JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. 1. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 23.1.2025, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Solan, District Solan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 14.10.2022 and order of sentence dated 17.10.2022, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Solan, District Solan, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld and the appeal filed by the petitioner (accused before the learned Trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant is engaged in banking activities. The accused approached the complainant for availing a loan vide application dated 10.1.2015. The complainant provided financial assistance to the accused in the form of a Consumable Durable Loan vide Account No. CD/6033. The accused failed to repay the amount as per the terms and conditions agreed between the parties. The complainant requested the accused to repay the amount, and he issued a cheque of Rs.7.00 lacs drawn on Indian Overseas Bank, Branch Solan, to repay the amount. The complainant presented the cheque to its Bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The complainant issued a legal notice asking the accused to repay the amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. The registered AD containing the notice was returned with the endorsement ‘unclaimed’. Hence, the complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action as per law. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined K.C. Sharma (CW1) to prove his case. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he had taken a loan from the bank. He stated that the complainant-Bank had taken five cheques from him as security. 4. The complainant examined K.C. Sharma (CW1) to prove his case. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he had taken a loan from the bank. He stated that the complainant-Bank had taken five cheques from him as security. He had deposited Rs.6.00 lacs, but the complainant misused the cheques issued by him. No notice was received by him. He examined Harish Kumar (DW1) in support of his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused admitted the issuance of the cheque. He also admitted that he had taken a loan from the bank. He failed to repay the amount and issued a cheque to discharge his liability. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. The defence evidence proved that the accused had deposited Rs.6.00 lacs in his loan account on 16.8.2016 and Rs.16.00 lacs on 31.3.2021; however, this amount was deposited after the dishonour of the cheque and will not wipe out the offence. The notice was deemed to be served upon the accused. Hence, the accused was convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year, pay compensation of Rs.10.00 lacs to the complainant and to undergo further imprisonment for three months in default of payment of compensation. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Solan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused had admitted the issuance of the cheque. A presumption would arise that the cheque was issued in discharge of the liability for consideration. The plea taken by the accused that he had issued five security cheques at the time of taking the loan was not proved on record by any satisfactory evidence. The accused admitted taking of the loan from the Bank. The application for a term loan showed that Rs.32.00 lacs were advanced to the accused. The accused paid the amount after the dishonour of the cheque, which would not mitigate the crime. There was an alteration in the name of the payee, but this was not material. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The application for a term loan showed that Rs.32.00 lacs were advanced to the accused. The accused paid the amount after the dishonour of the cheque, which would not mitigate the crime. There was an alteration in the name of the payee, but this was not material. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The notice was deemed to be served upon the accused, but he failed to repay the amount. Hence, the accused was rightly convicted and sentenced. There is no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Consequently, the appeal filed by the accused was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the petitioner/accused has filed the present petition, asserting that the learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the material produced on record. There was tampering with the cheque. The cheque was issued towards the liability of the Account No. CD-5956, but CD-5956 was scored off and replaced by CD-6033. K.C. Sharma (CW1) also admitted this fact. He also admitted in his cross-examination that the accused had a liability of Rs.1,92,000/- in May 2015 in the loan account CD-6033. K.C. Sharma (CW1) was not authorised to file the complaint. No loan document of Account No. 6033 was placed on record. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Sangram Singh, learned counsel, for the petitioner/accused and Mr. Narender Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent. 10. Mr. Sangram Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the name of the payee was altered in the cheque (Ex.CW1/B). This was a material alteration and rendered the cheque void. The complaint and the affidavit are silent regarding the liability of the accused. K.C. Sharma (CW1) admitted in his cross-examination that an amount of Rs.1,92,000/- was due in May 2015. Thus, the complainant has failed to prove the liability of Rs.7.00 lacs for which the cheque was issued. The learned Courts below did not consider this aspect. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr. Thus, the complainant has failed to prove the liability of Rs.7.00 lacs for which the cheque was issued. The learned Courts below did not consider this aspect. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr. Narender Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly held that a presumption would arise by the issuance of the cheque that it was issued in discharge of liability for consideration. The burden is upon the accused to rebut this presumption; however, he failed to discharge this burden. All the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied. Learned Courts below had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused, and no interference is required with the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: 14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 14. In the above case, also a conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis. 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 ], it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. A bare perusal of the cheque (Ex.CW1/B) shows that CD-5956 was written in black ink against the name of the payee. CD-5956 was scored off, and CD-6033 was mentioned with the blue pen. This alteration does not bear any initials or signatures of the drawer to authenticate it. 19. It was laid down in Geemol Joseph v. Kousthabhan, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 2465, that the alteration in the name of the payee is a material alteration. It was observed: 14. On a perusal of Ext.P1 cheque, it is seen that the name “Kousthubhan” (the name of the accused) was initially written as the name of the payee. It is seen that the name of the payee, written as “Kousthubhan”, is struck off, and the name of the complainant is written in the cheque as the payee. Therefore, it is evident that there was alteration made in the cheque with regard to the name of the payee. The question is whether it is a material alteration or not. 15. A material alteration, varies the rights, liabilities, or legal position of the parties as ascertained by the deed in its original state, or otherwise varies the legal effect of the instrument as originally expressed, or reduces to certainty some provision which was originally unascertained and as such void, or which may otherwise prejudice the party bound by the deed as originally executed (See Loonkaran Sethia v. Ivan E. John : (1977) 1 SCC 379 : AIR 1977 SC 336 ). 16. Alteration of the payee's name in a cheque is material which affects the character of the instrument, and so also the relationship of the parties and their legal position as originally expressed. Therefore, it has to be concluded that material alteration of Ext.P1 cheque was effected with regard to the name of the payee. 17. Section 87 of the Act reads as follows: “87. Effect of material alteration - Any material alteration of a negotiable instrument renders the same void as against any one who is a party thereto at the time of making such alteration and does not consent thereto, unless it was made in order to carry out the common intention of the original parties. Effect of material alteration - Any material alteration of a negotiable instrument renders the same void as against any one who is a party thereto at the time of making such alteration and does not consent thereto, unless it was made in order to carry out the common intention of the original parties. Alteration by indorsee - Any such alteration, if made by an indorsee, discharges his indorser from all liability to him in respect of the consideration thereof. The provisions of this section are subject to those of Sections 20, 49 and 86 and 125. 18. The party who consents to the alteration, as well as the party who made the alteration, are not entitled to complain against such alteration. If the drawer of the cheque himself altered the cheque, he cannot take advantage of it later by saying that the cheque became void as there is a material alteration thereto. Even if the payee or the holder of the cheque made the alteration with the consent of the drawer thereof, such alteration also cannot be used as a ground to resist the right of the payee or the holder thereof. It is always a question of fact whether the alteration was made by the drawer himself or whether it was made with the consent of the drawer. It requires evidence to prove the aforesaid question whenever it is disputed (See Veera Exports v. Kalavathy : (2002) 1 SCC 97 : AIR 2002 SC 38 ). 20. It was held in Narayan Prasad Rai v. Ghanshyamlal, 1960 SCC OnLine MP 141 : ILR 1960 MP 999 : AIR 1961 MP 62 that any alteration in the amount will be a material alteration, which will make the instrument void. It was observed at page 1002: “Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is as follows: “Any material alteration of a negotiable instrument renders the same void as against anyone who is a party thereto at the time of making such alteration and does not consent thereto. The plain meaning of this section, as it stands, is that if any material alteration is found in a negotiable instrument, the instrument itself becomes void, and the party basing its claim upon it is precluded from claiming anything. The plain meaning of this section, as it stands, is that if any material alteration is found in a negotiable instrument, the instrument itself becomes void, and the party basing its claim upon it is precluded from claiming anything. This result follows irrespective of the fact whether the party concerned was responsible for the alteration or whether it was made by someone else without their consent or knowledge. This interpretation of the provision is hard on the innocent holder of the instrument. On the other hand, Shri R.K. Pandey contends that section 87 is attracted only if the alteration has been proved to have been made by the holder himself, and this fact must be pleaded