JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 01.12.2023 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.2, Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the complaint filed by the appellant/complainant before the learned Trial Court was dismissed, and the respondent/accused before the learned Trial Court was acquitted. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1988 (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant is a financial institution engaged in banking activities. The accused sought a personal loan of  Rs. 1,00,000/-, which was sanctioned to him on 17.05.2017. The loan was to be repaid in a monthly instalment of  Rs. 1800/- per month in eight years. The accused failed to repay the amount as per the terms and conditions agreed between the parties. An amount of Rs. 2,13,179/- became due. The accused issued a cheque on 15.01.2013 for  Rs. 2,09,437/- drawn on UCO Bank, Kasumpti, to return the amount. The complainant presented the cheque before the bank, but it was returned with the endorsement “funds insufficient”. A notice was sent to the accused, but it was returned with the report that the address was incorrect. Notice sent to the Shimla address was returned with the report that the house was locked. Notice was deemed to be served upon the accused. The accused failed to repay the amount within 15 days of receipt. Hence, the complaint was filed to take action against the accused as per the law. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined Ranjana Chauhan (CW1) to prove its complaint. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr. P.C. stated that a blank security cheque was issued by the firm Harsh Enterprises. The complainant misused the cheque. He had paid the cheque amount. 4. The complainant examined Ranjana Chauhan (CW1) to prove its complaint. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr. P.C. stated that a blank security cheque was issued by the firm Harsh Enterprises. The complainant misused the cheque. He had paid the cheque amount. He stated that he wanted to lead defence evidence, but he did not lead any evidence and closed the evidence on 27.09.2023. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the cheque was issued by Choice Fast Food. The accused signed the cheque as a proprietor. A complaint was filed only against the accused and not against the firm. The complaint could not have been filed without impleading the firm. Therefore, the complaint was dismissed. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The complainant proved all the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. The cheque was issued by the accused to discharge his legal debt/liability. Merely because he had described himself as a proprietor cannot lead to an inference that the cheque was issued on behalf of the company or the firm. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Prashant Chauhan, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr Amardeep Singh, learned counsel for the respondent, and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The cheque was issued by Choice Fast Food, and the accused signed it as a proprietor. The learned Trial Court concluded that the accused had signed it as a proprietor of the firm/company. However, there is no material on record to show that Choice Fast Food is a firm/company. No certificate of registration of the firm or the incorporation of the company was placed on record. The application for a personal loan (Ex.PW1/B) shows that the loan was sought by the accused in his personal capacity for his fast-food shop at Cemetery Road. Ranjana Chauhan (CW1) stated in her cross-examination that the loan was advanced to Harish Chauhan and not to any firm. She admitted that the accused had the personal liability to repay the amount. The application for a personal loan (Ex.PW1/B) shows that the loan was sought by the accused in his personal capacity for his fast-food shop at Cemetery Road. Ranjana Chauhan (CW1) stated in her cross-examination that the loan was advanced to Harish Chauhan and not to any firm. She admitted that the accused had the personal liability to repay the amount. She volunteered to say that the cheque of proprietorship concern is taken when the loanee is the proprietor of the concern. 10. The cross-examination of this witness shows that the accused is a proprietor of a proprietorship concern. This is also evident from the loan application, wherein the loan has been sought for a fast-food shop in the Cemetery. The accused nowhere claimed in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. that Choice Fast Food was a firm/company. He only stated that the cheque was issued by Harsh Enterprises, which is incorrect because the cheque is not in the name of Harsh Enterprises but that of Choice Fast Food. 11. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shankar Finance & Investments v. State of A.P., (2008) 8 SCC 536 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 558: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 997, that there is no distinction in law between a proprietary concern and an individual trading under a trading name. It was observed at page 540: - 10. As contrasted with a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, which is a legal entity distinct from its shareholders, a proprietary concern is not a legal entity distinct from its proprietor. A proprietary concern is nothing but an individual trading under a trade name.” 12. A similar view was taken in Nexus Health & Beauty Care (P) Ltd. v. National Electrical Office, 2012 SCC OnLine HP 5383, wherein it was observed: - “27…The substance of the complaint or petition is to be seen, and it should not be thrown out merely on technicalities of loose drafting. It emerges from the complaint that the complainant is the ‘National Electrical’ sole proprietorship concern of Subhash Bharwal….” 13. Therefore, there was no requirement to implead Choice Fast Food if it was a proprietorship concern. 14. Even if Choice Fast Food were a partnership firm, the complaint could not have been dismissed on the ground that the firm was not impleaded as a party. Therefore, there was no requirement to implead Choice Fast Food if it was a proprietorship concern. 14. Even if Choice Fast Food were a partnership firm, the complaint could not have been dismissed on the ground that the firm was not impleaded as a party. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, (2025) 258 Comp Cas 404: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1419 that the firm is not a juristic entity and is not required to be impleaded as a party in the complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was observed: “9.9 Therefore, even in the absence of the partnership firm being named as an accused, if the partners of the partnership firm are proceeded against, they being jointly and severally liable along with the partnership firm as well as inter se the partners of the firm, the com- plaint is still maintainable. The accused in such a case would, in substance, be the partners of the partnership firm along with the firm itself. Since the liability is joint and several, even in the absence of a partnership firm be- ing proceeded against by the complainant by issuance of legal notice as mandated under section 138 of the Act or being made an accused specifically in a complaint filed under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, (equivalent to section 223 of the BNSS), such a complaint is maintainable.” 15. Choice Fast Food was not described as a company or private limited company; therefore, the same would not be a juristic person within the meaning of Section 141 of the NI Act and cannot be impleaded as a party. 16. Hence, the conclusion drawn by the learned Trial Court that the complaint was not maintainable without impleading Choice Fast Food is not sustainable. The learned Trial Court has not gone into the other aspects of the complaint and proceeded to dismiss the complaint solely on this ground. Therefore, there is no option but to remand the matter to the learned Trial Court for a fresh decision on the merits of the complaint. 17. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed, and the judgment dated 01.12.2023 passed by the learned Trial Court is ordered to be set aside. Matter is remanded to the learned Trial Court for disposal of the matter on merits. 17. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed, and the judgment dated 01.12.2023 passed by the learned Trial Court is ordered to be set aside. Matter is remanded to the learned Trial Court for disposal of the matter on merits. Parties through their respected learned counsel are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on  14th October, 2025. 18. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this appeal and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits. 19. A copy of this judgment, along with records of the learned Trial Court below, be sent back forthwith.