JUDGMENT : SATYEN VAIDYA, J. 1. This petition has been filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short “the Act”) against the Award dated 09.01.2019, passed by learned Arbitrator in Arbitration Proceedings Reference No.52 of 2017. 2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the petition are that the respondent was publisher of a daily vernacular newspaper under the name and style of “Pehli Khabar”. Political advertisements were published in “Pehli Khabar” from 05.10.2014 to 15.10.2014 for Haryana Pradesh Congress Committee (for short “the HCC”). 3. The respondent being an enterprise, registered under the Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises Act, 2006 (for short, MSME Act”), made a reference to the Himachal Pradesh MSME Council seeking the unpaid amount for the political advertisements published in “Pehli Khabar” from 05.10.2014 to 15.10.2014 for HCC. The respondent claimed that the invoice dated 15.10.2014 of Rs.38,69,250/- was generated for the publications made for HCC, but only a sum of Rs.22,67,728/- was received and, as such, was entitled to balance outstanding amount of Rs.16,01,522/- along with interest as payable under the MSME Act. As per the respondent, the payment of Rs.22,67,728/- had been received by him vide cheque No.000146 dated 30.10.2014 in the sum of Rs.12,67,728, cheque No.000198 dated 18.12.2014 in the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- and cheque No.000199 dated 05.01.2015 for Rs.5,00,000/-. 4. The respondent impleaded Shri Rahul Gandhi, President, Indian National Congress, besides the petitioners herein as respondents in the reference filed before MSME Council. 5. The name of Mr. Rahul Gandhi, President, Indian National Congress, was deleted from the array of respondents by the Council during the pendency of reconciliation proceedings. 6. The MSME Council called upon the petitioners herein to file reply to the claim of respondent. The petitioners herein filed their written statement. The Council finally vide order dated 30.06.2018 referred the matter to the arbitration of sole Arbitrator Mr. Ravinder Parkash Verma, District & Sessions Judge (retired) on the ground that the conciliation had failed. 7. Order dated 30.06.2018, passed by the MSME Council, was assailed by the petitioners before this Court by way of CWP No.2006 of 2018. The said petition was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 22nd November, 2018 with the consent of both the parties in following terms: “2. 7. Order dated 30.06.2018, passed by the MSME Council, was assailed by the petitioners before this Court by way of CWP No.2006 of 2018. The said petition was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 22nd November, 2018 with the consent of both the parties in following terms: “2. Having heard learned counsel for the parties for some time, it appears expedient to dispose of these proceedings with the consent of learned counsel for the parties in following terms: (i) The learned Arbitrator shall formulate all the points issues raised having arisen for adjudication and shall return findings point-wise while passing a reasoned Award. (ii) The issues points to be adjudicated by the Arbitrator shall include. (a) whether the Himachal Pradesh Micro & Small Enterprises Facilitation Council was competent to make the subject Reference? (b) whether the Himachal Pradesh Micro & Small Enterprises Facilitation Council has got territorial jurisdiction to refer the dispute in the matter? (c) who is the person responsible for making the due payment if it is found that the full payment has not been made to respondent No. 3? (iii) The petitioner as well as respondent No. 3 shall be at liberty to submit written submissions alongwith relevant documents part of the pleadings being referred to by them, for consideration of the Arbitrator and the same shall be kept in view while adjudicating the dispute.” 8. The respondent filed his statement of claim before the Arbitrator. The petitioners contested the claim by filing written statement. The claim of the respondent was based on the premise that the political advertisements had been published at the agreed rate of Rs.250 per sq cm. Whereas, as per the petitioners, the publications were agreed to be made on approved DAVP rates i.e. Rs.33.642 per sq cm. 9. The Arbitrator formulated the following points for adjudication: (a) Whether the Himachal Pradesh Micro & Small Enterprises Facilitation Council was competent to make the subject of Reference? (b) Whether the Himachal Pradesh Micro & Small Enterprises Facilitation Council has got territorial jurisdiction to refer the dispute in the matter? (c) who is the person responsible for making the due payment if it is found that the full payment has not been made to the respondent No. 37. (b) Whether the Himachal Pradesh Micro & Small Enterprises Facilitation Council has got territorial jurisdiction to refer the dispute in the matter? (c) who is the person responsible for making the due payment if it is found that the full payment has not been made to the respondent No. 37. (iii) The petitioner as well as respondent No. 3 shall be at liberty to submit written submissions along with relevant documents part of the pleadings being referred to by them, for consideration of the arbitrator and the same shall be kept in view while adjudicating the dispute." On the basis of written as well as oral arguments and submissions of the parties, the following additional issues points are framed for adjudication