and proved by the defendant. He went to the length of saying that in the instant case, even if the alteration had been made by the minor's next friend or guardian, it would not affect the claims of the minor. This interpretation is too narrow and is not justified by the wording of section 87. In our opinion, the correct interpretation of section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is that the alteration which has the effect of making the instrument void should have been brought about by the plaintiff or by anyone with his consent or on account of his negligence. If the alteration is brought about by an accident, or by some stranger who came in possession of the instrument in an unauthorised manner, then the instrument would not be rendered void.” 21. It was held in C. Sonamuthu v. R. Barsha Beevi, 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 386 : (2013) 1 MWN (Cri) DCC 113 that any material alteration in the instrument will make it void. It was observed: 16. At this juncture, this Court aptly quotes the decision, T. Kalavathi v. Veera Export, 2002 BC 1247 Mad., wherein it is held that “where material alteration made by the Accused in Negotiable Instruments Act, after the expiry of the period of validity, it would render the said instruments void, hence the Complaint on the basis of invalid, Negotiable Instruments Act could not be maintained.” 17. The effort of Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is that such a document is void and as such non-est. The technical defence or absence of a plea should not drive the Court on such occasion, especially with reference to the contention and evidence. 18. The effort of Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is that such a document is void and as such non-est. The technical defence or absence of a plea should not drive the Court on such occasion, especially with reference to the contention and evidence. 18. Ordinarily, any material alteration of a Negotiable Instrument renders the same void as against anyone who is a party thereto at the time of making such alteration and does not consent thereto, unless it was made in order to carry out the common intention of the original parties. Any such alteration, if made by an endorsee, discharges his endorser from all liability to him/her in respect of the consideration thereof in the considered opinion of this Court. 22. It was held that an alteration in the Negotiable Instruments Act, if it changes its legal character, is a material alteration. It was observed: “24. An alteration of a Negotiable Instrument is material if it changes its legal character or its scope as means of evidence, in the considered opinion of this Court. Integrity and sanctity of contracts are to be preserved, and the object is to prevent fraud and deter persons from tampering with the written instruments. Where an instrument appears altered, it is the primordial duty on the part of the Plaintiff to show that the alteration was not improperly made as per the decision in Jayantilal Goel v. Zubeda Khanum, AIR 1986 AP 120 . xxxxxx 26. In law, the following are declared to be Material Alterations: (i) the date, (ii) the sum payable, (iii) the time of payment, (iv) the place of payment, (v) the addition of a place of payment mentioned by the acceptor without the acceptor’s consent.” Therefore, the burden was upon the complainant to prove that the alteration was made by the accused. Once it is apparent that the words have been added to the name of the payee. 23. It was submitted that there is no proof of the fact that the alteration was made by the payee. This submission will not help the complainant. It was laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Jayantilal Goel v. Zubeda Khanum, 1985 SCC OnLine AP 22 : AIR 1986 AP 120 : (1985) 2 AP LJ (SN 1) 10 that the burden to prove that the drawer had made the material alteration is upon the payee. This submission will not help the complainant. It was laid down by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Jayantilal Goel v. Zubeda Khanum, 1985 SCC OnLine AP 22 : AIR 1986 AP 120 : (1985) 2 AP LJ (SN 1) 10 that the burden to prove that the drawer had made the material alteration is upon the payee. It was observed at page 122: 7. The second aspect, which is more crucial, is — who should discharge the burden of proving that the document is materially altered. This, too, is well settled that the person who is in the custody of the document subsequent to its execution, should there be any alteration, has to discharge the burden of establishing that it is not altered. 8. in A. Subba Reddy v. Neelapa Reddi, (AIR 1966 Andh Pra 267) (supra), this Court held: — “The general rule in English law followed in India is that a party having custody or control of a document produced in evidence must explain the alteration. When the instrument on its production appears to have been altered, it is a general rule that the party offering it in evidence must explain its appearance, because every alteration in the case of a negotiable instrument renders it suspicious. It is only reasonable that the party claiming under it should remove the suspicion.” Further held: “It must be remembered that it is not any and every alteration that avoids the instrument. To have that effect, the alteration must be in a material particular. A material alteration can be brought about by a change of date or time of drawing or of the place of payment or by a change in the sum payable, etc., etc. It is thus evident that the date of a promissory note is a material portion of it, and any alteration of such date will naturally avoid the promissory note, unless, of course, as stated in the section, such an alteration is made with the consent of the other party, or is made to effectuate the common intention of the original parties. It is wrong to assume that the date of the promissory note is merely a description. It indicates the time when the promissory note was executed. It is wrong to assume that the date of the promissory note is merely a description. It indicates the time when the promissory note was executed. In most cases, the date is very material in calculating the date of the perfomance of the contract and more often fixing the period of limitation within which the plaintiff will have to institute the suit on the foot of such promissory note. It is immaterial whether the alteration is made in the date or month, or year. Any such alteration being material must necessarily result in the avoidance of the promissory note” Also held: “where an instrument appears to be materially altered, the law naturally casts a heavy burden on the plaintiff to explain the alteration and show when it was made. Ordinarily, the party who presents a negotiable instrument which is an essential part of his case in an apparently altered and suspicious state, must fail, from the mere Infirmity or doubtful complexion of the instrument unless it can satisfactorily explain the existing state of the document…. The plaintiff, in his deposition, denies any correction. He has no explanation to offer in case it is found that the date appears to be materially altered. In the absence of any explanation on behalf of the plaintiff who seeks the enforcement of the document, it is obvious that the plaintiff must fail, as the onus was on him to show that the material alteration was made either with the consent of the parties or in order to effectuate the common intention of the parties.” In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, 4th Volume, at para 459, it is stated: “Where an instrument, or if a bill the acceptance thereon, is materially altered without the assent of all the parties liable on it, the instrument is avoided as regards all the parties except any one who has himself made, authorised, or assented to the alteration, and those who have become parties to the instrument sub- sequent to the material alteration.” In para 460, it is further stated: “The following alterations are specifically declared to be material: any alteration of (1) the date: (2) the sum payable: (3) the time of payment: (4) the place of pay- ment, or the addition of a place of payment where one is mentioned by the acceptor, without the acceptor's assent.” 24. It was held in Narayan Prasad Rai (supra) that the burden to prove that the alteration was made by the signatory is upon the holder of the instrument. It was observed: “Shri R.K. Pandey contended that it was necessary for the defendant to plead that the alteration was brought about by the plaintiff himself or by someone with his consent. In the absence of such pleadings, no relief should be granted to the defendant on the ground that the instrument has been materially altered. We find that the law on the point is just the contrary, as would appear from the following passage occurring in Bhashyam's Negotiable Instruments Act (Tenth Edn., 1956) at page 452: “Where the instrument appears to be altered, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff (i.e. the holder) to show that the alteration is not improperly made, and the presumption in the case of negotiable instruments is that the alteration was made subsequent to the issue of the instrument; while in the case of deeds, etc., the presumption is the other way. Where a bill appears to have been altered, or there are marks of erasure on it, the party seeking to enforce the instrument is bound to give evidence that it is not avoided thereby.” The burden of pleading or proving how the alteration came in the instrument is thus on the plaintiff. In Petamber Manik-Jee v. Motee-Chund Manik-Jee [(1836- 37) 1 Moo IA 420.] the following observations were made regarding the burden of proof in such cases: “If a plaintiff relies on a bond in this country, or any other instrument, which appears to have been altered, the Court will not receive it, or act upon it, till it is most satisfactorily proved by all the subscribing witnesses at the least, and other evidence, that alteration was made antecedently to Signature.” The obvious implication of these observations is that if no such proof is forthcoming, the alteration shall be presumed to have been made after the instrument was executed. To the same effect is the following passage in Mst. Khoob Conwur v. Baboo Moodnarain Singh [(1861- 64) 9 Moo IA 1.]. To the same effect is the following passage in Mst. Khoob Conwur v. Baboo Moodnarain Singh [(1861- 64) 9 Moo IA 1.]. “It may be conceded that, in an ordinary case, the party who presents an instrument, which is an essential part of his case, in an apparently altered and suspicious state, must fail, from the mere infirmity or doubtful complexion of his proof, unless he can satisfactorily explain the existing state of the document.” Although their Lordships held that the presumption may be rebutted by the appearance of the document itself, but the principle laid down obviously is that he who produces an altered document must prove how the alteration was made. The same view has been consistently taken by this Court. In Kanhayalal v. Sitaram [20 NLR 76], it was held that a material alteration made by, or with the consent of, one party, but without the consent of the other party, makes the instrument void and disentitles the party responsible for the alteration from enforcing it. The Court observed in that case that where the plaintiff relies upon an altered or suspicious instrument, “the law casts a heavy onus on him to explain the alteration and to show when it was made”. The following observations from Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 