is the suit maintainable in its present form? (ii) Have the plaintiffs got cause of action? (iii) Is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? (iv) Is the suit property properly valued and the court fees paid sufficient? (v) Have the plaintiffs got subsisting right, title and interest and possession over the suit property? (vi) Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation? (vii) Is the sale deed dt. 22.4.54 executed by Mathur Mian in favour of defendants, void documents and not binding on the plaintiffs? (viii) To what other relief or reliefs, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 2025: JHHC: 24005 9 29. While deciding issue no. VI, the learned trial court held that the suit was barred by limitation. The finding is in paragraph 10 and while deciding issue no. VII which was decided along with issue no. V, the learned trial Court held that illegality of the deed could not be challenged after long period and also held that the plaintiffs had no right, title and possession over the suit land and the sale deed executed by the plaintiff no. 2 in favour of the defendants cannot be declared null and void. The learned trial court also declared that the plaintiffs had no cause of action and were not entitled to any relief. 30. So far as the learned 1st appellate court is concerned, the point of limitation has been dealt with in paragraph 9 and the learned 1st appellate court was of the view that when the instrument is null and void, the point of limitation would not apply and such a document need not be cancelled or set-aside by bringing the suit within 3 years and also observed that the suit was brought without praying for cancellation of the document. The learned 1st appellate court in paragraph 10 observed that the plaintiffs had filed the suit for declaration of their title and possession and the suit was not for recovery of possession. 31. However, the learned 1st appellate court refused to grant the plea of adverse possession as claimed by the plaintiffs. 32. The learned 1st appellate court thereafter entered into the merits of the case and was of the view that full consideration amount did not pass in connection with the sale deed. The learned 1st appellate court also recorded that the defendants cannot base their title upon a void document and ultimately held that the suit was not barred by limitation. The learned court also considered that the plaintiff no. 2 could be de-facto guardian of plaintiff no. 1, but could not have executed the sale deed. Ultimately, the learned 1st appellate court held that the sale deed dated 22.04.1954 is a void and illegal document, however, rejected the plea of adverse possession raised by the plaintiffs. 2025: JHHC: 24005 10 33. So far as the substantial question of law no. A is concerned, the same assumes importance in view of the fact that the plaintiff no. 2 was major at the time of execution of the sale deed and admittedly the sale deed was challenged after expiry of about 35 years from its execution. The substantial question of law no. A has to be seen with the substantial question of no. C wherein the plaintiff no. 1 was minor at the time of execution of sale deed dated 22.04.1954 and his property was sold by plaintiff no. 2 for himself and on behalf of the plaintiff no. 1, but admittedly the plaintiff no. 1 did not maintain a suit to get back the property even after attaining majority within 3 years from the date of such majority. 34. In the judgment passed by the Hon9ble Supreme Court reported n (1994) 6 SCC 585 (supra) in paragraph 5, it has been clearly held that the period of limitation to challenge the sale deed is 3 years from the date disability ceases. In the present case, disability ceases are with respect to plaintiff no. 1 upon attaining majority, but in spite of attaining majority, he did not challenge the sale deed. Consequently, when seen in the light of Section 6 of the Limitation Act, there is no dispute that challenge to the sale deed on the ground that the plaintiff no. 1 was minor at the relevant point of time in the year 1954, when the sale deed was executed, the suit was barred by limitation as that suit was filed after 35 years from the date of execution of the sale deed. 35. So far as the judgment passed by the Hon9ble Supreme Court reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353 (supra) is concerned, the Hon9ble Supreme Court in paragraph 28 held that if a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was minor and it was void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property purportedly conveyed thereunder. He could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority. In the present case, the plaintiff no. 1 did not take the necessary steps within prescribed period of limitation, although his property was transferred by 2025: JHHC: 24005 11 the deed of the year 1954. He neither filed the suit within 12 years of the deed nor filed the suit within 3 years of attaining majority 36. In paragraph 17 of the judgment passed in the case of Prem Singh (supra), it has been observed that once a suit is filed by a plaintiff for cancellation of a transaction, it would be governed by Article 59. Even if Article 59 is not attracted, the residuary Article would be. The same necessarily amounts to challenging the sale deed and in order to get declaration on sale deed as void it requires adjudication. It is one thing to say that the sale deed was void-ab-initio and need not be challenged and it was not actually challenged in the suit and it is another thing to say that the sale deed was sought to be declared void and having declared void, it is void-ab-initio and nullity and the point of limitation would not apply at all. In the present case, the suit also prayed for “That it may further be declared that the sale deed dated 22.04.1954 is quite void, ineffective and inoperative and is not binding upon the plaintiffs.