2025:JHHC:14218 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (S) No. 4655 of 2012 …. Krishna Prasad S/o Late Ram Naresh Prasad residing at Quarter No.193, Gandhi Nagar, P.O-Sunday Bazar, P.S.-Gandhi Nagar, Bokaro ……Petitioner Versus 1. Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Engineering Building, HEC, Dhurwa, P.O & P.S.-Dhurwa, Ranchi-4 through its Chairman, 2. The Secretary, Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Engineering Building, H.E.C, Dhurwa, P.O.& P.S.-Dhurwa, Ranchi-834004, 3. Director of Personnel, Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Engineering Building, H.E.C, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, Ranchi-834004, 4. Joint Secretary-IV, Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Engineering Building, H.E.C, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, Ranchi 834004, 5. Sri Jag Narayan Prasad the then Electrical Executive Engineer, Electric Supply Division, Electrical Supply Division, Sahebganj, P.O., P.S. and District-Sahebganj ……Respondents ----- CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD ----- For the Petitioner : Mr. Ashok Kumar Jha, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Mrinal Kanti Roy, Advocate …… CAV on 25.09.2024 Pronounced on 28.04.2025 This writ petition has been filed on behalf of the petitioner for grant of the following reliefs:- i. For issuance of an appropriate order in the nature of certiorari 2025:JHHC:14218 2 or any other appropriate order for quashing the office order no.72 dated 16.01.2010 (Annexure-14) read with office order no.1438 dated 16.09.2011 (Annexure-18). ii. For issuance of writ(s), order(s) and/or direction(s) commanding upon to respondents to refund the amount of Rs.4,20,938 (Rs. Four Lakh Twenty thousand nine hundred thirty eight) deducted from the amount of Gratuity payable to petitioner arbitrarily and pay the amount of salary and annual increments earned by the petitioner during the period from 11.06.2004 to date of his relieving in accordance with the service rules and allow the other consequential benefits accordingly. For grant of any other relief(s). 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order dated 16.01.2010 (i.e. Annexure-14) and the Appellate order No.1438 dated 16.09.2011 (i.e. Annexure-18) are illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in the eye of law. It is submitted that the respondents have dismissed the petitioner from the service illegally and penalty for recovery of Rs.4,20,938 (Rs. Four Lakh Twenty Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty Eight) was imposed and has wrongly ordered that nothing will be paid to the petitioner except the subsistence allowance during the period of suspension and no salary increment during the period of suspension. 4. It is submitted that the respondents have not followed the principles of natural justice and even despite the repetitive request for the documents, demanded by the petitioner, they were not 2025:JHHC:14218 3 furnished to him. It is submitted that the respondents, in support of the charges levelled against the petitioner, had not examined any witnesses in support of its case during the pendency of departmental proceeding nor any documents were marked as the Exhibits which is violation of judgment reported in the Case of Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank reported in (2009)2 SCC 570. It is submitted that the Enquiry Officer has mechanically submitted the Enquiry Report without giving proper opportunity to the petitioner to produce any defence in support of his case and the defence raised by the petitioner during the pendency of the departmental proceedings was not considered by the Respondents. It is submitted that the service condition of the petitioner was governed by the Certified Standing Order of the Board i.e. Jharkhand State Electricity Board. However, the enquiry was conducted under Clause 29 of the said Certified Standing Order instead of Clause 30 of the certified standing order of the Board (i.e. Jharkhand State Electricity Board). It is submitted that even the Appellate Authority vide order dated 16.09.2011 (i.e. Annexure-18) had dismissed the Appeal of the petitioner mechanically without considering the case of the petitioner. 5. It is submitted that the petitioner was discharged from the services only fifteen (15) days prior his superannuation and thus the act of respondents cannot be sustained in law. It is submitted that earlier when the appeal was pending before the Appellate Authority then the petitioner had filed WP(S) No.5527 of 2010 before this Court, which was allowed on vide order dated 04.01.2011 by the High Court (Annexure-16) by directing the Appellate Authority to dispose the appeal of the petitioner within 2025:JHHC:14218 4 the period of six (06) weeks. However, when the order of this High Court had not been complied with then the petitioner had to file Contempt Case No.497 of 2011 then during the pendency of said Contempt Petition, the Appellate authority had passed order dated 16.09.2011 (Annexure-18) by which they have dismissed the appeal by affirming the order passed by the Disciplinary Proceeding. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention, has relied upon the judgment in the case Managing Director, ECIL Hyderabad and Ors. Vs. B. Karunakar and Ors. reported in (1993)4 SCC 727 and submitted that due to non-supply of various documents has demanded by the petitioner he could not take his defence in such the impugned order dated 16.01.2010 (i.e. Annexure-14) and 16.09.2011 (i.e. the Annexure-18) may be set aside and hence the writ petition may be allowed. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondents-JSEB submitted that the impugned orders dated 16.01.2010 (i.e. Annexure-14) and 16.09.2011 (i.e. Annexure-18) are proper and as such no interference is required from this Court. It is submitted that the petitioner, while posted at Electric Supply Sub Division, Furso as Bill Clerk was found prima facie guilty of embezzlement of Board’s revenue and accordingly the petitioner was put under suspension. A departmental proceeding was initiated against him vide Office order No.1449 dated 08.12.2005 on the charges leveled against the petitioner (vide Annex-1 & 1/1 to the writ petition). The petitioner was directed to submit his written statement before the Enquiry Officer within 15 days and also to inform the Enquiry Officer if he submits his reply 2025:JHHC:14218 5 in his defence. It is submitted that the petitioner had not submitted his statement before the Enquiry Officer, rather he submitted letter dated 04.01.2006 asking for several documents so that he can submit his reply. In view of the request made by the petitioner, the Electrical Executive Engineer, Electric Supply Division, Tenughat was requested to make available the documents as demanded by the petitioner, if it is relevant to the proceedings. Thereafter, the Electrical Executive Engineer, Electric Supply Division, Tenughat vide his letter no.1105 dated 23.12.2006 informed the Board that they are ready to furnish the said document as requires by the present petitioner but the petitioner did not want to receive the same. It is further submitted that the Accounts Officer, Electric Supply Area, Hazaribagh vide letter no.3101 dated 29.11.2006 had also informed that the petitioner did not co-operate in Enquiry proceeding. It is submitted that the Enquiry Officer also informed the Board in respect of non-co-operation of the petitioner in enquiry proceeding vide letter no.462 dated 02.06.2008. It is submitted that since the petitioner did not co-operate the Enquiry Officer, therefore he was directed to co-operate in enquiry vide Board’s letter no.2546 dated 17.10.2007. Therefore, the petitioner submitted his written statement before the Enquiry Officer on 30.06.2008 and had prayed to change the Enquiry Officer. The request of the petitioner was considered at length and as per the Rule 17 of the CCA Rules, it is was found that the request made by the petitioner is not permissible. Accordingly, an 2025:JHHC:14218 6 information to this extent was given to him vide Board’s letter no.1855 dated 13.08.2008 (vide Annex.