JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 28.03.2025, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge- I, Mandi, Himachal Pradesh (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 02.06.2023 and order of sentence dated 13.06.2023, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were partly upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as the NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant is dealing in the financing of commercial vehicles on a hire-purchase/ lease/ loan cum hypothecation basis. The accused sought financing for his vehicle bearing registration No. HP 33A-8916. The complainant advanced a loan of Rs. 2,40,000/-, through an agreement dated 31.12.2010. The accused accepted the terms and conditions, including overdue charges, as per the hire purchase/ loan-cum-hypothecation agreement. The accused failed to repay the money. He issued a cheque of Rs. 4,70,000/- on 20.12.2013, drawn on Punjab National Bank, Pandoh to discharge his liability. The complainant presented the cheque for its realisation, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. The complainant sent a legal notice to the accused asking him to repay the money within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. The notice was duly served upon the accused, but he failed to repay the amount. Hence, the complaint was filed against the accused for taking action as per the law. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act), to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined Maan Singh (CW-1) to prove its case. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, stated that a false case was made against him. He owed nothing to the complainant. He stated that he wanted to lead defence evidence, but subsequently declined to lead any defence evidence. 6. 4. The complainant examined Maan Singh (CW-1) to prove its case. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, stated that a false case was made against him. He owed nothing to the complainant. He stated that he wanted to lead defence evidence, but subsequently declined to lead any defence evidence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the issuance of the cheque was duly proved, and there is a presumption that the cheque was issued for consideration in discharge of the liability. The accused failed to rebut the presumption. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. Even if the cheque was issued as security, the complainant had the authority to present it. The notice was served upon the accused but he failed to repay the amount; hence the accused was convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of Rs. 8,00,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month, for the commission of the aforesaid offence. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Mandi (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the issuance of the cheque was admitted. The accused did not dispute in the cross-examination of the complainant’s witness that he had sought the finance for his vehicle. The cheque carried with it a presumption that it was issued for consideration in discharge of the liability. The accused failed to rebut the presumption. The cheque, even if issued as a security, would not absolve the accused of his liability. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The notice was served upon the accused, but he failed to repay the amount. All the ingredients of commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied. Hence, the accused was rightly convicted. Learned Trial Court imposed a fine of Rs. 8,00,000/-, which was excessive, hence, the same was ordered to be reduced to Rs. 7,00,000/-. Subject to this modification, the rest of the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court were upheld. 8. Hence, the accused was rightly convicted. Learned Trial Court imposed a fine of Rs. 8,00,000/-, which was excessive, hence, the same was ordered to be reduced to Rs. 7,00,000/-. Subject to this modification, the rest of the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court were upheld. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed on record. The cross- examination of the complainant’s witness was not properly appreciated. The complainant failed to prove the existence of any liability. The accused had issued the cheque as security. There was no legally enforceable debt or liability. The complainant misused the security cheque. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Chandresh Kumar, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner, Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No. 1/ State and Mr Ashwani Kaundal, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2. 10. Mr Chandresh Kumar, learned vice counsel representing the petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. The plea taken by the accused that the cheque was issued as a security cheque was highly probable. The complainant failed to prove the existence of a debt/ liability on the date of presentation of the cheque. The complainant charged interest at the rate of 30% contrary to the terms and conditions of the agreement, and this aspect was ignored by the learned Courts below. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No. 1/ State, supported the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below and submitted that no interference is required with it. 12. Mr Ashwani Kaundal, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2/ complainant, submitted that the issuance of the cheque was not disputed by the accused, and a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued in discharge of the liability. The burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption. The accused did not lead any evidence to rebut the presumption. Mr Ashwani Kaundal, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2/ complainant, submitted that the issuance of the cheque was not disputed by the accused, and a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued in discharge of the liability. The burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption. The accused did not lead any evidence to rebut the presumption. Therefore, he was rightly convicted and sentenced by the learned Trial Court. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by learned Courts below; hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: 14. 15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: 14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 16. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by re-appreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 17. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 ], it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. Maan Singh (CW1) stated in his cross-examination that the accused had surrendered the vehicle himself in 2016. However, the true value was not got assessed. The vehicle was sold for Rs. 60,000/-. The loan was advanced in 2010 when the value of the vehicle was around Rs. 2,50,000/-. He filed the statement of account (Ex. CW1/G), which mentions that the total due interest was Rs. 3,66,201/-, the total due expenditure were Rs. 53,718.10/-, and the total due delayed payment interest was Rs. 7,73,231.08/-. The vehicle was sold for Rs. 60,000/-. The loan was advanced in 2010 when the value of the vehicle was around Rs. 2,50,000/-. He filed the statement of account (Ex. CW1/G), which mentions that the total due interest was Rs. 3,66,201/-, the total due expenditure were Rs. 53,718.10/-, and the total due delayed payment interest was Rs. 7,73,231.08/-. The Delayed Payment Interest calculation sheet shows that the delayed payment interest @ 36% was charged by the complainant. This statement of account shows the overdue amount as Rs. 11,93,150/- on a principal amount of Rs. 2,40,000/-. 20. It was asserted in the complaint that the interest was charged as per the agreement between the parties. However, no such agreement was brought on record, and there is no material showing that the accused was liable to pay delayed payment interest at the rate of 36%. 21. The statement of account also shows that an amount of Rs. 2882/- was charged towards insurance on 23.03.2011, Rs. 671/- was charged as insurance on 31.08.2011, and Rs. 16,190/-were charged towards the insurance on 23.03.2013; however, no insurance amount was charged thereafter. This statement of account does not corroborate the statement of Maan Singh (CW1) that the vehicle was sold in the year 2016, because the amount would have been charged towards the insurance till 2016 in such a case. 22. Maan Singh (CW1) claimed that vehicle was sold for Rs. 60,000/-, however, there is no entry of Rs. 60,000/- in the receipt column of the statement of account. An entry of Rs. 44,601/- was made on 28.09.2016 in the receipt column, but it is not mentioned that this was towards the sale of the vehicle. 23. The complainant asserted that the cheque was issued on 20.12.2013 for Rs. 4,70,000/-. The statement of account shows that an amount of Rs. 5,66,282.08/- was payable as arrears on 04.12.2013, which included various amounts charged towards delayed payment interest, other charges and legal expenses. There is no evidence that the accused had agreed to pay the delayed payment interest, other charges and legal expenses. Thus, the amount of Rs. 4,70,000/- is not proved to be due and recoverable on the date of the issuance of the cheque. 24. There is no evidence that the accused had agreed to pay the delayed payment interest, other charges and legal expenses. Thus, the amount of Rs. 4,70,000/- is not proved to be due and recoverable on the date of the issuance of the cheque. 24. Both the learned Courts below proceeded on the basis that issuance of a cheque and taking of a loan were not disputed; therefore, a presumption arose that the cheque was issued for consideration in discharge of liability/ debt. But they failed to appreciate the significance of the statement of account placed on record. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1275 that the presumption applies in the absence of evidence and disappears after the evidence is produced. It was observed: “38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as follows: “The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption ‘disappears as a rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule’.” 25. This position was reiterated in N. Vijay Kumar v. Vishwanath Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, wherein it was observed: “11. Considering the total of the above, we find that the probable defence on the part of the accused has been established. Once such a defence is established, the burden again shifts upon the complainant to now establish his case beyond a reasonable doubt, for after all, the effect of Section 138 of the N I Act is a criminal conviction. Reference may be made to Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh (2023) 16 SCC 125 and, more particularly, Para 44 thereof, which reads as under: “44. Reference may be made to Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh (2023) 16 SCC 125 and, more particularly, Para 44 thereof, which reads as under: “44. Therefore, in fine, it can be said that once the accused adduces evidence to the satisfaction of the Court that on a preponderance of probabilities there exists no debt/liability in the manner pleaded in the complaint or the demand notice or the affidavit- evidence, the burden shifts to the complainant and the presumption “disappears” and does not haunt the accused any longer. The onus having now shifted to the complainant, he will be obliged to prove the existence of a debt/liability as a matter of fact, and his failure to prove would result in dismissal of his complaint. Thereafter, the presumption under Section 139 does not again come to the complainant's rescue. Once both parties have adduced evidence, the Court has to consider the same and the burden of proof loses all its importance. [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 571: AIR 2019 SC 1983 ]; see also, Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184: AIR 2010 SC 1898 ]” 26. In the present case, the cross-examination of Maan Singh (CW1) and the statement of account placed on record made it clear that an amount of Rs. 4,70,000/- could not have been due on the date of issuance of the cheque. Thus, it was impermissible to act upon the presumption to record the conviction. Hence, the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below cannot be sustained. 27. In view of the above, the present revision is allowed. The judgment dated 28.03.2024, passed by learned Appellate Court, and the judgment and order dated 02.06.2023/13.06.2023 passed by the learned Trial Court, are set aside. The accused is acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act. The fine amount, if deposited be refunded after the expiry of the period of limitation in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. The accused is acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act. The fine amount, if deposited be refunded after the expiry of the period of limitation in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the petitioner/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court 29. A copy of the judgment and the records of the learned Courts below be sent back forthwith.