JUDGMENT : SUSHIL KUKREJA, J. 1. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC) against the judgment of acquittal dated 31.07.2013 passed by the learned Sessions Judge Shimla-cum-Special Judge under NDPS Act, in Sessions Trial No.9-S/7 of 2012, whereby the accused persons (respondents herein) were acquitted of the offences punishable under Section 20 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short the ‘NDPS Act’). 2. Facts of the case, in brief, giving rise to instant appeal as per the prosecution story, are that on 10.06.2011, while a police party, headed by SI/SHO Narinder Singh, was on patrolling duty towards Newati-Ghawas on Jhiknipul road, in a private vehicle bearing registration No.HP-01A-0981, being driven by one Ashok Kumar, then at about 11:45 p.m, two persons were noticed one kilometer ahead of Newati near Shiv temple, coming on foot from Jhiknipul side, who were carrying gunny bags on their right hand. On seeing the police, they suddenly tried to run away, but both of them were apprehended by the police at some distance. Thereafter, SI Narinder Singh inquired their names and address, upon which, one person disclosed his name as Mohar Singh (accused-respondent No.1 herein) and the other as Prem Parkash (accused-respondent No.2 herein). On suspicion of having some contraband with them, SI Narinder Singh gave option to them as to whether they wanted to give their personal search to a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, but both of them opted to be searched by the police party present on the spot. Thereafter, the police personnel gave their personal search to the accused persons, but nothing incriminating was found and after that, search of the gunny bag, being carried by accused Mohar Singh, was conducted. On opening the same, a black coloured substance, in the shape of wicks and balls, wrapped in a polythene cover, was recovered, which was found to be charas and on weighment, the recovered charas was found to be 4 Kgs. Similarly, on opening the gunny bag, being carried by accused Prem Parkash, same black coloured substance, in the shape of wicks and balls, wrapped in a plastic cover, was recovered, which was also found to be charas and on weighment, the recovered charas was found to be 2 Kgs. Similarly, on opening the gunny bag, being carried by accused Prem Parkash, same black coloured substance, in the shape of wicks and balls, wrapped in a plastic cover, was recovered, which was also found to be charas and on weighment, the recovered charas was found to be 2 Kgs. Thereafter, SI Narinder Singh, separated 50 grams sample each from the recovered charas, which were sealed separately in a cloth parcel with six seals of seal impression ‘U’ and remaining recovered charas was put into same plastic covers and then in the same gunny bags, which were also sealed in cloth parcels, each sealed with six seals of seal impression ‘U’. Specimen sample of seal ‘U’ was separately taken on a piece of cloth and the seal after use was handed over to Ashok Kumar. Since the place was secluded one, as such, no independent witness could be associated in the proceedings and thereafter, the police completed other codal formalities and arrested both the accused persons. 3. On completion of the investigation and after receipt of SFSL report, the charge-sheet was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 4. The learned trial Court, vide order dated 27.03.2012 framed charges against the accused persons under Section 20 of NDPS Act, to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 5. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined eleven witnesses. Statements of accused persons under Sections 313, Cr.PC were recorded, wherein they denied all set of incriminating evidence led by the prosecution against them, besides pleaded to be innocent and that they were falsely implicated in the case. The accused persons examined one witness in their defence. 6. The learned Trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated 31.07.2013, acquitted the accused persons of the charges under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, hence, the instant appeal preferred by the appellant- State. 7. The learned Deputy Advocate General contended that the trial Court has appreciated the evidence on record in a slip-shod and perfunctory manner and discarded the well reasoned and consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. He further contended the learned trial Court has discarded the testimonies of prosecution witnesses for untenable reasons in the absence of any proof of enmity. He also contended that the learned Trial Court has erred gravely and did not read the evidence together to reach at the right conclusion. He further contended the learned trial Court has discarded the testimonies of prosecution witnesses for untenable reasons in the absence of any proof of enmity. He also contended that the learned Trial Court has erred gravely and did not read the evidence together to reach at the right conclusion. Hence, it is prayed that the impugned judgment of acquittal is liable to be set aside. 8. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondents/ accused persons contended that the impugned judgment has been passed by the learned Trial Court after proper appreciation of both facts and law. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence in its true perspective and the impugned judgment does not require any interference by this Court. Therefore, he submitted that the instant appeal, which is devoid of merits, deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant-State as well as learned counsel for the respondents and also carefully examined the entire records. 10. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 11. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another Vs. State of Karnatka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , which reads as under :- "10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup [1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... State of Karnatka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , which reads as under :- "10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup [1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years. 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed: "7. the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.” 12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley [5] , Aher Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G. Agarwal [8], Noor Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [11], Lekha Yadav [12], Khem Karan [13], Bishan Singh [14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota Singh [17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan [20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22], C. Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay Thakran [25] and Chandrappa [26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court, (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal, (iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 , observed as under:- “31. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows: 31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows: 31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352 ] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir] 31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows: 31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse; (a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489 ] (b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489 ] (b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh (1980) (c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] (d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99 ] (f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ] (g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of the prosecution to establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445 ] 31.2.2. [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445 ] 31.2.2. Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice; (a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502 ] (b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ].” 13. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:- “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as follows: 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4.If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible. 9. Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to find out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court must first decide whether the trial court’s view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken.” 14. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the Trial Court. 15. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the Trial Court. 15. Adverting to the facts of the case on hand, the accused persons have been tried for commission of the offences under Section 20 of the NDPS Act on the allegations that on 10.06.2021 at about 11:45 p.m., near Shiv Temple, Jhiknipul Road (Chopal), charas weighing 4 Kgs. was recovered from accused Mohan Singh and 2 Kgs. from accused Prem Parkash. 16. To substantiate the said charges framed against the respondents-accused persons and to bring home their guilt, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses. However, case of the prosecution mainly rests upon the statements of PW-1 HC Gian Singh, PW-2 HC Ramesh Chand, PW-3 Ashok Negi and PW-10 Sub-Inspector Narinder Singh (Investigating Officer), who have been examined primarily to prove search, recovery and seizure of charas in question from the conscious possession of the accused persons. 17. PW-3 Ashok Negi, who is the only independent witness, did not support the prosecution case and, as such, he was declared hostile. He was cross-examined at length by the learned Public Prosecutor, however, nothing favourable could be elicited from his cross- examination. In his cross-examination by learned defence counsel, he specifically stated that the accused persons were not apprehended by the police in his presence and no charas was recovered from anyone in his presence. He also stated that SHO Narinder Singh was known to him and he remained associated with him in number of cases and appeared as witness in the Court. 18. It is well settled that the conviction can be based upon the testimony of the police officials, provided that such testimony is reliable, trustworthy and confidence inspiring. In Pramod Kumar vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 6 SCC 588 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the Court can definitely act upon the same. In Pramod Kumar vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 6 SCC 588 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the Court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinizing the evidence, the Court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the Court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. Para-13 of the judgment reads as under:- “13. This Court, after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana that there is no absolute command of law that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large show their disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle that quality of the evidence weighs over the quantity of evidence.” 19. Similarly, in Baldev Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2015) 17 SCC 554, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Relevant para of the judgment reads as under:- “10. There is no legal proposition that evidence of police officials unless supported by independent evidence is unworthy of acceptance. Evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Relevant para of the judgment reads as under:- “10. There is no legal proposition that evidence of police officials unless supported by independent evidence is unworthy of acceptance. Evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Prudence however requires that the evidence of police officials who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case needs to be carefully scrutinised and independently appreciated. Mere fact that they are police officials does not by itself give rise to any doubt about their creditworthiness.” 20. In Surinder Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. Para-16 of judgment reads as under:- “16. In State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Sunil it was held as under: (SCC p.655) “It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. The official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature”. 21. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid settled legal position, the testimony of police witnesses cannot be rejected on the ground of non- corroboration by independent witnesses, however such testimony needs to be carefully scrutinized. The same must inspire confidence and should be consistent with the case set up by the prosecution. In case there are material contradictions, which goes to the root of the case and make the prosecution case highly doubtful, then this Court would obviously be circumspect while placing reliance on such testimony. 22. The same must inspire confidence and should be consistent with the case set up by the prosecution. In case there are material contradictions, which goes to the root of the case and make the prosecution case highly doubtful, then this Court would obviously be circumspect while placing reliance on such testimony. 