of the dispute between the parties. (d) Whether the respondents are buyer of the services provided by the petitioner if not who is the buyer u/s 2(n of MSMED Act, 2006? (e) Whether there was no privity of contract between the parties if so its effect? (f) Whether the petition is bad for joinder, mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties? (g) Whether the respondents have been impleaded in personal capacity as party if so its effect? (h) Whether Indian National Congress is not a party in the petition? (1) Whether petitioner has filed any amended and revised arbitration petition if so whether the same is maintainable? (k) Whether Haryana Congress Publication and Publicity committee was a necessary party if so its effect? (1) Whether Jitender Bhardwaj was a necessary party if so its effect? (m) Whether adverse inference has to be drawn for non-examination of Jitender Bhardwaj by the petitioner? (n) Whether there was commission of offence of forgery by the petitioner if so its effect? (o) Whether the petitioner has tried to mislead the tribunal as alleged? (p) What was the accepted rate of publication of advertisement as per averments and documents produced by the parties? (q) Whether the documents produced by the supplier were not admissible if so its effect? (r) Whether the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction after the expiry of 90 days u/s 18(5) of MSMED Act (s) Whether the petition reference is barred by limitation Act?” 10. The Arbitrator vide impugned award has held that the Himachal Pradesh MSME Council had jurisdiction in the matter, in terms of Section 18(4) of the MSME Act. (r) Whether the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction after the expiry of 90 days u/s 18(5) of MSMED Act (s) Whether the petition reference is barred by limitation Act?” 10. The Arbitrator vide impugned award has held that the Himachal Pradesh MSME Council had jurisdiction in the matter, in terms of Section 18(4) of the MSME Act. The Arbitrator has further held that though, the publication was made for HCC by the respondent, yet the petitioners being the office bearers i.e. President and Treasurer of HCC were rightly impleaded as respondents in their capacity as President and Treasurer of HCC, respectively. Finally, it was held that the petitioners were liable to pay the amount for the publications at the rate of Rs.250/- per sq cm. 11. The objection with respect to limitation raised by the petitioners was also decided against them. 12. In result the Arbitrator has held the petitioners liable to pay Rs.16,01,522/- as principal amount and Rs.17,74,462/- as interest under Section 16 of the MSME Act. Thus, an award of Rs.33,75,984/- as amount due up to date of filing of reference has been passed against the buyers. Further, the buyers have also been held liable to pay interest from the date of filing of reference i.e. 04.01.2018 up to the date of passing of award and future interest from the date of passing of award till the actual payment as per interest rate fixed under Section 16 of MSME Act. The respondent has also been held entitled to get reimbursed of Rs.40,000/- and Rs 60,000/- as the fee of Arbitrator and litigation and other miscellaneous expenses respectively. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record carefully. 14. The Arbitration award has been assailed by the petitioners herein primarily on the grounds that the time barred claim of the respondent has been wrongly allowed; the claim against the petitioners in absence of HCC or INC (Indian National Congress) could not be maintained; and that the findings, holding the agreed rate of publication charges at Rs.250 per sq cm, was perverse to the records. 15. On the other hand, the respondent, besides supporting the impugned award, has raised an argument that the instant petition under Section 34 itself was barred by limitation. 16. The scope of interference with arbitral award in proceedings under Section 34 of the Act is limited. 15. On the other hand, the respondent, besides supporting the impugned award, has raised an argument that the instant petition under Section 34 itself was barred by limitation. 16. The scope of interference with arbitral award in proceedings under Section 34 of the Act is limited. The contravention with fundamental policy of Indian law as also patent illegality should emerge on the face of the award itself. It is impermissible for the court to sit in appeal or review over the findings recorded by the arbitral tribunal. 17. In Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority, 2015 (3) SCC 49 , it was held as under:- 42. In the 1996 Act, this principle is substituted by the 'patent illegality' principle which, in turn, contains three sub heads: 42.1 (a) A contravention of the substantive law of India would result in the death knell of an arbitral award. This must be understood in the sense that such illegality must go to the root of the matter and cannot be of a trivial nature. This again is a really a contravention of Section 28(1)(a) of the Act, which reads as under: "28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute: (1) Where the place of arbitration is situated in India:- (a) in an arbitration other than an international commercial arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to arbitration in accordance with the substantive law for the time being in force in India." 