1 2025:CGHC:34708 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 7839 of 2025 1 - Smt. N. J. Ekka W/o C. L. Khare Aged About 59 Years R/o Sasaha Road, Pamgarh, District- Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of School Education, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - The Director Directorate Of Public Instruction, Indrawati Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - The Collector District- Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh. 4 - The District Education Officer District - Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) ---- Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sandeep Dubey, Advocate For Respondent(s)/State : Mr. Suyashdhar Badgaiya, Deputy G.A. Hon'ble Shri Justice R avindra Kumar Agrawal Order on Board 21/07/2025 1. The petitioner is questioning her suspension order dated 04.07.2025 (Annexure P/1) issued by the State Government and filed the present VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2025.08.07 13:04:18 +0530 2 writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India claiming the following reliefs:- “10.1 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari for set aside / quash the impugned Suspension order dated 04.07.2025 (Annexure P/1). 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief(s), which is deemed fit and proper in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. The brief facts of the case as emerges from the pleadings and documents annexed with the petition are that, the petitioner is appointed as Lecturer in the year 1989. She has been promoted on the post of Principal on 07.11.2007. Subsequently, she has been posted on deputation under the SAGES English Medium School, Pamgarh, District Janjgir-Champa. On a unanimous complaint received through online portal on 15.12.2024, that the petitioner has taken illegal gratification for providing admission of the children in SAGES school, Pamgarh, the District Education Officer constituted a two members’ inquiry committee on 10.01.2025. The District Education Officer also sought explanation on 21.03.2025 from the petitioner, which has been properly replied by the petitioner on 24.03.2025 and thereafter the impugned order of her suspension has been passed by the respondent No.1, which is under challenge in the present writ petition. 3 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order of suspension has been passed in the name of Governor and has been signed by the Under Secretary, which cannot be done under the service rules. The impugned suspension order has been passed violating the circular dated 31.07.2006 issued by the State Government and no departmental enquiry is contemplated by the said order of suspension of the petitioner and since the impugned order is passed by the State Government, no alternative remedy of appeal is available to the petitioner. He would also submit that in the inquiry committed constituted by the District Education Officer on 10.01.2025, the junior employees to the petitioner have been made members of the inquiry committee, which cannot be done. Therefore, the impugned order of suspension of the petitioner is bad in law and is liable to be quashed. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State on instructions opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and would submit that the petitioner is having an alternative remedy of appeal provided under Rule 23 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (in short “CCA Rules, 1966”) and the writ petition is not maintainable challenging the suspension order. He would also submit that though the order was passed in the name of Hon’ble Governor, but it has not been passed by the Governor himself. This issue has been settled by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in WA No. 80 of 2012 (G.S. Dewangan v. State of Chhattisgarh and others), order dated 15.02.2012. The allegation against the petitioner includes various 4 factual aspects, which cannot be determined in the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and this Court cannot examine the correctness of the allegations against the petitioner in the writ petition. He would further submit that the judicial review against a suspension order is very limited, as the suspension does not cast any stigma upon the employee. After considering the entire material, the authorities concerned have considered for suspension of the petitioner and there is sufficient material available before the authorities to consider the same, and therefore, there is no merit in the present writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. The suspension of the employee itself involved the contemplation of the departmental enquiry and the suspension is only to keep away the employee in view of the fairness of the inquiry proceeding, therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the petition. 6. The petitioner has raised the issue that the impugned order has been passed in the name of Hon’ble Governor, and therefore, the petitioner has no alternative remedy to file the appeal before the competent authority as provided under Rule 22 of the CCA Rules, 1966. In the matter of “G.S. Dewangan” (supra) the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court has settled this issue in para 9 to 15, which reads as under:- “9. The main contention of learned counsel appearing for the appellant, it appears, is that the alternative 5 statutory remedy of appeal as provided under Rule 23 of the Rules, 1966 is not available to the appellant as the impugned order was passed in the name of the Governor. Thus, the same may be deemed to have been passed by the Governor himself. Under Rule 22 of the Rules, 1966, no appeal lies against the order passed by the Governor. 10. The Supreme Court, in State of M.P. & Others v. Dr. Yashwant Trimbak, (1996) 2 SCC 305 while considering provisions of Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the M.P. Civil Services Pension Rules, 1976, wherein, it is provided that the departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his re- employment, shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the Governor. The Supreme Court observed as under:- "14. The Rule in question no doubt provides that departmental proceedings if not instituted while the government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his re- employment, shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the Governor. The question that arises for consideration is whether it requires the sanction of the Governor himself or the Council of Ministers in whose favour the Governor under the Rules of Business has allocated the matter, can also sanction. It is undisputed that under Article 166(3) of the 6 Constitution the Governor has made rule for convenient transaction of the business of the Government and the question of sanction to prosecute in the case in hand was dealt with by the Council of Ministers in accordance with the Rules of Business. Under Article 154 of the Constitution, the executive power of the State vests in the Governor and is exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. The expression "executive power" is wide enough to connote the residue of the governmental function that remains after the legislative and judicial functions are taken away. 17. The order of sanction for prosecution of a retired government servant is undoubtedly an executive action of the Government. A Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 166(3) of the Constitution may allocate all his functions to different Ministers by framing rules of business except those in which the Governor is required by the Constitution to exercise his own discretion. The expression "business of the Government of the State" in Article 166(3) of the Constitution, comprises functions which the Governor is to exercise with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers including those which he is empowered to exercise on his subjective satisfaction and including statutory functions of 7 the State Government. The Court has held in Godavari Shamrao Parulekar v. State of Maharashtra that even the functions and duties which are vested in a State Government by a statute may be allocated to Ministers by the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution. In State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, where power of issuing notification under Section 3(1) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 have been conferred on the Governor of Bihar, this Court held: "Section 3(1) of the Act confers the power of issuing notifications under it, not on any officer but on the State Government as such though the exercise of that power would be governed by the rules of business framed by the Governor under Article 166(3) of the Constitution." Finally, it was held that excepting the matters with respect to which the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to act in his discretion, the personal satisfaction of the Governor is not required and any function may be allocated to the ministers. In the said decision, contention of the learned counsel for the respondent therein that in the Rule itself both the expressions "Governor" and "Government" have been used and therefore the expression "sanction of the Governor" in Rule 9(2)(b)(i) would mean the personal sanction of the Governor, did not find favour with the Hon'ble Judges in the matter. 8 11. Rule 23(iii) of the Rules, 1966 provides that subject to the provisions of Rule 22 of the Rules, 1966, a Government servant may prefer an appeal against an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under Rule 9 of the Rules, 1966. Indisputably, the order of suspension was passed under Rule 9(2) of the Rules, 1966 which is an appealable as the order was not passed by the Governor himself, but in the name of the Governor which is the requirement Article 166(2) of the Constitution of India, wherein the allocation of work has been done and business of the Government has been allocated to various departments in respect of the employees of the same department. Thus, the order passed in the name of the Governor was an executive order and not the order passed by the Governor himself. Thus, bar under Rule 22 of the Rules, 1966 is not applicable in the case. 12. A Seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court, in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab & Another, (1974) 2 SCC 831 held as under: "30. In all cases in which the President or the Governor exercises his functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers he does so by making rules for convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India or the Government of the State respectively or by allocation among his Ministers of the said business, in accordance with Articles 77(3) and 9 166(3) respectively. Wherever the Constitution requires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for exercise any or by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, as for example in Articles 123, 213, 311(2) proviso (c), 317, 352(1), 356 and 360 the satisfaction required by the Constitution is not the personal satisfaction of the President or of the Governor but is the satisfaction of the President or of the Governor in the constitutional sense under the Cabinet system of Government. The reasons are these. It is the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers on whose aid and advice the President or the Governor generally exercises all his powers and functions. Neither Article 77(3) nor Article 166(3) provides for any delegation of power. Both Articles 77(3) and 166(3) provide that the President under Article 77(3) and the Governor under Article 166(3) shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government and the allocation of business among the Ministers of the said business. The Rules of Business and the allocation among the Ministers of the said business all indicate that the decision of any Minister or officer under the Rules of Business made under these two articles viz. Article 77(3) in the case of the President and Article 166(3) in the case of the Governor of the State is the decision of the President or the Governor respectively. 10 57. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the President or the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head in the case of the Union and the Chief Minister at the head in the case of State in all matters which vests in the Executive whether those functions are executive or legislative in character. Neither the President nor the Governor is to exercise the executive functions personally. The present appeals concern the appointment of persons other than District Judges to the Judicial Services of the State which is to be made by the Governor as contemplated in Article 234 of the Constitution after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court. Appointment or dismissal or removal of persons belonging to the Judicial Service of the State is not a personal function but is an executive function of the Governor exercised in accordance with the rules in that behalf under the Constitution. 88. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the President as well as the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in executive action and is not required by the Constitution to act personally without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers or against the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Where the Governor has any discretion the 11 Governor acts on his own judgment. The Governor exercises his discretion in harmony with his Council of Ministers. The appointment as well as removal of the members of the Subordinate Judicial Service is an executive action of the Governor to be exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Appointments and removals of persons are made by the President and the Governor as the constitutional head of the Executive on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. That is why any action by any servant of the Union or the State in regard to appointment or dismissal is brought against the Union or the State and not against the President or the Governor.” 13. Further, a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Union of India && Others v. Sripati Ranjan Biswas & Another, held as under:- "8. The question which is raised in this appeal relates to the domain of appointment or dismissal of a government servant. Such a question falls within the ambit of a purely executive function of the President in the case of the Union Government and of the Governor in the case of a State. In the present case, such a function being ultimately an executive function of the President, the fact that the final order is 12 preceded or accompanied by a quasi-judicial enquiry held by the Minister does not affect the character of the exercise of that function by the President. There is, therefore, nothing in principle which can be distinguished in this appeal from the ratio of the decision in Samsher Singh's case (supra)." 14. Reliance of the appellant on Aziz Qureshi, also reiterates the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases cited hereinabove as has been observed by the Tribunal in the following terms:- "9...It will suffice to say that appeal to the Governor against, the order of the State Government under M.P.C.S. (CCA) Rules, 1966, is an effective remedy and the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under the Constitution." 