Research › Search › Judgment

High Court of Himachal Pradesh · body

2025 DAILYLAW 35030 (HP)

M/S MEGHA ENGINEERING INFRASTRUCTURE LTD v. ROHIT SOOD

FAO(OS)/13/2025 · 2025-11-11

Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, Jiya Lal Bhardwaj

body2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 2025:HHC:38091 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA FAO(OS) No.13 of 2025 Decided on: 11 th November , 2025 __________________________________________________ M/s Megha Engineering Infrastructure Ltd. & another ....Appellants Versus Rohit Sood ...Respondent ___________________________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the appellants: Mr. R.K. Bawa, Senior Advocate with Mr. Yudhvir Singh Thakur, Advocate. G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral) The present appeal arises out of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 19.05.2025, whereby the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC (OMP No.103 of 2024) of the appellant-defendant was dismissed. 2. Counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the suit was barred by limitation in as much as the work order had ended on 05.10.2018, and therefore, the filing of the suit at a belated stage on 16.09.2023 would bring it within the ambit of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 3. Other arguments also regarding the issue of jurisdiction under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and the fact that exclusive jurisdiction had been given to the Courts at Hyderabad, was also stressed upon. 4. The learned Single Judge, vide a detailed order, came to the conclusion that this was not the first round of litigation inter se the parties. Firstly, the matter had been sought to be redressed by invoking the provisions of the MSMED Act and the matter had been referred to the Arbitrator. 5. The present appellant, challenging the notices issued, was successful by filing CWP No.4564 of 2022 whereby the writ petition was allowed on 12.01.2023. We have gone through the said order. It is apparently on account of the fact that the plaintiff as such had been registered with the Ministry of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises after more than 3 years from the final invoice dated 25.10.2018. 6. Resultantly, the coordinate Bench, while placing reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in M/s Silpi Industries etc. v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation & Anr., (2021) SCC OnLine SC 439, had allowed the writ petition and set aside the notice dated 22.07.2021 and the subsequent proceedings passed by the Facilitation Council. 3 7. The matter had been taken in SLP No.9500 of 2023 by the plaintiff/respondent as such unsuccessfully and the same was dismissed on 08.05.2023, however, giving liberty to take recourse to the available remedy in accordance with law. The order reads as under:- “We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment in view of the fact that the petitioner had approached, by way of a representation, the Himachal Pradesh Micro, Small Enterprises Facilitation Council on 22.07.2021. In view of the said delay, we are not inclined to issue notice in the present special leave petition. However, we clarify that the impugned judgment and the dismissal of the present special leave petition would not come in the way of the petitioner to take recourse to available remedy in accordance with law. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of” 8. It is thus apparent that the Apex Court granted the said liberty and the suit was thereafter filed expeditiously, within a period of four months, on 16.09.2023. 9. It is in such circumstances, the learned Single Judge has also referred to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The issue of cause of action having arisen in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court that the work had been carried out at Kangra was kept in mind. It was held that it would be a disputed question of fact 4 whether the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction upon the Courts at Hyderabad would be made out, keeping in view the part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The issue whether it was to be governed by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, was also not accepted on the ground that the provisions of Order VII Rule 10 would come into play for return of the plaint, and not for rejection. The filing of the suit in the wrong Court could not be equated with a bar created by law to institute such a suit. 10. It is relevant to notice that the said plea of Commercial Courts having jurisdiction as such had not been taken in the application under Order VII Rule 11 filed by the present appellant and only the plea of maintainability as such was raised. It is a settled principle that the rejection of the plaint can only be done if, on the face of it, it appears to be barred by law and only the averments in the plaint are to be taken into consideration. The cause of action is on account of the fact that the payments were outstanding and plaintiff was the contractor and there was a dispute as such and in such circumstances, the last payment is stated to have been made in the year 2019 and the claim is stated to have been denied on 23.12.2020, leading to the litigation. 11. It is in such circumstances, the learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that issue of limitation under 5 the Limitation Act, 1963, is a mixed question of fact and law. Therefore once the cause of action prima facie appears and the plaintiff as such was agitating for his rights and had sought to invoke arbitration proceedings as such in order that his grievance is redressed, it cannot be as such said that the suit is barred by limitation at this stage. It would be the matter of scrutiny by the Court as such on the basis of evidence led. 12. The Apex Court in The Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. M/s Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706, has also laid down the principle regarding the rejection of the plaint that it is an extreme remedy as such and the plaintiff cannot be thrown out at the mere asking. 13. In Dahiben vs. Arbindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) (2020) 7 SCC 366, it was held that the underlying object of the said provisions as such was that there was no cause of action disclosed or if the suit is barred by limitation, the proceedings could not be protracted and it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation. 14. In the present case, it cannot be said that the litigation as such is sham, as apparently, the plaintiff has filed the suit claiming his full and final payment for the work done. 6 15. The said view has thereafter been followed recently in Kum. Geetha, D/O late Krishna and others vs. Nanjudaswamy and others, (2024) 14 SCC 390. In similar circumstances, the High Court as such had gone into the merits of the case while allowing the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and rejecting the plaint which was pertaining to the dispute between the members of a joint family and the alienations made by the Karta. It was held that at the stage of considering an objection to the plaint, only the averments made in the plaint are to be taken into consideration. Thus the order as such was set aside on the ground that the approach as such was not permissible. 16. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the order passed by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any infirmity which would warrant interference by this Court. 17. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. ( G.S. Sandhawalia ) Chief Justice 11 th November , 2025 ( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj ) (ankit) Judge