- 1 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF APRIL, 2025 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE R DEVDAS CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO. 793 OF 2024 BETWEEN: 1. SHRI B V PAPANNA S/O VALAPPA, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, R/A NO 2/11, 1ST CROSS, BILLEKAHALLI, BANNERGATTA ROAD, BANGALORE 560076. 2. SRI B S NAGARAJ S/O B V SAMPATH, AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, 3. SHRI B S RAVI S/O B V SAMPATH, AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, 4. SHRI B S RAMESH S/O B V SAMPATH, AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, 5. SHRI B S MANJUNATH S/O B V SAMPATH, AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS, 6. SMT KATAMMA W/O LATE B V SAMPATH, AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS, Digitally signed by JUANITA THEJESWINI Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 7. SMT B S BINDU W/O LATE B V SAMPATH, AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, PETITIONER NOS.2 TO 7 ARE R/A NO 16, 27TH B CROSS, GEETHA COLONY JAYANAGAR 4TH BLOCK, BANGALORE 560011. …PETITIONERS (BY SRI. DHANANJAY V JOSHI., SR. COUNSEL FOR SMT. KAVITHA DAMODARAN., ADVOCATE) AND: J P INFRA MUMBAI PRIVATE LIMITED HAVING ITS REGD. OFFICE AT 4TH FLOOR, VIRAJ TOWERS, NEAR WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY METRO STATION, WESTERN EXPRESS HIGHWAY ANDHERI EAST, MUMBAI 400093. …RESPONDENT (BY SRI. G PAPIREDDY., SR. COUNSEL FOR SRI. SHARAN B.T., ADVOCATE) THIS CRP IS FILED UNDER SEC.115 OF CPC., AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 30.09.2024 PASSED ON IA IN OS NO.5772/2024 ON THE FILE OF XXVII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, AT BENGALURU., REJECTING THE IA FILED UNDER ORDER VII RULE 11(a) AND (d) OF CPC., FOR REJECTION OF PLAINT AND ETC. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: - 3 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE R DEVDAS ORAL ORDER The petitioners are defendants in O.S.No.5772/2024. They are aggrieved of the impugned order at Annexure-A, whereby their application filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of CPC has been rejected by the trial court. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in terms of their ranking before the trial court. 3. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Dhananjay.V.Joshi appearing for the defendants would submit that from a plain reading of the plaint, it is clear that one M/s.J.P.Infra (India) Private Limited had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding dated 02.12.2006 with the first defendant Shri B.V.Papanna and his brother, late Shri B.V.Sampath, desirous of entering into a Joint Development Agreement in respect of four pieces of immovable property all situated at the Kalena Agrahara Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore - 4 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 South Taluk belonging to the two brothers. The total extent of land admeasuring 3 acres 34 guntas or 1,67,700 square feet of land was the subject matter of the Memorandum of Understanding. It was agreed that the second party J.P.Infra will deposit Rs.3 Crores, out of which Rs.1 Crore 50 Lakhs would be non-refundable deposit and the other 1 Crore 50 Lakhs would be refundable deposit without interest. The second party had parted with Rs.25 lakhs as on the date of entering into the Memorandum of Understanding. The first party, owners of the land had agreed that within a period of seven days from the date of the Memorandum of Understanding, they shall deliver to the second party copies of the documents relating to the property, for investigation of the title. The first party owners had also agreed to allow inspection of the original documents at the hands of the Advocates and Solicitors of the second part. It was also agreed that the second party shall verify the title documents within 3 months from the date of execution of the Memorandum of Understanding. It was agreed that if the second party is - 5 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 not satisfied with the marketable title of the first party, the first party shall refund the advance amount along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. It was agreed that the right of cancellation of the Memorandum of Understanding would lie solely with the second party. 4. However, by a Deed of Assignment dated 15.11.2008, M/s.J.P. Intra (India) Private Limited, assigned its rights to its sister concern, M/s.J.P. Infra (Mumbai) Private Limited, which is the plaintiff before the trial court. It is stated in the plaint that the owners of the property miserably failed to adhere to the conditions stipulated in the Memorandum of Understanding as they never handed over the title deeds for verification at the hands of the second party. It is stated that the plaintiff was in oral communication with defendant No.1 and late Shri B.V.Sampath seeking title documents for verification. However, the owners of the property kept on postponing the event of production of the documents for verification. Learned Senior Counsel submits that it is not even - 6 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 mentioned in the plaint as to when Sri B.V.Sampath passed away. However, it is contended that there was a partition suit filed by Shri B.V.Papanna in O.S.No.3459/2020, before the City Civil Court, Bengaluru, seeking partition and separate possession of certain properties. The suit schedule properties were also part of the schedule in the suit filed by Shri B.V.Papanna. It is also stated that the suit is a clear collusion between the plaintiffs and the defendants therein to defeat the valuable rights of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property. The plaintiff had filed an application for impleading in the suit as an additional defendant. The application came to be rejected by the trial Court on 04.01.2023. The plaintiff herein approached this Court in W.P.No.4081/2023 and this Court by order dated 04.01.2023 set aside the order passed by the trial court. However, this Court held that any judgment/decree which would be passed in O.S.No.3459/2020 shall not be binding on the plaintiff. Liberty was also reserved to the plaintiff herein to institute - 7 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 appropriate suit before the very same court where O.S.No.3459/2020 was being considered. 5. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that with the facts narrated in the plaint, it is very clear that firstly, there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendants. An assignment made by M/s.J.P.Infra in favor of the plaintiff is not within the knowledge of the defendants. No further communication was made by M/s.J.P.Infra to the defendants regarding the assignment of rights under the Memorandum of Understanding to the plaintiff. That being the position, the trial court could not have rejected the application filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d), since there was no cause of action available for the plaintiff to file the suit. Even otherwise, the suit is clearly barred by limitation, since the Memorandum of Understanding was entered into in the year 2006 and the suit is filed in the year 2024, seeking a direction to the defendants to specifically perform their obligations under the Memorandum of Understanding dated 02.12.2006 and - 8 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 to share the title documents to the plaintiff and thereafter execute a Joint Development Agreement in favor of the plaintiff after being satisfied with the title of the schedule property. Alternatively, it was also prayed that if the Court comes to a conclusion that specific performance of the Memorandum of Understanding is rendered impossible then to direct the defendants to pay a sum of Rs.25 lakhs to the defendants along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of receipt of the said amount till the realization of the same. 6. Learned Senior Counsel would place reliance on T.ARIVANDANDAM /Vs./T.V.SATYAPAL AND ANOTHER - (1977) 4 SCC 467, where it was held that the Court should remember that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint, it is manifestly vexatious and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the court should exercise its power under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. It was also held that if clever - 9 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 drafting has created an illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. In a more recent decision, in the case of Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others /vs./ Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another - 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844, it was held that having regard to order VII Rule 14 of CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11(a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint. The law laid down in T.Arivandandam was repeated while stating that if on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. Learned Senior Counsel would therefore submit that merely by stating that question of limitation would be a question of a mixed question of law and fact, - 10 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 the trial court could not have rejected the application filed by the defendants, when it is clear that a suit is filed after 18 years after the Memorandum of Understanding was entered into between the parties and no specific statement is made in the plaint that the defendants have agreed to extend the time to perform the terms of the contract. A unilateral statement made by the plaintiff that it issued a notice somewhere in the year 2020 and cause of action would arise for the plaintiff only after issuance of the notice, it would be a clear case of a vexatious suit without cause of action. 7. Per contra, Learned Senior Counsel Sri G.Papireddy appearing for the plaintiff would submit that no wrong has been committed by the trial court while rejecting the application, since question of limitation is always a mixed question of law and fact and unless the parties are permitted to lead evidence, the point of cause of action cannot be determined by the Court. Attention of this Court is also drawn to paragraph No.16 of the - 11 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 Memorandum of Understanding which provides that all amount paid by the second party to the first party shall create a charge on the property in question. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that where immoveable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the later person is said to have a charge on the property and all the provisions contained in the Act which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be apply to such charge. It is therefore submitted that a charge has been created on the suit schedule property and therefore unless the charge created on the suit schedule property is cleared in accordance with law, the defendants will not be permitted to deal with the property. Where charge is created it cannot be equated to an agreement for sale which is bound by a different provisions of the Limitation Act. It is therefore submitted that unless the evidence is - 12 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 lead, the court will not be in a position to determine as to when cause of action arose for the plaintiff to file the suit. 8. Learned Senior Counsel would place reliance on BALASARIA CONSTRUCITON (P) LTD., /VS./HANUMAN SEVA TRUST AND OTHERS – (2006) 5 SCC 658, wherein, after going through the plaint, the Apex Court was of the opinion that the suit could not be dismissed as barred by limitation without proper pleadings, invoking the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC, without proper pleadings, framing of an issue of limitation and taking of evidence. It was held that question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. In SALIM D. AGBOATWALA AND OTHERS /Vs./SHAMALJI ODDHAVJI THAKKAR AND OTHERS – (2021) 17 SCC 100, it was held that order VII Rule 11 is a drastic power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. Therefore, the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power are stringent and it is especially so when rejection of plaint is sought on the - 13 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 ground of limitation. It was further held that when a plaintiff claims that he gained knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action only at a particular point of time, the same has to be accepted at the stage of considering the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. 