JUDGMENT : SATYEN VAIDYA, J. 1. Aggrieved against impugned order/resolution dated 22.06.2013, Annexure P-14 issued by respondent No.2, petitioner has filed the instant petition for following substantive reliefs: (i) That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a Writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned order/a copy of resolution dated 22nd June, 2013, Annexure P-14. (ii) That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents to produce before this Hon’ble Court the entire record of the case.” 2. The order impugned herein has been passed by the Board of Directors of Himachal Pradesh State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd., whereby the services appeal of petitioner has been rejected. 3. The petitioner was posted as Incharge of Retail Shop Himachal Pradesh State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. (for short “HPSCSC”), Auckland, Shimla from 05.05.1989 to 21.02.1990. It was alleged that on inspection of the retail shop of Auckland in January, 1990 extra ordinary shortage of essential commodities was noticed. Consequently, the petitioner faced disciplinary action as also criminal trial under Section 409 of the IPC. In criminal trial, petitioner was acquitted by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (II), Shimla in case No. 7/1 of 1993 vide judgment dated 07.06.1999. The acquittal of petitioner was challenged by the State of Himachal Pradesh before this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 386 of 1999, which was dismissed vide judgment dated 03.08.2010. 4. The petitioner was served with charge memo with following Articles of Charge:- “ARTICLE OF CHARGE-1 That the said Sh. Mohan Lal Thakur, while functioning as Sale Depot Incharge at H.P. State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, Retail Shop, Auck Land (Lakkar Bazar, Shimla Town, during the period from the 1st April, 1989 to 21 February, 1990, has failed to maintain devotion to duty and absolute integrity. He has not maintained proper record / accounts of the said Shop as per procedure of the Corporation. As soon, he had misappropriated /embezzled corporation's stocks / funds to the tune of Rs. 60,795.98 paise, (Rupees Sixty Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety Five and Paise Ninety Eight only). Thus violated Rule -3 of Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and bye laws 13 & 15 of the Corporation. ARTICLE OF CHARGE-II That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid Retail Shop of H.P. State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. As Sale Depot Incharge, the said Sh. Thus violated Rule -3 of Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and bye laws 13 & 15 of the Corporation. ARTICLE OF CHARGE-II That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid Retail Shop of H.P. State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. As Sale Depot Incharge, the said Sh. Mohan Lal Thakur, has misappropriated / embezzled Corporation's stocks / funds to the tune of Rs. 29,979.79 paise (Rupees Twenty Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Nine and paise Seventy eight only) by selling essential commodities handled by him on behalf of the corporation, in black market for his wrongful gain. The matter was detected at the time of inspection.” 5. The petitioner contested the charge in regular inquiry under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules conducted against him. The inquiry report submitted by the Inquiry Officer indicted the petitioner and found both the charges proved against him. 6. The disciplinary authority concurred with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and imposed the major penalty of removal from service vide order dated 30.03.1991. 7. The petitioner assailed the punishment order by availing remedy of service appeal before the Board of Directors of HPSCSC (for short “BOD”). The BOD dismissed the service appeal of the petitioner vide order dated 27.03.1992. The said order was assailed by the petitioner before the erstwhile State Administrative Tribunal but remained unsuccessful and the Original Application filed by the petitioner was rejected on 01.08.2001. The dismissal order passed by the State Administrative Tribunal was assailed before this Court by filing CWP No.1275 of 2001. This Court disposed of CWP No. 1275 of 2001 vide order dated 17.12.2001 by granting liberty to the petitioner to file an appropriate application before the State Administrative Tribunal pointing out all the issues which were addressed before the learned Tribunal and were not dealt with by the said forum. In sequel, the petitioner filed review petition No.68 of 2008 before the State Administrative Tribunal. On abolition of State Administrative Tribunal, the Review Petition came to be transferred to this Court and was allowed vide order dated 19.11.2010. The order dated 01.08.2001 passed by the learned Tribunal in OA No. 2910 of 1994 was recalled. The review petition was disposed of in following terms:- “6. On abolition of State Administrative Tribunal, the Review Petition came to be transferred to this Court and was allowed vide order dated 19.11.2010. The order dated 01.08.2001 passed by the learned Tribunal in OA No. 2910 of 1994 was recalled. The review petition was disposed of in following terms:- “6. In that view of the matter, we set aside Annexure A-6 with direction to the Board of Directors/appellate authority under the Corporation to consider the appeal filed by the petitioner against the punishment of removal from service with reference to all the grounds taken by the petitioner in the appeal and addressed before the Board of Directors at the time of hearing. Needless to say that the petitioner will be afforded an opportunity of hearing by the appellate authority. Order shall also be passed by the appellate authority within a period of four months from the date of production of copy of this judgment by the petitioner.” 