-7 of the writ petition). It is submitted that the Enquiry Officer, thereafter, fixed several dates for appearance of the petitioner in the enquiry proceedings but even then the petitioner did not appear before the enquiry proceeding. Therefore, the Enquiry Officer, concluded the proceedings on the basis of evidence given, which was not denied by the petitioner himself, and thus enquiry officer has submitted its report vide letter no. 384 dated 09.10.2009 and on the basis of the enquiry report submitted the Enquiry Officer and it was found that the charges have been proved against the petitioner and accordingly it was proposed to impose the following punishments to the petitioner: - (i) To remove him from the service of the Board, (ii) To recover the amount embezzled by him to the tune of Rs. 4,20,938.00/-, (iii) Nothing will be paid to the petitioner except the subsistence allowances already been paid to him. The suspension period will not be treated for the purpose of increment and it will not be permissible. Thereafter, a second show cause notice proposing the reply on the above punishment was asked from him vide Office Order No. 1949 dated 29.12.2009. However, the petitioner was going to be retired from the services of the Board on 31.01.2010 and therefore the present petitioner was not inclined to submit his reply of 2nd show-cause notice issued to him. As such the petitioner has intentionally delayed the proceedings since its inception as he was going to retire very shortly and not inclined to submit the 2025:JHHC:14218 7 reply. Therefore, it was decided to impose him the proposed punishment as ex-parte. Accordingly, the punishment proposed in second show - cause notice was confirmed against him vide Board’s Office Order No. 72 of 16.01.2010.(i.e. Annexure-14) The petitioner was found guilty of embezzlement of Board’s revenue amounting to Rs.4,20,938.00/-. The Enquiry Officer found the charges proved against the petitioner on the basis of evidence adduced with the charge-sheet and personal hearing of the petitioner given on 19.08.2009. The petitioner, himself accepted the facts on 19.08.2009 that he had committed the said guilt. It is submitted that the petitioner was never denied any documents by the Board and vide Board’s letter no.1691 dated 12.10.2006 the concerned authority, under whose the documents were in possession, was requested to make available the documents to the petitioner, if relevant to the proceeding. It is submitted that the duties and functions of Bill Clerk is defined very specifically in Board’s finance and Accounts Code Chapter 6. It is submitted that the appeal filed by the petitioner was taken into consideration and it was found that the petitioner (i.e. petitioner) did not submit any new facts in the appeal, rather he tried to burdened his guilt on one Sri Jibanand Thakur who was posted as Cashier during the period in question. Thereafter the Appeal of the petitioner was dismissed vide Board’s Office order no.1438 dated 16.09.2011 by a reasoned order. It is submitted that the Board has directed the petitioner to 2025:JHHC:14218 8 refund Rs.4,20,938.00/- from his gratuity amount of Rs.5,27,027/- which was misappropriated by the petitioner. Thus, there is no illegality, irregularity in the impugned order dated 16.01.2010 (i.e. Annxure-14) and the Appellate Order dated 16.09.2011 (i.e. Annexure-18) and hence the writ petition may be dismissed. 8. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that while issuing second show cause notice dated 29.12.2009, the respondents had not served him the Enquiry report prepared by the Enquiry Officer and for which the petitioner has filed the representation on 11.01.2010 (i.e. Annexure-13) to serve him a copy of enquiry report so that he could submit his reply in the second show cause notice. It is submitted that the proceeding has been initiated against the petitioner under Rule 29(B)(c)(i) of the certified standing order which is applicable to all the employees. Under Rule 30 the certified standing order, the Board has not been followed the procedure which was prescribed as to how and in what manner the proceeding has to be conducted against the employee of the Board belonging to workman cadre. Learned counsel for the petitioner had enclosed the Xerox copy of Clause 29 and Clause 30 of the standing order. 9. In further reply, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioner while posted at Electric Supply Sub Division, Phusro as Bill Clerk was found prima facie guilty of embezzlement of Board’s revenue and therefore he was rightly placed under suspension. It is submitted that a departmental proceeding was 2025:JHHC:14218 9 initiated against the petitioner vide Officer order No.1449 dated 08.12.2005. In pursuance to the departmental proceeding the petitioner was directed to submit his written statement before the Enquiry Officer within 15 days and he was also directed to inform the Enquiry Officer whether he desires to place his defence through defence Assistance. It is submitted that the Enquiry Officer fixed several dates of hearing but the petitioner never appeared before him. The Enquiry Officer on the basis of evidence concluded the proceedings and submitted the report vide letter no.884 dated 09.10.2009 and hence the WPS No.4655 of 2022 may be dismissed. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the both the sides and from going through the records, it appears that the petitioner was appointed on 11.06.1972 as Bill Clerk/Jr. Accounts Clerk vide Officer Order No.205/1160 dated 22.05.1972 and he joined the post on 11.06.1972 and posted under Electric Supply Division, Dhanbad. 11. It appears that the petitioner was further posted in Electric Supply Subdivision, Kathara vide office order no.76/655 dated 26.12.2002 of the Electrical Executive Engineer, Electric Supply Division, Tenughat and petitioner joined thereafter on 03.01.2003. 12. It appears on the certain charges of the misconduct viz not depositing the amount of revenue collected in the Board’s account, the petitioner was placed under suspension vide office order no.1321 dated 31.10.2005 13. It appears that the Board vide Office order no.1448 dated 08.12.2005 and Office Order No.1449 dated 08.12.2009 initiated 2025:JHHC:14218 10 departmental proceeding against one Shri Jibanand Thakur, the then Cashier and the petitioner for misconduct under Rule 29 B(c) and (i) of certified standing order of Board. The charge sheets were issued against both the persons. Thereafter one Shri J.N. Prasad, Electric Executive Engineer, Electric Supply Area, Hazaribagh was appointed as an Enquiry Officer to conduct the Departmental Proceeding. (i.e. Annexure-1 and 1/1). 