JUDGMENT : Vivek Singh Thakur, J. This appeal has been preferred by Insurance Company against award dated 28.5.2015 passed in MAC Petition RBT No. 11/2012, titled Smt. Veema Devi (deceased) through her legal representative Abhishek Vs. Sanjiv Kumar and others, passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (II), Una, District Una, H.P., whereby claim petition preferred by claimant has been allowed and compensation of Rs.55,00,466.23/- alongwith interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing petition till deposit of awarded amount has been awarded. 2. As per case of claimant Veena Devi (now deceased) was serving as Trained Graduate Teacher (TGT) in Education Department of Himachal Pradesh and on 31.12.2011, for going to school, she boarded Bus HP-20C-7512 from Dharampur to Palkwah at 8.30 A.M. She alighted from bus at Palkwah and started crossing the road, but in the meanwhile Sanjeev Kumar driver of the bus moved the bus and hit Veena Devi and as a result thereof Veena Devi fell down and rolled down on the road up to a certain distance and sustained multiple injuries on her legs, head and other parts of body. 3. Regarding aforesaid accident, FIR No. 328 dated 31.12.2011 was registered against the bus driver Sanjeev Kumar in Police Station Haroli, District Una under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. Veena Devi, for receiving injuries in the accident, was taken to Civil Health Center (CHC), Haroli, wherefrom she was referred to Regional Hospital, Una and therefrom, she was taken to Joshi Hospital, Jalandhar (Punjab). Veena Devi was operated upon by Neuro Surgeon for CS.5 cervical deduction, disectomy discompression, iliac crst bone grafting and spinal fixation using titanium cervical plate and screws and open reduction and internal fixation of femur fracture. 5. Veena Devi initially was kept in Intensive Care Unit and remained admitted in the hospital from 31.12.2011 to 5.1.2012. 6. As a result of accident, Veena Devi became 100% disabled and was not able to perform her own daily activities. After discharge from the hospital, she had to engage two attendants to look after her at her house, as she was not in a position to travel and she remained confined to bed and was not able to sit without support and was able to take only liquid (special diet) and was not able to lead independent life, rather was in need of two attendants throughout her life. She used to pass stool on bed and for urine catheter had been inserted. She did not remain capable for sitting posture. 7. During pendency of the Claim Petition Veena Devi expired on, 25.6.2013 whereupon her son Abhishek substituted her as claimant and Claim Petition was amended, claiming compensation of Rs.70,00,000/- with interest @ 12% per annum. 8. Respondent Sanjeev Kumar (driver) and respondent Kanchan Jaswal (owner of the bus) filed joint reply, denying the averments made in the Claim Petition with submission that no accident had taken placed on the date, time and place, as alleged in the Claim Petition and it was claimed that while passengers started alighting from the bus, the driver did not move the bus but Veena Devi could not balance herself and suddenly slipped due to her own ailment on the road and rolled down on the road and consequently received injuries on her person. According to them, a false story has been cooked up to get compensation. 9. Insurance Company contested the petition by filing reply with plea that bus driver was not holding valid and effective driving license to drive the transport vehicle alleged to be involved in the accident and the bus was being driven without valid registration certificate, route permit, fitness etc. and the petition was bad for non- joinder and misjoinder, as in the Claim Petition, name of owner of bus was mentioned as Kanchan Jaswal in the head note of the petition and Amandeep in para 15 of the petition. It was also claimed that accident was result of contributory negligence on the part of Veena Devi herself. Apart from aforesaid, averments made in all paras of Claim Petition were denied for want of knowledge. It was also claimed that claimant was not entitled to any amount from Insurance Company and otherwise also amount claimed was highly excessive, baseless, wrong and thus it was denied. 