9. Heard the learned Senior Counsels appearing for the defendants as well as the plaintiffs and perused the petition papers. 10. This Court recently had an occasion to consider a case where a suit for specific performance was filed after a lapse of 57 years after the agreement was entered into between the parties. Even under those circumstances, an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC was rejected by the trial court on the ground that question of law of limitation would be a mixed question of law and fact and unless evidence is recorded, such question cannot be decided. However, having regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of RAJESH - 14 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 KUMAR /vs./ ANAND KUMAR & ORS. in Civil Appeal No.7840 of 2023, decided on 17-05-2024 and in the case of CHAND RANI (SMT) (DEAD) BY LRS /VS./ KAMAL RANI (SMT) (DEAD) BY LRS – (1993) 1 SCC 519, where it was held that when no explanation was forthcoming from the plaintiff for the long delay of three years in filing the suit after issuing a legal notice, the conduct of the plaintiff is very crucial in a suit for specific performance. It was noticed that the Apex Court had consistently held that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, two circumstances would emanate and it does not follow that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation, notwithstanding the time limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or no value and they - 15 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 would mean nothing. Therefore, a rhetoric question was framed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court stating, “would it be reasonable to say that because time is not made the essence of the contract, the time limit specified in the agreement would have no relevance and can be ignored with impunity?”. It would also mean denying the discretion vested in the court by both Sections 10 and 20. It was noticed that such a view was taken by the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Chand Rani (supra). This Court noticed that Article 54 of the Limitation Act prescribes that if no such date is fixed for performance of the contract, then the time begins to run when the plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused by the defendant. What can be read into the said provisions is that the plaintiff is required to rise a demand for execution of the sale deed within a reasonable time. It does not mean that the plaintiff can keep quiet for decades together and thereafter issue a legal notice to the defendants calling upon him to execute the sale deed and immediately thereafter file a suit. The conduct of the - 16 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 plaintiff is therefore very crucial as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. No plausible explanation is forthcoming from the plaint to explain why the plaintiff kept quiet for more than 18 years, before calling upon the defendants to produce the title deeds for verification. 11. For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is a clear case of a vexatious suit filed at the hands of the plaintiff after 18 years after the Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the parties in the year 2006. Only seven (7) days time was given to the owners to produce the title deeds for verification at the hands of the second party. This would mean that the second party was required to call upon the landowners to furnish the title deeds for verification immediately after the lapse of seven days from the date of signing of the Memorandum of Understanding. Even otherwise, the Memorandum of Understanding itself provides that within three months from the date of execution of the Memorandum of Understanding, the - 17 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 second party shall verify the title of the property. If the second party is not satisfied with the title, it was open for the second party to call upon the first party to return the advance amount paid along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. No notice is issued by the plaintiff calling upon the defendants to furnish the title deeds or return the amount in terms of the Memorandum of Understanding. That being the position, it cannot be permitted to be contented on behalf of the plaintiff that cause of action accrued to the plaintiff in the month of April 2022, when it got the knowledge of the pending suit filed by defendant No.1 in O.S.No.3459/2020. It cannot be permitted to be contended by the plaintiff that the cause of action further arose on 11-10-2022 when defendant No.1 virtually denied the Memorandum of Understanding and Deed of Assignment vide his objections in O.S.No.3459/2020 or that cause of action arose for the plaintiffs when orders were passed by this Court in W.P.No.4081/2023 granting liberty to the plaintiffs to file an appropriate suit. - 18 - NC: 2025:KHC:15520 CRP No. 793 of 2024 12. Having regard to the facts obtained hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the suit does not disclose a cause of action which invests the plaintiff with a right to file the suit in the year 2024 in respect of the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the parties in the year 2006. 13. Consequently, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The impugned order at Annexure-A dated 30.09.2024 is hereby quashed and set aside. The application filed by the defendants under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of CPC is allowed, while rejecting the plaint in O.S.No.5772/2024, on the file of XXVII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge (CCH 9) at Bengaluru. Ordered accordingly. Sd/- (R DEVDAS) JUDGE KLY CT: JL