Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 872 of 2024 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Doundi- Lohara, District- Balod (C.G.)
... Appellant versus 1 - Navin Patel @ Golu S/o Keshav Ram Patel, Aged About 28 Years R/o Village-Ward No.1, Bhedi, Police Station Doundilohara, District- Balod (C.G.)
... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Amit Buxy, PL For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vikas Dubey, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput
Judgment on Board 25.08.2025
1. This appeal under section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,has been filed by the appellant/State against the judgment dated 09.11.2023 passed by the Court of learned Special Judge (Protection of Children from Sexual Offeces Act), 2012 (for short ‘trial Court’) Balod Disctrict- Balod (CG) in Special Sessions case no. 48/2021 whereby the respondent has been acquitted from the charge punishable under Sections 354 (A), 354 (D) of the Indian Panel Code, 1860 (for short IPC) and also under Section 11/12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offeces Act), 2012 (for short ‘ POCSO Act). 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the respondent was prosecuted in connection with Crime No. 81/2021 registered at Police Station Doundi-lohara, District Balod. As per the complaint, the respondent subjected the minor victim to HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Digitally signed by HIFZURRAHMAN ANSARI Date: 2025.09.12 17:55:22 +0530
2 obscene comments and foul language. The complainant (PW-2), father of the victim, reported that on 24.05.2021, while returning with his daughter on a motorcycle, the respondent followed them on his motorcycle near Village Bhedi and hurled obscene remarks at the victim. It was further alleged that the respondent had previously indulged in similar acts. 3. After registration of the offence, investigation was conducted in accordance with law, and a charge-sheet was filed against the respondent. The respondent abjured guilt, and the prosecution examined eight witnesses in support of its case. However, upon appreciation of evidence, the learned Trial Court, by judgment dated 09.11.2023, acquitted the respondent of the charges. 4. On due appreciation, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused (respondent herein) on the aforesaid offences. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judge is illegal, improper, and unsustainable. It is contended that the Trial Court erred in discarding the consistent testimony of the prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses without cogent reasons. The school admission register (Ex. P/10) duly proved the age of the victim as a minor, which the defense failed to disprove. The statements of the prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.P.C., as well as her deposition in Court, clearly establish that the respondent subjected her to obscene remarks and foul language, thereby attracting the provisions of Sections 354A and 354D IPC and Sections 11/12 of the POCSO Act.
It is urged that the Trial Court overlooked material evidence and acquitted the respondent on erroneous grounds. The prosecution had adduced sufficient evidence to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore, the impugned judgment is bad in law and liable to be set aside. 3
6. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the impugned judgment of acquittal is based on proper appreciation of evidence and suffers from no illegality. The prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, and the Trial Court rightly extended the benefit of doubt. Hence, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 10 SCC 461 observed that an appellate Court entertaining an appeal from the
judgment of acquittal by the trial Court though entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and come to an independent conclusion, it should not do so as a matter of routine. It has been held in paragraph 9 as under -
“Before concluding, we would like to point out that this Court in a number of cases has held that an Appellate Court entertaining an appeal from the judgment of acquittal by the trial court though entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and come to an independent conclusion, it should not do so as a matter of routine. In other words, if from the same set of evidence two views are possible and if the trial court has taken one view on the said evidence, unless the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the trial court is either perverse or such that no reasonable person could come to that conclusion or that such a finding of the trial court is not based on any material on record, it should not merely because another conclusion is possible reverse the finding of the trial court. [See : M/s. Mohanlal Hargovind Dass vs. Ram Narain & Ors. (1979 (3) SCC 279), State of Punjab vs. Balraj Singh alias Chhajju (1978 (3) SCC 129), State of Maharashtra vs. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar (1981 (3) SCC 199) and Ram Kumar Pandey vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975 (3) SCC 815)]. In the instant case also we find that the trial court had taken a view which the High Court has not held to be either perverse, unreasonable or a finding which is not based on evidence, still on re-appreciation of the evidence, the High Court came to a different conclusion which on facts of this case and on the basis of the ratio of the law laid down by this Court in the above cited cases cannot be sustained. 4
9. In the case of M.C.Ali and anr. v. State of Kerala, (2010) 4 SCC 573, it has been observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal and placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 in which it has been held as under -
42.
From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an
order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
10. Learned trial Court has meticulously discussed the evidence available on record in respect of all the offences which has been charged against the respondent and after
analysis of the evidence of the witnesses, in paragraph 29 and gave following
5 finding:-
“ (29). Upon overall appreciation of the evidence on record, including the testimony of the prosecutrix, her parents, as well as the independent eyewitness Mangaleen Bai, the allegation that on 24.05.2021 the accused continuously followed the prosecutrix with sexual intent is found to be doubtful. Likewise, although it stands proved from the unshaken testimony of the prosecutrix and her parents that the accused made a remark to the effect, “I will give you money, apply lipstick, you will look good”, yet such remark has not been established to have been made with sexual intent towards the prosecutrix. Similarly, the prosecution has failed to prove that the aforesaid comment of the accused was intended to outrage the modesty of the prosecutrix. It is well settled that the offence of sexual harassment or sexual intent is a question of fact, which must be proved by the prosecution. On the basis of the evidence on record, the allegation that on 24.05.2021 the accused continuously followed the prosecutrix and made obscene comments with the intention of outraging her modesty is found to be doubtful. Mere suspicion cannot be the basis of conviction. It is the primary duty of the prosecution to establish the charges against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, in the present case, upon due consideration of the evidence, the offences alleged against the accused are found to be doubtful, and thus he cannot be held guilty.”
11. The question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court warrants any interference by this Court. 12. Upon re-appreciation of the evidence, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of the prosecutrix and her parents, though consistent regarding the alleged remarks, does not prove that such remarks were made with sexual intent or with the intention to outrage her modesty. The independent eyewitness has also not supported the case in a manner sufficient to inspire confidence. The allegation of continuous following with sexual intent is doubtful.
Since suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place
6 of proof, and the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden, the order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court does not suffer from any illegality or perversity warranting interference. 13. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge
H.Ansari