10. Owner and driver of the bus had placed on record copy of driving license of Sanjeev Kumar as Ex. RW-3/B, copy of Registration Certificate Ex. RW-3/C, copy of Insurance Ex. RW-3/D, copy of fitness certificate Ex. RW-3/F and copy of Insurance Policy Ex. RX. 11. In cross-examination by respondents No. 2 and 3, nothing material has been elucidated to substantiate that Sanjeev Kumar was not having valid driving or bus was being plied without valid Road Certificate, Fitness Certificate, permit etc. 12. RW-3/C, copy of Insurance Ex. RW-3/D, copy of fitness certificate Ex. RW-3/F and copy of Insurance Policy Ex. RX. 11. In cross-examination by respondents No. 2 and 3, nothing material has been elucidated to substantiate that Sanjeev Kumar was not having valid driving or bus was being plied without valid Road Certificate, Fitness Certificate, permit etc. 12. From Ex. RW-3/C and Ex. RW-3/E, it is apparent that Registration Certificate and Fitness of the bus involved in the accident was valid up to 15.3.2013 and it is also evident from Insurance Cover as well as Policy Ex. RW-3/D and RX that there was valid insurance for plying the bus till 15.12.2012. From Ex. RW-3/B, it has been established that Sanjeev Kumar was competent to drive the passenger service vehicle (PSV) w.e.f. 21.9.2011 and the license was valid to drive transport vehicle up to 30.11.2017. Therefore, stand of the Insurance Company with regard to the aforesaid documents has no force. 13. Insurance Company has examined two witnesses RW-1 Tek Chand, Senior Assistant, District Treasury, Una and RW-2 Rajesh Kumar Superintendent Grade-II, Government Senior Secondary School Palkwah, Tehsil Haroli, District Una, H.P. to prove that after death of Veena Devi, GPF amount of Rs.16,0452/- was to be released to the legal heirs of deceased Veena Devi and apart from it an amount of Rs.4,50,000/- and Rs.77,280/- was paid to the legal heirs of deceased Veena Devi as DCRG and ex gratia grant. Further that pension of Veena Devi payable to her son Abhishek would be Rs.18,000/- per month. 14. Claimant by examining PW-1 Dr. Vinod Dhiman, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital Haroli, PW-8 Dr. Ankush Sharma, Junior Resident, Department of General Surgery, PGIMER, Chandigarh, PW-9 Dr. Sudhir Sood, Consultant Neuro Surgeon, Joshi Hospital and Trauma Center, Kapurthala Chowk, Jalandhar (Punjab), proved that on 31.12.2011 Veena Devi was taken to Civil Hospital Haroli with alleged history of road side accident, and PW-1 Dr.Vinod Dhiman after examining Veena Devi had issued MLC Ex. PW-1/A, and Veena Devi was referred by him to Regional Hospital, Una on the same day and injuries were possible in a road side accident. 15. PW-9 Dr. Sudhir Sood proved on record treatment chart and Discharge Summary (Ex. PW-1/A, and Veena Devi was referred by him to Regional Hospital, Una on the same day and injuries were possible in a road side accident. 15. PW-9 Dr. Sudhir Sood proved on record treatment chart and Discharge Summary (Ex. PW-9/A) of Veena Devi, with submission that she was treated for traumatic cervical spine injuries and fracture of right femur, which were accidental injuries, and Veena Devi had Grade-1 power in arms and Grade-0 power in legs and there was sensory loss below the clavicle. He also proved medical bills of medicines Ex. P-1 to Ex.P-44. He stated that patient with such injuries are 100% disabled and bed-ridden for a long time with very minimal chances of recovery and the patient can suffer from multiple complications during this period like bed sores, chest infection (aspiration pneumonia) and spontaneous bowel perforation and patient can die due to these complications and life of patient was shortened due to the accident. 16. PW-8 Dr. Ankush Sharma proved on record copy of medical certificate Ex. PW-8/A, certifying cause of death as “traumatic paraplegia with bilateral upper limb paresis with ileal perforation peritonitis with ARDS with cardiac arrest”. He clarified that direct cause of death was cardiac arrest and traumatic paraplegia was not direct cause of death of patient. 17. PW-3 Dr. N.S. Dogra, retired Orthopedic Surgeon, Regional Hospital, Una, H.P., has also been examined by claimant to prove that he was member of Medical Board when Veena Devi was examined medically for assessment of disability percentage. He proved on record that Veena Devi had been operated for cervical spine injury and was having quadriparesis with loss of bowel and bladder control with supracondylar fracture femur and she was having 100% permanent disability at the time of examination subject to review after one year. He further stated that due to this injury patient was likely to remain bed ridden for life long and likely to suffer further complications like bed sores, urinary and bowel infections and pneumonia and death of Veena Devi could have been caused because of lateron complications, stated by him in his examination-in-chief. He proved disability ceritificate Ex. PW-3/A on record. In his cross-examination, nothing material could be extracted in favour of owner and driver and Insurance Company. 18. In cross-examination of aforesaid doctors, nothing favorable to Insurance Company could be brought on record. 19. He proved disability ceritificate Ex. PW-3/A on record. In his cross-examination, nothing material could be extracted in favour of owner and driver and Insurance Company. 18. In cross-examination of aforesaid doctors, nothing favorable to Insurance Company could be brought on record. 19. The occurrence has been proved by the claimant by examining PW-7 Poonam Verma, who on the date of accident had traveled in the same bus and alighted from the bus at Palkwah. 