JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 2 of 2024, dated 2.2.2024, registered at Women Police Station, Kullu, District Kullu, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the victim is aged 16 years and she is studying in class 10th. She was found missing on 27.1.2024. The efforts to trace her were unsuccessful. The matter was reported to the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The victim’s date of birth was found to be 6.1.2008, and she was aged 16 years on the date of the incident. The police checked the call detail record and found that the victim was in touch with the petitioner. The location of the victim and the petitioner was found to be at Kapurthala. The police recovered the victim on 16.2.2024. She made a statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. that the petitioner had kidnapped her. She resided with the petitioner from 27.1.2024 till 16.2.2024. The petitioner had engaged in sexual intercourse with her multiple times during this period. The victim refused to undergo a medical examination. The prosecution’s evidence has not started yet. The investigation is complete, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner does not have any criminal history, and he would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence the petition. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant was found missing on 27.1.2024. Her father could not find her. He reported the matter to the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The birth certificate of the victim shows that she was born on 6.1.2008. The police obtained the call detail record of the victim’s mobile phone and found that she was in touch with the petitioner. Their location was found to be at Kapurthala. The police went to Kapurthala and recovered the victim. The victim made a statement that she had accompanied the petitioner on 27.1.2024 and had resided with him till 16.2.2024. The petitioner had maintained physical relations with her many times during this duration. Their location was found to be at Kapurthala. The police went to Kapurthala and recovered the victim. The victim made a statement that she had accompanied the petitioner on 27.1.2024 and had resided with him till 16.2.2024. The petitioner had maintained physical relations with her many times during this duration. The victim was sent for her medical examination, but she declined to undergo her internal examination. The police also recovered the bus ticket from the petitioner. The petitioner was sent for his medical examination, and as per the Medical Officer, there was nothing to suggest that the petitioner was incapable of performing sexual intercourse. The victim made a statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate in which she stated that the petitioner had taken her with him and had maintained physical relations with her multiple times. The case property and samples were sent to the FSL, but no human semen was detected. The prosecution has cited 17 witnesses, but no witness has been examined so far. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence and would intimidate the witnesses if released on bail. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4. I have heard Mr Paras Dhaulta, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 5. Mr Paras Dhaulta, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. The victim’s testimony is not corroborated by any medical evidence. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence. He kidnapped and raped a minor. The petitioner would intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: - “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: - “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558.] 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned the Courts against the superficial examination of the bail consideration in Shabeen Ahmad v. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 172 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 479, and it was observed at page 177: “18. A superficial application of bail parameters not only undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks weakening public faith in the judiciary's resolve to combat the menace of dowry deaths. A superficial application of bail parameters not only undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks weakening public faith in the judiciary's resolve to combat the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception of justice, both within and outside the courtroom, that courts must safeguard, lest we risk normalising a crime that continues to claim numerous innocent lives.” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The status report shows that the victim was found with the petitioner at Kapurthala. She made a statement to the police and the learned Magistrate that the petitioner had taken her with him to Kapurthala on 27.1.2024, and he maintained physical relations with her many times. These allegations prima facie show the commission of offences punishable under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 12. It was submitted that the victim refused to undergo her internal examination, and there is no corroboration of her testimony. This submission is not acceptable. Ordinarily, the victim’s testimony has to be accepted as correct unless there is anything inherently improbable in it. There is nothing on record to doubt the victim’s testimony, and her statement cannot be discarded merely because she had refused to undergo a medical examination. 13. The status report reads that the prosecution has cited 17 witnesses, but has not examined any of them so far. It was submitted by Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent-State, that the victim’s statement was recorded on 30.7.2025, and the matter is listed for recording the statements of four witnesses in December 2025. Section 35 of the POCSO Act provides that the evidence of the child shall be recorded within 30 days of the taking of cognisance, and the trial shall be completed within one year from the date of taking cognisance. In the present case, the date of cognisance is not mentioned; however, the petitioner was arrested on 16.2.2024. More than one and a half years have elapsed since the arrest of the petitioner, and the learned Trial Court had only summoned four witnesses for the next date fixed in December 2025. The manner in which the statements of witnesses are being recorded shows that the learned Trial Court is unable to complete the trial within a reasonable time. 14. The manner in which the statements of witnesses are being recorded shows that the learned Trial Court is unable to complete the trial within a reasonable time. 14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that when the State or any prosecuting agency including the Court concerned has no wherewithal to provide the right to speedy trial of the accused, the bail should not be opposed on the ground that crime committed is serious. It was observed at page 820: 17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime. 18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, however stringent the penal law may be. 19. We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded, the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the Constitution. 15. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 291 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127 that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused. It was observed on page 298: “13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, assures that: “12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 14. More recently, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that: “6. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 14. More recently, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that: “6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time….” And in its second sub-article, that: “6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” 15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386 US 213 (1967)]. 16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp. 638-39, paras 86-87) “86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of the investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from the impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [ (1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5) ‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. … No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long- delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally, freed from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such a trial would constitute a violation of his fundamental right under Article 21?” 