APHC010565672008 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) TUESDAY, THE TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: Between: 1. THE STATE OF APR EP BY ITS PP HYD., REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P., AT HYDERABAD. 1. SOMARALA SRINIVASA RAO INDIRA COLONY, GODAVARI DISTRICT. 2. SOMARALA CHINNI KRISHNA, S/O TIRUPATHI, RETD. SECURITY GUARD, R/O INDIRA COLONY, VENKATAPURAM PANCHAYAT, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT. 3. SOMARALA BABY NIRMALA, W/O CHINNIKRISHNA, RETD. SECURITY GUARD, R/O INDIRA COLONY, VENKATAPURAM PANCHAYAT, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT. Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High Court may be pleased to present this Memorandum of Crl.A., against the acquittal in C.C.No.379 of 2005 Hon'ble J. dt.28.02.2007 and prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set the order of acquittal and convict the accused / respondent for the offence with which they were charged. IA NO: 1 OF 2008(CRLAMP 1324 OF 2008 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) THE NINETEENTH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1083/2008 THE STATE OF APR EP BY ITS PP HYD., REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P., AT HYDERABAD. ...AP AND SOMARALA SRINIVASA RAO, 2 OTHERS, S/O CHINNIKRISHNA, R/O VENKATAPURAM PANCHAYAT, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT. SOMARALA CHINNI KRISHNA, S/O TIRUPATHI, RETD. SECURITY GUARD, R/O INDIRA COLONY, VENKATAPURAM PANCHAYAT, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT. SOMARALA BABY NIRMALA, W/O CHINNIKRISHNA, RETD. SECURITY GUARD, R/O INDIRA COLONY, VENKATAPURAM PANCHAYAT, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT. ...RESPON Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High Court may be pleased to present this Memorandum of Crl.A., against the C.No.379 of 2005 Hon'ble J.F.C.M., Spl.Mobile Court, Eluru, 2007 and prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set the order of acquittal and convict the accused / respondent for the offence with IA NO: 1 OF 2008(CRLAMP 1324 OF 2008 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [3369] THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO THE STATE OF APR EP BY ITS PP HYD., REP. BY ITS PUBLIC ...APPELLANT 2 OTHERS, S/O CHINNIKRISHNA, R/O VENKATAPURAM PANCHAYAT, WEST SOMARALA CHINNI KRISHNA, S/O TIRUPATHI, RETD. SECURITY GUARD, R/O INDIRA COLONY, VENKATAPURAM PANCHAYAT, SOMARALA BABY NIRMALA, W/O CHINNIKRISHNA, RETD. SECURITY GUARD, R/O INDIRA COLONY, VENKATAPURAM NDENT(S): Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High Court may be pleased to present this Memorandum of Crl.A., against the Spl.Mobile Court, Eluru, 2007 and prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set-aside the order of acquittal and convict the accused / respondent for the offence with 2 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of the ''383'' days in presenting the appeal against the order of acquittal of the accused / respondents in C.C.No. 379 of 2005 on the file of the J.F.C.M., Spl.Mobile Court, Eluru, dt. 28-02-2007. Counsel for the Appellant: 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. I V N RAJU The Court made the following JUDGMENT: 1. This appeal, under section 378(3) & (1) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C’) is preferred by the Appellant / State against the judgment of acquittal rendered by the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Special Mobile Court, Eluru (for short, ‘the Trial Court’) in Calendar Case No.379 of 2005 (old C.C.No.1334 of 2004) by its judgment dated 28.02.2007, acquitted the accused for the offences punishable under sections 496, 417 and 498A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). 2. Perused the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the Trial Court, which is challenged under this appeal. It consisted of evidence of PWs.1 to 12 and documents Exs.P.1 to P.16, were marked. 3. The facts in a nutshell, which give rise to the present appeal, are as follows: On 17.06.2004, B. Rajeswari (LW1) lodged a complaint alleging that, for about a year, A.1, a close neighbour, professed love and repeatedly promised marriage. After Rajeswari proposed marriage, A.1’s parents (A.2 and A.3) began referring to her as their daughter-in-law. Subsequently, A.1 informed her that his parents expected a dowry of Rs.1,00,000/- for the marriage. On 02.06.2004, A.1 conducted a ceremonial tying of the 3 Mangalasutram at Perupalem beach, creating the impression of a lawful marriage, and engaged in sexual relations with her. When Rajeswari informed A.1’s parents of the marriage, they became hostile, abused her and her family, and threatened her with dire consequences. Before village elders, A.1 denied any relationship with her. On her complaint, the police registered case in Cr.No.136 of 2004, recorded statements, and arrested A.1 on 17.06.2004 and A.2 and A.3 on 30.06.2004, and produced before the court. Medical examination confirmed Rajeswari had engaged in sexual intercourse, and the A.1 was medically capable. A charge sheet was subsequently filed after completion of the investigation. 4. The Trial Court took cognizance of the offence under Section 496, 493, 417, 506, 498A r/w 34 of IPC against the accused. Upon their appearance before the Court, copies of the relevant documents were furnished to them as mandated under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C. After hearing the submissions made by the Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel on the question of charge, the Trial Court framed charges against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 496, 417 and 498A of the IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. The Trial Court examined the accused as required under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to enable them to consider the evidence that had been led on the part of the prosecution and also appeared against them. But the accused denied the truth of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. After conclusion of arguments and upon perusal of the material, the Trial Court found the accused not guilty and acquitted them. 6. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the Appellant / State contends that the trial court erred in failing to appreciate that the essential ingredients of offences under Sections 496, 417, and 498A of IPC were made out. He further contends that the PW.1’s testimony, clearly establishes the 4 charge of cheating, and the Trial Court's disregard of prosecution evidence renders the acquittal unsustainable. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents/accused contends that the case has been fabricated against the respondents; the PW.1’s testimony lacks corroboration from other prosecution witnesses, and that the Trial Court rightly disbelieved the prosecution’s version. The learned counsel accordingly supports the findings and conclusions recorded by the Trial Court. 8. I have heard learned counsel on either side and carefully perused the material available on record, including the oral and documentary evidence produced by the prosecution before the Trial Court. 9. The point for determination is: Was the Sessions Court justified in acquitting the accused? P O I N T: 10. Before re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it is necessary here to mention the power of the Appellate Court regarding interference. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of A. Shankar V. State of Karnataka 1, at paragraph 26 of the judgment, has held as follows: "26. It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the appellate court, under compelling circumstances, should reverse the judgment of acquittal of the court below if the findings so recorded by the court below are found to be perverse i.e. the conclusions of the court below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that acquittal by the court below bolsters the presumption of his innocence." 11. In State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr.2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the power of appellate court to interfere in an appeal 1 (2011) 6 SCC 279 2 (2007) 3 SCC 755 5 against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this point has concluded as under: “16.....while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterised as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged with.” 12. With the above principles in mind, this court analyse the reasoning and ultimate conclusion of the Sessions Court in interfering with the order of acquittal. 13. The de facto complainant, as PW.1, testified that at the time of her marriage, she was working as a Vidya Volunteer and that the accused were her neighbors. It is undisputed that PW.1 was acquainted with A.1 well before the alleged marriage. According to her testimony, A.1 used to follow her on her way to school and expressed his love for her during 2003–2004. While A.1 does not deny knowing PW.1, he claims their acquaintance was limited to a teacher–student relationship, as PW.1 had taught him. The familial relationship among the accused is also not in dispute. 14. PW.6, Buditha Surya Kumari, PW.1’s sister, is also a teacher. During cross-examination, she stated that her house is adjacent to that of the accused, and that the A.1 and his family have been residing next door. She also testified that she has been conducting tuition classes for the past five years. The evidence on record clearly indicates that A.1 had prior acquaintance with PW.1, as they resided in the same locality. According to PW.1, A.1 had been following her for five years and expressed his love for her 6 in 2004. She suggested marriage, to which A.1 responded that he would seek his parents’ permission and later informed her that they were demanding dowry. PW.1 further stated that their marriage took place on 02.06.2004 at the RCM Church, though not according to customary traditions; she presented a gold ring to A.1, which she had ordered at his request. A.1, in his defence, claimed he was merely PW.1’s neighbour and a student receiving tuition from her, and denied any other relationship. The Trial Court accepted A.1’s version. However, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, during arguments, submitted that there is no evidence, as observed by the Trial Court, to establish that A.1 was ever a student of PW.1. 15. The Trial Court observed that PW.5, Buditha Mohana Rao, PW.1’s brother, clearly admitted that A.1 had been a student of PW.1 during the 8th and 9th standards. Upon going through the evidence of PW.5, it is clearly evident that he explicitly stated A.1 used to attend tuition under PW.1. Therefore, the submission made by the prosecution in this regard is incorrect. The testimony of PW.5 supports the Trial Court’s finding. 