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2025 DAILYLAW 3506 (HP)

Gulab Chand v. Gopal (since deceased) through Legal Representatives namely Sh. Ravinder Kapoor

2025-09-23

Ajay Mohan Goel

body2025
Judgment : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. By way of this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have assailed order dated 02.09.2024, passed by learned Trial Court, in terms whereof, the application filed by the petitioners herein under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the rejection of the plaint has been dismissed. 2. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that the contesting respondents/plaintiffs have filed a suit for declaration against the petitioners herein which is pending adjudication. The suit has been filed in the month of June, 2015. The following prayers have been made in the in the suit:- “It is, therefore, prayed that the suit of the plaintiffs liable to be decreed and the same may be decreed in favour of plaintiffs and against the defendants and the following relief may be granted to the plaintiffs: (1) IT MAY BE DECLAED THAT the land measuring 3-15- 0 Bigha comprised in Khasra No.1031 contained in Khatouni No.356 of Khata No. 249 incorporated in Jamabandi Phati Shamshi Kothi Khokhan tehsil and district Kullu for the year 2009-10 is jointly owned and possessed by Plaitiffs No.1 to 6 absolute owners thereof and entry showing Dharm Chand son of Dilu as tenant is wrong, illegal and void, No. 1 to 7 on the basis of aforesaid wrong and illegal entry is also illegal, void and inoperative and of no effect and consequence and the plaintiffs are not bound by the same, (III) IT MAY FURTHER BE DECLARED THAT Mutation. No.9092 Phati Shamshi Kothi Khokhan decided on 3.8.2013 by AC IIGrade is also wrong, illegal, void and inoperative and of no effect and consequence and the plaintiffs are not bound by the same, (IV) IT MAY FURTHER BE DECLARED THAT the sale deed dated 19.10.2013 executed by defendants No.5, 6 and 7 in favour of defendant No.8 is also wrong, illegal, void and inoperative and Mutation No. 10056 Phati Shamshi attested on the basis of aforesaid wrong, illegal and void sale deed is also wrong, illegal and void and the same confer no right, title and interest on defendant No.8. (V) IT MAY FURTHER BE DECLARED THAT that the sale. (V) IT MAY FURTHER BE DECLARED THAT that the sale. deed dated 19.10.2013 executed by Thakar Singh defendant No.4 in favour of Piare Lal defendant No.9 is also wrong, illegal, void and inoperative and Mutation No.10057 Phati Shamshi attested and sanctioned on the basis of aforesaid wrong, illegal and void sale deed is also wrong, illegal and void and inoperative and the plaintiffs are not bound by the same, V-A) That the sale deed dated 12.11.2013 executed by Bhawani Singh Defendant No.2 and consequent mutation No.10081, AND sale deed dated 25.11.2013 executed by Karam Chand defendant No.3 and consequent mutation No. 10105 AND sale deed dated 17.1.2014 executed by Pyare Lal defendant No.9 and consequent mutation No. 10173 on the basis there of, all sale deeds in favour of Ashwani Kumar defendant No.8 are all wrong, illegal, void and inoperative and of no effect and consequence and the same do not confer any right, title and interest of any kind on defendant No.8 AND FURTHER the sale deed executed by Gulab Chand defendant No.1 dated 25.11.2013 in favour of Smt.Manorma defendant No.10 and consequent mutation No.10106 is also wrong, illegal, void and inoperative and the plaintiffs are not bound by the same." (VI) AS A CONSEQUENTIAL RELIEF defendants may be restrained from interfering in the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs by way of issuance of PERMANENT PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION. (VII) Cost of the suit may be awarded to the plaintiffs. (VIII) All other relief which this court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case and necessary to be granted to the plaintiffs in the interest of justice may also be granted and justice be done. (II) IT AMY FURTHER BE DECLARED that Mutation No.9031 Phati Shamshi Kothi Khokhan decided on 26.6.2013 under section 45 of the HP Tenancy & Land Reforms Act in favour of defendants” 3. The application filed before the learned Trial Court under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for rejection of the plaint is appended with the petition as Annexure P-12. In this application, it was mentioned that the plaintiffs had filed a suit for declaration and injunction to the effect that the suit land was recorded in ownership of Gopal, Shiv Lal, i.e. plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 and Hans Raj, predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs No. 3 to 6. In this application, it was mentioned that the plaintiffs had filed a suit for declaration and injunction to the effect that the suit land was recorded in ownership of Gopal, Shiv Lal, i.e. plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 and Hans Raj, predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs No. 3 to 6. However, entry in column of cultivation, showing Dharam Chand son of Dilu, as tenant was wrong, illegal, null and void. As per the defendants, Dharam Chand son of Dilu had become owner of the suit land by virtue of operation of the HP Land Reforms Act, 1972 and mutation to this effect stood attested and sanctioned in favour of the defendants. The defendants have also taken a preliminary objection that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit, as it was barred by Section 112 of the abovementioned Act. It was further mentioned in the application that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit in light of the judgment mentioned therein, i.e. RSA No. 17 of 1993 titled as Gopal Krishan vs. Jagdamba Prasad as well as the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. (s) 8447 of 2002, titled as Jagdamba Prasad vs. Gopal Krishan and others, dated 06.09.2011 and accordingly, it was prayed that as the Civil Court was having no jurisdiction to determine the dispute between the plaintiffs and defendants regarding the status of the defendants as tenants of the suit land, as this dispute could only be determined by a Land Reforms Officer in terms of the provisions of Land Reforms Act and the relevant Rules made thereunder, the plaint be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 4. The application was resisted inter alia on the ground that the Civil Court was having jurisdiction in the matter and other contentions made in the application were also not admitted. 5. Learned Trial Court, in terms of order under challenge, rejected the application by returning the following findings:- “I have perused the record and is of considered view that certainly some contentious issues which need trial and decision on 4 merit. 