Judgment : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 528 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) for quashing and setting aside orders dated 31st July 2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge CBI Courts, Shimla (learned Revisional Court), and 21st February 2024, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Second Class, Court No.6, (learned Trial Court). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the applicant filed an application before the learned Trial Court under Section 156 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC),to lodge an FIR against the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Shimla. It was asserted that the learned Presiding Officer had unduly favoured the respondent No. 2 in her illegal act of publishing false and misleading advertisements. Learned Presiding Officer intentionally violated her official duty by wrongly dismissing the stay application filed by the applicant. Hence, it was prayed that an FIR be registered against the learned Presiding Officer. 3. The applicant adduced preliminary evidence in support of his application. 4. The learned Trial Court held that the Court cannot act as a post office and has to apply its mind before passing an order of investigation. The Magistrate can order the registration of the FIR only when the allegations made before him disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. A judicial or quasi-judicial authority cannot be held criminally responsible for the judgments passed by it. The allegations did not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The applicant had a personal grudge against the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. Allowing such applications would undermine the dignity and integrity of the institution. Hence, the application was dismissed with costs of Rs. 1500/- 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant filed a revision, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge CBI Court, Shimla (learned Revisional Court). The learned Revisional Court held that the applicant was aggrieved by the dismissal of the application, which does not amount to the commission of any offence. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant filed a revision, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge CBI Court, Shimla (learned Revisional Court). The learned Revisional Court held that the applicant was aggrieved by the dismissal of the application, which does not amount to the commission of any offence. The jurisdiction to register FIR under Section 175 (3) of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) is discretionary and can be exercised when the allegations disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. No cognizable offence was disclosed, and the learned Trial Court was justified in dismissing the application. The applicant had an appropriate remedy to challenge the order before the competent forum. Judicial order does not become illegal by alleging it to be so, and only a competent authority can set aside such orders. The Magistrate had imposed the cost of Rs. 1500, which was not justified; hence, the order imposing the costs was set aside, and the revision was partly allowed. 6. Being aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Courts below, the applicant has filed the present petition, asserting that the learned Courts below neglected their duty and responsibility towards society. The application was dismissed despite providing sufficient evidence for the commission of the offence. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court failed to properly look into the complaint filed before her, and she violated her official duty. She wrongly held that the matter could be taken for consideration only after the receipt of a reference from the State Government. The learned Courts below also failed to look into the allegations made in the application. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed, orders passed by the learned Courts below be set aside, FIR be ordered to be registered, and compensation of Rs. 10 lakh be awarded to the petitioner. 7. The petitioner in person submitted that the learned Courts below erred in passing the impugned orders. The complaint disclosed the commission of cognizable offences, and the FIR should have been registered in the present case. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the orders passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the orders passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of BNSS (corresponding to Section 482 of CrPC) against an order dismissing the revision petition. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnan v. In Krishnaveni (1997) 4 SCC 241 , that the High Court can intervene under Section 482 of CrPC (corresponding to Section 528 of BNSS) when there is a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed: “10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person — accused/complainant — cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and, in an appropriate case, even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of a criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of a criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed, and public justice can be ensured only when the trial is conducted expeditiously. 11. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [ (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10], a three-judge Bench was to consider the scope of the power of the High Court under Section 482 and Section 397(2) of the Code. This Court held that the bar on the power of revision was put to facilitate expedient disposal of the cases, but in Section 482, it is provided that nothing in the Code, which would include Section 397(2) also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. On a harmonious construction of the said two provisions on this behalf, it was held that though the High Court has no power of revision in an interlocutory order, still the inherent power will come into play when there is no provision for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. In that case, when allegations of defamatory statements were published in the newspapers against the Law Minister, the State Government decided to prosecute the appellant for an offence under Section 500 IPC. After obtaining the sanction, on a complaint made by the public prosecutor, cognisance of the commission of the offence by the appellant was taken to trial in the Sessions Court. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The Sessions Judge rejected all the contentions and framed the charges under Section 406. The Order of the Sessions Judge was challenged in revision in the High Court. On a preliminary objection raised on maintainability, this Court held that the power of the High Court to entertain the revision was not taken away under Section 397 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code. 12. The Order of the Sessions Judge was challenged in revision in the High Court. On a preliminary objection raised on maintainability, this Court held that the power of the High Court to entertain the revision was not taken away under Section 397 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code. 12. In V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI [ 1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695: (1980) 2 SCR 380 ] (SCR at p. 393) a four-judge Bench per majority had held that sub- section (3) of Section 397, however, does not limit at all the inherent powers of the High Court contained in Section 482. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Court under Section 397(1) of the Code. In the Rajan Kumar Machananda case [ 1990 Supp SCC 132 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 537], the case related to the release of a truck from attachment, obviously on the filing of an interlocutory application. It was contended that there was a prohibition on the revision by operation of Section 397(2) of the Code. In that context, it was held that it was not revisable under Section 482 in the exercise of inherent powers by operation of sub-section (3) of Section 397. On the facts in that case, it was held that by provisions contained in Section 397(3), the revision is not maintainable. In the Dharampal case [ (1993) 1 SCC 435 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 333], which related to the exercise of power to issue an order of attachment under Section 146 of the Code, it was held that the inherent power under Section 482 was prohibited. On the facts, in that case, it could be said that the learned Judges would be justified in holding that it was not revisable since it was a prohibitory interim order of attachment covered under Section 397(2) of the Code but the observations of the learned Judges that the High Court had no power under Section 482 of the Code were not correct in view of the ratio of this Court in Madhu Limaye case [ (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] as upheld in V.C. Shukla case [ 1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695 : (1980) 2 SCR 380 ] and also in view of our observations stated earlier. The ratio in the Deepti case [ (1995) 5 SCC 751 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1020] is also not apposite to the facts in the present case. To the contrary, in that case, an application for discharge of the accused was filed in the Court of the Magistrate for an offence under Section 498-A IPC. The learned Magistrate and the Sessions Judge dismissed the petition. In the revision at the instance of the accused, on a wrong concession made by the counsel appearing for the State that the record did not contain allegations constituting the offence under Section 498-A, the High Court, without applying its mind, had discharged the accused. On appeal, this Court, after going through the record, noted that the concession made by the counsel was wrong. The record did contain the allegations to prove the charge under Section 498-A IPC. The High Court, since it failed to apply its mind, had committed an error of law in discharging the accused, leading to the miscarriage of justice. In that context, this Court held that the order of the Sessions Judge operated as a bar to entertain the application under Section 482 of the Code. In view of the fact that the order of the High Court had led to the miscarriage of justice, this Court had set aside the order of the High Court and confirmed that of the Magistrate. 13. The ratio of the Simrikhia case [ (1990) 2 SCC 437 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] has no application to the facts in this case. Therein, on a private complaint filed under Sections 452 and 323 IPC, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, had taken cognisance of the offence. He transferred the case for inquiry under Section 202 of the Code to the Second-Class Magistrate, who, after examining the witnesses, issued a process to the accused. The High Court, exercising the power under Section 482, dismissed the revision. But subsequently, on an application filed under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court corrected it. The question was whether the High Court was right in reviewing its order. In that factual backdrop, this Court held that the High Court could not exercise inherent power for the second time. The ratio therein, as stated above, has no application to the facts in this case. 14. The question was whether the High Court was right in reviewing its order. In that factual backdrop, this Court held that the High Court could not exercise inherent power for the second time. The ratio therein, as stated above, has no application to the facts in this case. 14. In view of the above discussion, we hold that though the revision before the High Court under sub- section (1) of Section 397 is prohibited by sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of the High Court under Section 483, the High Court is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and in setting aside the order of the courts below. It remitted the case to the Magistrate for a decision on the merits after consideration of the evidence. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the case. Since the High Court has left the matter to be considered by the Magistrate, it would be inappropriate at this stage to go into that question. We have only considered the issue of power and jurisdiction of the High Court in the context of the revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 397(3) and the inherent powers. We do not find any justification warranting interference in the appeal.” 