14. Thereafter, the petitioner filed application on 04.01.2006 before the Enquiring Officer for certified copies of D.C.R money receipt and Revenue Cash Books. (i.e. Annexure-2). 15. The petitioner vide application dated 21.03.2006 and 16.06.2006 requested the Enquiry Officer for certified copy of D.C.R., Money receipts and Revenue cash book and for appearance through defence assistant vide Annexure-3 i.e. the letter dated 28.07.2006. 16. In the meantime, the suspension order of the petitioner was revoked by the Board vide Office Order no.1883 dated 16.10.2007. 17. It appears that the charges alleged against Shri Jibanand Thakur, Cashier were proved and accordingly punishment were imposed against him vide Office Order No.798 dated 07.05.2008 as follows:- (i) Five (05) percent deduction from his pension, (ii) Nothing will be paid except gratuity. 18. Then the petitioner requested to replace the Enquiry Officer vide letter dated 30.06.2008 (Annexure-6). 19. However, the request of petitioner to replace Enquiry 2025:JHHC:14218 11 Officer was rejected by the Director of Personnel vide his Letter No.1885 dated 13.08.2008 (Annexure-7). 20. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the petition before the Secretary of the Board with a copy to Enquiry Officer for supplying the documents to enable the petitioner to submits his reply letter dated 17.09.2008 (i.e. Annexure-8) 21. It appears that the petitioner could not get the documents in spite of his prayer to Secretary (vide Annexure-8) and then he filed another application on 16.01.2009 before the Enquiry Officer for document as well as allowing the petitioner to appear through Defence Assistance. The Enquiry Officer, however, directed the Asst. Electrical Engineer for submission of records for the period from 08/97 to 12/2002. 22. It appears that the Asst. Electrical Engineer, Electric Supply Sub-division, Fusro did not produce the required documents in spite of direction of the Enquiry Officer and as such the petitioner represented before Enquiry Officer for the same vide his application dated 20.06.2009. (i.e. Annexure-10). 23. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer abruptly closed the enquiry and submitted his Enquiry Report on 09.10.2009 (i.e. Annexure-11) to Board without recording any evidence even from the named chargesheet witnesses. 24. Then, the petitioner received the second show cause vide Board’s office Order No.1949 dated 29.12.2009 (i.e. Annexure-12) on 17.01.2010. 25. Thereafter, the petitioner vide his application dated 11.01.2010 (i.e. Annexure-13) requested the Joint Secretary of the Board for the copy of order sheet and Enquiry Report through 2025:JHHC:14218 12 Regd. Post. 26. Thereafter, the punishment against the petitioner was imposed vide Board Office order no.72 dated 16.01.2010 (i.e. Annexure-14) by removing him from the service of the Board with effect from 16.01.2010, and also ordered for recovery of Rs.4,20,938/- from him and debarring him from the pension for the period during which he was under suspension. 27. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an Appeal on 02.02.2010 before the Chairman of the Board against the punishment order imposed against him and the appeal remained pending for a long period. 28. Thereafter, the petitioner filed WPS No.5527 of 2010 which was disposed of vide order dated 04.01.2011 (Annexure-16) by the High Court by directing the respondent to consider the appeal of the petitioner and pass the reasoned order in accordance with law. 29. Then, the petitioner filed detailed representation before the Chairman on 01.02.2011. 30. However, the Chairman, during the pendency of contempt case, disposed of the appeal vide Office Order no.1438 dated 16.09.2011 (i.e. Annexure-18) consequently the contempt proceeding had become infructuous. 31. The gratuity amount payable to petitioner amounting to Rs.5,27,027/- was sanctioned vide Memo no.524 dated 04.05.2012 (i.e. Annexure-19) but Rs.4,20,938/- had been deducted arbitrarily. 32. It also appears that the Cont. Case (Civil) No.497 of 2011 was disposed of vide order dated 30.07.2012 with a liberty to the petitioner to challenge the same before the appropriate forum. 2025:JHHC:14218 13 33. From perusal of Supplementary Counter Affidavit dated 31.08.2024, it appears that the charges were framed against the petitioner on 08.12.2005 after the inspection by Electric Supply Sub-Division Fusro. The petitioner had not mentioned the money receipts of the various consumers during the month of 08/1997 to 12/02 (i.e. August 1997 to December 2002) and said to have misappropriated Rs.3,46,246 (i.e. vide Annexure-1). Even during the said period he is said to have misappropriated Rs.18,303/- in various months of 08-1997 to 12/2002 (i.e. vide Annexure-2). The petitioner had also not marked the daily entry of the Government Cashbook issued by which money receipts were issued to the consumers by misappropriating Rs.56,373/-. Even the petitioner has entered the receipt of the Rs.12,000/- in money receipt as Rs.2,000/- but made entry Daily Receiving Register as Rs.12,000/- Even the sums of Rs.20,000/- during the period of the month of 08-1997 to 12/2002 was not shown. They have asserted that the petitioner had not co-operated when he was issued notice several times and ample opportunity was given to appear in the departmental proceeding but he failed to appear as the petitioner was contesting the case for non-supply of required documents demanded by the petitioner. However, the fact remains that as the documents as required by the petitioner i.e. copies of bill, vouchers for the period of month of 08/1997 to 12/2002 i.e. August 1997 to December 2002 were not supplied to the petitioner which were money receipts of the various consumers. 34. It appears that even the copy of Enquiry Report was not served to the petitioner. 2025:JHHC:14218 14 35. It appears from the supplementary affidavit that the number of dates were fixed by the Enquiry Officer for appearance of the petitioner but he did not appear due to non-supply of the documents demanded by him. 36. It is well settled that the Delinquent employee has to file reply to the charges leveled against him. It is also evident from the representation vide letter dated 04.01.2010, a copy of the enquiry report was not served upon him. 37. It appears that in the departmental proceeding the department has to prove its case by examining the witnesses and by marking the documents as Exhibits and if the same is not followed then the departmental proceeding becomes vitiated. 38. It is evident that even the Appellate Authority had not considered the fact that non-supply of documents to the petitioner and non-supply of enquiry report to the petitioner, had caused serious prejudice to the petitioner while passing the order dated 16.09.2011 (i.e. Annexure-18). 