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2025 DAILYLAW 3560 (HP)

Rakesh Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-09-22

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 184 of 2022, dated 21.09.2022, registered at Police Station Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur (HP), for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “SC & ST Act”) and Sections 504 and 506 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police that he was working as a mason in the under-construction house of the petitioner. He demanded his wages from the petitioner. The petitioner paid only Rs. 40,000/- and stopped the work. The informant’s machines were also kept by the petitioner. The informant demanded money from the petitioner, but he threatened and abused him (the informant) by name of his caste. The amount of Rs. 1,26,000/- was due from the petitioner. The informant called the petitioner on 04.09.2022 at around 02.30 PM telephonically, but he abused the informant in the name of his caste. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police filed the charge sheet before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and the filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of the said FIR. It has been asserted that the dispute between the parties is contractual. The complainant prayed for the return of his tools and recovery of the money. A Civil remedy is being converted into criminal proceedings. The allegations made against the petitioner are false. The informant produced the recording of the conversation, which was seized on 17.10.2022 after a long gap of almost a month. The statements of the witnesses were also recorded after a long time from the date of registration of the FIR. The statements of the witnesses do not prove the prosecution’s case. The police had not verified the incident dated 03.04.2022 from the neighbours. There was a delay in reporting the matter to the police. The statements of the witnesses were also recorded after a long time from the date of registration of the FIR. The statements of the witnesses do not prove the prosecution’s case. The police had not verified the incident dated 03.04.2022 from the neighbours. There was a delay in reporting the matter to the police. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the said FIR be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by respondent No.1 by filing a reply asserting that the police investigated the matter and found the allegations to be correct. Dina Nath and Deepak Sharma corroborated the informant’s version. A charge sheet was filed before the learned Trial Court, and the matter was listed for the prosecution’s evidence from 13.06.2024 to 15.06.2024. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. A separate reply was filed by the respondent No. 2, reiterating the contents of the complaint. It was asserted that the learned Trial Court has framed the charges against the petitioner, and the present petition is not maintainable. The abuses hurled by the petitioner were recorded, and the CD was handed over to the police. The matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, which should be permitted to adjudicate it. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. Separate rejoinders denying the contents of the replies and affirming those of the petition were filed. 7. I have heard Mr Vedant Ranta, learned counsel, for the petitioner, Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No. 1 /State and Mr Vijay Singh Bhatia, learned counsel, for respondent No. 2. 8. Mr Vedant Ranta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the allegations made by the informant are false. There is no evidence that the incident occurred in a pubic place within public view. The informant filed a criminal complaint with the police to recover the machinery left by him and the money owed to him. He converted the civil proceedings into criminal proceedings, which is impermissible. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. He relied upon judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karuppudayar vs. State Rep. He converted the civil proceedings into criminal proceedings, which is impermissible. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. He relied upon judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karuppudayar vs. State Rep. By the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy & Ors, 2025 INSC 132 , and Ramawatar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Cri. Appeal No. 1393 of 2011 decided on 25.10.2021 and judgment of the Delhi High Court in Daya Bhatnagar & Ors. vs. State (2004) 109 DLT 915 , in support of his submission. 9. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No. 1 /State, submitted that the learned Trial Court has framed the charge and the matter is pending for recording statements of prosecution witnesses. The petitioner has not challenged the order framing the charges, and the present petition is not maintainable. The allegations made by the informant are corroborated by independent witnesses. The truthfulness or otherwise of all the allegations is not to be seen at this stage; hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. Mr Vijay Singh Bhatia, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, adopted the submissions of Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No. 1/ State and submitted that the petitioner abused the informant in the name of his caste because he had demanded his wages for the work done by him. The abuse hurled by the petitioner is covered under the SC & ST Act. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 13. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby preempting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). 14. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High Court can quash the criminal proceedings if they amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed on page 703: “7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose, which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose, which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests, and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law, though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” 15. The term abuse of the process was explained in Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761: 33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well-established and recognised doctrine both by the English courts and courts in India. There are some established principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to be an abuse of the process of the court. 34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02) “There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. … A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process. … A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process. *** The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction) to prevent abuses of its process and to control its procedure must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice.” In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. 35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 : (1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word “abuse of process” as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case. 36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42: (1993) 3 WLR 90 : (1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances: (i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial; or (ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of the process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case. 37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated: “It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of the court to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.” 