10. This position was reiterated in Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir, (2001) 8 SCC 522 , wherein it was held: “…though the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is very wide, the same must be exercised sparingly and cautiously, particularly in a case where the petitioner is shown to have already invoked the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. Only in cases where the High Court finds that there has been a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, a sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may, in its discretion, prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Only in cases where the High Court finds that there has been a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, a sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may, in its discretion, prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. It was further held, “Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code.” 11. A similar view was taken in Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation, (2005) 2 SCC 571 , and it was held: “5. It may also be noticed that this Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan [ (1999) 6 SCC 326 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118] said that the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and such power shall not be utilised as a substitute for second revision. Ordinarily, when a revision has been barred under Section 397(3) of the Code, the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to revision before the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, as it is prohibited under Section 397(3) thereof. However, the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there is a serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the court or when mandatory provisions of the law are not complied with and when the High Court feels that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the revisional court.” 12. This position was reiterated in Shakuntala Devi v. Chamru Mahto, (2009) 3 SCC 310 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 8: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 292, wherein it was observed: - “24. This position was reiterated in Shakuntala Devi v. Chamru Mahto, (2009) 3 SCC 310 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 8: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 292, wherein it was observed: - “24. It is well settled that the object of the introduction of sub-section (3) in Section 397 was to prevent a second revision to avoid frivolous litigation, but, at the same time, the doors to the High Court to a litigant who had lost before the Sessions Judge were not completely closed and in special cases, the bar under Section 397(3) could be lifted. In other words, the power of the High Court to entertain a petition under Section 482 was not subject to the prohibition under sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code and was capable of being invoked in appropriate cases. Mr Sanyal's contention that there was a complete bar under Section 397(3) of the Code debarring the High Court from entertaining an application under Section 482 thereof does not, therefore, commend itself to us. 25. On the factual aspect, the Magistrate came to a finding that the appellants were entitled to possession of the disputed plot. It is true that while making such a declaration under Section 145(4) of the Code, the Magistrate could have also directed that the appellants be put in possession of the same. 26. The question which is now required to be considered is whether the High Court was right in quashing the order passed by the Magistrate, which was confirmed by the Sessions Judge, on the ground that the application made by the appellants under Section 145(6) of the Code was barred firstly by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and also by virtue of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 13. Delhi High Court also took a similar view in Surender Kumar Jain v. State, ILR (2012) 3 Del 99 and held:- “5. The issue regarding the filing of a petition before the High Court after having availed the first revision petition before the Court of Sessions has come up before the Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly. While laying that section 397(3) Cr. P.C. laid the statutory bar of the second revision petition, the courts have held that the High Court did enjoy inherent power under section 82 (sic) Cr. P.C. as well to entertain petitions even in those cases. While laying that section 397(3) Cr. P.C. laid the statutory bar of the second revision petition, the courts have held that the High Court did enjoy inherent power under section 82 (sic) Cr. P.C. as well to entertain petitions even in those cases. But that power was to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, particularly when the person approaching the High Court has already availed a remedy of first revision in the Sessions Court. This was not that in every case the person aggrieved by the order of the first revision court would have the right to be heard by the High Court to assail the same order which was the subject matter of the revision before the Sessions Court. It all depends not only on the facts and circumstances of each case but also on whether the impugned order brought about a situation that is an abuse of the process of the court, there was a serious miscarriage of justice or the mandatory provisions of law were not complied with. The power could also be exercised by this Court if there was an apparent mistake committed by the revisional court. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limave v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 , State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Aggarwal, (1979) 2 SCC 305 : AIR 1979 SC 87 , Rai Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration) 1980 Cri LJ 202, Krishnan v. Krishnaveni and Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation (2005) 2 SCC 571 .” 14. It is apparent from the judgments that the High Court has a limited jurisdiction and it can rectify a serious miscarriage of justice or non-compliance with a mandatory provisions of law while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNS (482 of the Cr. P.C). 15. It was specifically asserted by the applicant that he had filed an application seeking an ad interim injunction before the Labour Court. Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act provides the qualifications of the Presiding Officers of the Labour Court. It reads as follows: 7. Labour Courts. — xxx (2) A Labour Court shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the appropriate Government. Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act provides the qualifications of the Presiding Officers of the Labour Court. It reads as follows: 7. Labour Courts. — xxx (2) A Labour Court shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the appropriate Government. (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the presiding officer of a Labour Court, unless — (a) He is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or (b) he has, for a period of not less than three years, been a District Judge or an Additional District Judge; or] (c) [* * *] (d) He has held any judicial office in India for not less than seven years; or (e) He has been the presiding officer of a Labour Court constituted under any Provincial Act or State Act for not less than five years.] (f) He is or has been a Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) or Joint Commissioner of the State Labour Department, having a law degree and at least seven years' experience in the labour department, including three years of experience as a Conciliation Officer: Provided that no such Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner or Joint Labour Commissioner shall be appointed unless he resigns from the service of the Central Government or State Government, as the case may be, before being appointed as the presiding officer; or (g) he is an officer of the Indian Legal Service in Grade III with three years' experience in the grade.] 16. Section 11 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,makes every proceeding conducted by the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal a judicial proceeding. It reads as follows: “11. Section 11 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,makes every proceeding conducted by the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal a judicial proceeding. It reads as follows: “11. Procedure and powers of conciliation officers, Boards, Courts and Tribunals.— xxxx (3) Every Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely— (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects; (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses; (d) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed; and every inquiry or investigation by a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 17. Thus, it is apparent that the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court is a Judge and he conducts legal proceedings. Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 protects a Judge or the body of persons acting as a Judge giving definitive proceedings in legal proceedings. It was laid down in G. Santhosh Kumar v. State of Kerala, (2021) 2 HCC (Ker) 130: 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 2744 that every judicial proceeding is a legal proceeding. It was observed on page 140: “24. The expression used in Section 2 of the Act is “legal proceeding” and not “judicial proceeding”. 25. “Legal proceeding” in its normal connotation can only mean a proceeding in accordance with law. There can be no doubt that assessment proceedings under the Sales Tax Act are such proceedings. The expression “legal proceeding” is not synonymous with “judicial proceeding”. Proceedings may be legal even if they are not judicial proceedings, if they are authorised by law. (See Abdul Aziz Ansari v. State of Bombay, 1957 SCC OnLine Bom 108: AIR 1958 Bom 279 ). 26. Every judicial proceeding is a legal proceeding, but not vice versa, for the reason that there may be a “legal proceeding” which may not be judicial at all, e.g. statutory remedies like assessment under the Income Tax Act, Sales Tax Act, arbitration proceedings, etc. So, the ambit of expression “legal proceedings” is much wider than “judicial proceedings”. 26. Every judicial proceeding is a legal proceeding, but not vice versa, for the reason that there may be a “legal proceeding” which may not be judicial at all, e.g. statutory remedies like assessment under the Income Tax Act, Sales Tax Act, arbitration proceedings, etc. So, the ambit of expression “legal proceedings” is much wider than “judicial proceedings”. (See Army Headquarters v. CBI, (2012) 6 SCC 228 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 88: AIR 2012 SC 1890 ) 18. It was further held that an act of imposing a penalty or liability affecting the rights of others falls within the definition of judicial acts. It was observed at page 141: “29. The term “judicial” does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge or legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law. A judicial act is an act done by a competent authority, upon a consideration of facts and circumstances, and imposing liability or affecting the rights of others. (See Malraju Venkata Narasimha Rao Bahadur Zamindar Garu v. Municipal Council, Narasaraopet, 1930 SCC OnLine Mad 70: AIR 1931 Mad 122 ] )” 19. Patna High Court held in Rajesh Jha ‘Raja’ v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine Pat 9104 that Tehsildar/Naib Tehsildar are entitled to protection under the Judges Protection Act for the acts done by them in their official duties. It was observed: “23. Madhya Pradesh High Court, in similar situations, has held in the following judgments that Tehsildar/Naib Tehsildar is entitled to get the protection as provided in the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 while exercising powers under the M.P. Land Revenue Code, including the Mutation proceedings. (i) Mahesh Kumar Badole v. The State of M.P. Station House Officer, Misc. Criminal Case No. 41607 of 2021, order dated 10-7-2023 (MP) (ii) S.K. Jamra v. Rajaram in Cr. Appeal No. 2017/2016 dated 15.03.2019. (iii) Balram v. Ashwani Kumar Yadav, 2001 (2) MPHCT 330. (iv) Om Prakash v. Surjan Singh, 2004 RN 31 (v) S.S. Trivedi v. State of M.P., 2007 SCC OnLine MP 207 24. Section 3 of the Act of 1985 clearly provides that no civil or criminal proceeding can be entertained or continued against any judge in regard to any act allegedly committed while acting or purporting to Act in discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. Hence, the complaint itself was not maintainable before the Ld. Magistrate. Section 3 of the Act of 1985 clearly provides that no civil or criminal proceeding can be entertained or continued against any judge in regard to any act allegedly committed while acting or purporting to Act in discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. Hence, the complaint itself was not maintainable before the Ld. Magistrate. The Magistrate should not have entertained or continued the complaint proceeding, because the same is barred under Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. 20. This Court held in Manasi Sahay Thakur v. Madan Lal Sharma, 2018 SCC OnLine HP 3428, that the authorities acting under the RTI Act are entitled to protection under the Judges Protection Act. It was observed: “17. Since a person who is empowered by law to give in any legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment, which if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive, would include the appellate authority under R.T.I. Act and, therefore, such a person performing his duties as the appellate authority would obviously be immune from legal action.” 