39. It transpires that after the conclusion of departmental proceeding the Disciplinary Authority has imposed following punishment upon the petitioner on 16.01.2010 as follows:- (i). To remove him from the service of the Board, (ii). To recover the amount embezzled by him to the tune of Rs. 4,20,938.00/-, (iii). Nothing will be paid to the petitioner except the subsistence allowances already been paid to him. The suspension period will not be treated for the purpose of increment. 40. The respondents have dismissed the petitioner from the 2025:JHHC:14218 15 services and have imposed penalty of recovery of Rs.4,20,938/- (Rs. Four Lakh Twenty thousand nine hundred thirty eight). It is submitted that the wrongly order that nothing will be paid to the petitioner except the substances allowance during the suspension and no salary increment during period of suspension. 41. It further transpires that the Disciplinary Authority had passed the order dated 16.01.2010 although the petitioner was to retire on 31.01.2010 and the respondents were in hurry to dispose of and conclude the departmental proceeding. The non-supply of the documents to the petitioner and for not furnishing the copy of consumer bills of Rs.3,46,262/- are an important factors as the department had relied upon the said bills and the book i.e. DCR, money receipt book, cash revenue book etc. 42. Annexure-5 i.e. the Office order dated 07.05.2008 issued by the Director Personnel, reveals that another employee Jibanand Thakur then Junior Accounts Clerk, had caused loss of Rs.5,84,661/- between 08/97 to 12/02 on different dates. Thereafter, the said employee i.e. Jibanand Thakur had therefore deposited Rs.3,10,000/- in the year 2004-05 on different dated without any objection in the UCO Bank Account No. 1356C of Electric Supply Sub-Division, Fusro. 43. It appears that the - Enquiry report (i.e.Annexure-11) submitted by the Enquiry Officer reveals that so far as the charge no.1 regarding the defalcation of Rs.3,46,262/- is concerned and then the petitioner has orally taken the defence that the collected amount was handed over to the concerned Bill Clerk (i.e. Jibanand Thakur) but he failed to produce any documentary evidence in the signature of Bill Clerk and thus the charge is likely to be fully 2025:JHHC:14218 16 proved. Therefore, it is evident that this was not final conclusion of the Enquiry Officer and he has merely stated that there is possibility of fully proving the charges. The Enquiry Officer himself noticed that no record was produced in the during the course of evidence with regard to not entering into the money receipts in the Daily Collection Register. There is nothing on record to show that even the Jharkhand State Electricity Board, i.e. JSEB the department in question had produced any receipts against the petitioner for not depositing of Rs.3,46,262. The department i.e. JSEB was required to produce the said money receipts or the vouchers or the Concerned Daily Collection Register during the departmental enquiry but it failed to do so, and as such the charge no.1 does not appear to be proved. It reveals that although the Enquiry Officers has enclosed the details of bills in Enclosure-I, defalcated amount of Rs.3,46,262/- but the said bills of Rs.3,46,262/- were not produced during the departmental enquiry. Thus, even without producing the copies of said bills/vouchers of Rs.3,46,262/-, the charge no.1 was deemed to be proved illegally against the petitioner. 44. So far as the charge no.2 for defalcation of Rs.18,303/- is concerned but the Enquiry Officer has merely recorded the defence of the petitioner by stating that it would not legally verified because the petitioner Krishna Prasad had not produced any record against the charges and he has merely orally stated that neither he put any entry in the DCR nor made any defalcation in the amount. However, as record was not produced against the witness and hence the petitioner Krishna Prasad cannot be exonerated. 2025:JHHC:14218 17 Thus, it is evident that the charges no.2 cannot be legally proved against the petitioner for want of production of relevant document and in any absence of any documentary evidence with respect to the charge no.2, the same could not be proved against him. 45. So far as the charge no.3 regarding defalcation of Rs.56,303/- is concerned, the said charges was proved by the department even in absence of production of records and the Enquiry Officer merely observed that the petitioner Krishna Prasad had failed to produce any evidence and hence he could not be exonerated from charge no.3. Thus, it is evident that the Enquiry Officer has wrongly proved the charge no.3 against the petitioner Krishna Prasad in absence of record and the record was required to be produced by the department itself. The department i.e. JSEB failed to produce any record and hence the petitioner cannot be held liable for the defalcation of amount of Rs.56,303/-. 46. So far as the charge no.4 regarding defalcation of Rs.12000/- during the period of 17.06.2000 is concerned, the Enquiry Officer himself admitted that the petitioner has made correct entry and the Enquiry Officer has given himself finding by stating that from perusal of record, it is evident that the petitioner Krishna Prasad has made correct entries and hence the charge no.4 is not proved against him. 47. So far as, the charge no.5 is concerned regarding the defalcation of Rs.20,000/- is concerned for the period of 8/97 – 12/02 is concerned, it would appear that the said charge related to non-entering of details of cash amount in Revenue Cash Register. 2025:JHHC:14218 18 However, the petitioner has replied that he neither wrote the Cash Register nor he got deposit any amount in the Bank and hence this charge cannot be imposed upon him. The Enquiry Officer has observed that this is a case of separate investigation as to whether the entry has been made by the petitioner or not in the cash register or whether who had deposited the amount in the bank. He also recorded that he has read over his Enquiry Report with regard to all the charges to the petitioner Krishna Prasad and his signature is obtained with his consent. 48. Thus, it is evident that the Enquiry Report was not supplied to the petitioner by the Enquiry Officer at the time of submission of Enquiry report before Disciplinary Authority. 49. Annexure-12 is the Office order dated 29.12.2002 issed by the Jharkhand State Electricity Board to the petitioner by which second show cause notice has been issued upon him with the proposed punishments such as punishment as follow:- (i) To remove him from the service of the Board, (ii) To recovered the amount of Rs. 4,20,938.00/- embezzled by him, (iii) Nothing will be paid to the petitioner except the subsistence allowances already been paid to him. The suspension period will not be treated for the purpose of increment and it will not be permissible. 50. Thus, it is clear that the charges no.1 to 5 had not been legally proved against the petitioner, yet he has been held guilty. 51. It appears that the petitioner vide representations dated 04.01.2006 (Annxure-2), 28.07.2006 (Annexure-3), 30.06.2008 2025:JHHC:14218 19 (Annexure-6), 17.09.2008 (Annexure-8) and 16.01.2009 (Annexure-9), 20.06.2009 (Annexure-10) had required the Enquiry Officer as well as Authorities concerned to furnish the relevant bills and vouchers but the respondents had failed to provide the same to him. 52. Even the Enquiry report dated 09.10.2009, reveals that the Enquiry Officer cum Electrical Executive Engineer cum Electric supply Division Sahebganj had read over the contents of the Enquiry Report to the petitioner and obtained his signatures but the Enquiry Report was not handed over to the petitioner (i.e. Annexure-10). 