JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. Present revision is directed against the order dated 7th November 2024 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-4, Shimla (learned Trial Court) vide which a cancellation report submitted by the police in FIR No. 78/17 dated 24th May 2017 was accepted and objections preferred by the petitioner (informant) were rejected. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police that his cousins, Ashwani Kumar and Vinod Kumar, induced him to pay Rs.15 lakhs on the pretext that they would send him abroad. The complainant paid Rs.1,04,000/- in the year 2006 on the pretext that the amount of Rs.1,00,000 would be the processing fee and Rs.4,000/- would be required for renewal of the passport. Rs.5,00,000 was paid to them through Ashwani Kumar by way of a demand draft dated 21st March 2008. The informant also paid Rs.5.00 lakhs in cash on 30th August 2009 in the presence of his relatives. The accused assured that the informant’s visa would be issued, but they stopped picking up the informant’s calls. The accused also failed to return the informant’s passport taken by them. They threatened to kill the informant if he sought the return of money or the filing of the complaint against the accused. 3. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The  police  found  after  the  investigation  that the informant and the accused are co-owners of the land located at Theog bearing Khasra numbers 153, 154 and 155. The accused and informant’s elder brother, Ashwani Kumar, went to Punjab, and Atul Kumar remained in possession of Khasra number 155. He was running a shop in the name and style of Krishna Sweet Shop. A three-story house was constructed on Khasra number 155. Vikas, the younger brother of Atul, resides with his mother on the ground floor, whereas Rampal, the informant’s brother, resides on the two upper floors. Atul Kumar, brother of Ashwani Kumar, was running a shop in the name and style of Krishna Sweet Shop in the building till 2005, and Rampal started running a shop in the same building after 2006. Atul Kumar, brother of Ashwani Kumar, was running a shop in the name and style of Krishna Sweet Shop in the building till 2005, and Rampal started running a shop in the same building after 2006. Rampal used to remit Rs.10,000 per month to Krishna Devi, mother of the accused and Rs.5,000/- to Shivani Devi, wife of Ashok Kumar, after the death of Krishna Devi, with effect from 2006, till 2016. He had paid Rs.6,04,000 by means of a demand draft to the accused. A civil suit was also filed between the parties, but was withdrawn. A false FIR was registered against the accused due to a land dispute. Hence, a cancellation report was filed before the Court. 4. The informant filed objections to the cancellation report, asserting that the report was based upon surmises and conjectures. The basic principles of criminal law were brushed aside by the investigating officer. The allegations made by the informant were sufficient to conclude that the accused had induced the informant to pay them money with dishonest intention. The police also seized the demand drafts issued in the name of the accused. They sought clarification from the bank regarding the payment of the money. The informant and his witnesses proved that the money was paid to the accused for sending the informant abroad. The investigating agency concluded that there was a family dispute between the parties, which led to the filing of the false FIR. Similar complaints were also made against the accused in Punjab. Therefore, it was prayed that the cancellation report be rejected and the objection petition be accepted. 5. Learned Trial Court held that the informant had made some payment to the accused, but the evidence was insufficient to conclude that these payments were made for sending the informant abroad. Copy of the passport shows that it was valid till 2007, and there was no justification for the payment of the money for the renewal of the passport in 2006. The FIR was lodged in the year 2017, after the lapse of more than eight years. The result of the investigation showed that there was some dispute between the parties, which led to the filing of the false FIR; hence, the objections were rejected, and the cancellation report was accepted. 6. The FIR was lodged in the year 2017, after the lapse of more than eight years. The result of the investigation showed that there was some dispute between the parties, which led to the filing of the false FIR; hence, the objections were rejected, and the cancellation report was accepted. 6. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the informant has filed the present petition asserting that the order is contrary to the material available on the record. The findings are perverse. The evidence collected during the investigation does not support the conclusion drawn by the learned Trial Court. The objections were not considered. The allegations made in the FIR showed the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420 and 506 read with section 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The learned Trial Court did not consider the statements recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. and the documentary evidence collected by the investigating agency. There was no reason to believe the informant’s statement. The payment of money to the accused was duly proved on record. The investigating agency had tried to help the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 7. Mr. Anubhav Chopra, learned for the informant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in accepting the cancellation report and rejecting the objections filed by the informant. The allegations in the FIR and the material supplied by the informant clearly established that the informant had paid money to the accused, after they had made a promise to him to send him abroad. The accused failed to fulfill their promise. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submission made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: - “10. It was observed at page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against  conviction  is  not  supposed  to  exercise  the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 10. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: 14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court  in Amit  Kapoor v. Ramesh  Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 11. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 14. In the above case, also a conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis. 12. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As  held  by  this  Court  in Southern  Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 ], it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 13. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. The informant had filed a complaint for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC. The ingredients of the Section were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1950 as under: “12. The ingredients of the offence of cheating are as follows: 1) Deception of a person by making a false representation which the maker knows or has reason to believe is false, and thereby 2)(a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing such person: (i) to deliver any property to any person, or (ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property, or (b) Intentionally induces that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.” 15. The allegations in the FIR show that the accused had promised the informant to send them abroad, but they failed to do so. The informant claimed that the accused had cheated him. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rikhab Birani v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 823 that mere breach of contract does not amount to cheating if the intention to cheat did not exist in the beginning. It was observed: “16. The informant claimed that the accused had cheated him. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rikhab Birani v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 823 that mere breach of contract does not amount to cheating if the intention to cheat did not exist in the beginning. It was observed: “16. Reference was also made to the decision in V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat (2009) 3 SCC 78 , and it was observed: “7. Similar elucidation by this Court in “V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat” explicitly states that a contractual   dispute   or breach of contract per se should not lead to the initiation of a criminal proceeding. The ingredient of ‘cheating’, as defined under Section 415 of the IPC, is the existence of a fraudulent or dishonest intention of making an initial promise or representation thereof, from the very beginning of the formation of the contract. Further, in the absence of the averments made in the complaint petition, wherefrom the ingredients of the offence can be found out, the High Court should not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. saves the inherent power of the High Court, as it serves a salutary purpose, viz., a person should not undergo harassment of litigation for a number of years, when no criminal offence is made out. It is one thing to say that a case has been made out for trial and criminal proceedings should not be quashed, but another thing to say that a person must undergo a criminal trial despite the fact that no offence has been made out in the complaint. This Court in V.Y. Jose (supra) placed reliance on several earlier decisions in “Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI”, “Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.”, “Vir Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal”  and  “All  Cargo  Movers  (I)  (P) Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain”.” xxx 18. In Kunti v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) 6 SCC 109 , this Court referred to Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab (2023) 5 SCC   360,   wherein   it   was   observed that a breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. In Kunti v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) 6 SCC 109 , this Court referred to Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab (2023) 5 SCC   360,   wherein   it   was   observed that a breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep a promise will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings. Thus, the dishonest intention on the part of the party who is alleged to have committed the offence of cheating should be established at the time of entering into the transaction with the complainant; otherwise, the offence of cheating is not established or made out.” 16. In the present case, no allegation was made in the FIR that the intention of the accused was fraudulent from the beginning. The simple case of the informant is that they failed to perform the promise made by them to send the informant abroad. This is insufficient to constitute the commission of an offence punishable under section 420 of the IPC. 17. The complaint was also filed for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506, read with Section 503 of the IPC. Criminal intimidation is provided in Section 503 of the IPC as under: - 503. Criminal intimidation Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested is within this section. 18. Section 503 requires that the threat of injury should have been within an intent to cause alarm to a person, to do an act, which a person is not legally bound to do or omit to do any act which he is legally entitled to do. 18. Section 503 requires that the threat of injury should have been within an intent to cause alarm to a person, to do an act, which a person is not legally bound to do or omit to do any act which he is legally entitled to do. It was laid down by this Court in Inder Pratap Singh Versus State of Himachal Pradesh 2003 (1) Crimes 345 (HC) that the complainant should have been alarmed by the threat advanced by the accused to attract Section 506 of IPC. It was observed: “21. Similarly, before an offence of criminal intimidation can be made out, it must be established prima facie that the accused persons (like petitioners in the present case) intended to cause an alarm to the complainant party, e., Jasbeer Singh. Mere threats, as alleged by him, extended by the petitioners, with a view to deter the complainant from interfering with what the petitioner believed to be his exclusive property, would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation.” 19. Similar is the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vikram Johar v. State of U.P., (2019) 14 SCC 207 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 795: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 609) wherein it was held at page 209: - “25. Now, reverting to Section 506, which is an offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715 have also to be applied when the question of finding out as to whether the ingredients of the offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edn., with regard to proof of offence, states the following: “… The prosecution must prove: (i) That the accused threatened some person. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edn., with regard to proof of offence, states the following: “… The prosecution must prove: (i) That the accused threatened some person. (ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested; (iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.” (emphasis supplied) A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above. 