10, sections 764 and 765, at page 431, were relied upon: “An alteration made while the instrument is in the custody of one party, not made with his knowledge or consent, has the same effect in avoiding the instrument as if made by him, on the principle that he who has the custody of an instrument made for his benefit is bound to preserve it in its original state.” In Pachkodi's case (supra), the same view has been taken regarding the burden of proof by observing that: “These documents were altered in his possession and were produced from his custody. He had to explain when and how the alteration was made.” We have no doubt that the burden of proving how the alterations were made in the document lies on the plaintiff, and in the absence of any proof, it should be presumed that they were made by him or by his next friend, who was in custody of the document. The view which we have taken does not go against the Madras decisions relied upon by the appellant. The view which we have taken does not go against the Madras decisions relied upon by the appellant. Although the single Judge had stated his conclusion somewhat widely, the Division Bench definitely concluded that the instrument would be saved from becoming void only if the material alteration was made by a stranger without the consent of the holder. In that case, the natural father, who was suspected to have made the changes, was a stranger inasmuch as the pro-note was in favour of the adoptive father, and the adoptive mother was acting as the legal guardian. In the instant case, the pro-note has all along been in the custody of the minor plaintiff's father, who also acted as the next friend of the minor when the suit was filed. Under these circumstances, according to the statement of law quoted from Halsbury's Laws of England in paragraph 13 above, the presumption that the alteration was made by the plaintiff's father or by someone with his consent had to be rebutted by the plaintiff.” 25. Thus, the burden was upon the payee to prove that the alteration was made by the drawer or with his consent. 26. K.C. Sharma (CW1) stated in his cross-examination that there was an alteration in the account number, and 5986 was altered to 6033. He did not clarify that this alteration was made with the consent of the accused. Therefore, the cheque would become void, and no liability would arise by its dishonour. 27. K.C. Sharma (CW1) admitted in his cross- examination that four instalments were due towards the accused amounting to Rs.1,92,000/- in May 2015. His testimony does not show that the accused had a subsisting liability of Rs.7.00 lacs on 8.5.2015, the date of issuance of the cheque. 28. It was submitted that the accused admitted the issuance of the cheque and his signatures on the cheque; therefore, a presumption would arise under Section 139 and 118(a) of the NI Act. This submission will not help the petitioner. The presumption is rebuttable, and the moment evidence is led, the presumption would stand rebutted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1275 that the presumption applies in the absence of evidence and disappears after the evidence is produced. It was observed: “38. The presumption is rebuttable, and the moment evidence is led, the presumption would stand rebutted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, (2023) 10 SCC 148 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1275 that the presumption applies in the absence of evidence and disappears after the evidence is produced. It was observed: “38. John Henry Wigmore [John Henry Wigmore and the Rules of Evidence: The Hidden Origins of Modern Law] on Evidence states as follows: “The peculiar effect of the presumption of law is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling the Jury to reach the conclusion in the absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent but if the opponent does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the Judge's requirement of some evidence), the presumption ‘disappears as a rule of law and the case is in the Jury's hands free from any rule’.” 29. In the present case, the presumption stood displaced by the admission made by K.C. Sharma (CW1) that an amount of Rs.1,92,000/- was due in May 2015, and no advantage can be derived from the admission made by the accused regarding the issuance and signatures on the cheque. 30. Learned Appellate Court noticed the submission that there was a material alteration and the provisions of Section 87, which made the instrument void on material alteration, but held that the alteration was not material because the debt and legally enforceable liability were proved. Even if the liability was proved, it will not take away the effect of Section 87 of the NI Act, which renders an instrument void by a material alteration. 31. Therefore, both the learned Courts below failed to advert to the material aspect of the case, and the judgments and order passed by them cannot be sustained. 32. In view of the above, the present revision is allowed, and the judgment of conviction dated 14.10.2022 and order of sentence dated 17.10.2022, passed by the learned Trial Court, affirmed by the learned Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No. 95-S/10 of 2022, dated 23.1.2025, are ordered to be set aside. The complaint is dismissed and the accused is acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. 33. The complaint is dismissed and the accused is acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. 33. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs.25,000/-with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the petitioner on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 34. A copy of this judgment, along with the record of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.