22. So far as the statements of PW-1 HC Gian Singh, PW-2 HC Ramesh Chand and PW-10 Sub-Inspector Narinder Singh (Investigating Officer) are concerned, all these witnesses have deposed that on 10.06.2011, while the police party was on petrolling duty towards Newati- Ghawas on Jhiknipul road in a private vehicle bearing registration No. HP-01A-0981 with private driver Ashok, then at about 11.45 p.m., one kilometre ahead of Newati near Shiv temple, two persons were noticed coming from Jhiknipul side, who were carrying gunny bags in their right hand. When their vehicle reached near the said persons, on seeing police, both of them turned back and tried to move fast, but they were apprehended at a distance of about 10-20 feet ahead. Thereafter, PW-10 SI Narinder Singh inquired their names and address and upon which, one person disclosed his name as Mohar Singh and the other as Prem Parkash. As the accused persons were carrying gunny bags with them, the police got suspicious about some suspicious substance, therefore, option was given to them whether they wanted to give their search before a gazetted officer or a magistrate or to the police, however, they consented that the police present on the spot could search their bags and persons. Thereafter, the police officials, including the independent witness Ashok Negi, gave their personal search to the accused persons, but nothing incriminating was recovered and after that, the search of gunny bag, which was in possession of accused Mohar Singh, was carried out. On opening the same, a black coloured substance in the shape of wicks and balls, wrapped in a polythene cover, was recovered, which was found to be charas and on weighment, the recovered charas was found to be 4 Kgs. Similarly, on opening the gunny bag, being carried by accused Prem Parkash, same black coloured substance, in the shape of wicks and balls wrapped in a plastic cover, was recovered, which was also found to be charas and on weighment, the recovered charas was found to be 2 Kgs. 23. Similarly, on opening the gunny bag, being carried by accused Prem Parkash, same black coloured substance, in the shape of wicks and balls wrapped in a plastic cover, was recovered, which was also found to be charas and on weighment, the recovered charas was found to be 2 Kgs. 23. We have closely scrutinized the entire evidence on record especially the statements of police witnesses but from the close scrutiny of the same, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused persons beyond shadow of reasonable doubt. 24. Perusal of the record reveals that there are various contradictions and inconsistencies in the statements of police witnesses. PW-1 HC Gian Singh, during cross-examination, stated that neither any vehicle was checked nor any inquiry was made from any person and from Gawas to Neoti, they did not stop anywhere in between, whereas, PW-2 HC Ramesh Chand stated, in his cross-examination, that they checked 3-4 vehicles on that day, which crossed during their journey from Police Station to Neoti. Similarly, PW-1 stated that the vehicle was not available in the Police Station on that day, but PW-9 Constable Leela Ram stated that there was a government vehicle in Police Station, which was also there in the Police Station on that day. Further, PW-9 Constable Leela Ram stated that he handed over the case file to the Investigating Officer (PW-10) at bus stand at 4:15 a.m. and from 4:15 a.m. till 7.30 a.m., they kept on sitting in the vehicle at the bus stand without doing anything whereas PW-10 stated that they patrolled at Chopal from 4.15 am to 7:30 am. 25. Perusal of NCB from Ext.PW10/B also casts a serious doubt regarding the case of the prosecution as it has been mentioned against column No.7 of NCB form that the case property was dispatched to the police station on 11.06.2011 at 4:45 AM. As per case of the prosecution, column Nos. 1 to 8 of NCB form were filled-in by the Investigating Officer before sending the rukka. The Investigating Officer, while appearing in the witnesses-box as PW-10, specifically deposed that rukka Ext. PW10/A was prepared on 11.06.2011 at 1:45 AM and was sent through Constable Leela Ram to Police Station, Chopal for registration of FIR. 1 to 8 of NCB form were filled-in by the Investigating Officer before sending the rukka. The Investigating Officer, while appearing in the witnesses-box as PW-10, specifically deposed that rukka Ext. PW10/A was prepared on 11.06.2011 at 1:45 AM and was sent through Constable Leela Ram to Police Station, Chopal for registration of FIR. However, the prosecution has failed to explain the fact that when column No.7 of NCB form was filled-in before sending the rukka which was prepared at 1:45 AM and was sent to the Police Station for registration of the FIR, then how there is mention of time as 4:45 AM against column No.7 of NCB form. The aforesaid discrepancy casts a serious doubt about the case of the prosecution. 26. There is another discrepancy in the case of prosecution as the perusal of arrest memo Ext. PW1/F,shows that the accused was arrested at the spot at 4:00 AM. As per statement of PW-10, they were very much present at Bus Stand, Chopal at 4:15 AM. Admittedly the Bus Stand was 26 KM away from the spot. However, the prosecution has failed to explain as to how within 15 minutes they travelled a distance of 26 KMs and reached Bus Stand, Chopal at 4:15 AM, which also creates a serious doubt about the story of the prosecution. 27. Now, after the close scrutiny of the police/official witnesses, we are left with no other option, but to disbelieve their testimonies, as there are contradictions in their testimonies, which creates a doubt qua the veracity of the prosecution story. Hence, we are of the firm opinion that it is not expedient in the ends of justice to convict the accused solely on testimonies of police officials due to various contradictions, discrepancies and inconsistencies in their statements and also in the case of prosecution which has caused miscarriage of justice to accused and has also created serious doubt in the mind of Court about the impartial investigation of present case. 28. Law is well settled with regard to the fact that howsoever strong the suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot take the place of proof. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 5 SCC 722 on this aspect of the matter held as under:- “21. Law is well settled with regard to the fact that howsoever strong the suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot take the place of proof. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 5 SCC 722 on this aspect of the matter held as under:- “21. Suspicion, howsoever grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that `may be proved and `will be proved. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason, that the mental distance between `may be and `must be is quite large and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between `may be true and `must be true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between `may be true and `must be true, the court must maintain the vital distance between conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense.” 29. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, we are of the firm opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, we are of the firm opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The view taken by the learned Trial Court while acquitting the accused persons under Section 20 of NDPS Act is a reasonable view based on the evidence on record and the same cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record. Hence, no interference in the judgment of acquittal dated 31.07.2013, rendered by the learned Sessions Judge Shimla-cum-Special Judge under NDPS Act, in Sessions Trial No.9-S/7 of 2012, is required as the same is the result of proper appreciation of evidence and law. The appeal, which is devoid of merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged. 30. In view of the provisions of Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the respondents are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within a period of four weeks with the stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The appeal is accordingly disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.