53. It further appears that even the letter dated 29.12.2009 (i.e annexure-12) does not show that while issuing second show cause notice to the petitioner the copy of enquiry report was also enclosed or not with the said second show cause notice dated 29.12.2009. 54. Then, the Respondents have inflicted the punishment order against the petitioner in view of the fact that departmental enquiry was not held in accordance with rules and documents demanded by the petitioner were not furnished to him and no management witness was examined however, the Disciplinary Authority had passed the order of punishment on 16.01.2010 (i.e. Annexure-14) without affording the reasonable opportunity of hearing and Appellate Authority affirmed the order of punishment mechanically vide order dated 16.09.2011 (i.e. Annexure-18). 55. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. Vs. B. Karunakar & Ors., reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727, at Para 61 to 63 2025:JHHC:14218 20 as follows: “Para 61:- It is now settled law that the proceedings must be just, fair and reasonable and negation thereof offends Articles 14 and 21. It is well-settled law that the principles of natural justice are integral part of Article 14. No decision prejudicial to a party should be taken without affording an opportunity or supplying the material which is the basis for the decision. The enquiry report constitutes fresh material which has great persuasive force or effect on the mind of the disciplinary authority. The supply of the report along with the final order is like a post-mortem certificate with putrefying odour. The failure to supply copy thereof to the delinquent would be unfair procedure offending not only Articles 14, 21 and 311(2) of the Constitution, but also, the principles of natural justice. The contention on behalf of the Government/management that the report is not evidence adduced during such inquiry envisaged under proviso to Article 311(2) is also devoid of substance. It is settled law that the Evidence Act has no application to the inquiry conducted during the disciplinary proceedings. The evidence adduced is not in strict conformity with the Indian Evidence Act, though the essential principles of fair play envisaged in the Evidence Act are applicable. What was meant by ‘evidence’ in the proviso to Article 311(2) is the totality of the material collected during the inquiry including the report of the enquiry officer forming part of that material. Therefore, when reliance is sought to be placed by the disciplinary authority, on the report of the enquiry officer for proof of the charge or for imposition of the penalty, then it is incumbent that the copy thereof should be supplied before reaching any conclusion either on proof of the charge or the nature of the penalty to be imposed on the proved charge or on both. Para-62:- Shri P.P. Rao obviously realising this effect, contended that the enquiry officer being a delegate of the disciplinary authority is not bound by the delegatee's recommendations and it is not a material unless it is used by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, the need for its supply does not arise and the principles of natural justice need not be extended to that stage as the officer/workman had opportunity at the inquiry. In support thereof he placed strong reliance on Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [(1969) 1 SCR 317 : AIR 1969 SC 198] ; Shadi 2025:JHHC:14218 21 Lal Gupta v. State of Punjab [(1973) 1 SCC 680 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 293 : (1973) 3 SCR 637] ; Hira Nath Misra v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi [(1973) 1 SCC 805 : AIR 1973 SC 1260] ; Satyavir Singh v. Union of India [(1985) 4 SCC 252 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 1 : AIR 1986 SC 555] ; Secretary, Central Board of Excise & Customs v. K.S. Mahalingam [(1986) 3 SCC 35 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 374] and Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131] . I am unable to agree with his contentions. Doubtless that the enquiry officer is a delegate of the disciplinary authority, he conducts the inquiry into the misconduct and submits his report, but his findings or conclusions on the proof of charges and his recommendations on the penalty would create formidable impressions almost to be believed and acceptable unless they are controverted vehemently by the delinquent officer. At this stage non-supply of the copy of the report to the delinquent would cause him grave prejudice. S.K. George case [(1969) 1 SCR 317 : AIR 1969 SC 198] renders no assistance. It is only an inquiry against malpractice at an examination conducted by the University under executive instruction. Therein the students were given an opportunity of hearing and they were supplied with all the material, the foundation for the report. The observations of the Bench of two Judges with regard to the theory of two stages in the Inquiry under Article 311 also bears little importance for the foregoing consideration in this case. It is already seen that this Court held that the inquiry from the stage of charge- sheet till the stage of punishment is a continuous one and cannot be split into two. The reliance in Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [(1973) 1 SCC 380 : (1973) 3 SCR 22] is also of no avail. Therein it was pointed out that under Section 18-A of the I.D.R. Act there was no scope of enquiry at two stages and the omission to supply enquiry report, before taking the action, did not vitiate the ultimate decision taken. In Shadi Lal case [(1973) 1 SCC 680 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 293 : (1973) 3 SCR 637] Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules did not provide for the supply of copy of the report of an inquiry conducted by the fact finding authority before inquiry. It was held that the delinquent officer was supplied with all the materials and was given opportunity to make representation and the same was considered. The report did not indicate anything in 2025:JHHC:14218 22 addition to what was already supplied to him. Under those circumstances it was held that the principles of natural justice cannot be put into an iron cast or a strait-jacket formula. Each case has to be considered and the principles applied in the light of the facts in each case. The effect of the violation of the principles of natural justice on the facts of the case on hand needs to be considered and visualised. The effect of Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131] ratio was considered by my brother Sawant, J. and it needs no reiteration. The reliance on S.K. George case [(1969) 1 SCR 317 : AIR 1969 SC 198] in Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131] ratio renders no assistance in the light of the above discussion. Since Mahalingam case [(1986) 3 SCC 35 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 