17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; that it encompasses all stages viz. investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this right had been denied in the particular case before it.” 16. It was held in the Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot be kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial being concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621: “8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant some relief to those persons who have been deprived of their personal liberty for a considerable length of time without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future. It was observed at page 621: “8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant some relief to those persons who have been deprived of their personal liberty for a considerable length of time without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and the nation needs to be safeguarded, given the nature of the offences these undertrials have been charged with. But the ultimate justification for such deprivation of liberty pending trial can only be their being found guilty of the offences for which they have been charged. If such a finding is not likely to be arrived at within a reasonable time, some relief becomes necessary.” 17. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at page 335: “40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which, regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or the gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised the legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it differently, no accused can be subjected to unending detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such as in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason, such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be measured over and above the right of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution (see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 , paras 15 and 17] ).” 18. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: - 13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discretion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case), this Court has upheld them for conflating two competing values i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and societal interest — as observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745: (2008) 17 SCR 369 ] (“the concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal….”). They are, at the same time, upheld on the condition that the trial is concluded expeditiously. The Constitution Bench in Kar- tar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994) 2 SCR 375 ] made observations to this effect. In the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of India [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123 ] again, this Court expressed the same sentiment, namely, that when stringent provisions are enacted, curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting judicial discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and trials would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123 ], SCC p. 624, para 17) “17. The Court said that parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123 ], SCC p. 624, para 17) “17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal liberty of an undertrial accused for the sake of protecting the community and the nation against terrorist and disruptive activities or other activities harmful to society, it is all the more necessary that investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and an adequate number of Designated Courts are set up to bring to book persons accused of such serious crimes. This is the only way in which society can be protected against harmful activities. This would also ensure that persons ultimately found innocent are not unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.” 19. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page 178: “23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and their living conditions, more often than not, are appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry's response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31-12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against a total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country [ National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India ]. Of these, 1,22,852 were convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials. 24. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates are at risk of “prisonisation”, a term described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242] as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner: (SCC OnLine Ker para 13) “13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.” 25. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.” 25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” [ Working Papers - Group on Prisons & Borstals - 1966 U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer's “The Prison Community” published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer's Concept of Prisonisation”, available at: (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ). Incarceration has further deleterious effects, where the accused belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts, therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials—especially in cases where special laws enact stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded speedily.” 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra)that the right to speedy trial of the offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to the grant of bail. It was observed at page 817: - “10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held that: (SCC p. 89, para 5) “5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long- delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.” 11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court re-emphasised the right to a speedy trial and further held that an accused, facing a prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para 84) “84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections of society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do not often get competent legal advice, the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused demands a speedy trial and yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of his right to a speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial.” 21. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of his right to a speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial.” 21. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was observed: 7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in “The Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following poignant lines while being incarcerated: “I know not whether Laws be right, Or whether Laws be wrong; All that we know who be in jail Is that the wall is strong; And that each day is like a year, A year whose days are long.” 22. It was submitted that the offence is grave and heinous, and the petitioner is not entitled to bail. There can be no dispute with the submission that when the offence is committed against the child, the Court has to take a serious view of the matter, but the Court cannot ignore the legislative mandate to protect the liberty of the person. When the Court is unable to provide speedy justice to the petitioner, the petitioner cannot be detained in custody indefinitely because of the gravity of the crime. 23. It was submitted that the petitioner would abscond in case of his release on bail, and he would intimidate the witnesses. These apprehensions can be removed by imposing the conditions, and are not sufficient to deny bail to the petitioner. 24. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. 24. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following terms and conditions: - (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever; (II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments; (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court; (IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and (V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change. 25. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail. 26. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, District Jail, Bilaspur, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER. 27. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits. 28. A downloaded copy of this order shall be accepted by the learned Trial Court while accepting the bail bonds from the petitioner, and in case said Court intends to ascertain the veracity of the downloaded copy of the order presented to it, the same may be ascertained from the official website of this Court.