16. From the evidence on record, it is clear that PW.2 (K. Mariyamma), PW.3 (K. Pentamma), PW.4 (N. Ganga), and PW.10 (G. Solmanraju) did not support the prosecution’s case. Consequently, they were treated as hostile and cross-examined by the learned Public Prosecutor. PW.7 (Thota Naga Raju), who was examined as a mediator to prove the panchayat held between the parties, also failed to support the prosecution’s case. 17. The record reveals that the prosecution has failed to produce any cogent or convincing evidence to establish the alleged marriage between PW.1 and A.1. PW.1 has given inconsistent statements regarding the place of marriage. In her chief-examination, she stated that the marriage took place on 02.06.2004 at the RCM Church, Perupalem, Narsapuram. However, the prosecution did not produce any documentary evidence or records from the church authorities to substantiate this claim. Contrarily, PW.5, the brother of 7 PW1, testified that the marriage occurred on the same date at Narsapuram Beach, Perupalem, though he admitted he did not attend the ceremony. This suggests that neither PW.1’s brother nor her parents were present at the alleged marriage. In cross-examination, PW.5 further stated that he had no personal knowledge of the marriage or of any exchange of rings. There is a clear inconsistency between the testimonies of PW.1 and PW.5 regarding the location of the alleged marriage, whether it took place at the beach or at the RCM Church, Perupalem, casting serious doubt on the prosecution’s version. 18. Notably, PW.6 also did not state that she attended the alleged marriage between PW.1 and A.1. The Trial Court, in its observations, noted that even according to PW.1, it was she who proposed marriage after A.1 professed his love for her. A.1 allegedly married her as a formality and led her to believe that they were husband and wife, thereafter engaging in repeated sexual intercourse with her. In this context, the Trial Court expressed significant doubts regarding the credibility of PW.1’s version. It questioned the likelihood that an educated and experienced individual, such as a Vidya Volunteer, who is presumed to be both knowledgeable and prudent, would place unconditional trust in A.1’s verbal assurances. The Trial Court found it difficult to accept that such a woman could have willingly consented to a physical relationship based solely on A.1’s claims of marriage, without any formal ceremony or legal recognition to support those assertions. PW.1’s cross- examination reveals that she completed her M.A., in 2002, whereas the alleged marriage took place on 02.06.2004. The Trial Court further noted that despite knowing A.1’s alleged ill motives at the time she filed the complaint (Ex.A1), PW.1 did not inform her family members about the events until much later, raising further doubt about the credibility of her version. The overall evidence suggests that PW.1 is not a wholly reliable witness. In her cross- examination, she denied that A.1 was her student. However, as previously noted, PW.5 categorically stated that A.1 was a student of PW.1 during his 8th and 9th standard. PWs.8 and 9, the medical professionals, were examined to 8 establish the physical capacity of both PW.1 and A.1 to engage in sexual intercourse. As per the medical certificates marked as Exs.P12 and P13, both were found to be capable of performing sexual intercourse. 19. The record clearly shows that, aside from PW.1’s testimony, there is no other evidence indicating that A.1 induced PW.1 to engage in sexual intercourse with the intent to deceive her. PW.1’s evidence reveals that she became acquainted with A.2 and A.3, the parents of A.1, as early as seven years before the alleged offence, given that they lived adjacent to her house. PW.1 frequently visited their home, maintained close interactions, exchanged conversations, and discussed various matters with them. Despite this close relationship with A.1’s parents, PW.1’s testimony does not demonstrate any effort on her part to report the alleged acts committed by A.1. Moreover, she has not provided any explanation for failing to inform either her parents or A.2 and A.3 about the matter. 20. PW.1’s testimony reveals several inconsistencies. Despite being an educated woman, she failed to explain why she did not obtain a marriage certificate from the RCM Church confirming that the marriage took place there. According to PW.1’s evidence, the matter was referred to the elders on 10.06.2004, with a meeting scheduled for 13.06.2004. At the panchayat held on that date, A.1 reportedly stated before the elders that his relationship with PW.1 was purely a friendship. This testimony indicates that even A.1 denied the marriage in the presence of the elders. During cross-examination, PW.1 stated that she presented a gold ring to A.1 because the church pastor was unavailable at the time of the marriage; A.1 formally tied the thali (mangalsutra); and that A.1 promised to marry her. However, this evidence suggests that PW.1 herself was uncertain whether the marriage was actually solemnized. Furthermore, there is no record of the thali being produced or marked during the investigation, nor has PW.1 provided any explanation for its absence. Had PW.1’s claims been truthful, she would likely have offered details about the thali and reasons for its non-production. Additionally, PW.1 9 has not clarified why she agreed to marry A.1 despite the significant age difference and the fact that he was her student. 21. PW.5 testified that PW.1 informed him that A.1 exchanged rings as a token of marriage. However, PW.5 did not state that PW.1 told him that A.1 tied the thali in the church. If PW.1’s version were accurate, she would likely have shared this significant detail with PW.5 as well. During cross- examination, PW.5 further explained that it is customary for the bride’s parents to approach the groom’s parents to arrange the marriage. However, they neither communicated with A.1’s parents regarding the marriage nor discussed any related matters. PW.5 also stated that he had no personal knowledge of any demand for additional dowry made by A.1 to his parents, A.2 and A.3. Had PW.1’s claims been true, it is reasonable to expect that PW.5 would have been aware of such dowry demands allegedly made by A.1’s parents. 