8. In compliance to the aforesaid directions, the BOD of HPSCSC called the petitioner for hearing on 21.12.2010. Vide order dated 27.12.2010, Annexure P-6, dismissed the service appeal of petitioner on the basis of findings recorded by the service appeal committee. It will be apt to notice that on being called upon to decide the service appeal of petitioner vide judgment dated 19.11.2010, the BOD of HPSCSC had referred the matter to the service appeal committee which had submitted its report to the BOD. 9. The petitioner again assailed the order dated 27.10.2010 of the BOD by way of Civil Writ Petition before this Court, which was registered as CWP No. 7833 of 2011. The said petition was disposed of vide judgment dated 26.09.2012 in following terms:- “4. Now significantly the Board of Directors themselves did not consider and decide the appeal. The Board of Directors evolved a self serving procedure which is not in accordance with the law, rules, guidelines, policy or articles of the institution. It assigned its authority to a Service Appeal Committee, to examine the merits of the appeal. Now significantly all the members of the Service Appeal Committee are not members of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors evolved a self serving procedure which is not in accordance with the law, rules, guidelines, policy or articles of the institution. It assigned its authority to a Service Appeal Committee, to examine the merits of the appeal. Now significantly all the members of the Service Appeal Committee are not members of the Board of Directors. The impugned order, as also the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors dated 28.6.2011, which were produced in the Court, do not reveal that there is any independent application of mind by the Board of Directors on the petitioner’s appeal. They have simply approved the recommendations of the Service Appeal Committee while deciding the petitioner’s appeal. 5. The Apex Court in Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney and others, (2009) 4 SCC 240 has held as under:- “5. In our opinion, an order of affirmation need not contain as elaborate reasons as an order of reversal, but that does not mean that the order of affirmation need not contain any reasons whatsoever. In fact, the said decision in Prabhu Dayal Grover case [ (1995) 6 SCC 279 ] has itself stated that the appellate order should disclose application of mind. Whether there was an application of mind or not can only be disclosed by some reasons, at least in brief, mentioned in the order of the appellate authority. Hence, we cannot accept the proposition that an order of affirmation need not contain any reasons at all. That order must contain some reasons, at least in brief, so that one can know whether the appellate authority has applied its mind while affirming the order of the disciplinary authority.” 6. Hence the appellate authority cannot be said to have decided the appeal on merits by applying its independent mind. As such, the impugned order dated 27.7.2011 (Annexure P-6) is quashed with a direction to the Board of Directors to decide the appeal, strictly in terms of the judgment passed by this Court on 19.11.2010 (Annexure P- 2). Needful be positively done within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment. With the aforesaid observations, present petition stands disposed of, so also the pending application(s), if any. 10. Needful be positively done within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this judgment. With the aforesaid observations, present petition stands disposed of, so also the pending application(s), if any. 10. The BOD once again considered the service appeal of petitioner and has dismissed the same vide impugned order Annexure P-14. 11. The petitioner filed the review of the aforesaid decision of the BOD which is stated to have remained pending. In the aforesaid backdrop, the instant petition has been filed. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the entire record carefully. 13. Mr. Nitin Thakur, Advocate learned counsel representing the petitioner has laid stressed on following grounds. “a) That it had been proved beyond doubt that the disciplinary authority had passed the punishment order without supplying the inquiry report to the petitioner before passing of such order and thus, there was a clear case of violation of principles of natural justice. b) The petitioner had been acquitted from all the criminal charges on the same set of facts and evidence and thus, he was entitled to be exonerated of the charges on the similar facts in disciplinary proceedings.” 14. Indisputably, the petitioner is in third round of challenge to the order of the Appellate Authority before this Court. While disposing of Civil Review No. 68 of 2008 vide judgment dated 19.11.2010 along with CWP(T) No. 45 of 2010 (OA No. 2910 of 1994) a Division Bench of this Court had observed that the Appellate Authority i.e. BOD had dismissed the service appeal of petitioner without addressing the grounds raised by the petitioner in the appeal. The right of petitioner in the service appeal to make an attempt for change of heart before the appellate authority was held to be most important facet of the principle of natural justice and fairness. With this background, the judgment dated 19.11.2010, Annexure P-2 was passed. 15. The Hon’ble Division Bench had taken into notice the grounds raised by the petitioner before the Appellate Authority viz. he was innocent in the matter; no inquiry report had been given to him; he was forced to make admission regarding misappropriation so as to recover the amount from the insurance company; he had been found innocent by the criminal court and the procedure followed in the inquiry was vitiated. 16. he was innocent in the matter; no inquiry report had been given to him; he was forced to make admission regarding misappropriation so as to recover the amount from the insurance company; he had been found innocent by the criminal court and the procedure followed in the inquiry was vitiated. 