20. In FIR Ex. PW-2/A, registered on the basis of statement of Poonam Verma, it has been stated that she (Poonam Verma) had crossed the road, whereas Veena Devi was on the way to cross the road, but in the meanwhile driver of the bus moved it, hitting Veena Devi, as result whereof she rolled down on the road and bus was stopped after a distance. FIR on the record was proved by PW-2 H.C. Rakesh Kumar. 21. PW-7 Poonam Verma in her cross-examination denied the suggestion that she lodged false FIR because Veena Devi was her colleague, and that Police had recorded the report according to its wish and she had only signed it, rather she had clarified that whatever had been written by the Police, it was correct. 22. PW-5 Simran Devi proved on record that she was engaged as attendant by Veena Devi after her accident for looking after and feeding her and to do the cleanliness work against the payment of Rs.5,000/- per month and she did said job for about 1 and ½ years. 23. PW-4 Rakesh Kumar, Superintendent Grade-II Government Senior Secondary School Palkwah proved on record that in December, 2011 Veena Devi was getting Rs.29,598/- and in June, 2012 she was getting Rs.31,226/- and since June, 2013 her pay was to be increased to Rs.37,600/-. He proved on record Salary Certificate of Veena Devi Ex. PW-4/A. In cross-examination he stated that Veena Devi was receiving the salary after deduction of Rs.15,230/- and in June, 2012, deduction was Rs.15,030/- and net salary was Rs.16,195/-. In June, 2013 deduction would have been approximately Rs.15,000/- and net salary would have been Rs.22,630/-. He also proved that date of birth of Veena Devi as per record as 1.4.1966 and in May, 2013, deceased was getting salary @ Rs.31,500/- per month. 24. PW-6 Avtar Singh is real brother of Veena Devi. In June, 2013 deduction would have been approximately Rs.15,000/- and net salary would have been Rs.22,630/-. He also proved that date of birth of Veena Devi as per record as 1.4.1966 and in May, 2013, deceased was getting salary @ Rs.31,500/- per month. 24. PW-6 Avtar Singh is real brother of Veena Devi. He re- iterated the facts of the accident, her treatment, engagement of attendant, disability of Veena Devi and her confinement to bed after the accident. So far as facts related to the occurrence of accident are concerned, he was not eye-witness, however, injuries suffered by Veena Devi, her treatment, her disability and other post accidental facts were proved by him, which could not be rebutted in his cross-examination. 25. PW-8A Sukh Pal, Criminal Ahlmed CJM Court, Una proved on record statement of Veena Devi Ex. PW-8/A, which was recorded on 7.12.2012 during criminal trial initiated against the driver, because before deposing before the MACT, Veena Devi had expired. In this statement, Veena Devi had re-iterated the incident and cause of accident in corroboration of the contents contained in FIR, statement of Poonam Devi and averments made in pleadings of the Claim Petition. 26. As per medical bills Ex. P-1 to P-44 the expenditure of Rs.3,22,966.23 was proved for medicines prescribed by the doctors for treatment of Veena Devi. 27. Learned counsel for Insurance Company has submitted that from the evidence on record it is clearly evident that Veena Devi did not die on account of complications occurred due to injuries allegedly received by her in the accident, but she died on account of cardiac arrest, which was not a complication likely to occur due to injuries, as stated in the deposition of doctors. It has been further submitted that it has not been proved on record that Veena Devi received injuries for hitting by the bus while crossing the road, rather it has been proved that she was handicapped sufferer of Polio and while alighting from the bus, she became imbalanced because of her physical disability and received injuries and later on died during pendency of Claim Petition. Further that for death of reason other than the injuries caused in the accident, the MACT has committed a mistake by awarding compensation by treating the death of Veena Devi on account of accident. 28. Further that for death of reason other than the injuries caused in the accident, the MACT has committed a mistake by awarding compensation by treating the death of Veena Devi on account of accident. 28. Learned counsel for Insurance Company has placed reliance on judgments passed by the Supreme Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and others Vs. Trilok Chandra and others, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ; Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 ; National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC 680 ; Reshma kumari and others Vs. Madan Mohan and Another, (2013) 9 SCC 65 ; Smt Ram Ashari & others Vs. H.R.T.C. and Another, 2005 (1) Shim.LC 359 and Narinder Kaur and others Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1991 ACJ 767 , with submission that right of the injured person to seek damages is personal to him and will not survive to his legal representatives and in such a case legal maxim, “action personalis moritur cum persona” shall come into play. 29. On behalf of claimant, reliance has been placed on pronouncement in Harkirat Kaur and others Vs. H.R.T.C, HLJ 2006 (1) 110 (HPHC), wherein it has been held that claimants who are heirs can definitely claim the expenses for medical treatment since that is also loss to the estate. Whereas, learned counsel for the Insurance Company has submitted that amount of entire medical expenses would have been reimbursed to the claimants being an employee of Government. 