22. The evidence of PW.6 does not indicate that PW.1 informed her about A.1 tying the thali. Furthermore, the Ex.P12, RFSL report and PW.8’s clinical examination confirm that PW.1 had engaged in sexual intercourse on multiple occasions, but they do not establish that these acts were with A.1. The record lacks evidence to show that A.1 dishonestly induced PW.1 by leading her to believe she was his legally wedded wife or that the accused demanded Rs.1,00,000/- as dowry for performing a lawful marriage between PW.1 and A.1. In the absence of sufficient material to substantiate the alleged marriage, it is highly unlikely that such demands for additional dowry were made by the accused. Upon appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the Trial Court found the testimony of the PW.1, who is the prime witness, to be unreliable and accordingly disbelieved her version. 23. In light of these circumstances, and upon a comprehensive evaluation of the entire evidence, the Trial Court rightly concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused for the offences under section 496, 10 417 and 498A of the IPC beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Trial Court acquitted the accused of the said charges. 24. In Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena V. State of Karnataka3, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed the scope of section 378 of the Code as under: “Section 378 Cr.P.C. enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal. Section 384 Cr.P.C., speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial Court renders its decision by acquitting the accused, the presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate Court. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the court of the first instance has its advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the evidence before it. Still, it is duty bound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial Court is both a possible and plausible view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty and the advantage of having seen the witnesses. 25. So far as the main issue is concerned, that scope of acquittal appeal is well defined by now by series of decisions and the same is not to be repeated time and again, however, one of the recent decision in case of Harbeer Singh V. Sheeshpal4, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that mere fact that another view could also have been possible that cannot be a ground to reverse the acquittal. The powers of High Court are wide enough to turtle the acquittal order, however, some parameters are well defined by series of decisions in which this court is of the considered opinion that State has not made out any case which would permit this court to exercise such wide powers. Neither any material irregularity is pointed out nor any perversity is reflecting on the contrary it is reflecting that there is an application of mind on the part of learned judge as the entire material on record has been dealt with specifically and the principle of appreciation of evidence appears to have been rightly undertaken by the court below and therefore when such eventuality is 3 2021 (15) SCALE Pg. 184 4 (2017) CriLJ 169 11 reflecting sitting in a jurisdiction dealing with an order of acquittal Court is of the opinion not to interfere with such exercise. The relevant observations of the aforesaid decision in paras: 10 and 11 (Cri.L.J.) are reproduced herein after: "10. The above principle has been reiterated by this court in a number of judicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, this court will not interfere with the judgment of the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or perverse or mainfestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another view could also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a ground for reversing an order of acquittal. 11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution, and it never shifts. Another golden thread that runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view that is favourable to the accused should be adopted. 26. Considering the aforesaid set of circumstances and in view of the conjoint reading of the conclusion arrived at in co-relation with the evidence on record, this court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution makes out no case to establish a definite guilt of the respondents / accused. 27. It is a settled principle of law that if the Trial Court takes the view, it should not be reversed, even if another view is possible. The view taken by the Trial Court is a plausible one. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this court is not inclined to reverse the Trial Court's finding. 28. The Trial Court rightly reached its conclusion, providing sound and justifiable reasons. Therefore, the appellant’s request for interference lacks merit. A re-appreciation of the evidence reveals no misdirection or misinterpretation by the Trial Court. Upon careful reconsideration, there is no flaw in the findings of fact by the Trial Court. Therefore, the acquittal of the respondents cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, the appeal against the acquittal is dismissed, and the order of acquittal is confirmed, and there is no 12 reason to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court. Accordingly, the point is answered. 29. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Criminal Appeal No.1083 of 2008 fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Special Mobile court, Eluru, in Calendar Case No.379 of 2005 (old C.C.No.1334 of 2004), dated 28.02.2007 stands confirmed. Interim orders, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated, and all pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. _____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 19.08.2025 SAK 13 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1083 of 2008 Date: 19.08.2025 SAK