20. Therefore, it is necessary to prove that the accused had caused an alarm to the complainant or had caused him to do anything which he would not have done or omitted to do anything which he would have done but for the threat. 21. In the present case, no person stated that the informant was alarmed by any threat advanced by the accused. Therefore, the necessary ingredients for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC were also not satisfied. 22. Once it is held that the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 506 of the IPC are not made out, any criminal conspiracy to commit the aforesaid offences will also not be made out. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in holding that no case was made out for taking cognisance and summoning the accused. 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998) 5 SCC 749 that a person cannot examine two persons and insist upon the issuance of summons. Issuing a summons is a serious matter and should not be lightly resorted to. It was observed: “28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. It was observed: “28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence, both oral and documentary, in support thereof, and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing a charge home to the accused? It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before the summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.” 24. This position was reiterated in Rikhab Birani (supra), wherein it was observed: “20…Further, there has to be a conscious application of mind to these aspects by the Magistrate, as a summoning order has grave consequences of setting criminal proceedings in motion. Though the Magistrate is not required to record detailed reasons, there should be adequate evidence on record to set criminal proceedings into motion. The Magistrate should carefully scrutinise the evidence on record and may even put questions to the complainant/investigating officer, etc., to elicit answers to find out the truth about the allegations. The summoning order has to be passed when the complaint or chargesheet discloses an offence and when there is material that supports and constitutes the essential ingredients of the offence. The summoning order should not be passed lightly or as a matter of course.” 25. The learned Trial Court rightly pointed out that the allegations in the FIR and the material in its support were not probable. The informant asserted that he paid the money for the renewal of his passport in the year 2006; however, the passport was due for renewal in the year 2007. The learned Trial Court rightly pointed out that the allegations in the FIR and the material in its support were not probable. The informant asserted that he paid the money for the renewal of his passport in the year 2006; however, the passport was due for renewal in the year 2007. Therefore, the complainant had no justification for the payment of money for the renewal of a passport in 2006. Further, the passport is renewed in the passport office, and it is difficult to believe that a person who had obtained the passport would not be aware of this fact and would have paid the money to some third person for the renewal of the passport. 26. The informant nowhere suggested in the complaint or the statement made by him to the police, the name of the country where he intended to go. He simply stated that he wanted to go abroad. It is impossible to believe that he would have paid Rs.15,00,000 for going abroad without even knowing the name of the country. 27. The investigation showed that brother of the accused was running a shop in the name and style of Krishna Sweet Shop earlier and the informant’s brother started running the shop after 2006 in the name and style of Sharma Sweet shop. He paid the money to the mother of the accused and thereafter to Shivani Devi. The fact that the brother of the accused stopped running the shop and the informant’s brother started running the shop in the same building suggests some settlement between the parties, and the conclusion drawn by the investigating officer that the money was paid towards the settlement cannot be said to be implausible. 28. It was submitted that the investigating officer had collected the material in favour of the accused, which he was not supposed to collect. The submission is only stated to be rejected. The investigation officer has to carry out the investigation fairly, and he is not to favour any party. He has to unearth the truth, and he cannot be faulted for collecting the material in favour of the accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V.K. Sasikala v. State, (2012) 9 SCC 771 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 1010: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 799 that the investigating officer should exonerate the accused, if any material is found in his favour. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V.K. Sasikala v. State, (2012) 9 SCC 771 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 1010: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 799 that the investigating officer should exonerate the accused, if any material is found in his favour. It was observed at page 784: “17. Seizure of a large number of documents in the course of investigation of a criminal case is a common feature. After completion of the process of investigation and before submission of the report to the court under Section 173 CrPC, a fair amount of application of mind on the part of the investigating agency is inbuilt in the Code. Such application of mind is both with regard to the specific offence(s) that the investigating officer may consider to have been committed by the accused and also the identity and particulars of the specific documents and records, seized in the course of investigation, which support the conclusion of the investigating officer with regard to the offence(s) allegedly committed. Though it is only such reports which support the prosecution case that are required to be forwarded to the Court under Section 173(5) in every situation where some of the seized papers and documents do not support the prosecution case and, on the contrary, supports the accused, a duty is cast on the investigating officer to evaluate the two sets of documents and materials collected and, if required, to exonerate the accused at that stage itself….” (Emphasis supplied) 29. Therefore, the investigating officer cannot be faulted for collecting the material in favour of the accused. 30. In view of the above, there is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court; hence, no interference is required with it. 31. Consequently, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed so are the pending miscellaneous applications, if any. 32. The record of the learned Trial Court be returned with a copy of this judgment.