1 2025:CGHC:41163 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 6281 of 2021 1 - Rishi Kumar Singh S/o Late Shri Ramnarayan Singh Aged About 52 Years Suspended Assistant Grade-Iii, Land Record Office, Collector, Kedarpur, Ambikapur, District- Surguja, Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Reveue, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - The Collector Department Of Collectorate, Ambikapur, District- Sarguja, Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Shri Deepak Sharma, Advocate holding the brief of Shri Amit Soni, Advocate. For Respondent/ State : Shri Vedant Shadangi, P.L. Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 14.08.2025 1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following reliefs:- “10.1 To call for the entire records pertaining to the petitioner's case for the kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court. 10.2 To set aside the order dated 21.06.2013 passed by the respondent No.3, by virtue of which the petitioner is placed under suspension. SMT NIRMALA RAO 2 10.3 To issue suitable Writ/Direction to Respondent Authorities to pay the arrears of subsistence allowance for which petitioner is entitled according to circulars of State Government. 10.4 To grant any other relief(s)/ order(s)/ direction(s) in favour of petitioner, which may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice. 10.5 Cost of the petition.” 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that, at the relevant time, the petitioner was working on the post of Assistant Grade-III in the office of respondent No.2 and was placed under suspension vide order dated 21.6.2013. He would contend that a departmental enquiry was initiated but has not been concluded yet, and the suspension order has not been revoked. He would further submit that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the matter of Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs. Union of India through its Secretary and Anr., (2015) 7 SCC 291. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State would oppose the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner. He would submit that there are serious allegations against the petitioner and, therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents present on the record. 5. Considering the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was placed under suspension on 21.6.2013 and the suspension order has not been revoked till date, a prima facie case is made out. 3 6. In the matter of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if the charge-sheet or article of charge is not served on the delinquent employee, then a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension period. In paragraphs 20 & 21, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- ‘20. It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 an accused could be detained for continuous and consecutive periods of 15 days, albeit, after judicial scrutiny and supervision. The Cr.P.C. of 1973 contains a new proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the power of the Magistrate to authorise detention of an accused person beyond period of 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and beyond a period of 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. Drawing support from the observations contained of the Division Bench in Raghubir Singh vs. State of Bihar, 1986 (4) SCC 481, and more so of the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225, we are spurred to extrapolate the quintessence of the proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. 1973 to moderate Suspension Orders in cases of departmental/disciplinary inquiries also. It seems to us that if Parliament considered it necessary that a person be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even though accused of commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the similar period especially when a Memorandum of charges/charge-sheet has not been served on the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation of human dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on the same pedestal. 21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a Suspension Order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the Memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the Memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the concerned person to any Department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognized principle of human dignity and the right 4 to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognize that previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us.’ 7. Accordingly, this petition is disposed of reserving liberty in favour of the petitioner to make a representation within a period of seven working days from today before respondent No.2 and in turn, the authority concerned is directed to decide it within a further period of 15 days by passing a reasoned order in light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the matter of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Nimmi