= In the present case, the point of limitation would certainly apply and therefore, the learned 1st appellate court is not justified in holding that the plea of limitation would not apply. 37. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the substantial questions of law Nos. (A) and (C) are answered in favor of the appellants and against the respondents. It is held that the registered sale deed dated 22.4.1954 could not have been challenged by the plaintiffs- respondents by a suit instituted on 3.12.1988 i.e. after about 35 years AND the plaintiffs-respondents, Bopati Mian could not have maintained a suit after 3 years from the date of his attaining majority in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, reported in 1994 (6) SCC 585. 38. So far as substantial question of law no. (B) is concerned, the learned 1st appellate court has certainly misdirected itself in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation. In the judgment reported in 1996 (1) BLJR 94 (Mohammad Abuzar versus Akbar Imam Saheb and others), it has been held that once a registered sale deed was obtained for adequate consideration and if somebody feel aggrieved, he has to file a suit for 2025: JHHC: 24005 12 cancellation of the same within a period of 3 years, as contemplated by Article 59 of the Limitation Act. The sale deed should be challenged within 3 years from the date of sale or within 3 years from the date of knowledge. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that they had no knowledge about the registered sale deed. One of the executants of the sale deed was major and other was minor and both are the plaintiffs before the court seeking cancellation of sale deed dated 22.04.1954. The sale deed itself revealed that consideration amount of Rs.700/- was paid at the time of its registration coupled with delivery of possession of the suit property. The case of the plaintiffs was that consideration was not paid and on 12.07.1954 they had unilaterally cancelled the registered sale deed dated 22.04.54 in the registry office. The original sale deed and the unilateral deed of cancellation have been exhibited by the plaintiffs as exhibit-2 and 3. This Court is of the considered view that once the sale deed is registered, the only remedy to set-aside the same is through the process of court in view of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act for which steps are required to be taken within the period of limitation as prescribed by law and the action taken by the plaintiffs to execute a cancellation deed by itself has no sanctity in the eyes of law. Consequently, the substantial question of law No. (B) is also answered in favor of the appellants and against the respondents and it is held that the learned 1st appellate court has misdirected itself in holding that suit is not barred by limitation. 39. So far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1903 (supra) is concerned, the same does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. In the said case, no point of limitation was involved. In the said case, a minor had entered into a contract and soon thereafter the minor filed a suit for specific performance of contract through his mother and the defendant resisted the suit on the ground that contract entered into by a minor was itself void which plea was duly accepted by the Hon9ble Supreme Court and the appeal filed by the minor was dismissed. This Court is of the view 2025: JHHC: 24005 13 that the said judgment of the Hon9ble Supreme Court does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case as the substantial questions of law herein are related to point of limitation and this Court has held that if the deed is sought to be declared as void, the same has to be challenged within a period of limitation as prescribed under the law of Limitation. In the present case, the suit was filed in the year 1988 and by that point of time, about 35 years had elapsed from the date of registration of the sale deed impugned in the suit. 40. This Court is of the considered view that once the suit challenging the sale deed is barred by limitation, adjudication on merit of its legality and validity has got no relevance at all. 41. In view of the aforesaid circumstances and answers to the substantial questions of law in favour of the appellants, the judgment passed by the learned 1st appellate court is hereby set-aside to the extent it relates to challenge to the registered sale deed dated 22.04.54 and also the finding that the registered sale deed was not acted upon. 42. The plea of adverse possession of the defendants was also rejected by the learned 1st appellate court which does not call for any interference by this court considering the scope of the substantial questions of law involved in this case. 43. This appeal is hereby allowed in the aforesaid terms. 44. Pending I.A., if any, is closed. 45. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the concerned court through 8e-mail/FAX9. (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.) Dated: 14.08.2025 Mukul/-