5. Learned Trial Court, in terms of order under challenge, rejected the application by returning the following findings:- “I have perused the record and is of considered view that certainly some contentious issues which need trial and decision on 4 merit. Therefore, unless parties lead evidence in support of their claims and defences respectively, it cannot be said that this Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain this suit Hence, at this stage, this Court has no reason to reject the plaint merely because Section 112 of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act provides that jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred in relation to the decision taken by the Land Reforms Officer under Section 104 of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. In Chhuniya Devi versus Jindu Ram, 1991 (1) Shim LC 223 Hon'ble High Court of H.P. held that it is well established principle that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Likely in a case Gopal Chand and Others v. Ram Sarup 1991 (2) Shim. LC 31, Hon'ble high court of HP held that Civil Court has Jurisdiction if Revenue Officer did not act in conformity with fundamental principles of judicial procedure or he passed the order without complying with the basic requirements of section 30 of the Act. Civil Court's jurisdiction to examine the order with reference to fundamental provisions of statute, non-compliance with which would make the proceedings illegal and without jurisdiction, still remains. Similarly, in Lajpat Rai (deceased) through his LRs Smt. Maya Devi and others vs. Smt. Taro Devi and others, 1999 (3) Shim.L.C. 269 , Hon'ble High Court of H.P. held that jurisdiction of Civil Court is not barred for the suit of declaration of title and injunction by the orders passed by authorities under special enactment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhulabhai, etc. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhulabhai, etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others reported in A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 78 (Constitutional Bench) while discussing the provision of section 9 of CPC laid down the law as under: (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (II) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. (III) Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statue or not. (IV) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from decision of the Tribunals. (V) When a provision is already declare unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (VI) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (VI) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies. (VII) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit dies not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry (VIII) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the matter of (Abdul Gafur vs State of Utterakhand 2008 (10) SCC 97 taking recourse to the jurisdiction of Civil Court, have observed that as per section 9 CPC in all types of, civil disputes, the Civil Courts have inherent jurisdiction unless a part of that jurisdiction is carved out from such jurisdiction, expressly or by necessary implication by any statutory provision and conferred on other Tribunal or Authority. Thus, the law confers on every person an inherent right to bring a suit of civil nature of one's choice, at one's peril, howsoever frivolous the claim may be, unless it is barred by a statute. Since the main suit is still in the preliminary stage, therefore, it cannot be said that statutory authority under HP Tenancy and Land Reform Act in conformity with the fundamental provision of law and adhered to the natural principles of judicial procedure. Thus, keeping in view the reason assigned above, this application is not maintainable. Hence, this application is dismissed. The application after due completion be tagged with the main case file.” 6. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners argued that the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law as the same is in derogation of law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 2019, SC, page 1430, 2020 7 ACC 360, 2025 (5) SCC 198 and this Court in a judgment reported in 2002 (1) SLC 132. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners argued that the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law as the same is in derogation of law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 2019, SC, page 1430, 2020 7 ACC 360, 2025 (5) SCC 198 and this Court in a judgment reported in 2002 (1) SLC 132. Learned Senior Counsel took the Court through the plaint and submitted that in terms of the averments made therein, i.e. para-6 thereof, the plaintiffs were claiming their right over the purported relinquishment of tenancy which occurred in the year 1967 and as from the said date, the suit was time barred and this extremely important aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the learned Court below. Learned Senior Counsel also argued that in light of the express bar in the local law qua the maintainability of such plaint before the Civil Court, the findings to the contrary returned by the learned Trial Court were not sustainable in law. 7. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents argued that the District of Kullu, where the suit property is situated before the year 1966, was a part of the State of Punjab. The provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act were applicable in the State till it was repealed, as far as its applicability in the State of Himachal Pradesh is concerned, in the year 1974. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in terms of the Panjab Tenancy Act till the time it was applicable in the State of Himachal Pradesh, relinquishment of tenancy was permissible in terms of the provisions of Sections 35 and 36 thereof and in the present case, the tenant plaintiffs in the year 1967 and thereafter, they became owners-in-possession of the suit land. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that as the relinquishment is not in dispute, the plaintiffs became owners in possession of the suit land in the year 1967 and as in the year 1974, when the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act came into force, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondents. He submitted that in this backdrop, none of the judgments cited by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners was applicable for the reason that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondents in the year 1975. He submitted that in this backdrop, none of the judgments cited by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners was applicable for the reason that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondents in the year 1975. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that judgment of this Court relied upon on behalf of the petitioners has no applicability because that was a judgment relating to an issue which occurred post 1974 and factually, there was no similarity in the facts of that case as compared to this case. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that herein taking advantage of wrong entries which were there in the revenue records, as the defendants sold the suit land in terms of sale deeds which have been assailed in the civil suit, the cause of action to file and maintain the suit was there and further the Civil Courts were having jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that there is no question of the suit being time barred on account of pleading of the relinquishment that took place in the year 1967 for the reason that the petitioners are not aggrieved by that relinquishment of 1967 and it is not as if they are challenging the relinquishment of the year 1967. Accordingly, learned Senior Counsel submitted that as there is no merit in the present petition, the same be dismissed. 8. I have heard learned Senior Counsel for the parties and have carefully gone though the impugned orders as well as other documents on record, including the plaint as well as the application filed under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. Before adverting any further, it is relevant to make an observation at this stage that it is settled law that an application filed under order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has to be decided on the strength of the averments made in the plaint as well as documents, if any, filed therewith. The defence of the defendants is not to be taken into consideration while deciding the application under order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The defence of the defendants is not to be taken into consideration while deciding the application under order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If on the basis of pleadings, some cause stands established by the plaintiffs, then the Court is not to throw the plaint at the initial stage itself under the provisions of order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rejection of a plaint under order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has to be done with great circumspection because it entails consequences. Therefore, it is only where a perusal of the plaint satisfies the judicial conscious of the Court that indeed no case is made out in a sense that there is no cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff and further and/or the suit is barred by law, only then, such power is to be exercised by the Court. 10. Now, I well refer to the judgments relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. 11. In Raghwendra Sharan Singh vs. Ram Prasanna Singh (dead) by Lrs. AIR 2019 Supreme Court 1430, Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleaded to lay down the scope and ambit of application under order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and reiterated the law that if on a meaningful, not formal, reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, then the Court should exercise its power order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, then the Court should nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Trial Court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal, reading of the plaint, it is manifestly vexatious and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, then the Court should exercise its power order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that it is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written as well as the contentions of the defendant are immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. 12. Similarly, in Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead through Legal Representatives and Others, (2020) 7 Supreme Court Cases 366, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “12.1 We will first briefly touch upon the law applicable for deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under: “11. 12. Similarly, in Dahiben vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead through Legal Representatives and Others, (2020) 7 Supreme Court Cases 366, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “12.1 We will first briefly touch upon the law applicable for deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under: “11. Rejection of plaint.– The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:– (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9 Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevent by any cause of exceptional nature for correction the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” (emphasis supplied) 23.2. The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision. 23.3. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. 23.3. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.” 13. Similarly, in Uma Devi and Others Versus Anand Kumar and Others (2025) 5 Supreme Court Cases 198, Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold as under:- “15. The learned senior counsel for the defendants/ appellants, Mr. Sundaram, relied upon the decision of this Court in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust & Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle & Anr. (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844) to substantiate the contention that the suit was barred by limitation. It was observed as follows:- (SCC para 22 & 25) “22. When a portion of the property has been conveyed by court auction and registered in the first instance and when another portion has been conveyed by a registered sale deed in 1952, there is a constructive notice from the date of registration and the presumption under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, comes into operation. The possession, in the present case, also has been rested with the appellant before several decades, which operates as notice of title…. 23.-24. * * * 25. Continuing further with the plea of limitation, the Courts below have held that 23 (1977) 4 SCC 467 the question of the suit being barred by limitation can be decided at the time of trial as the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts. Though the question of limitation generally is mixed question of law and facts, when upon meaningful reading of the plaint, the court can come to a conclusion that under the given circumstances, after dissecting the vices of clever drafting creating an illusion of cause of action, the suit is hopelessly barred and the plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11”. 16. In Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal4, this court laid down the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC : “The plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. 16. In Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal4, this court laid down the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC : “The plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order VII Rule 11, CPC can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit.The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order VII Rule 11, CPC. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when, the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order V11 Rule 11 of CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage”. 17. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage”. 17. In Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (2020) 7 SCC 366 , it is stated as under – “The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted”. 14. In this backdrop, I will refer to the contents of the plaint now. In terms of the plaint, it has been averred by the plaintiffs that the suit land measuring 03-15-00 was recorded in the ownership of Gopal, Shiv Lal and Hans Raj, i.e. plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 and predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs No. 3 to 6. However, entry of cultivation showing Dharam Chand son of Dilu as tenant was wrong. As per the plaintiffs, in the year 1967, Dharam Chand relinquished the tenancy of the aforesaid land in favour of plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 and aforesaid Hans Raj and as such said land as also land comprised in Khasra No. 1038 came into cultivating possession of plaintiffs and aforesaid Hans Raj and in lieu of relinquishment of tenancy by aforesaid Dharam Chand in favour of plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 and Hans Raj, they gifted 1 bigha 10 biswas land out of Khasra No. 1038 vide gift deed dated and registered on 14.04.1967 to Dharam Chand, which gift deed was duly accepted by him. As per the plaintiffs, Dharam Chand being a clever man, in connivance with Patwari Halqa, excluded the suit land from correction and the entry of suit land continued in revenue record in favour of Dharam Chand, though, in fact, he had relinquished the tenancy in favour of the aforesaid owners. As per the plaintiffs, Dharam Chand being a clever man, in connivance with Patwari Halqa, excluded the suit land from correction and the entry of suit land continued in revenue record in favour of Dharam Chand, though, in fact, he had relinquished the tenancy in favour of the aforesaid owners. According to the plaintiffs, on the strength of said illegal entry, defendants No. 1 to 7 with ulterior motive got mutations attested under Section 45 of the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act in connivance with revenue officials and at their back, which mutations were wrong, illegal and inoperative against the plaintiffs. On the strength of said mutations, bogus and sham sale deeds were executed in the year 2013 and this is the basis, on which the plaintiffs have approached the Court and have filed the civil suit praying for the reliefs already enumerated hereinabove. 15. This Court is of the considered view that in light of the averments that have been made in the plaint, it cannot be said that the same does not either disclose any cause of action of the same is barred by limitation so as to order the rejection of the plaint under the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Herein, the foundation of the case of the petitioners is that the tenancy was relinquished in their favour in the year 1967 as stated in the plaint and thereafter, they became owners in possession of the suit land. It is further their contention that taking advantage of the wrong entries in the revenue record, the defendants sold the suit land and the suit has been filed in this backdrop with the prayers already mentioned by me herein above. This Court is not suggesting that the plaint has merit or not because that is a matter of trial and the Trial Court has to adjudicate the Civil Suit on the basis of defence that may be taken by the defendants as well as the evidence that will be led by the parties in support of their respective contentions but on the face of plaint, it cannot be said that it either does not disclose any cause or that it is hit by any law or is barred by limitation. For the purpose of adjudication of this petition, this Court observes that as it is the stand of the plaintiffs that the land was relinquished in their favour in the year 1967 and they became owners in possession of the suit land in the year 1967 itself when they gifted certain land in lieu thereof to the tenant concerned, obviously this means that as on the date when the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act came into force, according to the plaintiffs, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between them and the concerned defendants. Therefore, prima facie, in the backdrop of the contentions of the plaintiffs in the plaint, for the purpose of deciding the application under order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot be said that the suit is barred by limitation. If according to the defendants, this contention of the plaintiffs is incorrect, they can always put a defence thereto and prove that said averments are bad in law and also call upon the Civil Court to frame an issue with regard to its jurisdiction. But this has to be tested on the basis of defence. In this backdrop, if one peruses the order passed by learned Trial Court, one finds no perversity therein. I have already quoted the order passed by the learned Trial Court in the above part of the judgment and therefore, this Court holds that the findings returned by the learned Trial Court are justified in the facts of this case and in fact, the plaint could not have been rejected under order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 16. At this stage, I will refer to the judgment passed by this Court, being relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. 17. In Gopal Krishan vs. Jagtamba Parsad and others, 2002 (1) Shim. L.C. 132, this Court has held that the Civil Court in light of the facts involved in said case, had no jurisdiction to determine the dispute between the plaintiffs and defendants therein regarding the status of the defendant as tenant of the suit land and such a dispute could only be determined by the Land Reforms Officer exercising the powers of Assistant Collector in terms of Rule 29 read with Section 104(4) of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. This pronouncement has been made by the Court in a Regular Second Appeal. As has been observed by me hereinabove also, whether or not in the peculiar facts of this case, the plaint is barred by law, will have to be tested by the learned Trial Court on the basis of the defence that shall be taken before it by the defendants. While adjudicating an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court is of the considered view that the effect of this judgment cannot be tested. Therefore, in light of above discussion, as this Court does not find any merit in this petition, the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.