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2025 DAILYLAW 3494 (HP)

Shesh Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-09-19

Rakesh Kainthla

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JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 22.04.2014 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), whereby the judgment of conviction dated 31.08.2013 and order of sentence dated 03.09.2013 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Naduan, District Hamirpur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that Rajesh Kumar (PW-7) and Manoj Kumar (PW-9) were riding a motorcycle bearing registration No.RJ-07-9285(T) on 25.06.2008 at 12 noon. Informant Rajesh Kuamr (PW-7) was driving the vehicle, and Manoj Kumar (PW-9) was sitting as a pillion rider. A jeep bearing registration No.HP31-7894 came from the opposite side at a high speed at about 12:30 p.m. at Kohla and hit the motorcycle on the wrong side of the road. The motorcycle riders sustained injuries. They were taken to the hospital in a jeep. The driver identified himself as Shesh Ram (accused). Intimation was given to the police. The police recorded an entry (Ext.PW-2/A) in the daily diary. ASI Surjit Singh (PW-8) went to the hospital for verification. He filed an application (Ext.PW-8/A) for conducting the medical examination of the injured. Dr. B.S. Rana (PW-5) conducted the medical examination of Rajesh Kumar(PW-7) and Manoj Kumar (PW-9), and found that they had sustained simple and grievous injuries, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He issued MLCs (Ext.PW-6/A and Ext. PW-6/B). Rajesh Kumar (PW-7) made a statement (Ext.PW-7/A), which was sent to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW-11/A) was registered. ASI Surjit Singh (PW-8) took photographs of the spot(Ext.PW-8/B to Ext.PW8/D) whose negatives are Ext.PW-8/E to Ext. PW-8/G. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW8/H). He seized the jeep and the motorcycle vide memo (Ext.PW3/A). Shesh Ram (accused) produced the registration certificate, insurance of the vehicle, and his driving license, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW-5/A). Rajesh Kumar (PW-7) produced the registration certificate, insurance of the motorcycle, and his driving license, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW2/A). PW-8/G. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW8/H). He seized the jeep and the motorcycle vide memo (Ext.PW3/A). Shesh Ram (accused) produced the registration certificate, insurance of the vehicle, and his driving license, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW-5/A). Rajesh Kumar (PW-7) produced the registration certificate, insurance of the motorcycle, and his driving license, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW2/A). An application (Ext.PW8/J) was made for obtaining the treatment summary, and treatment summaries (Ext. PA to Ext. PC) were obtained. Ramesh Chand (PW-4) conducted the mechanical examination of the jeep and motorcycle and found no defect in the vehicles, which could have led to the accident. He issued his reports (Ext.PW4/A and Ext.PW-4/B). The Investigating Officer recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. After completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined twelve witnesses to prove its case. Suresh Kumar (PW-1) and Karam Chand (PW-3) witnessed various recoveries. MC. Janak Raj (PW-2) proved the entry in the daily diary. Ramesh Chand (PW-4) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles. Dr. B.S.Rana (PW-5) conducted the medical examinations of the injured. Rajiv Kumar (PW-6) did not support the prosecution’s case. Rajesh Kumar (PW-7) was driving the motorcycle. Surjit Singh (PW-8) investigated the case. Manoj Kumar (PW-9) was the pillion rider. Balam Kumar (10) accompanied ASI Surjit Singh and carried the rukka to the Police Station. ASI Som Dutt (PW-11) signed the F.I.R.. Thakur Dass (PW- 12) is the owner of the jeep. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He claimed that he had parked his vehicle. He examined Suresh Kumar (DW-1) in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. Thakur Dass (PW-12) proved that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The accident occurred on the right side of the road, and there was sufficient space towards the left side of the road. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. Thakur Dass (PW-12) proved that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The accident occurred on the right side of the road, and there was sufficient space towards the left side of the road. Driving the vehicle towards the right side of the road led to the accident. The statement of the defence witness was not satisfactory. The medical evidence provedthat the motorcycle riders had sustained simple and grievous injuries. Therefore, the accused was convicted for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and sentenced as follows: Sections Sentences 279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for seven days. 337 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, and in default of payment of the fine, undergo further simple imprisonment for seven days. 338 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for ten days. It was ordered that all the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal. Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The accident occurred towards the right side of the road. The accused was supposed to drive the vehicle towards the left side of the road. The negligence of the accused led to the accident. The motorcycle riders had sustained simple and grievous injuries in the accident. The learned Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused. No interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. No interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The testimony of the defence witness was wrongly ignored. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Yudhvir Singh Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused,and Ms. Sunaina, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr. Yudhivir Singh Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. It was duly proved on record that the motorcyclist had hit a stationary jeep, and the accident occurred due to the negligence of the motorcyclist. Learned Trial Court erred in holding that the accused was negligent. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. In the alternative, he prayed that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act be granted to the accused. He relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of H.P. vs Suresh Kumar 2010 SCC OnLine HP 5253, Surendran vs. Sub-Inspector of Police in Special Leave Petition (Crl. No. 5985 of 2016 decided on 30th June, 2021,and judgment passed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Bodh Raj vs. State of Himachal Pradesh 2024:HHC:9886 in support of his submissions. 11. Ms. Sunaina, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accident occurred on the right side of the road. The accused was supposed to drive the vehicle towards the left side of the road. His negligence led to the accident. The benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should not be granted in the present case, keeping in view the large number of accident cases. She prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14. His negligence led to the accident. The benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should not be granted in the present case, keeping in view the large number of accident cases. She prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 16. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. PuttumanaIllathJathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in SanjaysinhRamrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non- consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 17. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court 19. Rajesh Kumar (PW-7) stated in his examination-in- chief that he was riding the motorcycle bearing registration No. RJ - 07-92858 (T) and Manoj Kumar (PW-9) was sitting as pillion riders. A Pickup came from the opposite side at a high speed, and hit the motorcycle towards the right side of the road at Kohla. He and Manoj Kumar (PW-9) sustained injuries. They were taken to the hospital. The accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that the speed of the jeep was 70 KM per hour. He denied that he had consumed liquor or that he was driving the motorcycle towards the right side of the road at a speed of 100 KM per hour. 20. The testimony of Rajesh Kumar (PW-7) that the accident had taken place towards the right side of the road is duly corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW-8/H), in which the motorcycle and the jeep are shown towards the right side of the road. The Photographs (Ext.PW-8/B and Ext.PW-8/D) also show that the jeep was on the extreme right side of the road. Hence, the statement of this witness that the accident occurred towards the right side of the road has to be accepted as correct. 21. Manoj Kumar (PW-9) stated in his examination-in- chief that he was a pillion rider on the motorcycle, which was being driven by Rajesh Kumar (PW-7). A jeep came from the opposite side at high speed and hit the motorcycle towards the right side of the road at Kohla. 21. Manoj Kumar (PW-9) stated in his examination-in- chief that he was a pillion rider on the motorcycle, which was being driven by Rajesh Kumar (PW-7). A jeep came from the opposite side at high speed and hit the motorcycle towards the right side of the road at Kohla. The driver identified himself as Shesh Ram, who carried the injured to the hospital. He denied that Rajesh Kumar (PW-7) had consumed liquor,that the jeep was parked outside the road,or that Rajesh Kumar (PW-7) had hit the jeep. 22. It was suggested to this witnesses that Rajesh Kumar (PW-7) had consumed the liquor, and he denied this suggestion. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the Medical Officer had not found any smell of alcohol in the breath of Rajesh Kumar (PW-7). The Medical Officer was not asked whether Rajesh Kumar was intoxicated. Therefore, the defence version that Rajesh Kumar (PW-7) had consumed the liquor was rightly rejected by the learned Courts below. 23. Suresh Kumar (DW-1) stated in his examination-in- chief that he was taking the tea. His vehicle, bearing registration No HP31-7894, was parked on the left side of the road. A motorcycle came at high speed and hit the stationary vehicle. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the motorcycle rider. He stated in his cross-examination that he did not know the name of the owner of the shop. There were three or four shops, but he did not know the names of their owners. He could not mention the registration number of the motorcycle. He admitted that he knew the accused and had visited the Court at the instance of the accused. 24. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that he is not the owner of the vehicle, and his statement that his vehicle was parked on the left side of the road is incorrect. The vehicle was owned by Thakur Dass (PW-12), father of the accused. Suresh Kumar stated that his vehicle was parked towards the left side of the road, which is contrary to the photographs and the site plan. The motorcycle is seen crushed under the tyres of a jeep, which was not possible had the motorcycle hit the stationary vehicle. His name was not suggested to any of the prosecution witnesses. Suresh Kumar stated that his vehicle was parked towards the left side of the road, which is contrary to the photographs and the site plan. The motorcycle is seen crushed under the tyres of a jeep, which was not possible had the motorcycle hit the stationary vehicle. His name was not suggested to any of the prosecution witnesses. All these circumstances made his presence on the spot highly suspect, and learned Courts below were justified in discarding his testimony. 