42.2 (b) A contravention of the Arbitration Act itself would be regarded as a patent illegalityfor example if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award in contravention of section 31(3) of the Act, such award will be liable to be set aside. 42.3 (c) Equally, the third sub-head of patent illegality is really a contravention of Section 28 (3) of the Arbitration Act, which reads as under:- "28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute.- (3) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction. This last contravention must be understood with a caveat. An arbitral tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be set aside on this ground. This last contravention must be understood with a caveat. An arbitral tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be set aside on this ground. Construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide unless the arbitrator construes the contract in such a way that it could be said to be something that no fair minded or reasonable person could do.” 18. In Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited Vs. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), 2019 (15) SCC 131 , it was held as under:- “37. Insofar as domestic awards made in India are concerned, an additional ground is now available under sub-section (2A), added by the Amendment Act, 2015, to Section 34. Here, there must be patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, which refers to such illegality as goes to the root of the matter but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of the law. In short, what is not subsumed within “the fundamental policy of Indian law”, namely, the contravention of a statute not linked to public policy or public interest, cannot be brought in by the backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award on the ground of patent illegality. 38. Secondly, it is also made clear that reappreciation of evidence, which is what an appellate court is permitted to do, cannot be permitted under the ground of patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. 39. To elucidate, paragraph 42.1 of Associate Builders (supra), namely, a mere contravention of the substantive law of India, by itself, is no longer a ground available to set aside an arbitral award. Paragraph 42.2 of Associate Builders (supra), however, would remain, for if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award and contravenes Section 31(3) of the 1996 Act, that would certainly amount to a patent illegality on the face of the award. 40. Paragraph 42.2 of Associate Builders (supra), however, would remain, for if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award and contravenes Section 31(3) of the 1996 Act, that would certainly amount to a patent illegality on the face of the award. 40. The change made in Section 28(3) by the Amendment Act really follows what is stated in paragraphs 42.3 to 45 in Associate Builders (supra), namely, that the construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator construes the contract in a manner that no fairminded or reasonable person would; in short, that the arbitrator’s view is not even a possible view to take. Also, if the arbitrator wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits an error of jurisdiction. This ground of challenge will now fall within the new ground added under Section 34(2A). 41. What is important to note is that a decision which is perverse, as understood in paragraphs 31 and 32 of Associate Builders (supra), while no longer being a ground for challenge under “public policy of India”, would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. Thus, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Additionally, a finding based on documents taken behind the back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also have to be characterised as perverse”. 19. In Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Limited Vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited, 2022 (1) SCC 131 , it has been held as under:- “26. A cumulative reading of the UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules, the legislative intent with which the 1996 Act is made, Section 5 and Section 34 of the 1996 Act would make it clear that judicial interference with the arbitral awards is limited to the grounds in Section 34. While deciding applications filed under Section 34 of the Act, Courts are mandated to strictly act in accordance with and within the confines of Section 34, refraining from appreciation or re-appreciation of matters of fact as well as law. While deciding applications filed under Section 34 of the Act, Courts are mandated to strictly act in accordance with and within the confines of Section 34, refraining from appreciation or re-appreciation of matters of fact as well as law. (See Uttarakhand Purv SainikKalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field Ltd. [Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field Ltd., (2020) 2 SCC 455 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 570], Bhaven Construction v. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd. [Bhaven Construction v. Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 75 ] and Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran [Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran, (2012) 5 SCC 306 ].)” 20. In UHL Power Company Ltd. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2022 (4) SCC 116 , a Three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court expounded the scope of interference under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and has held as under:- “15. This Court also accepts as correct, the view expressed by the appellate court that the learned Single Judge committed a gross error in reappreciating the findings returned by the Arbitral Tribunal and taking an entirely different view in respect of the interpretation of the relevant clauses of the implementation agreement governing the parties inasmuch as it was not open to the said court to do so in proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, by virtually acting as a court of appeal. 16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an appellate court is examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, is all the more circumscribed. In MMTC Ltd. V. Vedanta Ltd., the reasons for vesting such a limited jurisdiction on the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act have been explained in the following words: (SCC pp.166-67, para 11). 11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2) (b)(ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. 11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2) (b)(ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of fundamental policy of Indian Law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of the “fundamental policy of Indian law” would cover compliance with statues and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice, and Wednesbury reasonableness. Furthermore, “patent illegality” itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of the terms of the contract.” 21. Recently in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited Vs. Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Limited, (2024) 6 SCC 357 , the scope of interference with arbitral award has been discussed as under:- “35. In Associate Builders v. DDA, a two-Judge Bench of this Court held that although the interpretation of a contract is exclusively within the domain of the arbitrator, construction of a contract in a manner that no fair-minded or reasonable person would take, is impermissible. A patent illegality arises where the arbitrator adopts a view which is not a possible view. A view can be regarded as not even a possible view where no reasonable body of persons could possibly have taken it. This Court held with reference to Sections 28(1)(a) and 28(3), that the arbitrator must take into account the terms of the contract and the usages of trade applicable to the transaction. The decision or award should not be perverse or irrational. An award is rendered perverse or irrational where the findings are: (i) based on no evidence; (ii) based on irrelevant material; or (iii) ignores vital evidence 39. The decision or award should not be perverse or irrational. An award is rendered perverse or irrational where the findings are: (i) based on no evidence; (ii) based on irrelevant material; or (iii) ignores vital evidence 39. In essence, the ground of patent illegality is available for setting aside a domestic award, if the decision of the arbitrator is found to be perverse, or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at it; or the construction of the contract is such that no fair or reasonable person would take; or, that the view of the arbitrator is not even a possible view. 12 A "finding" based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside under the head of "patent illegality". An award without reasons would suffer from patent illegality. The arbitrator commits a patent illegality by deciding a matter not within his jurisdiction or violating a fundamental principle of natural justice.” 22. Before dealing with the objections raised by the petitioners, it will be apt to observe that the objection of respondent herein with respect to the instant petition being time barred cannot be sustained for the reason that the said objection stands decided by this Court vide order dated 29.11.2019, passed in OMP No.448 of 2019, whereby, the petitioners herein had sought condonation of delay in re-filing of the petition. This Court had allowed OMP No.448 of 2019. The delay in refilling the petition was condoned and the petition was held to be within time. However, by the same order, this Court had also decided OMP No.343 of 2019 filed by the respondent herein, whereby the petition was alleged to be not maintainable for non-compliance of the provisions of MSME Act as the petitioners had failed to deposit 75% of the award amount as pre condition. This Court had allowed OMP No.343 of 2019 also. 23. The petitioners herein had assailed the order dated 29.11.2019, passed in OMP No.343 of 2019 by filing intra-court appeal, which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court. The petitioners thereafter assailed the order passed by Division Bench of this court before Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(C) No.5491 of 2020. 23. The petitioners herein had assailed the order dated 29.11.2019, passed in OMP No.343 of 2019 by filing intra-court appeal, which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court. The petitioners thereafter assailed the order passed by Division Bench of this court before Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(C) No.5491 of 2020. Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the SLP(C) No.5491 of 2020 vide order dated 22.11.2021 and remitted the instant petition to this Court for decision, in accordance with law. 24. Order dated 29.11.2019, passed by this Court on OMP No.448 of 2019 remained unchallenged. The respondent did not assail the said order further and thus, the order passed by this Court, having attained finality, cannot be re-agitated by the respondent now. 25. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners would contend that the claim of the respondent was time barred. The last publication was made on 15.10.2014 and the respondent could have raised the claim within three years i.e. on or before 14.10.2017. He pointed out that the original reference was made by the petitioners to MSME Council under Section 18 of MSME Act on 30.12.2017. He submitted in alternative that even if the respondent was to claim the benefit of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, the last payment was made on 05.01.2015 and thus, the respondent could have submitted the claim immediately on appointment of Arbitrator on 30.06.2018 in terms of order passed by MSME Council, whereas the respondent, after seeking adjournment on 16.07.2018, had filed the claim on 27.07.2018. 26. Learned Arbitrator while dealing with the issue of limitation has held the claim of respondent to be within time. The fact that last payment was made on 5.1.2015 and the reference was instituted on 4.1.2018 has been taken in consideration. The date of issuance of prior legal notice i.e. 22.9.2017 was also considered as part of cause of action being within limitation and lastly by taking into consideration provision of section 18(1) of the MSME Act and overriding effect of said Act on all other laws, the issue of limitation has been decided against the petitioners herein. 27. The stand taken by the petitioners before the MSME Council or the Arbitrator does not reveal that they had disowned the payment of Rs.5,00,000/- made to the respondent on 05.01.2015. 27. The stand taken by the petitioners before the MSME Council or the Arbitrator does not reveal that they had disowned the payment of Rs.5,00,000/- made to the respondent on 05.01.2015. Though, the MSME Act does not provide for any limitation for making reference under Section 18 of the said Act by a seller for the claim under Section 17 of the said Act nonetheless the submission of reference by the respondent to the MSME Council on 30.12.2017 or 4.1.2018 was within 3 years from the date of last payment i.e. 05.01.2015. 28. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners raised an argument that the respondent would not get the benefit of Section 19 of the Limitation Act for the reasons firstly that the payment of Rs.5,00,000/- made on 05.01.2015 was not made by the petitioners and secondly, the said payment was not even proved to have been paid by any agent of the petitioners. The argument has been noticed to be rejected. Section 19 of the Limitation Act reads as under: “19. Effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy.—Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly authorised in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made: Provided that, save in the case of payment of interest made before the 1st day of January, 1928, an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section: (a) where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee, the receipt of the rent or produce of such land shall be deemed to be a payment. (b) “debt” does not include money payable under a decree or order of a court.” 29. As noticed above, as per the stand of the petitioners before MSME Council as also the Arbitrator, they had not disowned the payment of Rs.5,00,000/- made to the respondent on 05.01.2015. It was also not the case of the petitioners that the said payment was on account of some other liability than the one claimed by the respondent. The payment was said to be made by HCC. It was also not the case of the petitioners that the said payment was on account of some other liability than the one claimed by the respondent. The payment was said to be made by HCC. Even during the course of hearing, a pointed query was put to learned counsel for the petitioners as to whether the petitioners disowned the payment of Rs.5,00,000/- made to the respondent on 05.01.2015, the clear answer was in negative. In such circumstances to say that the payment of Rs.5,00,000/- made on 05.01.2015 was not proved to be made by duly authorized agent of the petitioners does not hold good. 30. Thus, the reference was made by the petitioners to MSME Council within 3 years from 05.01.2025. 31. As regards the delay in submission of claim before the Arbitrator again the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is liable to be rejected for the reason that the arbitration had come into play as statutory arbitration under Section 18 of the MSME Act. It was a continuation of the reference made to the MSME Council under Section 18 of the Act. As per Section 18 of the Act, the reference made by a seller under Section 18 of the Act, in the first instance is taken up for conciliation by the Council or by any other institution to which the Council delegates the function and in case of failure of conciliation, the mechanism of arbitration comes into play. The Council either itself can arbitrate or can refer the matter to the Arbitrator. 