JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 24.1.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.2, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). However, he was convicted for the commission of offence punishable under Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act and sentenced to pay fine of Rs.500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for seven days. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304A of the IPC and Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that Sushma Devi (since deceased) and Kuldeep Chand (PW1) were returning from Tanda in a bus on 3.3.2009. They got down near the office of ONGC. Sushma Devi purchased onions and was sitting on the roadside. A motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-36A-3245 came from Jawalaji at high speed and hit Sushma. The motorcycle and the rider, Ravinder Kumar (accused), fell. Sushma and the accused sustained injuries in the accident. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. The injured were taken to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police, and an entry in the daily diary was recorded. ASI Bhupinder Singh (PW5) went to the hospital for verification. He filed an application (Ex.PA) for the medical examination of the injured. MLC (Ex.PB) was issued showing that Sushma Devi had sustained multiple injuries. X-ray and CT scan were advised. Sushma Devi was referred to RPGMC, Tanda, for further treatment. Ravinder Kumar was also medically examined, and an MLC (Ex.PC) was issued stating that he had sustained multiple injuries. Statement of Sushma (Ex.PW5/A) was recorded, which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW5/B) was registered. ASI Bhupinder Singh (PW5) investigated the matter. He went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW5/D). He took photographs (Ex.PF to Ex.PH). He seized the motorcycle vide seizure memo (Ex.PW1/A). Statement of Sushma (Ex.PW5/A) was recorded, which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW5/B) was registered. ASI Bhupinder Singh (PW5) investigated the matter. He went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW5/D). He took photographs (Ex.PF to Ex.PH). He seized the motorcycle vide seizure memo (Ex.PW1/A). Sushma Devi succumbed to her injuries in the hospital. ASI Bhupinder Singh (PW5) filed an application (Ex.PE) for the postmortem of Sushma. He also conducted the inquest on the dead body. Postmortem Report (Ex.PD) was issued, in which it was mentioned that Sushma died because of the combined effect of asphyxia and hemorrhagic shock attributable to multiple ante- mortem injuries. The accused produced the documents of the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-36A-3245, which were seized vide memo (Ex.PW5/F). HC Chaman Lal (PW4) conducted the mechanical examination of the motorcycle and found that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicle which could have led to the accident. The statements of remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, a challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court put the notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of IPC and Section 181 of MV Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. Prosecution examined five witnesses to prove its case. Kuldeep Chand (PW1), Sunny (PW2) and Kamal Kumar (PW3) are the eyewitnesses. HC Chaman Lal (PW4) conducted the mechanical examination of the motorcycle. ASI Bhupinder Singh (PW5) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was driving the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-36A-3245 on 3.3.2009. He admitted that an FIR was registered against him. He also admitted that he and Sushma were injured in the incident. He stated that witnesses deposed against him as they were interested. He did not lead any defence evidence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused did not dispute that he was driving the motorcycle. ASI Bhupinder Singh (PW5) admitted in his cross-examination that there are 7-8 shops at the place of occurrence; however, no eyewitness was examined. The prosecution witnesses admitted that they reached the spot after the accident. Hence, they could not be the eyewitnesses to the incident. ASI Bhupinder Singh (PW5) admitted in his cross-examination that there are 7-8 shops at the place of occurrence; however, no eyewitness was examined. The prosecution witnesses admitted that they reached the spot after the accident. Hence, they could not be the eyewitnesses to the incident. The prosecution had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accident occurred due to the rashness or negligence of the accused. The accused did not produce his driving licence; hence, he was convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 181 of the MV Act and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.500/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for seven days. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court did not appreciate the material placed on record properly. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses were discarded without assigning any cogent reason. Kuldeep Chand (PW1) and Sunny (PW2) categorically stated that the accused was driving the motorcycle in a rash and negligent manner. He could not control the motorcycle, and the accident occurred due to the high speed and negligence of the accused. Kamal Kumar (PW3) did not support the prosecution’s case but admitted in his cross-examination that the motorcycle being driven by the accused had hit Sushma. The accused did not dispute his presence on the spot. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant-State and Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence. The statements made by the deceased and Kuldeep proved that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. The accused was driving the motorcycle without a driving licence, which by itself is negligence. Learned Trial Court ignored this aspect and acquitted the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. The accused was driving the motorcycle without a driving licence, which by itself is negligence. Learned Trial Court ignored this aspect and acquitted the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that the prosecution’s case is based upon the high speed of the motorcycle, which by itself is not sufficient to infer negligence. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while appreciating the material on record, and this Court should not interfere with it while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in   the   following   words:   (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of the accused's innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of the accused's innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. The prosecution asserted that the accident occurred because of the rashness or negligence of the accused. These terms were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahadev Prasad Kaushik v. State of U.P., (2008) 14 SCC 479 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 834: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1551, at page 487: 26. Though the term “negligence” has not been defined in the Code, it may be stated that negligence is the omis- sion to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do. 25. In Empress of India v. Idu Beg [ILR (1881) 3 All 776] Straight, J. made the following pertinent observations which have been quoted with approval by various courts, including this Court: (ILR p. 780) “… criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury, but without intention to cause in- jury, or knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the conse- quences. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the conse- quences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury ei- ther to the public generally or to an individual in par- ticular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the impera- tive duty of the accused person to have adopted.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Statement of Sushma Devi (Ex.PW1/A) reads that a motorcycle came from Jawalaji at a high speed and hit her. She sustained multiple injuries. The accident occurred due to rashness, negligence and high speed. Kuldeep Chand (PW1) stated in examination-in-chief that the motorcycle came at a high speed from Kangra and hit Sushma Devi. Sunny (PW2) stated that a motorcycle came at a high speed from Kangra, and the driver could not control it. The motorcycle hit Sushma Devi. 16. Therefore, it is apparent from the statements of the prosecution witnesses that they have attributed the accident to high speed. No person has mentioned the approximate speed of the motorcycle. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 17. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493 , wherein it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 18. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2005 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “11. It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 19. This  position  was  reiterated  in  State  of  H.P.  Vs. It was observed: - “11. It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 19. This  position  was  reiterated  in  State  of  H.P.  Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 20. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable merely because the witnesses stated that he was driving the vehicle at a high speed. 21. It was submitted that the accused was convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 181 of the MV Act. The accused did not file any appeal against the judgment, which means that he has accepted the fact that he was driving of the vehicle without a valid driving licence. The driving of a vehicle without a valid driving licence itself amounts to negligence. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down in State Government v. Bhawanesh Kumar, 1957 SCC OnLine MP 102, that the absence of a driving licence does not constitute rashness or negligence. It was observed: “15. We are equally clear that from the mere fact that the accused-respondent did not possess a driving licence, it cannot be positively inferred that he was guilty of rashness or negligence in driving a heavy vehicle like a truck. There is evidence of Jabbar (D. W. 1), which shows that the accused is in charge of the Sarodha Head Workshop, and he has been testing and driving motor vehicles for 1½ years. There is evidence of Jabbar (D. W. 1), which shows that the accused is in charge of the Sarodha Head Workshop, and he has been testing and driving motor vehicles for 1½ years. According to him, he is an experienced motor driver, and consequently, there is nothing to show that in undertaking to drive a heavy motor vehicle like a truck, he was undertaking a risk for which there was no justification whatsoever. Whether he drives a vehicle with a licence or without a licence, the law expects him to be neither rash nor negligent in the performance of his task, and we will judge his conduct in the matter as if he were the most qualified driver who brings to his task the ordinary reasonable competency of persons driving heavy motor vehicles.” 22. This position was reiterated in Suleman Rehiman Mulani v. State of Maharashtra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 337 : (1968) 2 SCR 515 : AIR 1968 SC 829 , wherein it was observed: 12….There is no presumption in law that a person who possesses only a learner's licence or possesses no licence at all does not know driving. For various reasons, not excluding sheer indifference, he might not have taken a regular licence. The prosecution’s evidence that Appellant 1 had driven the jeep to various places on the day previous to the occurrence is proof of the fact that he knew driving. There was no basis for the conclusion that it was a sheer stroke of good fortune that he did not meet with any accident on that day. xxxxx 14….In the present case, we do not know what was the proximate cause of the accident. We cannot rule out the possibility of the accident having been caused due to the fault of the deceased. The question of whether Appellant 1 was proficient in driving a Jeep or not does not conclude the issue. His proficiency in driving might furnish a defence, which a learner could not have, but the absence of proficiency did not make him guilty. The only question was whether, in point of fact, he was not competent to drive and his incompetence was the cause of the death of the person concerned. 23. Hence, the accused cannot be held to be negligent merely because he did not possess a driving licence. 24. The only question was whether, in point of fact, he was not competent to drive and his incompetence was the cause of the death of the person concerned. 23. Hence, the accused cannot be held to be negligent merely because he did not possess a driving licence. 24. Kuldeep Chand (PW1) stated in his cross- examination that he came to the spot after hearing the noise of the accident. He was purchasing ‘bidis’. This part of the statement shows that he had not witnessed the actual accident, and he visited the spot only after hearing the noise. 25. Sunny (PW2) stated in his cross-examination that Kuldeep was not present on the spot, and he had gone to purchase ‘bidis’. Sunny admitted that Kuldeep reached the spot after hearing the noise. This cross-examination also supports the inference drawn by the learned Trial Court that Kuldeep was not present on the spot at the time of the accident. 26. Sunny (PW2) stated in his cross-examination that he came to know of the accident when the motorcycle had fallen. He also rushed to the spot. He did not know what had happened before the motorcycle had fallen. He also stated that he had seen Sushma after she had fallen. 27. The statement of this witness also shows that he had not witnessed the accident. He reached the spot after hearing the noise, and he was not aware as to what had transpired before the accident. Therefore, his testimony does not prove the rashness or negligence of the accused. 28. Kamal Kumar (PW3) did not support the prosecution’s case. He stated that he heard some noise and saw that a motorcycle had fallen. He was not aware that the motorcycle had hit Sushma Devi. He was permitted to be cross- examined. He denied that when he came out after hearing the noise, Sushma Devi was shouting for help, and the motorcycle was lying at some distance. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. 29. The testimony of this witness does not prove the rashness or negligence of the accused. He only saw the accused and not the motorcycle that had hit the deceased. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from his testimony. 30. There is no other evidence to prove the rashness or negligence of the accused. 29. The testimony of this witness does not prove the rashness or negligence of the accused. He only saw the accused and not the motorcycle that had hit the deceased. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from his testimony. 30. There is no other evidence to prove the rashness or negligence of the accused. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view which could have been taken based on the evidence led before the Court, and no interference is required with it while deciding an appeal against acquittal. 31. No other point was urged. 32. Consequently, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. 33. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 34. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.