374] which was after the Forty-second Amendment Act, the need to supply second show- cause notice was dispensed with, regarding punishment and therefore, that ratio renders no assistance to the case. Hira Nath Misra case [(1973) 1 SCC 805 : AIR 1973 SC 1260] also is of no avail since the inquiry was conducted relating to misbehaviour with the girl students by the erring boys. The security of the girls was of paramount consideration and therefore, the disclosure of the names of the girl students given in the report or their evidence would jeopardise their safety and so was withheld. Accordingly this Court on the fact situation upheld the action of the Medical College. Satyavir Singh [(1985) 4 SCC 252 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 1 : AIR 1986 SC 555] ratio also is of no assistance as the action was taken under proviso to Article 311(2) and Rule 199 of the CCA Rules. The inquiry into insubordination by police force was dispensed with as the offending acts of the police force would generate deleterious effect on the discipline of the service. Asthana case [(1988) 3 SCC 600 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 869] was considered by my brother Sawant, J. in which the report was not supplied and it was upheld. It should, thus be concluded that the supply of the copy of the enquiry report is an integral part of the penultimate stage of the inquiry before the disciplinary authority considers the material and the report on the proof of the charge and the nature of the punishment to be imposed. Non-compliance is denial of reasonable opportunity, violating Article 311(2) and unfair, unjust and illegal procedure offending Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice. 2025:JHHC:14218 23 Para 63: The emerging effect of our holding that the delinquent is entitled to the supply of the copy of the report would generate yearning for hearing before deciding on proof of charge or penalty which Forty- second Amendment Act had advisedly avoided. So while interpreting Article 311(2) or relevant rule the court/tribunal should make no attempt to bring on the rail by back track the opportunity of hearing as was portended by the Gujarat High Court. The attempt must be nailed squarely. Prior to the Forty-second Amendment Act the delinquent had no right of hearing before disciplinary authority either on proof of charge or penalty. So after Forty-second Amendment Act it would not be put on higher pedestal. The Gujarat High Court's decision is, therefore, not good law. However, the disciplinary authority has an objective duty and adjudicatory responsibility to consider and impose proper penalty consistent with the magnitude or the gravity of the misconduct. The statute or statutory rules gave graded power and authority to the disciplinary authority to impose either of the penalties enumerated in the relevant provisions. It is not necessarily the maximum or the minimum. Based on the facts, circumstances, the nature of imputation, the gravity of misconduct, the indelible effect or impact on the discipline or morale of the employees, the previous record or conduct of the delinquent and the severity to which the delinquent will be subjected to, may be some of the factors to be considered. They cannot be eulogised but could be visualised. Each case must be considered in the light of its own scenario. Therefore, a duty and responsibility has been cast on the disciplinary authority to weigh the pros and cons, consider the case and impose appropriate punishment. In a given case if the penalty was proved to be disproportionate or there is no case even to find the charges proved or the charges are based on no evidence, that would be for the court/the tribunal to consider on merits, not as court of appeal, but within its parameters of supervisory jurisdiction and to give appropriate relief. But this would not be a ground to extend hearing at the stage of consideration by the disciplinary authority either on proof of the charge or on imposition of the penalty. I respectfully agree with my brother Sawant, J. in other respects in the draft judgment proposed by him.” 56. It is well settled from the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court that even in the departmental proceeding the department has 2025:JHHC:14218 24 to examined its witnesses and also to prove its documents in support of discharges levelled against the delinquent employee. 57. It has been held in the case of Roop Singh Negi Versus Punjab National Bank and Others reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, at para- 14 and 15 as follows:- “Para 14:- Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi- judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. Para 15:- We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.” 2025:JHHC:14218 25 58. It has been held in the case of State of Jharkhand and Ors. Versus Amar Kumar Sinha passed in L.P.A. No. 212 of 2021 vide order dated 13.03.2023 passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, at para- 8 and 9 as follows:- “Para-8:- In the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs Punjab National Bank and another, (2009) 2 SCC 570, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also examined a similar question and held that indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the documents. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the F.I.R. which could not have been treated as evidence. Para-9:- In the aforesaid reported judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also intervened in the matter. In the present case, it is seen that no witness was examined, only certain documents purported to be a report, prepared by the Chief Engineer, CDO, was produced before the enquiry officer, he accepted the same and passed the final order. The enquiry made by an officer of the department, prior to the initiation of a departmental enquiry is in the nature of a preliminary enquiry. In such cases, a copy of the preliminary enquiry should be handed over to the petitioner and the evidence that led to preparation of the preliminary enquiry and the conclusion arrived thereon, has to be produced before the enquiring officer, who should apply his mind and come to the 2025:JHHC:14218 26 conclusion, whether such conclusion of the preliminary enquiry report is correct or not. While doing so, he should also afford a reasonable opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses, produced before the enquiring officer to prove the charges and also allow him to pass rebuttal evidence. In this case, nothing has been done, thus, there has been a clear violation of the principles of natural justice.” 59. The above judgment reported in Roop Singh Negi Versus Punjab National Bank and Others reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India Versus Biswanath Bhattacharjee reported in (2022) 13 SCC 329 and also in Delhi Transport Corporation Versus Ashok Kumar Sharma reported in (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1871. 60. Even the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has passed the finding of the Disciplinary Authority due to non-examination of witnesses and not proving the documents by the department in vide order dated 17.04.2021 in WPS No.635 of 2012. 