30. Learned counsel or the claimant has also referred judgment passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Kahlon through his Legal Representative Narinder Kahlon Gosakan Vs. K. Paramasivam and Another, 2019 SCC OnLine P&H 6028, which has been upheld by the Apex Court with modification in judgment of Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Kahlon alias Jasmail Singh Kahlon (deceased) through his legal representative, (2022) 13 SCC 494 . 31. K. Paramasivam and Another, 2019 SCC OnLine P&H 6028, which has been upheld by the Apex Court with modification in judgment of Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Kahlon alias Jasmail Singh Kahlon (deceased) through his legal representative, (2022) 13 SCC 494 . 31. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that MACT has committed a mistake by calculating the compensation, as in present case death was not attributable to the accident and, therefore, loss of estate/loss of income, if any, was to be calculated for the period during which deceased did not receive salary and had to remain on unpaid leave i.e. leave without salary and also no compensation was payable on account of pain and suffering, as the claim under the said head is personal in nature and was and is not payable after death of claimant. Further that as the accident was not cause of death, therefore, for loss of care and guidance, loss of love and affection and funeral charges, no compensation was payable in present case. 32. In present case, though it has come on record that deceased died due to cardiac arrest, but there is nothing on record to rule out the possibility of cardiac arrest on the basis of injuries suffered by deceased. In statements it has come that because of injuries, there was possibility of further complications like bed sores, urinary and bowel infections and pneumonia and PW-3 had stated that he was not able to say whether death of patient could have resulted on account of injuries sustained by her, but with further clarification that hear death could have been caused later on because of complications mentioned above. Therefore, there is no definite evidence on record either to rule out the possibility of death on account of injuries or clearly establishing that cause of death was related to injuries or complications on account thereof. In this regard, appellant/Insurance Company has also not lead any evidence. 33. Therefore, there is no definite evidence on record either to rule out the possibility of death on account of injuries or clearly establishing that cause of death was related to injuries or complications on account thereof. In this regard, appellant/Insurance Company has also not lead any evidence. 33. Though plea of appellant, on the face of it, appears to be logical and attractive however, in view of judgment of the Apex Court Court in Kahlon’s case, passed after taking into consideration judgments of various High Courts as well as Apex Court, almost with identical facts, wherein compensation was calculated by taking into consideration annual salary, 15% future prospects and applying multiplier of 11 as applicable in death cases for calculating the compensation, but no compensation was awarded on account of pain and suffering, loss of care and guidance, loss of love and affection and funeral charge, it has to be rejected. Like present case, in Kahlon’s case also, death of injured was subsequent to filing of Claim Petition, but for the reasons other than attributable to the accident or injuries. Relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are as under:- “8. The Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation. Section 166(1) (a) of the Act provides for a statutory claim for compensation arising out of an accident by the person who has sustained the injury. Under Clause (b), compensation is payable to the owner of the property. In case of death, the legal representatives of the deceased can pursue the claim. Property, under the Act, will have a much wider connotation than the conventional definition. If the legal heirs can pursue claims in case of death, we see no reason why the legal representatives cannot pursue claims for loss of property akin to estate of the injured if he is deceased subsequently for reasons other than attributable to the accident or injuries under Clause 1(c) of Section 166(1). Such a claim would be completely distinct from personal