- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF WRIT APPEAL NO. 1640 OF 2023(SC-ST) BETWEEN: 1. SRI. THIRUMALESH .B .O, S/O LATE OBAIAH, AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS, MADAKARI NAGARA, CHALLAKERE TOWN-577 522, CHALLAKERE TALUK, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT. 2. SRI POOJARI THIMMANNA, S/O LATE KIVUDU CHALLAKERAPPA, AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS, 3. SRI JAMBU, S/O LATE SHIVANNA, AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, 4. SMT BASAMMA, W/O RAMACHANDRAPPA, AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS, 5. SRI GOVINDAPPA, S/O LATE KRISHNAPPA AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS, APPELLANTS ARE RESIDING AT J J NAGARA, CHALLAKERE TOWN-577 522, CHALLAKERE TALUK, Digitally signed by PRAJWAL A Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 CHITRADURGA DISTRICT. …APPELLANTS (BY SRI. CHANDRANATH ARIGA .K, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT, CHITRADURGA- 577 501. 2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT, CHITRADURGA-577 501. 3. THE TAHSILDAR, CHALLAKERE TALUK, CHALLAKERE-577 522, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT. 4. THE SUB-REGISTRAR, CHALLAKERE TALUK, CHALLAKERE-577 522, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT. 5. SRI RAJAIAH, DIED HIS LRS., SMT YELLAMMA D/O RAJANNA JJR NAGARA, 3RD CROSS, PAVAGADA ROAD, CHALLAKERE, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT. 6. SMT MARAKKA, D/O RAJANNA, JJR NAGARA, 3RD CROSS, PAVAGADA ROAD, CHALLAKERE, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT. 7. SMT JAYAMMA, - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 D/O RAJANNA, JJR NAGARA, 3RD CROSS, PAVAGADA ROAD, CHALLAKERE, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT. 8. SMT PUSHPA LATHA, D/O RAJANNA, JJR NAGARA, 3RD CROSS, PAVAGADA ROAD, CHALLAKERE, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT. 9. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY OF INDIA, OFFICE AT VEDAVATHI NAGARA, CHALLAKERE ROAD, HIRIYUR, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT. 10. SRI R MOHAMMED FAYAZ, S/O D M RIYAZ SAB, SHANTHINAGAR, CHALLAKERE TOWN, CHITRADURGA DISTRICT. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. SARITHA KULKARNI, AGA FOR R1 TO R4) THIS WRIT APPEAL FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE DATED 25.07.2023 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WP.NO.24248/2021(SC-ST) AND ETC. THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO AND HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF) The relatives of the grantee have filed this appeal before this court calling in question the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.24248/2021 dated 25.07.2023, whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants herein, on the ground of delay and laches in initiating the proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act. 2. The facts leading to the filing of this appeal are stated in Paragraph Nos.4 and 5 of the impugned order, which are extracted as under: “4. In the present case on hand, the petition land was granted to one Poojari Challakeriga, who is the grand father of the petitioners. One of the legal heir of the original grantee sold the land in question in favour of Rajanna @ Rajaiah, who is the father of respondent Nos.5 to 8, under registered sale deed dated 28.01.1983. The petitioners, who claimed to be legal heirs of the original grantee, initiated action by filing an application under Sections 4 and 5 of the "PTCL Act". Both Authorities have rightly rejected restoration application filed by the petitioners. - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 5. In the present case on hand, there is a delay of 30 years in initiating action. The authorities below have rightly examined the delay and laches in moving the application. The judgments cited supra clearly indicates that on the ground of gross delay and laches, the application made by the grantee or by the legal heirs under Section 5(2) of the PTCL Act requires to be rejected. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the above cited judgment has held that where statute does not provide for limitation, the authorities and State must act consciously and if the process of invoking the provisions of statute is delayed and is initiated after long lapse of time, the delay by itself would act as an impediment. Thus, without exception and coming across various rules of law, the Apex Court has categorically stated the law in respect of exercise of power/jurisdiction under statute where no limitation is stipulated. The law on the point of delay and laches to invoke the provisions of PTCL Act is well settled by catena of judgments.” 3. The learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order has referred to the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI VS STATE OF KARNATAKA and ANOTHER reported in (2020) 14 SCC 232], VIVEK M.HINDUJA .VS. M. ASWATHA reported in (2019) 1 KANT LJ 819 SC, CHHEDI LAL YADAV AND OTHERES VS. HARI KISHORE YADAV reported in - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 (2018) 12 SCC 527 and NINGAPPA .VS. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS reported in (2020) 14 SCC 236. 4. In the said cases, the Hon’ble Apex Court extensively considered the interpretation of Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978. The said consideration of the Hon’ble Apex Court discussed by the learned Single Judge is in paragraph No.3, the same is extracted as under: “3. The Apex Court in the case of Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi, while interpreting Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, (for short "PTCL Act") had an occasion to examine the point of limitation wherein interested person can file appropriate application seeking annulment of sale as void under Section 4 of the PTCL Act. The Apex Court by reiterating the principles laid down in Chhedi Lal Yadav .vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (2018) 12 SCC 527 and also in the case of Ningappa .vs. Deputy Commissioner and others (2020) 14 SCC 236 has held that where Statute did not prescribe the period of limitation, the provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. The Apex Court was of the view that the authorities have to give due regard to the period of time within which action has to be - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 taken by the interested person. The Apex Court was of the view that it is well within the discretion of the competent authorities not to annul the alienations where there is inordinate delay in initiating action by the interested persons under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act. The co- ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.No.50446/2012 disposed of on 24.1.2020 declined to entertain the application filed by the original grantee where there was a delay of ten years. This Court was of the view that the application itself was not maintainable since the same was not filed within a reasonable time. While recording the finding, this Court relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Ningappa vs. Deputy Commissioner and others, where the Apex Court had declined to entertain the application which was submitted after nine years seeking restoration of land under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act. The judgment rendered by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.No.50446/2012 is affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.16/2021.” 