32. It cannot be denied that the respondent had already made a claim before the Council. By way of submission of statement of claim before the Arbitrator, the respondent had only made a reiteration. The statement of claim in all probability was sought and filed keeping in view the procedural aspect envisaged under the Act. As per Section 18 of the Act, the arbitration comes into picture only on failure of conciliation proceedings. Thus, the statement of claim filed by the petitioners cannot be said to be a fresh claim, rather it is the continuation of the reference submitted by the respondent before the MSME Council on 30.12.2017 or 4.1.2018 as the case may be. 33. As regards the objection with respect to absence of privity of contract between the petitioners and respondent, the same also deserves rejection. 33. As regards the objection with respect to absence of privity of contract between the petitioners and respondent, the same also deserves rejection. Admittedly, the respondent had made reference to MSME Council under Section 18 of the Act by impleading Sh. Rahul Gandhi as President of INC and the petitioners as President and Treasurer, respectively of HCC. The Council had deleted the name of Sh. Rahul Gandhi as President of INC from the array of parties. It was the specific case of the respondent that the publication had been made on the asking of petitioner No.2 for HCC. He further submitted that the Secretary of Publicity and Publication Committee of HCC had approved the rate of Rs.250 per sq cm for the publication made by the respondent. 34. The Arbitrator has held that the petitioners were not impleaded as parties in their personal capacity, rather they were the representatives of HCC being its President and Treasurer. It can be noticed that HCC had filed an application for its impleadment as party in the instant proceedings, but the same was subsequently withdrawn. It is also the case of the petitioners that the publication was made for HCC as the elections to Haryana Legislative Assembly were due. 35. Further, it is not shown by the petitioners that HCC is a legal entity besides being a political organization. There is nothing on record to suggest that HCC could sue or be sued in its own name. It being so, it was meaningless as to whether HCC was sued through its office bearers or the reference was made against office bearers by name as the representatives of HCC. 36. The next contention of the petitioners that the rate of Rs.250 per sq cm was never agreed by HCC has rightly been dealt by learned Arbitrator by holding that in case the rate was not so agreed, on what account the payment of Rs. 22,67,728/- was made by HCC to the respondent. 37. Undeniably, the payment for entire publication at the rate of Rs.33.642 per sq cm would have fetched the amount of Rs. 5,10,263.69/- only. In fact, the invoice raised by the respondent at the rate of Rs.33.642 per sq cm was in the sum of Rs. 5,10,263.69/-. The petitioners have not been able to explain the reasons for making more than four times excess payment to the respondent. 5,10,263.69/- only. In fact, the invoice raised by the respondent at the rate of Rs.33.642 per sq cm was in the sum of Rs. 5,10,263.69/-. The petitioners have not been able to explain the reasons for making more than four times excess payment to the respondent. The finding recorded by learned Arbitrator cannot be said to be perverse or illegally. 38. Emphasis was laid by the petitioners on the conduct of the respondent whereby he had issued two invoices on the same day, the first showing the rate of Rs. 33.642/- per sq cm and the second showing the rate at Rs.250 per sq cm. The explanation rendered by the respondent in this behalf cannot be brushed aside according to which he had done so at the instructions of Secretary, Publicity Committee of HCC, who had asked the petitioners to raise the invoice on the basis of both the rates. It is evident from the work or release orders issued by HCC that the DAVP rates were mentioned. The case of the respondent is that after receipt of release order he had refused to publish the advertisements at the DAVP approved rates and rather had offered to make publications at the rate of Rs.250 per sq cm. The respondent has also led evidence to this effect. 39. According to petitioners, the non-examination of Secretary, Publicity Committee of HCC as a witness by the respondent was a strong circumstance against him, however, learned Arbitrator has held otherwise. It has been observed that the office bearers of HCC could not be expected to depose in favour of respondent and rather he should have been examined as a witness by the petitioners and for such non-examination adverse inference has rightly been drawn against them. 40. The petitioners have not been able to render any explanation whatsoever for having paid Rs. 22,67,728/- to the respondent as against the amount of Rs. 5,10,263.69/- only stated to be due, therefore, the only inference can be that the agreed rate for publication was Rs. 250/- per sq cm 41. The view taken by learned Arbitrator is a possible view in the backdrop of material established on record. Nothing has been pointed out by the petitioners so as to render such view absurd, illegal or perverse. 250/- per sq cm 41. The view taken by learned Arbitrator is a possible view in the backdrop of material established on record. Nothing has been pointed out by the petitioners so as to render such view absurd, illegal or perverse. I have not found any material on the basis of which interference is required in the impugned Award, on any of the parameters prescribed under Section 34 of the A&C Act, 1996. 42 In result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed without any orders as to costs. The impugned Award is affirmed. 43. The petition is accordingly disposed of so also all pending application(s), if any. 44. Records be sent back.