injuries to the claimant and which may not be the cause of death. Such claims of personal injuries would undoubtedly abate with the death of the injured. What would the loss of estate mean and what items would be covered by it are issues which has to engage our attention. The appellant has a statutory obligation to pay compensation in motor accident claim cases. Such claims of personal injuries would undoubtedly abate with the death of the injured. What would the loss of estate mean and what items would be covered by it are issues which has to engage our attention. The appellant has a statutory obligation to pay compensation in motor accident claim cases. This obligation cannot be evaded behind the defence that it was available only for personal injuries and abates on his death irrespective of the loss caused to the estate of the deceased because of the injuries. 9. ….. ….. ….. 10. ….. ….. ….. 11. ….. ….. ….. 12. In Surpal Singh Ladhubha Gohil Vs. Raliyatbahen Mohanbhai Savlia, 2008 SCC OnLine Guj 221, Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan, C.J. (as he then was), observed that the Act was a social welfare legislation providing for compensation by award to people who sustain bodily injuries or get killed. The grant of compensation had to be expeditious as procedural technicalities could not be allowed to defeat the just purpose of the act. The Courts in construing social welfare legislations had to adopt a beneficial rule of construction which fulfils the policy of the legislation favorable to those in whose interest the Act has been passed. Judicial discipline demanded that the words of a remedial statutes be construed so far as they reasonably admit so as to secure that relief contemplated by the statute and it shall not be denied to the class intended to be relieved. Rejecting the maxim of actio personalis moritur cum persona on the premise that it was an injury done to the person and the claim abated with his demise it was observed: (SCC OnLine Guj para 11) “11. The question as to whether injury was personal or otherwise is of no significance so far as the wrong doer is concerned and he is obliged to make good the loss sustained by the injured. Legal heirs and legal representatives would have also suffered considerable mental pain and agony due to the accident caused to their kith and kin. Possibly they might have looked after their dear ones in different circumstances, which cannot be measurable in monetary terms. Legal heirs and legal representatives would have also suffered considerable mental pain and agony due to the accident caused to their kith and kin. Possibly they might have looked after their dear ones in different circumstances, which cannot be measurable in monetary terms. We are therefore in full agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation’s case (supra) that even after death of the injured, the claim petition does not abate and right to sue survives to his heirs and legal representatives.” 13. This view has subsequently been followed in a decision authored by brother Justice M.R. Shah J., (as he then was) in Madhuben Maheshbhai Patel vs. Joseph Francis Mewan, 2014 SCC OnLine Guj 13400, holding as follows: (SCC OnLine Guj para 10) “10….Considering the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Surpal Singh Ladhubha Gohil; decisions of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Jenabai Widow of Abdul Karim Musa and in the case of Amrishkumar Vinodbhai; and aforesaid two decisions of the learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, we are of the opinion that maxim “actio personalis moritur cum persona” on which Section 306 of the Indian Evidence Act (sic Indian Succession Act) is based cannot have an applicability in all actions even in an case of personal injuries where damages flows from the head or under the head of loss to the estate. Therefore, even after the death of the injured claimant, claim petition does not abate and right to sue survive to his heirs and legal representatives in so far as loss to the estate is concerned, which would include personal expenses incurred on the treatment and other claim related to loss to the estate. Under the circumstances, the issue referred to the Division Bench is answered accordingly. Consequently, it is held that no error has been committed by the learned Tribunal in permitting the heirs to be brought on record of the claim petition and permitting the heirs of the injured claimant who died subsequently to proceed further with the claim petition. However, the claim petition and even appeal for enhancement would be confine to the claim for the loss to the estate as observed hereinabove.” 14. However, the claim petition and even appeal for enhancement would be confine to the claim for the loss to the estate as observed hereinabove.” 14. Similar view has been taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Joti Ram vs. Chamanlal, 1984 SCC OnLine P&H 354 and the Madras High Court in Thailammai vs. A.V. Mallayya Pillai, 1991 ACJ 185 . 15. The view taken in Kanamma Vs. General Manager, 1990 SCC OnLine Kar 582 and Uttam Kumar Vs. Madhav, 2002 SCC OnLine Kar 219 that the claim would abate is based on a narrow interpretation of the Act which does not commend to us. The reasoning of the Gujarat High Court is more in consonance with aim, purpose and spirit of the Act and furthers its real intent and purpose which we therefore approve. 16. The injuries suffered by the deceased in the accident required prolonged hospitalization for six months. The extent of disability suffered was assessed on 16.06.2000 as 100%. The extent of disability, pursuant to physiotherapy was reassessed as 75% on 08.08.2002. In the interregnum, the injured resigned his job on 30.09.2001 at the age of 53 years as he found movement difficult and inconvenient without an attendant as distinct from complete immobility. The injured was possessing professional qualifications in labour laws and Industrial relations along with a Diploma in Personnel Management. He may have had to suffer some handicap in also practicing before the labour court, but cannot be held to have suffered 100% physical disability as his capacity for rendering advisory and other work coupled with movement on a wheel chair with the aid of an attendant could still facilitate a reduced earning capacity. It cannot be held that the injured was completely left with no source of livelihood except to deplete his estate. In assessing, what has been described as a ‘Just Compensation’ under the Act, all factors including possibilities have to be kept in mind. 17. The Tribunal, on technicalities rejected his claim for salary, medical expenses and percentage of disability and granted a measly compensation of Rupees one lakh only by a cryptic order. In assessing, what has been described as a ‘Just Compensation’ under the Act, all factors including possibilities have to be kept in mind. 17. The Tribunal, on technicalities rejected his claim for salary, medical expenses and percentage of disability and granted a measly compensation of Rupees one lakh only by a cryptic order. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while the claim for personal injuries may not have survived after the death of the injured unrelated to the accident or injuries, during the pendency of the appeal, but the claims for loss of estate caused was available to and could be pursued by the legal representatives of the deceased in the appeal. 18. In Parminder Sing Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 217 compensation on the basis of complete loss of income, the percentage of disability, future prospects were granted applying the relevant multiplier. Again, in Kajal Vs. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4 SCC 413 the injured was assessed as 100 per cent disabled, considering all of which compensation was awarded on the notional future prospects along with relevant multiplier. The loss of income to the injured in the facts of the present case has to be assessed at 75%. In view of Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar, (2011) 1 SCC 343 there shall be no deduction towards personal expenses. 19. We see no reason to deviate from the consistent judicial view taken by more than one High Court that loss of estate would include expenditure on medicines, treatment, diet, attendant, Doctor’s fee, etc. including income and future prospects which would have caused reasonable accretion to the estate but for the sudden expenditure which had to be met from and depleted the estate of the injured, subsequently deceased. 20. However, the compensation under the head pain and suffering being personal injuries is held to be unsustainable and is disallowed. The High Court has not awarded anything towards medical expenses despite hospitalisation for six months being an admitted fact. We therefore award a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- towards medical expenses. Hence, the reassessed total compensation would be Rs.28,42,175/-, calculated hereunder: 34. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court in Kahlon’s case, petitioner, in this case, shall be entitled for compensation as assessed hereinafter:- 35. The appeal is partly allowed by modifying the award in aforesaid terms. We therefore award a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- towards medical expenses. Hence, the reassessed total compensation would be Rs.28,42,175/-, calculated hereunder: 34. Applying the ratio of aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court in Kahlon’s case, petitioner, in this case, shall be entitled for compensation as assessed hereinafter:- 35. The appeal is partly allowed by modifying the award in aforesaid terms. Accordingly, appellant/Insurance Company is liable to pay an amount of compensation of Rs.30,14,466/- alongwith interest @6% per annum. The appeal stands disposed of alongwith pending applications, if any. In view of above, Cross-objections stand dismissed.