16. Similarly, in the second round of petitioner before this Court, what was looked into was the legality and propriety of the order passed by the Appellate Authority i.e. BOD of HPSCSC in service appeal of petitioner. This Court while delivering judgment dated 26.09.2012 in CWP No. 7833 of 2011, Annexure P-12 had specifically found lack of independent application of mind by the BOD as the said authority was found to have passed the order on the basis of proceedings held by service appeal committee. 17. Thus, by way of instant petition, the petitioner cannot be allowed to enhance the scope of challenge except to the impugned order Annexure P-14. It is more than settled that this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will normally not hold judicial review as to the administrative decision, only the legality and propriety of decision-making process can be gone into at the touchstone of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 18. The impugned order reveals that the objections raised by the petitioner with respect to the non-supply of inquiry report had been rendered infructuous. The BOD had held that though copy of inquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner before imposing penalty but the same was made available to him along with the penalty order dated 30.03.1991. The BOD had taken cognizance on this procedural lapse and had directed the disciplinary authority to supply to the petitioner copy of the inquiry report. In compliance, the disciplinary authority had supplied the inquiry report to the petitioner and despite that the petitioner had failed to make any representation against the inquiry report or the proposed penalty. On such premise, the Appellate Authority has held that the petitioner could not be allowed to raise a grievance on account of alleged violation of principle of natural justice. 19. Petitioner in the instant petition has not been able to refute the aforesaid findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Authority. On such premise, the Appellate Authority has held that the petitioner could not be allowed to raise a grievance on account of alleged violation of principle of natural justice. 19. Petitioner in the instant petition has not been able to refute the aforesaid findings of fact recorded by the Appellate Authority. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the supply of inquiry report after passing of punishment order would not cure the defect. He has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others vs. B. Karunakar & Ors., (1993) 4 SCC 727 in which it has been held as under:- “28. The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a "reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him". The findings on the charges given by a third person like the enquiry Officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. What is further, when the proviso to the said Article states that "where it is proposed after such inquiry to impose upon him any such penalty such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed" it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the Inquiry Officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to the Inquiry Officer's report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the Inquiry Officer. The latter right was always there. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the Inquiry Officer. The latter right was always there. But before the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the enquiry Officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges. 29. Hence it has to be held that when the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has right to receive a copy of the inquiry Officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the Inquiry Officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.” 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon a judgment passed by this Court on 30.08.2024 in CWPOA No. 2598 of 2019, titled as Roshan Lal Banyal vs. State of H.P. & Ors., to assert that the non-supply of inquiry report was a serious violation of the principle of natural justice. In addition, learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on paragraphs No.23 and 24 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. R.P. Singh, (2014) 7 SCC 340 , which reads as under:- “23. At this juncture, we would like to give our reasons for our respectful concurrence with S.K. Kapoor (supra). In addition, learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on paragraphs No.23 and 24 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. R.P. Singh, (2014) 7 SCC 340 , which reads as under:- “23. At this juncture, we would like to give our reasons for our respectful concurrence with S.K. Kapoor (supra). There is no cavil over the proposition that the language engrafted in Article 320(3)(c) does not make the said Article mandatory. As we find, in the T.V.Patel's case, the Court has based its finding on the language employed in Rule 32 of the Rules. It is not in dispute that the said Rule from the very inception is a part of the 1965 Rules. With the efflux of time, there has been a change of perception as regards the applicability of the principles of natural justice. An Inquiry Report in a disciplinary proceeding is required to be furnished to the delinquent employee so that he can make an adequate representation explaining his own stand/stance. That is what precisely has been laid down in the B.Karnukara's case. We may reproduce the relevant passage with profit:- “Hence it has to be held that when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the enquiry officer’s report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee’s right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the enquiry officer’s report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.” 