61. It has been held in the case of Braj Kishore Mahto Versus the State of Jharkhand and Ors. vide order dated 17.04.2021 passed in W. P. (S) No. 635 of 2012 by the Co-ordinate Bench (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi) of this Court, Para-9 to 12 as follows: “ Para-9:- Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record. On perusal of charge-sheet, it transpires that charge has been framed on the basis of certain paper report. The enquiry report has been brought on record as Annexure 15/1 to the writ petition. On perusal of enquiry report, the Court finds that no document has been proved before the Enquiry Officer and no witness has been adduced to 2025:JHHC:14218 27 prove the charge against the petitioner. It is well-settled that in enquiry proceeding at least certain witnesses are required to be examined to prove the document and charge against the delinquent which has not been done in the case in hand which is crystal clear on going through the enquiry report as Annexure- 15/1. This aspect of the matter has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “ Roop Singh Negi” (supra). There is no doubt that the parameters described to look into the disciplinary proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to the High Court is there, will not interfere with the disciplinary proceeding and it is well-settled ratio decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “P. Gunasekaran” (supra) wherein para 12 (i) of the said judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court can interfere with the finding of the fact based on no evidence. Thus this judgment is helping to the petitioner to some extent which has been relied on by Mr. Saboo in the case of no evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer to prove the charge. So far as judgment relied on by Mr. Saboo in the case of “Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board” (supra) is concerned, it is well settled provision of law that in the fact and circumstances of each case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred to the case of “Indian Oil Corporation another Vs. Ashok Kumar Arora” reported in (1997) 3 SCC 72 in para 28 itself on which Mr. Saboo has placed reliance in that paragraph also it is held that the High Court can interfere if the findings are based on no evidence. In the case in hand, it is crystal clear that there is no evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer and thus these two judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent- State is not rescuing the respondents and it is well-settled that the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry can be characterized as perverse if it is shown that such findings are not supported by any evidence on record or are not based on the evidence adduced 2025:JHHC:14218 28 by the parties. It is well-settled that the High Court can interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on going through departmental proceeding, no prudent person comes to the conclusion that charge framed against the delinquent has been proved. Reference may be made in the case of “ Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police and others” reported in (1999) 2 SCC 10. Paragraph nos. 8, 36 and 37 of the said judgement is quoted here-in-below:- “8.The findings recorded in a domestic enquiry can be characterized as perverse if it is shown that such findings are not supported by any evidence on record or are not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to the those findings on the basis of that evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of A.P. V. Ram Rao in which the question was whether the High Court under Article 226 could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain and Bharat Iron works V. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel. In Rajinder Kumar Kindra V. Delhi Admn. it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are its mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated.” ................................................................................................ 36.It will be noticed that there were three complainants but only two, namely, Radhey Shyam and Rajpal Singh were proposed to be examined. Why was not the third complainant, Shiv Kumar proposed to be examined ? The reason becomes obvious from the fact that when he was examined as a defence witness, he fully 2025:JHHC:14218 29 supported the appellant by stating that no payment was made by Smt. Meena Mishra on that date. But he was held by the enquiry officer to be an impostor on the ground that he had not proved himself to be the actual Shiv Kumar. The enquiry officer has observed as under:- “ D.W. 1 Shri Shiv Kumar is a witness and has not proved himself to be the actual Shiv Kumar. This D.W.1 has denied that he had visited the police station and had ever met with the SHO. Moreover he has denied to have signed Ex. P.W.- 1/A. He had not made any complaint to the SHO. His version has been contradicted by ASI Jagdish Prasad, D.W.4 the writer of this complaint, Ex. P.W.-1/A. D.W.6 ASI Bhopal Singh has also confirmed that Shiv Kumar had signed Ex. P.W.-1/A. Both these defence witnesses have been produced by the defaulter himself. so the statement of D.W.1 Shiv Kumar has not been relied upon because he is not the actual Shiv Kumar who is a complainant in this case and is a false person who has been produced by the defaulter.” 37. The reasons why he has been held to be an impostor or a false person have not been indicated. The finding in this regard is wholly arbitrary and perverse.” Para-10:- The appellate authority has passed order on the surmises and conjectures rather than the evidences on record. All these aspects have been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “ Yoginath D. Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another” reported in (1999) 7 SCC 739 wherein para 44 the Ho’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “44. We fail to appreciate the approach of the Disciplinary Committee which has gone by surmises and conjectures rather than by the evidence-on-record. The statements of Dr. Naranjee and that of Mr. Bapat, Advocate have not been taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Committee and it has relied upon the statement of the complainant alone to come to the conclusion that Mr. Bapat, Advocate had assured acquittal provided the complainant withdrew his transfer petitions” Para- 2025:JHHC:14218 30 11:- In that judgment again the power of judicial review available to the High Court has been considered at para 51 of the said judgment which is quoted here-in-below:- “51. It was lastly contended by Mr. Haris N. Salve that this Court cannot reappraise the evidence which has already been scrutinized by the enquiry officer as also by the Disciplinary Committee. It is contended that the High Court or this Court cannot, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution , act as the appellate authority in the domestic enquiry or trial and it is not open to this Court to reappraise the evidence. The proposition as put forward by Mr. Salve is in very broad terms and cannot be accepted. The law is well settled that if the findings are perverse and are not supported by the evidence on record or the findings recorded at the domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person would have reached, it would be open to the High Court as also to this Court to interfere in the matter. In Kuldeep Singh V. Commr. Or Police this Court, relying upon the earlier decisions in Nand Kishore Prasad V. State of Bihar, State of Andhra Pradesh V. Rama Rao, Central Bank of India Ltd. V. Prakash Chand Jain, Bharat Iron Works V. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel as also Rajinder Kumar Kindra V. Delhi Admn, laid down that although the court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer in a departmental enquiry, it does not mean that in no circumstances can the Court interfere. It was observed that the power of judicial review available to a High Court as also this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and the courts can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse.” Para- 12:- In that judgment it has been held that the High Court 2025:JHHC:14218 31 can interfere with the finding if the findings are perverse and are not supported by the evidence on record or the findings recorded at the domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person would have reached. In the case in hand, mere perusal of enquiry proceeding, it transpires that not even a single witness has been adduced before the Enquiry Officer and on without proving all the documents, the Enquiry Officer has submitted enquiry report and on that basis the appellate authority has passed the impugned order. The case of the petitioner is also strengthen in the light of acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal proceeding which has been arisen out of the same departmental proceeding.” 62. It has been held in the case of Union of India Versus H. C. Goel reported in (1964) 4 SCR 718, at para- 24 to 27 as follows:- “ Para-24:- The facts relating to this narrow point are very few. The respondent expressed his regret to Mr Rajagopalan that he had not brought rasagullas for his children. There is some controversy as to whether this statement was made by the respondent at the beginning of his interview with Mr Rajagopalan or at its end. The complaint made by Mr Rajagopalan shows that the interview began with the respondent's expression of regret that he had not brought sweets for Mr Rajagopalan's children. Mr Rajagopalan in his evidence stated that this statement was made by the respondent at the close of the interview. One fact is clear that the respondent did express regret that he had not taken sweets to Mr Rajagopalan's place. If the respondent's version that he said so at the begainning of the interview is believed, particularly when it is supported by the complaint made by Mr Rajagopalan, it may show that the stern disapproval expressed by Mr Rajagopalan on hearing the said remark from the respondent must have acted as a warning to him. That, however is another matter. 2025:JHHC:14218 32 Para-25:- Then, as to the hundred rupee note which, according to Mr Rajagopalan, was taken out by the respondent from his wallet, Mr Rajagopalan has admitted that the sald note was folded double. He says that he noticed that its colour was blue and that Its size was bigger than the usual ten rupee or five rupee note. Mr Rajagopalan who appears to be a straightforward officer gave his evidence in a very honest way. He frankly told the enquiry officer that it could not be said that the hundred rupee note which he thought the respondent, took out from his wallet had been offered to him by the respondent, but he thought that the whole thing had to be viewed in the context of the matter. He also admitted that his eye-sight was not perfect. Para-26:- The respondent, on the other hand, suggested that in reply to the questions which Mr Rajagopalan put to him he took out some papers from his pocket to find out the letter of his appointment, and as soon as Mr Rajagopalan appeared to discourage him, he put the said paper in his pocket. Para-27:- Now, in this state of the evidence, how can it be said that the respondent even attempted to offer a bribe to Mr Rajagopalan? Mr Rajagopalan makes a definite statement that the respondent did not offer him a bribe. He merely refers to the fact that the respondent took out a paper from his wallet and the said paper appeared to him like a hundred rupee note double folded. Undoubtedly, Mr Rajagopalan suspected the respondent's conduct, and so, made a report immediately. But the suspicion entertained by Mr Rajagopalan cannot, in law, be treated as evidence against the respondent even though there is no doubt that Mr Rajagopalan is a straight-forward and an honest officer. Though we fully appreciate the anxiety of the appellant to root out corruption from public service. we cannot ignore the fact that in carrving out the said purpose, mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. It may be that the technical rules which govern criminal trials in 2025:JHHC:14218 33 courts may not necessarily apply to disciplinary proceedings, but nevertheless, the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquires held under the statutory rules. We have very carefully considered the evidence led in the present enquiry and borne in mind the plea made by the learned Attorney-General, but we are unable to hold that on the record, there is any evidence which can sustain the finding of the appellant that charge No. 3 has been proved against the respondent. It is in this connection and only incidentally that it may be relevant to add that the UPSC considered the matter twice and came to the firm decision that the main charge against the respondent had not been established.” 63. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and in view of the discussion made above, this Court is of the view that the Office Order No.72 dated 16.01.2010 (i.e. Annexure-14) passed by the Respondent No.4 and the Office Order No.1438 dated 16.09.2011 (i.e. Annexure-18) passed by the Respondent No.6 are illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in the eye of law. Even the order of deducting of Rs.4,20,938/- from the gratuity of the petitioner is also not sustainable in the eye of law. Accordingly, the Office Order No.72 dated 16.01.2010 (i.e. Annexure-14) and the Office Order No.1438 dated 16.09.2011 (i.e. Annexure-18) and order of deducting amount of Rs.4,20,938/- from the Gratuity of the petitioner is set aside and the Respondents are directed to refund Rs.4,20,938/- to the petitioner and to pay all the consequential benefits to the petitioner. 64. It is evident that the petitioner had superannuated on 31.01.2010 and hence the Appellate order dated 16.01.2010 (i.e. Annexure-14) passed by the Respondent No.4 and the Appellate 2025:JHHC:14218 34 order dated 16.09.2011 (i.e. Annexure-18) passed by the Respondent No.6 are set aside and hence, the petitioner is entitled for all the consequential benefits and the Respondents are directed to refund the amount of Rs.4,20,938/- to the petitioner forthwith within two months from the date of receipt the copy of this order. 65. Thus, the W.P.(S) No.4655 of 2022 is allowed with the observations mentioned above. (Sanjay Prasad, J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi N.A.F.R./Nishant