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2025 DAILYLAW 3562 (HP)

Mureed Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-09-16

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 234 of 2024, dated 19.10.2024, registered at Police Station Sadar, District Chamba, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short ‘the NDPS Act’). 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner is a permanent resident of District Chamba. He was arrested for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act vide FIR No. 234 of 2024. The petitioner is innocent, and nothing incriminating was recovered from his possession. The petitioner belongs to a respectable family, and there is no chance of his absconding. FIR No. 85 of 2023, dated 26.9.2023, was registered against the petitioner for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the petition. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party was on nakabandi duty on 19.10.2024. A vehicle bearing HP-73-2328 came from Balu at 9.25 AM. The police stopped the vehicle. The driver identified himself as Sonu Kumar. The police were checking the documents of the vehicle when the petitioner came towards the police from Parel Bridge. He returned after seeing the police. The police apprehended the petitioner. He identified himself as Mureed Mohammad. He had a carry bag, which was checked, and 1.368 kilograms of cannabis were recovered from the carry bag. The police seized the charas and arrested the petitioner. The cannabis was sent to the SFSL, Junga and it was found to be a sample of charas. The police completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet. The matter is pending for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses on 13.10.2025 and 14.10.2025, respectively. 4. I have heard Mr. M.A. Safee, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 5. Mr. M.A. Safee, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. The petitioner was arrested on 19.10.2024, and there is no progress in the trial. The petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed. 6. Mr. 5. Mr. M.A. Safee, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. The petitioner was arrested on 19.10.2024, and there is no progress in the trial. The petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed. 6. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that a commercial quantity of charas was found in possession of the petitioner. The rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner has not satisfied the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The trial is progressing normally. The summons has been issued to the prosecution witnesses for 13.10.2025 and 14.10.2025. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: - “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the  accused  on  bail. [Refer: Chaman  Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC  528 :  2004  SCC  (Cri)  1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010)  14  SCC  496  :  (2011)  3  SCC  (Cri)  765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018)   12   SCC   129   :   (2018)   3   SCC   (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .] 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned the Courts against the superficial examination of the bail consideration in Shabeen Ahmad v. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 172 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 479, and it was observed at page 177: “18. A superficial application of bail parameters not only undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks weakening public faith in the judiciary's resolve to com- bat the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception of justice, both within and outside the courtroom, that courts must safeguard, lest we risk normalising a crime that continues to claim numerous innocent lives.” 10. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. A perusal of the status report shows that the petitioner was found in possession of 1.368 kilograms of charas. Therefore, the petitioner was, prima facie, found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as follows: “37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable. Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as follows: “37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable. (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A, and also for offences involving commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless– (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.” 12. Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC 738 , that the accused cannot be released on bail without recording a satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit an offence while on bail. It was observed: “7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain offences enumerated under the said Section. They are : (1) In the case of a person accused of an offence punishable under Section 19, (2) Under Section 24, (3) Under Section 27A and (4) Of offences involving commercial quantity. 8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case the court proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other enactment. (1) The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty of such an offence; (2) that person is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” 13. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721 , wherein it was held: “19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be followed while considering the application for bail moved by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In Union of India vs. Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429 , it has been elaborated as under: - "7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the accused commits the murder of one or two persons, while those persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs. Chief Secy., Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95 ) as under: 24. With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section of the public, particularly the adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and a deadly impact on society as a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine. 8. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and a deadly impact on society as a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine. 8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be released on bail during trial unless the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37, namely, (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence; and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has not given any justifiable reason for not abiding by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the respondent accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic consequences and health hazards which would accompany trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the court should implement the law in the spirit with which Parliament, after due deliberation, has amended." 20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of the commission of an offence under the Act unless twin conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application, and the second is that the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail operates. 21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that, in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.” 14. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110: “21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-A and also for offences involving a commercial quantity are: (i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail; and (ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to believe” that: (a) the person is not guilty of such an offence; and (b) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. 22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is “reasonable  ground  to  believe”  that  the  person is not guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505], held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11) “7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is “reasonable grounds”. The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes  substantial  probable  causes  for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief, contemplated in turn, points to the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged. 8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. 8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. ‘7. … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy.’ [See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497 ], SCC p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532 ]] *** 10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a question of fact whether a particular act is reasonable or not, which depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. Of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315 ] 11. The court, while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose, essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail, that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.” (emphasis supplied) 23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High Court and this Court are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High Court and this Court are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail. Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed.” 15. This position was reiterated in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 891, wherein it was observed: “11. It is evident from a plain reading of the non-obstante clause inserted in sub-section (1) and the conditions imposed in sub-section (2) of Section 37 that there are certain restrictions placed on the power of the Court when granting bail to a person accused of having committed an offence under the NDPS Act. Not only are the limitations imposed under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, to be kept in mind, but the restrictions placed under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 are also to be factored in. The conditions imposed in subsection (1) of Section 37 are that (i) the Public Prosecutor ought to be given an opportunity to oppose the application moved by an accused person for release and (ii) if such an application is opposed, then the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person accused is not guilty of such an offence. Additionally, the Court must be satisfied that the accused person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. 12. The expression “reasonable grounds” has come up for discussion in several rulings of this Court. In “Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira” (2004) 3 SCC 549 , a decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of this Court, it has been held thus: — “7. The limitations on granting bail come in only when the question of granting bail arises on merits. In “Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira” (2004) 3 SCC 549 , a decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of this Court, it has been held thus: — “7. The limitations on granting bail come in only when the question of granting bail arises on merits. Apart from the grant of opportunity to the Public Prosecutor, the other twin conditions which have relevance so far as the present accused-respondent is concerned, are the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The conditions are cumulative and not alternative. The satisfaction contemplated regarding the accused being not guilty has to be based on reasonable grounds. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence.” [emphasis added] 13. The expression “reasonable ground” came up for discussion in “State of Kerala v. Rajesh” (2020) 12 SCC 122 , and this Court has observed as below: “20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that, in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.” [emphasis added] 14. To sum up, the expression “reasonable grounds” used in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 37 would mean credible, plausible and grounds for the Court to believe that the accused person is not guilty of the alleged offence. To sum up, the expression “reasonable grounds” used in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 37 would mean credible, plausible and grounds for the Court to believe that the accused person is not guilty of the alleged offence. For arriving at any such conclusion, such facts and circumstances must exist in a case that can persuade the Court to believe that the accused person would not have committed such an offence. Dovetailed with the aforesaid satisfaction is an additional consideration that the accused person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. 15. We may clarify that at the stage of examining an application for bail in the context of Section 37 of the Act, the Court is not required to record a finding that the accused person is not guilty. The Court is also not expected to weigh the evidence for arriving at a finding as to whether the accused has committed an offence under the NDPS Act or not. The entire exercise that the Court is expected to undertake at this stage is for the limited purpose of releasing him on bail. Thus, the focus is on the availability of reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offences that he has been charged with and that he is unlikely to commit an offence under the Act while on bail he is unlikely to commit an offence under the Act while on bail.” 16. In the present case, the petitioner was prima facie found in possession of 1.368 kilograms of charas. There is nothing to indicate that he is not likely to commit a similar offence in the event of his release on bail. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and he is not entitled to bail. 17. It was found submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. The petitioner was arrested on 19.10.2024. The status report shows that the matter is listed for recording the statements of witnesses on 13.10.2025 and 14.10.2025. The copies of the order sheets have not been filed to show that the delay is not attributable to the petitioner. The petitioner was arrested on 19.10.2024. The status report shows that the matter is listed for recording the statements of witnesses on 13.10.2025 and 14.10.2025. The copies of the order sheets have not been filed to show that the delay is not attributable to the petitioner. Therefore, the plea of the petitioner that there is a delay in the progress of the trial cannot be accepted without any adequate material. 18. No other point was urged. 19. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. Hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 20. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.