21. It was further held that acting in excess of jurisdiction will not take away the protection conferred by the Act. It was observed: “13. This section affords protection to two broad categories of acts done or ordered to be done by a judicial officer in his/her judicial capacity. In the first category fall those acts, which are within the limits of his/her jurisdiction and the second category encompasses those acts, which though may not be within the jurisdiction of Judicial Officers, but are nevertheless done or ordered to be done by him/her believing in good faith that he/she had jurisdiction to do them or order them to be done. If the Judicial Officer is found to have been acting in the discharge of his/her judicial duties, then, in order to exclude him/her from the protection of this statue, the complainant has to establish that - (i) the Judicial Officer complained against was acting without any jurisdiction whatsoever; and (ii) he/she was acting without good faith in believing himself/herself to have jurisdiction.” 22. Similar is the judgment in Anowar Hussain v. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, AIR 1965 SC 1651 ,wherein it was observed: “The statute is clearly intended to grant protection to Judicial Officers against suits in respect of acts done or ordered to be done by them in discharge of their duties as such officers. The Statute, it must be noticed, protects a Judicial Officer only when he is acting in his judicial capacity and not in any other capacity. But within the limits of its operation, it grants large protection to Judges and Magistrates acting in the discharge of their judicial duties. If the act done or ordered to be done in the discharge of judicial duties is within his jurisdiction, the protection is absolute and no enquiry will be entertained whether the act done or ordered was erroneously, irregularly or even illegally, or was done or ordered without believing in good faith that he had jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of. If the act done or ordered is not within the limits of his jurisdiction, the Judicial Officer acting in the discharge of his judicial duties is still protected, if at the time of doing or ordering the act complained of, he, in good faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act. The expression “jurisdiction” does not mean the power to do or order the act impugned, but generally the authority of the Judicial Officer to act in the matter.” 23. In the present case, the Presiding Officer passed an order giving definitive judgment on the question whether the applicant was entitled to an ad-interim injunction. Such judgment bound the parties to the proceedings. Once the Labour Court has the jurisdiction to pass an order it is entitled to the protection granted under the Act, and no proceeding is maintainable.It was observed in Pravin Niwritti Sawant v. J.D. Anandgaonkar, Ex. J.M.F.C., Ichalkaranji, 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 394: 2008 Cri LJ 984: (2007) 5 Mah LJ 838, that the protection granted to the Judge is absolute and the Magistrate cannot entertain any complaint. It was observed at page 846: “17. J.M.F.C., Ichalkaranji, 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 394: 2008 Cri LJ 984: (2007) 5 Mah LJ 838, that the protection granted to the Judge is absolute and the Magistrate cannot entertain any complaint. It was observed at page 846: “17. In view of the title of section 3 of the ‘Act’ and in view of specific provisions of section 4 of the ‘Act’, it is clear that the protection given under section 3 is in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force providing for the protection of a Judge. Certain protection against prosecution without prior sanction is provided by section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. From the language of section 3(1) of the ‘Act’, it is clear that subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty or function. Thus, sub-section (1) of section 3 provides complete protection against any civil or criminal proceeding against a Judge for any act done by him in the discharge of his official or judicial functions, only subject to sub-section (2) of section 3. In view of the complete protection under section 3(1) of the ‘Act’, no person who is or who was a Judge can be prosecuted for any act or thing done by him in the discharge of his official or judicial functions. In view of this protection, on the basis of the complaint made by the complainant, cognisance could not be taken by any Magistrate.” 24. The petitioner filed the complaint against the learned Presiding Officer for passing an order against him. He arrayed the Judicial Magistrate as a party in the revision and the Revisional Court as a party before this Court. This shows an attempt to browbeat and terrorise the Courts in discharging their duties and to interfere with the administration of justice. This Court deprecated such a tendency in Manasi Sahay Thakur (supra) as under: “22. The entire sequence of events, as narrated above, only goes to show that the plaintiff, all throughout the proceedings, was trying to browbeat, terrorise and intimidate the Presiding Officer, i.e. the defendant. 23. This Court deprecated such a tendency in Manasi Sahay Thakur (supra) as under: “22. The entire sequence of events, as narrated above, only goes to show that the plaintiff, all throughout the proceedings, was trying to browbeat, terrorise and intimidate the Presiding Officer, i.e. the defendant. 23. No affront to the majesty of law can be permitted. The fountain of justice cannot be allowed to be polluted by disgruntled litigants. The protection is necessary for the Courts and quasi-judicial authorities to enable them to discharge their functions without fear. Even the quasi-judicial authorities like the Judges need to be insulated so that they are able to perform their duties freely and fairly, or else, the administration of justice would become a casualty and the Rule of Law would receive a setback. Even the quasi-judicial authorities are obliged to decide cases impartially and without any fear or favour. Therefore, litigants cannot be allowed to terrorise or intimidate these authorities with a view to securing orders which they want. This is basic and fundamental, and no civilised system of administration of justice can permit it.” 25. Therefore, no fault can be found with the orders passed by the learned Courts below. 26. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.