APHC010556962024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3459] MONDAY, THE SEVENTH DAY OF APRIL TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM WRIT PETITION NO: 29526/2024 Between: Chintala Chennamma ...PETITIONER AND The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...RESPONDENT(S) Counsel for the Petitioner: 1. D KASIM SAHEB Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. GP FOR CIVIL SUPPLIES The Court made the following: JS,J W.P.No.29526 of 2024 2 ORDER: This writ petition is filed for the following relief: “…to issue a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the 3rd respondent in suspending the authorization of the petitioner vide shop No.133703 and in-charge fair price shop No.1337014 of Mandalur village, Rudravaram Mandal, Nandyal District, in proceedings Rc.CS.755/2024, dated 30.11.2024, as illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India and also violative of Andhra Pradesh State Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2018 and principles of natural justice and consequently direct the respondents to continue the petitioner to hold F.P. shops of Mandalur Village and pass such order or orders…..” 2. The case of the petitioner is briefly as follows: The petitioner is a fair price shop dealer for shop No.1337013 of Nandyal District and in-charge of fair price shop No.1337014 of the same village. While so, due to influence of some local political leaders, the Deputy Tahsildar (CS), Allagadda, along with staff has inspected the petitioner’s fair price shops on 04.10.2024 and found variations in the stocks of certain commodities. JS,J W.P.No.29526 of 2024 3 Based on the report submitted by the 4th respondent, the 3rd respondent issued a show cause notice vide Rc.Cs.No.755/2024, dated 02.11.2024 calling for explanation. The petitioner submitted her explanation on 11.11.2024 stating that the petitioner has kept the stock of two fair price shops at one place. The Inspecting Team visited the petitioner’s shops, when he was distributing the stock to the cardholders. Without looking into the explanation submitted by the petitioner, the 3rd respondent has issued proceedings vide Rc.CS.755/2024, dated 30.11.2024, suspending the authorization of the petitioner pending enquiry. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that though ninety (90) days elapsed, the respondents have not completed the enquiry. An identical issue has fallen for consideration in A.Neelima v. Joint Collector, Kurnool and others1 wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court held at Para No.13 thus: “13. Nevertheless, the power of suspension pending enquiry being one which is exercisable by the Appointing authority pending enquiry into or in contemplation of the suspension or cancellation of the authorisation, the ratio laid down by the Apex Court with regard to the exercise of the said power as in the passage quoted above would apply with equal force to the Control Orders, subject matter of consideration in these proceedings. Though no time limit is prescribed during which 1 1996 (1) APLJ 266 JS,J W.P.No.29526 of 2024 4 the authorisation of a fair price shop dealer can be suspended in the Control orders, it must be held as declared by Supreme Court in the passage quoted above, that the period of 90 days is reasonable safeguard for limiting the period of suspension. During this period the Appointing authority is expected to complete the enquiry and take a decision as to cancellation or otherwise of the authorisation. If for any reason the enquiry is not completed within the said period of 90 days the order of suspension is liable to be revoked and should be revoked either by the appointing authority or the Appellate authority or the Revisionary authority.” Against the said Judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge, a writ appeal was preferred by the respondents therein, and while disposing of the Writ Appeal by its Judgment in Joint Collector, Kurnool vs. A. Neelima2, a Division Bench of this High Court observed at para No.2 as under: “2. We have gone through the impugned judgment which is based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s.Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab (1) AIR 1982 (S.C.), 1965. In that case, the prescribed form of licence contained the clause for the period of suspension to be maximum for 90 days. A perusal of the order of the learned Single Judge shows that in essence and substance what was meant by him is that the period of 90 days is a reasonable period to conclude the enquiry and the continuance of it beyond 90 days would be unreasonable and shall be, hence, taken as quashed. As we see it was in the nature of a direction to 2 1996 LawSuit (AP) 956 JS,J W.P.No.29526 of 2024 5 complete the enquiry within 90 days than laying down a general proposition of law that the maximum period of suspension could be only for 90 days. We agree with the view of the learned Single Judge that the order of suspension cannot be used as a pretext for indefinite postponement of the operation of the fair price shop dealership making it in effect cancellation of the dealership. An order of suspension, like every executive and administrative act, has to be founded upon fair play and lack of arbitrariness. The continuation of order of the suspension indefinitely is whole arbitrary and cannot be countenanced. But we must also rush to add that what is reasonable period of suspension will vary from case to case depending upon various factors, though more often than not, a period of 90 days should ordinarily be sufficient to conclude the enquiry.” 4. On the other hand, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondents submits that there are variations in the stocks of fortified rice, sugar and jowar, and without availing the alternative remedy of appeal before the 2nd respondent, the petitioner has straight away approached this Court. 5. On perusal of the record, it is observed that the petitioner has submitted her detailed explanation on 11.11.2024. However, the 3rd respondent, without discussing the explanation of the petitioner, has issued the impugned proceedings on 30.11.2024 suspending the authorization of petitioner’s shop No.1337013 and in-charge shop No.1337014 which is nothing but violation of the principles of natural JS,J W.P.No.29526 of 2024 6 justice. Therefore, the impugned proceedings are liable to be set aside. 6. In the light of the observations of the Division Bench as extracted supra, this Court is of the considered opinion that as the enquiry is not completed by the respondents in the present case for more than 90 days, it has to be construed that the enquiry is not completed within the “reasonable period” and accordingly, this Court is holding that the 3rd respondent failed to conclude the enquiry within “reasonable period” and the suspension order passed against the petitioner on 30.11.2024 shall be revoked and the authorization of the petitioner shall be restored. 7. For the reasons stated above, this Writ Petition is allowed directing the 3rd respondent to revoke the suspension order dated 30.11.2024 issued against the petitioner and restore the authorization of the petitioner and continue the petitioner as fair price shop dealer. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. ______________________________ SMT JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM 7th April, 2025 cbn JS,J W.P.No.29526 of 2024 7 157 THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM WRIT PETITION No.29526 of 2024 7th April, 2025 cbn