15. Applying the well settled principles of law to the facts of the case, it is evident that the order of suspension passed under Rule 9(2) of the Rules, 1966 is an executive order of the State against which, an appeal is maintainable and the same is effective remedy.” 7. In the matter of “State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty” 1994 (4) SCC 126, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 13 that:- 13 “13. It is thus settled law that normally when an appointing authority or the disciplinary authority seeks to suspend an employee, pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or pending investigation into grave charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds or serious acts of omission and 5 1993 Supp (3) SCC 483: 1994 SCC (L&S) 67: (1993) 25 ATC commission, the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or investigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of the mind by disciplinary authority. Appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. It would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. Suspension is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. In other words it is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending inquiry without any impediment or to 14 prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the inquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or inquiry etc. But as stated earlier, each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact it creates on the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or investigation. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the delinquent's continuance in office while facing departmental inquiry or trial of a criminal charge.” 8. A plain reading of the aforesaid judgments makes it clear that, whether charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive, cannot be gone into at the stage of examining the validity of suspension order. At the stage of suspension, the correctness of allegations is not required to be looked into. The public interest is also an element on the consideration of which an employee can be placed under suspension. This is within the province of the Disciplinary Authority to decide, whether an employee is required to be suspended or not, because suspension is a step towards ultimate result of an investigation or an inquiry. 15 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of “M. Paul Anthoni v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited” 1999 (3) SCC 679 has held in para 26 that:- “26. To place an employee under suspension is an unqualified right of the employer. This right is conceded to the employer in service jurisprudence everywhere. It has even received statutory recognition under service rules framed by various authorities, including Govt. of India and the State Governments. (See: for example, Rule 10 of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules. Even under the General Clauses Act, this right is conceded to the employer by Section 16 which, inter alia, provides that power to appoint includes power to suspend or dismiss.” 10. Further, in the matter of “Union of India and another v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal” 2013 (16) SCC 147, in para 22 and 27, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:- “22. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that suspension order can be passed by the competent authority considering the gravity of the alleged misconduct i.e. serious act of omission or commission and the nature of evidence available. It cannot be actuated by mala fide, arbitrariness, or for ulterior purpose. Effect on public interest due to the employee’s continuation in office is also a relevant and determining factor. The facts of each case have to be taken into consideration as no formula 16 of universal application can be laid down in this regard. However, suspension order should be passed only where there is a strong prima facie case against the delinquent, and if the charges stand proved, would ordinarily warrant imposition of major punishment i.e. removal or dismissal from service, or reduction in rank etc. 27. Suspension is a device to keep the delinquent out of the mischief range. The purpose is to complete the proceedings unhindered. Suspension is an interim measure in aid of disciplinary proceedings so that the delinquent may not gain custody or control of papers or take any advantage of his position. More so, at this stage, it is not desirable that the court may find out as which version is true when there are claims and counter claims on factual issues. The court cannot act as if it an appellate forum de hors the powers of judicial review.” 11. Rule 23 of CCA Rules, 1966 provides for a departmental appeal against the order of suspension of the employee to the State Government, which reads as under:- “23. Orders against which appeal lies.- Subject to the provisions of Rule 22, a Government servant may prefer an appeal against all or any of the following orders, namely- ( i ) an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 10 whether made by the disciplinary authority or by any appellate or reviewing authority; 17 (ii) an order enhancing any penalty, imposed under Rule 10; (iii) [an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under Rule 9;] Explanation. - In this rule the expression "Government servant" includes a person who has ceased to be in Government service.” 12. It is settled law that the order of suspension is not that of punishment. The requirement of the law is that the reason should be there in the order of suspension. In the present case, the reason for the suspension of the petitioner is mentioned that, she obtained illegal gratification of students for their admission in the school and the matter was preliminary inquired by the two members’ committee and found the allegation true, which is the misconduct as provided under Rule 3 of Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965. The petitioner is having specific remedy of appeal before the State Government as provided under Rule 23 of the CCA Rules. Though, the petitioner tried to establish that the members of inquiry committee were junior to the petitioner and the matter should be inquired by the senior to the petitioner, but in the present case from perusal of the order dated 04.07.2025 (Annexure P/1), it transpires that the matter has already been inquired and the report has been submitted by the two members’ inquiry committee, even otherwise, it is only a preliminary enquiry to ascertain the correctness of the complaint. No prejudice or mala fide is alleged against them; therefore, this Court 18 does not find it to be sufficient to interfere with the impugned order. It further transpires from the document (Annexure P/6) that the petitioner was also served with a notice to submit her explanation and she submitted her explanation on 24.03.2025. Thus, the opportunity to explain the allegation was also provided to the petitioner. 13. In view of the foregoing analysis and also in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court does not find any mala fide or arbitrariness in passing the suspension order and further is of the opinion that the petitioner does not make out any exceptional case to interfere with her suspension order dated 04.07.2025 (Annexure P/1) invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner is at liberty to challenge her suspension order before the State Government as provided under Rule 23 of CCA Rules, 1966, if so advised. 14. In the result, the petition is liable to be and hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved