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2025 DAILYLAW 35225 (JHR)

SHYAM LAL SINGH v. CENTRAL COALFIELDS LIMITED THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN CUM MANAGING DIRECTOR

WPC/706/2025 · 2025-09-11

Deepak Roshan

Civil Appealbody2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

2025:JHHC:28048 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 706 of 2025 ….….. Shyam Lal Singh, aged about 55 years, son of Late Tulo Singh, Resident of Ghutitand Basti, P.O. and P.S.- Bermo, District-Bokaro (Jharkhand). ..… Petitioner Versus 1. Central Coalfields Limited through its Chairman cum Managing Director, Darbhanga House, P.O.- G.P.O., P.S.-Kotwali, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand. 2. Director (Personnel), Central Coalfields Limited, Darbhanga House, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.-Kotwali, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand. 3. Project Officer, Kargali Project, B & K Area, Central Coalfields Limited, P.O.+P.S. Bermo, District- Bokaro. ..... Respondents ….….. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN ….… For the Petitioner : M/s. Rahul Kumar, Khushboo Kumari, Tejaswa Mohanta, Advocates For the Respondents : Mr. Amit Kr. Sinha, Adv ….….. C.A.V. ON 30/07/2025 PRONOUNCED ON:11/09/2025 Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner for the following reliefs:- (i) To issue a direction(s)/order(s) in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or direction(s)/ order(s) for quashing and setting aside the order dated 30.12.2023 (Annexure-9) passed by the Project Officer/Disciplinary Authority, Kargali Washery, B&K Area, CCL, whereby and whereunder "removal from services" has been awarded to the Petitioner; And / Or (ii) To issue a direction(s)/order(s) in the nature of writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or direction/order for quashing and 2025:JHHC:28048 2 setting aside the appellate order dated 26.4.2024 (Annexure-11), passed by the Director Personnel/Appellate Authority, CCL, Ranchi, whereby and whereunder the order dated 30.12.2023 passed by the Disciplinary Authority/Respondent No. 3 has been affirmed wherein the Petitioner has been awarded punishment for 'removal from services.' And/Or (iii) To issue a direction(s) / order(s) in the nature of mandamus commanding upon the respondents to reinstate the Petitioner with full back wages with all consequential benefits thereof. And/Or (iv) For further issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/ direction(s) particularly a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the entire departmental proceeding including the charge- sheet dated 30.09.2013(Annexure-2), issued by the Project Officer cum disciplinary authority and all subsequent actions thereto. And/Or (v) To issue a direction(s) / order(s) in nature of writ or mandamus and / or pass any direction(s) or order(s) as my Lords may deem fit and proper in view of the facts and circumstances of the case for doing conscionable justice to the petitioner. 3. From record it appears that this is the second round of litigation. In the first round of litigation i.e. in W.P.(S) No. 5875/2015, vide judgement dated 28.3.2022, this Court had quashed the order of punishment for removal as well as the appellate order and had remitted the matter to the disciplinary authority to proceed from the stage of enquiry itself by providing investigation report and other relied upon documents and pass a fresh order following principles of natural justice in accordance with law within a period of six months; failing which the present petitioner shall also 2025:JHHC:28048 3 be reinstated in service. The respondent CCL undertook the enquiry from the initial stage and contemplated the whole proceeding in which the same punishment of removal vide order dated 30.12.2023 was passed and upon appeal made by the petitioner, the appeal has been decided against the petitioner vide order dated 26.4.2024. 4. The factual matrix is that a charge-sheet dated 30.9.2013 was issued against the petitioner alleging therein that he being the “Dealing Clerk” of the Sales Department, issued loading slips in bulk to the D.O. Holders and allowed to lift the coal rejects of Kargali Washery in huge quantity without being billed. It has also been alleged that the petitioner failed to reconcile records of about 4150 MT of coal rejects valuing Rs. 85 Lacs approximately. 5. Pursuant to the aforesaid charge-sheet, the petitioner replied vide Annexure-3. Upon remand by this Court, fresh enquiry was set up and the sole and same management witness appeared as MW-1, who has stated that he shall depose on the same line as deposed in the earlier enquiry proceeding. As it would appear from the records that the whole departmental proceeding has been contemplated upon the recommendation of the investigation report submitted by 2025:JHHC:28048 4 MW-1, who recommended punitive action i.e. suitable disciplinary action shall be taken against the Project Officer, Kargali Washery, CCL; Sales Officer, Kargali Washery and two Clerks including the petitioner. 6. It appears that from the investigation report, supplied to the Petitioner upon remand by this Court, there is a finding of the MW-1 that the Project Officer-Sri D. Singh is the administrative Head of Kargali Washery. The weigh Bridge Sales Office are under his administrative control and he failed to establish a proper system to check and control. His administrative failure has led to the occurrence of such a gross irregularity. The Sales-In-charge, Sri S.R. Singh, has also been found to be responsible for whole occurrence as he is the overall in-charge of the sales activities in Kargali Washery. The investigation further pin-pointed that he being the head of Sales department was looking after all the activities in the Sales Department and signing all the relevant documents prepared by staffs under his administrative control. The investigation report further reveals that all the lifting orders, sales road challan, JVAT forms were signed by him. Thus, he is responsible for the failure for establishing a proper system in respect of issue and receipt 2025:JHHC:28048 5 of the loading slip and corroboration of records of sales office with that of Weigh bridge leading to occurrence of this irregularity. 7. The inquiry officer in his enquiry report came to the conclusions that the petitioner is – S.N. Clause No. along with particulars Conclusion 1. 26.1 – Theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with employer’s business or property Not proved. 2. 26.5 – Wilful neglect at work. Proved. 3. 26.22 – Any wilful and deliberate act which is subversive of discipline or which may be detrimental to the interest of the company. Proved. 4. 26.41 – Violation of any order irrelevant. Not proved. 8. The contention of the Petitioner is that though the disciplinary authority has issued 2nd show cause disagreeing with the finding of the Inquiry officer in relation to misconduct under Clause 26.5 and 26.22 of the Certified Standing Order, but the disciplinary authority has not disturbed with the findings of the Inquiry officer in regard to system failure holding the Project Officer mainly responsible for such an occurrence. It has also been contended by Ld. Counsel that the survey report prepared on the company level itself illustrates that no shortage was ever found and therefore, no financial loss occurred to the company. In the above referred background, the Counsel for the petitioner further tried to impress upon the said fact corroborating it with the CISF letter dated 16.4.2013, which also shows that no theft has been reported/detected. 2025:JHHC:28048 6 It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner that these conspectus aspects have also not been challenged by the management during the enquiry proceeding and the enquiry report. Further, the loading slips is merely a specimen produced in the departmental proceeding and the same has not been corroborated and moreover, the same document has been produced in the departmental proceeding and in the previous round of litigation this Court has discarded the said loading slips. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents has defended the impugned orders by submitting that the petitioner has been awarded due opportunity of defending himself and in adherence to the cardinal principles of natural justice, the whole enquiry proceeding has been conducted in which the petitioner has been found guilty and upon giving 2nd show cause to the petitioner, the petitioner has been imposed the punishment of removal from service. He further submits that there is no scope of any interference in the matter and as such the impugned orders should not be interfered with as there is no procedural irregularity and there was full-fledged enquiry. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the entire records and averments made in the respective affidavits, this Court is of the view that without interfering with the finding of the Inquiry officer as well as the disciplinary authority, the whole controversy in regard to system failure has never been rebutted by the management during the departmental proceedings and the responsibility of the Project Officer has also not been challenged by the respondents. It is the categorical stand of the petitioner in the writ petition as well as during the enquiry proceeding that the 2025:JHHC:28048 7 Project Officer is mainly responsible for the whole occurrence as alleged and the whole occurrence took place because of system failure. The petitioner has also taken stand that despite the investigating officer coming to the specific conclusion that disciplinary action must be initiated against the Project officer, Sale officer in-charge and two erring Clerks including the Petitioner; but neither any departmental proceeding has been contemplated against the two officials nor any punishment has been awarded to them. This fact has never been rebutted in the counter affidavit by the respondents as well. 11. That a part; it is also an admitted case that the whole charge is based on occurrence caused due to the system failure and the charge-sheet has been prepared on the basis of the investigation carried out by the M.W.1. From bare perusal of the investigation report, it would transpire that he has held the Project Officer and Sales Officer responsible for system failure and in fact, the Inquiry officer has also come to the same finding. Even after giving no credence to the survey report showing no shortage and the letter issued by the CISF stating that no detection of shortage of coal reject; the issue regarding the case of system failure cannot be discarded and ignored and therefore, the only charge which can be attributed to the petitioner is that of negligence. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Girish Bhushan Goyal Vrs. BHEL 1 went into the question of negligence and quantum of punishment. The relevant portion of the said judgement is quoted hereinbelow:- “13. The major punishment which is awarded to the appellant through the order of dismissal dated 18.3.2009, is covered under Rule 23(i) of 1 (2014) 1 SCC 82 2025:JHHC:28048 8 BHEL Conduct Rules considering that the appellant had reached the age of superannuation. However, the order of termination does not mention any form of criminal charges against him, which is necessary to attract penalty under Rule 23(i) of BHEL Conduct Rules amounting to dismissal from service. On the other hand, the nature of charges leveled against the appellant was such that he omitted from performing his duty of being a responsible vigilant officer which amounted to being negligent as against being an active participant in colluding with the employees against his employer and acting against the interest of the Company. 14. The consequence of the dismissal order served on him at the end of his service tenure not only results in inflicting disproportionate punishment on him in terms of bad name and reputation, but also deprives the appellant of his retiral benefits for which he has got statutory entitlement for rendering three decades of service to the Company whereas his negligence attracts minor penalty under Rule 23 of BHEL Conduct Rules. It is pertinent to mention the observation made on this issue by this Court on the premise of similar facts and circumstances. In the case of Surendra Prasad Shukla v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.[1], at paras 9-10, this Court held as under: “9. There was no charge against the appellant that he had in any way aided or abetted the offence under Section 392 IPC or that he knew that his son had stolen the car and yet he did not inform the police. The appellant, as we have held, was guilty of negligence of not having enquired from his son about the car kept in front of the government quarters occupied by him. The appellant had served the Government as a Constable and thereafter as a Head Constable from 7-8-1971 till he was dismissed from service on 28-2-2005 i.e. for 34 years, and for such long service he had earned pension. In our considered opinion, the punishment of dismissal of the appellant from service so as to deprive him of his pension for the service that he had rendered for 34 long years was shockingly disproportionate to the negligence proved against him. 10. We accordingly, allow this appeal in part and modify the punishment of dismissal from service to compulsory retirement. The LPA and the writ petition filed by the appellant before the High Court are allowed in part. There shall be no order as to costs.” 15. Therefore, in view of the principle laid down by this Court in the above referred case, we are of the opinion that dismissal order served on the appellant just 6 days prior to his retirement date is exorbitant and disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct particularly, because he was not involved in active collusion with the other employees of the Company who were involved in this incident, for causing financial loss to the respondent-Company but was negligent by an act of omission. We also should not lose sight of the fact that the appellant took steps to retrieve the materials which were due against the Bill from the suppliers which rectified the error. Accordingly, the order of dismissal served on him is liable to be quashed and is accordingly, quashed. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that his negligence has caused financial loss to the respondent-Company. Therefore, keeping at par with the punishment awarded to Sh. B.S. Rana on ground of misconduct in terms of demotion to lower grade for 3 years as per letter dated 6.6.2011 from Central Public Information Officer, we award the similar punishment of deduction of one year increment on the appellant as per Rule 23 (b) of the BHEL Conduct Rules since the appellant already reached the age of superannuation when the order of dismissal was served on him. Accordingly, the Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.30883-30884 of 2012 are allowed.” 13. Another aspect of the matter is that now it is well settled that different treatment/punishment cannot be given. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajendra 2025:JHHC:28048 9 Yadav Vrs. State of M.P.,2 has laid down the law as under:- “8.We have gone through the inquiry report placed before us in respect of the appellant as well as Constable Arjun Pathak. The inquiry clearly reveals the role of Arjun Pathak. It was Arjun Pathak who had demanded and received the money, though the tacit approval of the appellant was proved in the inquiry. The charge levelled against Arjun Pathak was more serious than the one charged against the appellant. Both appellants and other two persons as well as Arjun Pathak were involved in the same incident. After having found that Arjun Pathak had a more serious role and, in fact, it was he who had demanded and received the money, he was inflicted comparatively a lighter punishment. At the same time, appellant who had played a passive role was inflicted with a more serious punishment of dismissal from service which, in our view, cannot be sustained. 9. The Doctrine of Equality applies to all who are equally placed; even among persons who are found guilty. The persons who have been found guilty can also claim equality of treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed. Punishment should not be disproportionate while comparing the involvement of co-delinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident. The Disciplinary Authority cannot impose punishment which is disproportionate, i.e., lesser punishment for serious offences and stringent punishment for lesser offences. 10. The principle stated above is seen applied in few judgments of this Court. The earliest one is Director General of Police and Others v. G. Dasayan (1998) 2 SCC 407, wherein one Dasayan, a Police Constable, along with two other constables and one Head Constable were charged for the same acts of misconduct. The Disciplinary Authority exonerated two other constables, but imposed the punishment of dismissal from service on Dasayan and that of compulsory retirement on Head Constable. This Court, in order to meet the ends of justice, substituted the order of compulsory retirement in place of the order of dismissal from service on Dasayan, applying the principle of parity in punishment among co- delinquents. This Court held that it may, otherwise, violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 11.In Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah case (supra), the workman was dismissed from service for proved misconduct. However, few other workmen, against whom there were identical allegations, were allowed to avail of the benefit of voluntary retirement scheme. In such circumstances, this Court directed that the workman also be treated on the same footing and be given the benefit of voluntary retirement from service from the month on which the others were given the benefit. 12. We are of the view the principle laid down in the above mentioned judgments also would apply to the facts of the present case. We have already indicated that the action of the Disciplinary Authority imposing a comparatively lighter punishment to the co-delinquent Arjun Pathak and at the same time, harsher punishment to the appellant cannot be permitted in law, since they were all involved in the same incident. Consequently, we are inclined to allow the appeal by setting aside the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the appellant and order that he be reinstated in service forthwith. Appellant is, therefore, to be re- instated from the date on which Arjun Pathak was re-instated and be given all consequent benefits as was given to Arjun Pathak. Ordered accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs.” 2 (2013) 3 SCC 73 2025:JHHC:28048 10 14. In the case at hand, it is crystal clear from the proceedings that the larger responsibility lied upon the Project Officer and Sales Officer against whom, neither any departmental proceedings; nor any criminal case has been lodged despite recommendation made by the Investigating Officer for departmentally proceeding against them. It appears that the petitioner who was discharging his duties as a Sales Clerk was proceeded departmentally, is a small fish and perhaps has been targeted to protect the bigger fish involving high ups. 15. Having regard to the aforesaid discussions analysing the materials on record, it can be inferred about active collusion of the Petitioner with the Project Officer and Sales Officer, who were at realm of affairs for causing financial losses (if any) to the respondent company, but, as stated hereinabove, they have not been proceeded with. In such circumstances, the punishment of removal from service of this petitioner appears to be shockingly disproportionate. 16. Accordingly, the instant writ application stands partly allowed. Impugned order 30.12.2023 (Annexure-9) and Appellate Order dated 26.04.2024 (Annexure-11), are hereby, quashed and set-aside. The Respondents are directed to reinstate the Petitioner forthwith. The matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority to pass a fresh order on the quantum of punishment, inasmuch as, the order of removal from service of the Petitioner in the attending facts and circumstances of this Case indeed shocks the conscience of this Court. 2025:JHHC:28048 11 The disciplinary authority is directed to pass the fresh order of punishment within a period of 12 weeks from today and communicate the same to the Petitioner. 17. Consequently, the instant writ application stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Pending I.A.s, if any, also stands closed. (Deepak Roshan, J.) Amardeep/ A.F.R