25. Rajeev Kumar (PW-6) did not support the prosecution’s case. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He admitted in his cross-examination that ,the names of the motorcycle driver and pillion rider were revealed on the spot. He admitted that the motorcyclist had sustained injuries. He admitted various recoveries. He denied that the accident had occurred in his presence, and he was making a false statement. He also denied the previous statement recorded by the police. He had specifically stated before the police that the jeep had hit the motorcycle on the right side of the road.ASI Surjit Singh (PW-8) stated that he had recorded the statement of Rajeev Kumar (PW-6) as per his version. This statement was not shaken in the cross-examination. Therefore, Rajeev Kumar had made two contradictory statements: one before the police and another before the Court. His credibility has been impeached by his previous statement, and his testimony cannot be used to discard the prosecution’s case. 26. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. Therefore, the jeep was being driven towards the right side of the road in violation of Rule 2, and the motorcycle was being driven towards its left side of the road as per Rule 2. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the wrong side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the wrong side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 27. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, that where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.” 28. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 29. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligent in driving the jeep in violation of the Rules of the Road Regulations. 30. Dr. B.S.Rana (PW-5) proved that Rajesh Kumar (PW-7) had sustained grievous injuries,and Manoj Kumar (PW-9) had sustained simple injuries. These injuries were caused by the negligent driving of the accused. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC. 31. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused, and the learned Courts below failed to consider this aspect. This submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of IPC. It was observed: “11. This submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of IPC. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted per- son under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highway are among the top killers of the country" the saturation of accidents toll was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of neg- ligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human be- ing. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigor- ous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the vic- tims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the na- ture of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the be- nevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. While considering the quantum of sentence, to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A pro- fessional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile al- most throughout his working hours. He must constantly in- form himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not neces- sarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with le- niently by the Court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a ve- hicle he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 32. A similar view was taken in Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 208 , wherein it was observed:- 6. Learned counsel lastly made an alternative plea that the Probation of Offenders Act may be applied to secure his job. This Court has held in Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 ] that the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be invoked in cases involving rash or negligent driving of the bus resulting in death of human beings.” 33. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held: - 13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 34. It was laid down in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, that a deterrent sentence has to be awarded to a person convicted of negligent driving. It was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 35. In view of the binding precedent of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is difficult to rely upon the judgment of this Court,Suresh Thakur and Bodh Raj (supra). In Surendran (supra),the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had noticed that the accident had occurred more than 26 years ago and exercised the discretion to substitute the sentence of six months imprisonment. In the present case, the incident occurred seventeen years ago. The act of the accused of driving the jeep towards the right side of the road at a speed of more than 70 KM per hour showed blatant disregard for the safety of others, and thesentence of imprisonment cannot be sustained. 36. In the present case, the incident occurred seventeen years ago. The act of the accused of driving the jeep towards the right side of the road at a speed of more than 70 KM per hour showed blatant disregard for the safety of others, and thesentence of imprisonment cannot be sustained. 36. No other point was urged. 37. Consequently, the present revision petition fails, and the same is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous application, if any. 38. The records of the learned Courts below be returned forthwith alongwith a copy of this judgment for the information.