1 2025:CGHC:14131 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1858 of 2023 Asif Khan S/o Late Ajeez Khan Aged About 50 Years R/o Haati Bazar Para, S.S. Chaal, District Raigarh (C.G.) ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Chowki - Rajgamar, P.S. Balco Nagar, District- Korba (C.G.) ... Non-applicant For Applicant : Mr. Anshul Tiwari, Advocate. For Non-applicant/State : Ms. Shubha Shrivastava, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Order on Board 24.03.2025 1. This appeal is directed against the impugned order dated 29.04.2023 to the extent that while deciding the disposal of vehicle order of confiscation of the vehicle bearing No. C.G./16/B/3937 as per section 60 of the NDPS Act has been passed erroneously even after the acquittal of the appellant from the charges under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act, by the Special Judge (N.D.P.S. Act) Korba, District Korba (C.G.) 2. Prosecution’s story in brief, is that on 09.09.2021, at around 12:00 p.m., a vehicle bearing the registration number C.G./16/B/3937 was ABHISHEK SHRIVAS Digitally signed by ABHISHEK SHRIVAS Date: 2025.03.28 17:16:44 +0530 2 intercepted and searched. As a result, 2 kilograms of ganja were recovered from possession of the appellant and other co-accused persons. Following the investigation, the vehicle and contraband were seized, and a charge sheet was filed under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. 3. The appellant had applied for interim custody of the vehicle under Section 457 of the Cr.P.C., which was granted with certain conditions. Annexure P/2 is a copy of the vehicle's RC book. At the end of the trial, the appellant and other co-accused were acquitted of the charges by an order dated 29.04.2023. The acquittal was due to the prosecution's failure to conduct a proper investigation in accordance with the NDPS Act, and the Court directed the confiscation of the vehicle and the opening of a separate MJC under Section 60 of the NDPS Act. Annexure P/3 is a copy of the MJC proceedings in MJC (Criminal) No. 12/2023, along with a copy of the notices served on the appellant. 4. It appears from the trial Court's order that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, and the seizure of the article from the appellant's possession was not established. Therefore, the court should not have ordered the confiscation of the vehicle after the acquittal. The order of confiscation is illegal, erroneous, and liable to be set aside. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned order dated 29.04.2023, to the extent that it orders the confiscation of the vehicle even after the acquittal of the accused/appellant, is bad in 3 law, perverse, and arbitrary. He also submits that the learned trial Court has to appreciate that when the Court finds that the prosecution has failed to prove that the seized goods were narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, the provisions of Section 60(3) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, would not be applicable. The acquittal order removes the very basis for applying Section 60(3). He further submits that the order of acquittal itself undermines the purpose of the NDPS Act, and further confiscation of the vehicle would be a clear abuse of the legal process and a violation of the appellant's fundamental rights. The appellant was already granted custody of the vehicle by the learned trial court during the trial. After the acquittal, it is unnecessary to confiscate the vehicle and initiate new proceedings. He also submits that the learned trial court failed to consider Section 452 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and did not order the disposal of the property, despite passing an acquittal order. The initiation of MJC proceedings and the direction to seize the appellant's vehicle amount to an abuse of legal process of law. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State would support the impugned order and submit that the Special Judge (N.D.P.S. Act) Korba has rightly rejected the order of supurdnama of the said vehicle to the appellant, but fairly admits that no appeal was filed by the respondent / State against the judgment of the acquittal. 7. Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the petition carefully. 4 8. It transpires from the record that the appellant who had faced trial along with the co-accused has been acquitted by the trial Court by the impugned judgment and the trial Court while acquitting the appellant ordered for registration of a miscellaneous case for confiscation of the vehicle of the appellant which was stated to be used in the alleged offence in question and on 29.04.2023 the trial Court has directed that the vehicle in question, which is in Supurdnama of the appellant be confiscated and the same was challenged before this Court in the present appeal. 9. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant that as he has been acquitted, hence the order passed by the learned trial Court for confiscation of the vehicle in question is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 10. Considering the fact that the appellant has already been acquitted by the trial Court and no appeal has been filed by the State/respondent against the judgment of acquittal of the appellant, therefore, no useful purpose would be served if the vehicle of which the appellant is the registered owner be confiscated, hence the impugned order dated 29.04.2023, with respect to the confiscation of the vehicle bearing registration No.C.G./16/B/3937 is hereby set- aside. 11. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. Sd/- (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Abhishek