24. We will be failing in our duty if we do not refer to another passage which deals with the effect of non- supply of the enquiry report on the punishment. It reads as follows:- “[v] The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. It reads as follows:- “[v] The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the [pic]concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice.” 25. After so stating, the larger Bench proceeded to state that the court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished. The courts/tribunals would apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment. It is only if the court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of report could have made a difference to the result in the case then it should set aside the order of punishment. The courts/tribunals would apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment. It is only if the court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of report could have made a difference to the result in the case then it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the said procedure the court/tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/ management to proceed with the enquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the enquiry from that stage of furnishing with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement, if ultimately ordered, should invariably left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome.” 21. Noticeably, this Court while deciding the CWPOA No. 2598 of 2019, titled as Roshan Lal Banyal vs. State of H.P. & Ors., had placed reliance on the constitutional bench judgment in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad vs. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074 . In R. P. Singh (supra) also the Hon’ble Supreme Court had followed the same principle as enunciated in the case of B. Karunakar. 22. There is no dispute to the proposition of law that the non-supply of inquiry report amounts to violation of principle of natural justice. However, simultaneously, the omission should have caused prejudice to the case of the delinquent. 23. Coming to the facts of the case, as noticed above, though the initially punishment order was passed against the petitioner by the disciplinary authority without prior supply of copy of inquiry report but later the rectification was made on the asking of the BOD and the inquiry report was made available to the petitioner. Even thereafter, the petitioner did not make any representation, the fact assumes importance in the background, when the petitioner had continuously been laying challenge to the punishment inflicted upon him. Despite previous two rounds before this Court, the petitioner could not secure an order that the inquiry or the punishment order was vitiated. Even thereafter, the petitioner did not make any representation, the fact assumes importance in the background, when the petitioner had continuously been laying challenge to the punishment inflicted upon him. Despite previous two rounds before this Court, the petitioner could not secure an order that the inquiry or the punishment order was vitiated. Every time, flaws were found in the orders of Appellate Authority and the matter was remitted to the said authority to reconsider the appeal of the petitioner. 24. Even otherwise, the petitioner has not been able to show any specific prejudice caused to him by the non-supply of inquiry report. The petitioner was indicted by the inquiry officer on the basis of evidence produced before him coupled with the fact that the petitioner had admitted his guilt. Noticeably, the petitioner has not assailed the findings of inquiry officer to that effect being perverse. What has been alleged is that he was forced to make admission under a promise to get the amount indemnified from the insurer. The Appellate Authority vide impugned order has not found any substance in the claim of the petitioner that he was forced to make an admission. The petitioner has not been able to show that such findings by the Appellate Authority was illegal or perverse. The petitioner has also not been able to place on record any supporting material to prove that he was forced to make the admission. 25. The other contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the acquittal of petitioner in criminal trial should have benefited him in disciplinary proceedings also deserves to be rejected. The petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court In Maharana Pratap Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 5497 of 2025, on 23rd April, 2025, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court taking note of the judgment passed by the same Court in Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, (2024) 1 SCC 175 has held that though acquittal in criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well established that when charges, evidence, witness and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair and oppressive. 26. Again, there cannot be any dispute to the proposition of law as canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, the aforesaid proposition is served with a caveat; as can be noticed from the aforesaid judgment itself wherein it has been held that to assess the degree of similarity between the charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances in the disciplinary and criminal proceedings, it is indeed crucial to review the material placed before the Court, where such an issue arises. 27. In the facts of the case at hand, the judgment of acquittal passed by the Division Bench of this Court reveals that the acquittal of petitioner had itself bases on non- examination of material witnesses and other technical ground viz. procurement of specimen handwriting and signatures of the accused during the investigation against the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sukhbinder v. State of Punjab, (1994) 5 SCC 152 . Thus, the acquittal of petitioner from criminal charges was clearly on technical grounds. Whereas, in the inquiry held by the inquiry officer the material witnesses had made depositions against the petitioner. Above all, the petitioner had admitted his guilt. In this view of the matter, parallels cannot be drawn in the material which had been before the criminal court vis-a-vis the material before the disciplinary authority. 28. In light of above discussion, I do not find any material to interfere with the impugned order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the instant petition is dismissed with no order as to the costs, so also, the pending applications, if any.