JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 13.08.2013 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amb, District Una, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the charges framed under Sections 323 and 325 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 325 read with Section 34 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant Laxman Gir (PW1), was going to his home on 24.03.2007. He found Babbu alias Ravinder Kumar (accused) near his home. The informant inquired from the accused as to what he was doing near his home. The accused replied that a cow had entered the informant's field. The informant went to his field to drive away the cow. The accused followed him. The accused pushed the informant. Jafu alias Rajinder Kumar, the brother of the accused Babbu, also reached the spot, and both of them gave beatings to the informant. The informant cried for help. His wife Parveen Kumari (PW2) and daughter Monika (PW4) reached the spot and rescued the informant from the accused. The informant sustained injuries. He reported the matter to the police. An entry (Ex. PW1/E) was recorded in the police post, which was sent to the police station where F.I.R. (Ex.PW5/A) was registered. Deep Chand (PW8) investigated the matter. He filed an application (Ex.PW8/A) for conducting the medical examination of the injured. Dr. R.K. Garg (PW9) conducted the medical examination of the injured and found that he had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused within 24 hours by a blunt weapon. He issued MLC (Ex. PW9/A). X-rays (Ex. PW3/A) were taken, and the injuries were found to be grievous. Deep Chand visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW8/C). He recorded the statements of prosecution witnesses as per their version. Challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. He issued MLC (Ex. PW9/A). X-rays (Ex. PW3/A) were taken, and the injuries were found to be grievous. Deep Chand visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW8/C). He recorded the statements of prosecution witnesses as per their version. Challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 325 and 323 read with Section 34 of IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Laxman Gir (PW1) is the informant. Parveen Kumari (PW2) and Monika (PW4) are the eyewitnesses. Dr. Vipin Chaudhary (PW3) went through X-rays and found a grievous injury. Om Parkash (PW5) applied for medical examination of the injured. HHC Sada Shiv (PW6) proved the entry in the daily diary. Mehar Chand (PW7) prepared the challan. Deep Chand (PW8) conducted the investigation. Dr. R.K. Garg (PW9) conducted the medical examination of the injured. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr. P.C. denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They stated that a false case was made against them due to enmity over the land. Statements of Surindra Devi (DW1) and Raj Kumar (DW2) were recorded in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that Surindra Devi (DW1), whose presence was not disputed, had not supported the prosecution’s case. Monika (PW4) admitted that the houses of Raj Kumar, Ashwani and Santosh were located in the vicinity. Raj Kumar (DW2) denied that any incident had taken place. There were major contradictions in the testimonies of eyewitnesses, which made the prosecution’s case highly doubtful. The incident occurred on 24.03.2007; however, the matter was reported to the police on 25.03.2007 after a lapse of sixteen hours. There was no satisfactory explanation for the delay; hence, the accused were acquitted of the charged offences. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The accused claimed that a false FIR was lodged against them because of a land dispute, but no such suggestion was put to the informant. MLC proved that the victim had sustained injuries. The accused failed to provide any explanation for the injuries. The accused claimed that a false FIR was lodged against them because of a land dispute, but no such suggestion was put to the informant. MLC proved that the victim had sustained injuries. The accused failed to provide any explanation for the injuries. Medical evidence corroborated the informant’s statement, but it was ignored by the learned Trial Court. Surindra Devi (DW1) was an interested witness who was not on talking terms with the informant. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Ms. Sunaina Chaudhary, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant-State and Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned Counsel for the respondents-accused. 9. Ms. Sunaina Chaudhary, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The informant, his wife and daughter supported the prosecution’s case. The medical evidence corroborated their testimonies. Learned Trial Court erred in ignoring the oral and medical evidence; therefore, she prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate for respondents-accused, supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that no interference is required with it. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. The informant Laxman Gir (PW1) stated that he saw accused Bhagu near his home, who told him that a cow had entered his (informant’s) field. The informant went to the field, and accused Bhagu followed him. Accused Bhagu pushed him. His brother Jafu also came to the spot. Both of them have given him beating. The informant’s daughter and mother arrived at the spot and rescued him from the accused. He reported the matter to the police on the next day. He kept on waiting for his brother. He stated in his cross-examination that Kirna, the mother of the accused and Surindra Devi were also present on the spot. Both of the accused gave him beatings. His daughter reached the spot first. She brought her mother thereafter. He had become unconscious and regained consciousness at midnight. He had called his brother on the 24th. He stated in his cross-examination that Kirna, the mother of the accused and Surindra Devi were also present on the spot. Both of the accused gave him beatings. His daughter reached the spot first. She brought her mother thereafter. He had become unconscious and regained consciousness at midnight. He had called his brother on the 24th. He corrected to say that he had not made a call, and it might have been made by his wife Parveen Kumari. 15. The statement of the informant that he became unconscious and regained consciousness during the night is not supported by Monika (PW4) who stated that her father had not become unconscious during the incident. 16. The informant stated that his daughter reached the spot first, and she brought her mother to the spot. Parveen Kumari (PW2) also stated that Monika had visited the spot first. Monika (PW4), on the other hand, stated that she and her mother went to the spot together. 17. Laxman Gir (PW1) stated that he had sustained bleeding injuries and his clothes were blood-stained. Dr. R.K. Garg (PW9) found mobility in the tooth of the lower jaw and abrasion in the middle finger, left forearm and lower leg. He has not mentioned any bleeding injury. Thus, the medical evidence does not support the informant’s testimony that he had sustained a bleeding injury. 18. It is undisputed that the incident was not reported to the police on the same day. The informant stated that a call was made to his brother, and he waited for his brother to come. However, he admitted in his cross-examination that he had not called his brother, and his wife might have called him. Parveen Kumari (PW2) stated in her cross-examination that she had called her brother-in-law the next morning at 10:00-11:00. The matter was reported to the police at 12:00. If the call was made on 10:00-11:00 on the next morning, there was no justification to wait for the brother from 8:00 P.M., the time of the incident. Thus, the explanation provided by the informant for the delay in reporting the matter to the police is not satisfactory, and the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the delay would put the Court on guard regarding the embellishment, concoction and false implication. 19. Thus, the explanation provided by the informant for the delay in reporting the matter to the police is not satisfactory, and the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the delay would put the Court on guard regarding the embellishment, concoction and false implication. 19. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and therefore, the Court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8." 20. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: - “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114 ; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1 ].” 21. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N., (2024) 2 SCC 176 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653, wherein it was observed at page 182: “14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N., (2024) 2 SCC 176 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653, wherein it was observed at page 182: “14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution version. 15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.” 22. The presence of Surindra Devi (DW1) on the spot was not disputed by the informant and Parveen Kumari. Surindra Devi (DW1) stated that no incident had taken place in her presence. She stated in her cross-examination that she used to work in MNREGA. She denied that she had an inimical relationship with the informant, and she was making a false statement due to enmity. 23. There is nothing in her cross-examination to say that she has any motive to depose against the informant and in favour of the accused. Her presence was not disputed, and the learned Trial Court was justified in placing reliance upon her testimony. 24. Raj Kumar (DW2) stated that his house is located in the vicinity. No incident had taken place in his presence. Her presence was not disputed, and the learned Trial Court was justified in placing reliance upon her testimony. 24. Raj Kumar (DW2) stated that his house is located in the vicinity. No incident had taken place in his presence. He denied in his cross-examination that he had a land dispute with the informant, and he was making a false statement. 25. Monika (PW4) stated in her cross-examination that the houses of Raj Kumar, Ashu, Vasudev and Santosh are located in the vicinity. This corroborates the statement of Raj Kumar (DW2) that he has a house located in the vicinity, which would provide him an opportunity to see the incident. 26. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adambhai Sulemanbhai Ajmeri v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 7 SCC 716 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 312: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 465 that equal weightage must be given to the defence witnesses. It was observed at page 829: “219. It has been held by this Court in a catena of cases that while examining the witnesses on record, equal weightage shall be given to the defence witnesses as that of the prosecution witnesses. In Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar [ (2002) 1 SCC 351 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 175], this Court held as under: (SCC p. 356, para 3) “3. … Before drawing the curtain on this score, however, we wish to clarify that the evidence tendered by the defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one by reason of the factum of the witnesses being examined by the defence. The defence witnesses are entitled to equal respect and treatment as that of the prosecution. The issue of credibility and the trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses on a par with that of the prosecution — a lapse on the part of the defence witnesses cannot be differentiated and be treated differently from that of the prosecutors' witnesses.” (emphasis supplied) 220. Further, it has been held in State of Haryana v. Ram Singh [ (2002) 2 SCC 426 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 350] as under: (SCC p. 439, para 19) “19. … Incidentally, be it noted that the evidence tendered by defence witnesses cannot always be termed as a tainted one — the defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment and equal respect as that of the prosecution. … Incidentally, be it noted that the evidence tendered by defence witnesses cannot always be termed as a tainted one — the defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment and equal respect as that of the prosecution. The issue of credibility and trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses on a par with that of the prosecution. Rejection of the defence case on the basis of the evidence tendered by the defence witness has been effected rather casually by the High Court. Suggestion was there to the prosecution witnesses, in particular PW 10 Dholu Ram that his father Manphool was missing for about 2/3 days prior to the day of the occurrence itself—what more is expected of the defence case: a doubt or a certainty— jurisprudentially a doubt would be enough: when such a suggestion has been made the prosecution has to bring on record the availability of the de- ceased during those 2/3 days with some independent evidence. Rejection of the defence case only by reason thereof is far too strict and rigid a requirement for the defence to meet — it is the prosecutor's duty to prove beyond all reasonable doubts and not the defence to prove its innocence — this itself is a circumstance, which cannot but be termed to be suspicious in nature.” 221. Also, in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram [ (2000) 4 SCC 515 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 845], this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 524-25, paras 21-23) “21. Shri N.P. Midha, learned counsel for the re- spondent, submitted written submissions over and above the oral arguments addressed by him. One of the contentions adverted to by the learned counsel is pertaining to the evidence of the defence witness (DW 1 Moharam Ali). The counsel contended that if the evidence of DW 1 Moharam Ali can be believed, it is sufficient to shake the basic structure of the prosecution’s evidence. Shri N.P. Midha invited our attention to the following observations contained in the decision of this Court in Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. [ (1981) 2 SCC 166 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 379] : (SCC p. 173, para 19) ‘19. … Defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment with those of the prosecution. And, courts ought to overcome their traditional, instinctive disbelief in defence witnesses.’ 22. … Defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment with those of the prosecution. And, courts ought to overcome their traditional, instinctive disbelief in defence witnesses.’ 22. We may quote the succeeding sentence also from the said decision for the sake of completion of the observations of Their Lordships on that score. It is this: ‘Quite often they tell lies, but so do the prosecution witnesses.’ 23. Depositions of witnesses, whether they are examined on the prosecution side or defence side or as court witnesses, are oral evidence in the case, and hence the scrutiny thereof shall be without any predilection or bias. No witness is entitled to get better treatment merely because he was examined as a prosecution witness or even as a court wit- ness. It is judicial scrutiny which is warranted in respect of the depositions of all witnesses for which different yardsticks cannot be prescribed as for those different categories of witnesses.” (emphasis supplied) 27. A heavy reliance was placed upon the medical evidence to submit that the medical evidence provided valuable corroboration to the informant's testimony. This submission is not acceptable. Dr. R.K. Garg (PW9) stated that the injuries can be caused by kicks and fist blows. He also admitted that the injury can be self-inflicted and could have been caused by a fall. The statements of the defence witnesses show that no incident had occurred, and the possibility of injuries being self-inflicted will become significant. 28. Learned Trial Court noticed that eye witnesses have made contradictory statements regarding the manner of infliction of injuries and the name of the person who had caused the injuries. This would have adversely affected the testimonies, and the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the same. 29. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view was possible on the record or this Court would have taken a different view while deciding the matter on the original side. 30. No other point was urged. 31. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 32. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.