38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that: “The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that: “The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.” What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case. 16. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 488 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them. However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was observed at page 498: 13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, try to read in between the lines. The Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution, need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take, for instance, the case at hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances that the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge, as alleged. 14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between the consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and the appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between the consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and the appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held : (Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527, paras 5-7) “5. … Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In the exercise of its powers, the court would be justified in quashing any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866 ], this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6) (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 7. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial process, no doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.” (emphasis supplied) 17. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. It has been specifically mentioned in the FIR that the petitioner abused the informant in the name of his caste after the informant had demanded his wages and machines. Deepak Sharma corroborated this version. He stated that the informant demanded the machines and the wages at Chehad Bridge on 03.04.2022. The petitioner got infuriated. He abused the informant in the name of his caste and threatened to kill him. The site plan prepared by the police shows Chehad Bridge, where the incident had taken place. The shops are shown in the vicinity. Dina Nath stated that he had talked to the petitioner, but the petitioner abused the informant in the name of his caste. 19. The statement of Deepak Sharma, prima facie, establishes that the petitioner had abused the informant in the name of his caste at a public place within public view in the presence of Deepak Sharma. Thus, the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC and ST Act are prima facie satisfied on record. 20. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. Thus, the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC and ST Act are prima facie satisfied on record. 20. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. Deepak Sharma was making an incorrect statement. This submission will not help the petitioner. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction has to take the allegations in the FIR as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 21. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060: “14. 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not. 22. It was submitted that there is a civil dispute between the parties. The informant was to recover money from the petitioner, and criminal proceedings are being used for ulterior purposes. This submission will not help the petitioner. The enmity is a double-edged weapon; while it furnishes the motive for false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of a crime. In the present case, the FIR specifically mentions that the petitioner abused the informant when he demanded the wages. Thus, as per the FIR, the dispute was the motive for the commission of the crime and not false implication. 23. In the present case, the FIR specifically mentions that the petitioner abused the informant when he demanded the wages. Thus, as per the FIR, the dispute was the motive for the commission of the crime and not false implication. 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 , “If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.” Xxxx 39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 24. In Karuppudayar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court defined the term any place within a public view. Since it has been found out above that Chehad Bridge, where the petitioner had abused the informant, was a public place within public view. Therefore, the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. In Ramawatar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised to quash the proceedings under the special Act. There is no dispute with this proposition of law, and nobody is disputing the jurisdiction of this Court. In Daya Bhatnagar (supra), the Delhi High Court held that the incident occurring inside the building was not committed in a public place within public view. In the present case, the incident occurred on Chehad Bridge and not inside the house, and therefore, this judgment will also not apply to the present case. 25. It was submitted that abusing a person over the telephone does not fall within the purview of the SC and ST Act. This Court is deliberately refraining from giving a finding on this aspect because the FIR would not be quashed, even if this plea is accepted. Therefore, this is a moot question, as it is not necessary for the decision of the present petition. Further, the matter is pending before the learned Trial Court and any finding regarding this aspect will prejudice the learned Trial Court. Hence, it will be open to the petitioner to argue this matter before the learned Trial Court and invite a finding upon it. 26. It is undisputed that the learned Trial Court had framed the charges, and the petitioner has not assailed the orders framing the charges. Hence, it will be open to the petitioner to argue this matter before the learned Trial Court and invite a finding upon it. 26. It is undisputed that the learned Trial Court had framed the charges, and the petitioner has not assailed the orders framing the charges. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the Competent Court has framed the charges, the person aggrieved may invoke the revisional jurisdiction and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in rare cases. It was observed at page 145:- “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases, the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 27. In the present case, no exceptional circumstances were shown to justify the quashing of the FIR. 28. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948 that an order taking cognizance can be assailed under Section 528 of BNSS by challenging it specifically. In the present case, no exceptional circumstances were shown to justify the quashing of the FIR. 28. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948 that an order taking cognizance can be assailed under Section 528 of BNSS by challenging it specifically. It was observed: “8…..once a judicial order of taking cognisance intervenes, the power under Article 226 though not available to be exercised, power under Section 528, BNSS was available to be exercised to quash not only the FIR/charge-sheet but also the order taking cognisance, provided the same is placed on record along with the requisite pleadings to assail the same and a strong case for such quashing is set up.” 29. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 30. No other point was urged. 31. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 32. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.