5. Considering the judgment of the Hon‘ble Apex Court and as well as the facts of the case wherein there was a delay of above 30 years in initiating the proceedings after the sale deed dated 28.01.1983, the learned Single Judge dismissed the petition by confirming the order passed by respondent Nos.1 and 2. - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 6. The main contention of the appellants herein is with regard to the amendment brought to Section 5 of the PTCL Act. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.A.No.210/2023 dated 25.11.2024, while considering the said amendment has held in Paragraph No.4.4 onwards, as under:- “4.4 While the aforesaid law that relief of setting aside of transfer could not be granted after unreasonably long period and the applications made under Section 5 for restitution or resumption of the land by a person could not be acted upon in favour of such person on the ground of delay, the legislature intervened to proceed to amend Section 5 by virtue Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) (Amendment) Act, 2023, notified in the Gazette Notification dated 27nd July 2023. Thereby sub- clauses (c) and (d) were inserted, namely, “(c) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. (d) The provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.” - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 4.5 It was stated at the bar that the validity of the aforesaid amendment is challenged in Writ Petition No.27496 of 2023 which is pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court. This judgment does not travel anything on merit of the said validity proceedings. 4.6 However, the aspects which emerged in light of the law laid down in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), vis-à-vis the amendment in Section 5 and the situation obtained, came to be dealt with by the coordinate bench of this Court at Dharwad in Smt. Gouramma alias Gangamma vs. Deputy Commissioner, Haveri, which was Writ Appeal No.100101 of 2024 decided on 29th July 2024. 4.6.1 After noticing the amendment in Section 5, the division bench observed thus, in para 3(d), "The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity." 4.6.2 It was observed that in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra), did not speak of limitation period, but focused on the long lapse of time in making the application for restitution of the land, by quoting paragraph 8 above from the said decision, the division bench then held as per para 3(f), "It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas "laches" is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate." - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 4.7 From the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. N. Murugesan [(2022) 2 SCC 25], the division bench highlighted the nice distinction between ‘delay and latches’, as against ‘limitation’. It was observed that the ‘limitation’ is a prescription of time for taking an action as contemplated by the legislature, whereas the concept of ‘delay and latches’ has a different connotation to operate. 4.8 The coordinate bench of this Court in Smt. Gouramma (supra), proceeded on the above reasoning to clarify that the issues were examined without touching the aspects of validity of amendment which is pending adjudication. It was held in Smt. Gouramma (supra) that on the ground of latches, the court would be justified in denying the relief of setting aside the transfer and restoring the land to the applicant when he has approached the court after unreasonable delay and his approaching the court is marred by latches. 5. The Supreme Court in N. Murugesan (supra), explained the word ‘laches’ thus, "The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy." (para 21) 5.1 The Supreme Court proceeded to observe that the remedy for which the party knocks the doors of the Court may not be provided to him on equitable grounds when such party is guilty of indolence and his action suffers from latches, "Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy." (Para 22) 5.2 Though the principles governing overlap, the delay and latches has the facet in equity. Delay is the genus to which the latches and acquiescence are species. The jurisprudential concepts of delay, - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 latches and acquiescence have their own colour and connotation and conceptually often different from crossing the period of limitation prescribed in the statutory provision. Limitation binds the litigant in terms of initiating a legal action or filing any proceedings. Laches concedes an element of culpability in allowing time to pass by in commencing the action in law. 6. In light of the above discussion and the position of law that would emerge, in the facts of the case, the restoration of the land cannot be permitted after 12 years. The question of latches would come into play. 12 years having been passed, it would be highly unreasonable, unjust and inequitable, as well as against law to grant any relief to the original grantee-the petitioner-appellant, permitting restoration of the land and to treat the transfer of the land taken place long back to be null and void. 6.1 In view of the reasons and discussion as above, the judgment and award of the learned Single Judge does not book any error. 7. The appeal is dismissed. In view of dismissal of the appeal, the interlocutory applications, as may be pending, would not survive and they stand accordingly disposed of.” 7. In view of the above, we find no merit in the appeal. That apart, there is a delay of 117 days in filing the appeal before this Court. Though several opportunities were granted - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC:8484-DB WA No. 1640 of 2023 to the appellants by this Court to file the necessary application, seeking condonation of delay in preferring the present appeal, no such application has been filed till date. Under such circumstances, we dismiss the appeal on merits and also on delay. No order as to costs. Sd/- (V KAMESWAR RAO) JUDGE Sd/- (T.M.NADAF) JUDGE SMC, List No.: 1 Sl No.: 4