JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 06.04.2013 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.03.2009 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, (I), Palampur, District Kangra (learned Trial Court) were set-aside and the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the charged offences. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Kuldeep Chand (PW3) was returning to his home on 25.12.2006 at about 8:00 A.M. Nirmala Devi (since deceased) was going to her field. A bus bearing registration No. HP37-3127 hit Nirmala Devi, who fell. The bus also turned turtle. Nirmala Devi sustained injuries on her left arm and other parts of her body. The passengers also sustained injuries in the accident. Nirmala Devi was taken to the hospital, but she was declared dead. Matter was reported to the police, and an entry No.4 (Ex.PW5/A) was recorded in the police station. SI Duni Chand (PW6) went to the spot for verification of the entry. The informant, Kuldeep Chand, made a statement (Ex.PW3/A), which was sent to the police station where F.I.R. (Ex.PW6/A) was registered. An application was filed for conducting the post-mortem examination of the deceased. A report (Ex. PM) was issued, stating that Nirmala Devi had died due to intra-abdominal haemorrhage leading to cardiogenic shock. Medical examinations of the injured were conducted, and the reports were issued. Duni Chand went to the spot and prepared a site plan (Ex. PW6/C). He seized the bus bearing registration No. HP37-3127, along with the documents vide memo (Ex. PW1/A). Rajender Kumar (PW4) conducted the mechanical examination of the bus and found that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicle which could have led to the accident. Statements of remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. PW1/A). Rajender Kumar (PW4) conducted the mechanical examination of the bus and found that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicle which could have led to the accident. Statements of remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304- A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined six witnesses to prove its case. Vijay Singh (PW1) is the witness to recovery. Reema Katoch (PW2) was the passenger in the bus. Kuldeep Chand (PW3) reported the matter to the police. Rajender Kumar (PW4) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. HHC Swaroop Chand (PW5) proved the entry in the daily diary. Duni Chand (PW6) conducted the investigation. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr. P.C., denied that he was driving the bus in a rash and negligent manner. He stated that a van driver overtook his bus and stopped it all of a sudden in front of the bus. The accused applied the brakes, and the bus overturned. He admitted that Nirmala Devi died in the accident and Prithvi Singh, Arvind Kumar, Mahinder, Banwari Lal and Reema sustained simple and grievous injuries. He stated that he was innocent and was falsely implicated. Statement of Banwari Lal (DW1) was recorded in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused admitted that he was driving the bus at the relevant time. Reema Katoch (PW2) and Kuldeep Chand (PW3) also proved this fact. Reema Katoch stated that the accused was driving the bus at a high speed. He applied the brake, due to which the bus overturned. Banwari Lal (DW1) stated in his examination-in-chief that the driver drove the bus towards the right side of the road and stated in his cross-examination that the bus was driven towards the left side of the road. This contradiction made his testimony highly doubtful. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him as follows:- Sr. Banwari Lal (DW1) stated in his examination-in-chief that the driver drove the bus towards the right side of the road and stated in his cross-examination that the bus was driven towards the left side of the road. This contradiction made his testimony highly doubtful. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him as follows:- Sr. No. Offence Sentence Imposed 1 279 IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months, pay fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of the payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of fifteen days. 2 337 IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months, pay fine of Rs.500/- and in default of the payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of seven days. 3 338 IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months, pay fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of the payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of twenty days. 4 304-A IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months, pay fine of Rs.2000/- and in default of the payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra, at Dharamshala (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the statements of prosecution witnesses did not prove the rashness or negligence of the accused. Reema Katoch (PW2) stated that she was unable to say who was responsible for the accident. Kuldeep Chand (PW3) also stated that he was 10 meters away from the place of the incident and could not say how the accident occurred. The defence of the accused that a van suddenly overtook the bus and stopped immediately was made probable by the statement of Banwari Lal (DW1). No negligence can be inferred from the use of the term 'high speed'. Learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Accordingly, the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court were set aside. 8. No negligence can be inferred from the use of the term 'high speed'. Learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Accordingly, the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court were set aside. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court failed to appreciate the evidence properly. The accused admitted that he was driving the bus at the relevant time. There was no mechanical defect in the vehicle. Banwari Lal (DW1) stated that the bus turned turtle and hit Nirmala Devi. The site plan (Ex.PW6/C) also shows that the bus was driven towards the right side. This fact established the negligence of the accused. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr. Shashwat Dadwal and Mr. Subhash Chander, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The accused did not dispute that he was driving the bus at the relevant time. The statement of Banwari Lal (DW1) and the site plan (Ex. PW6/C) show that the accident occurred towards the right side of the road. The accused was supposed to drive the bus towards the left side of the road. His negligence led to the accident. Learned Appellate Court failed to appreciate this aspect. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 11. Mr. Shashwat Dadwal, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the prosecution witnesses claimed that the accused was driving the bus at a high speed, which is insufficient to infer the negligence of the accused. The defence taken by the accused that a van overtook the bus and suddenly stopped in front of the bus is highly improbable. The accused was justified in driving the bus towards the right side to avoid a collision with the van. He cannot be held negligent in these circumstances. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. The defence taken by the accused that a van overtook the bus and suddenly stopped in front of the bus is highly improbable. The accused was justified in driving the bus towards the right side to avoid a collision with the van. He cannot be held negligent in these circumstances. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 14. The prosecution asserted that the accident occurred because of the rashness or negligence of the accused. These terms were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahadev Prasad Kaushik v. State of U.P., (2008) 14 SCC 479 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 834: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1551, at page 487: 26. Though the term “negligence” has not been defined in the Code, it may be stated that negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do. 25. In Empress of India v. Idu Beg [ILR (1881) 3 All 776] Straight, J. made the following pertinent observations which have been quoted with approval by various courts, including this Court: (ILR p. 780) “… criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury, but without intention to cause injury, or knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted.” 15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. Reema Katoch (PW2) stated that the accused was driving the bus at a high speed. He applied the brakes, and the bus turned turtle. One woman suffered injuries in the accident. She could not say whose negligence led to the accident. She was permitted to be cross-examined. She admitted the previous statement mark 'X', which was made by her to the police. She stated in her cross-examination by learned counsel for the accused that she was not aware that the accused had tried to take the bus towards the right side to avoid the collision with the van. She admitted that the bus had turned turtle after applying the brakes. 17. She stated in her cross-examination by learned counsel for the accused that she was not aware that the accused had tried to take the bus towards the right side to avoid the collision with the van. She admitted that the bus had turned turtle after applying the brakes. 17. The informant Kuldeep Chand (PW3) stated that a bus bearing registration No. HP37-3724 or probably 3127 came to the spot. The bus turned turtle. He saw that his daughter-in-law had sustained injuries. The bus was being driven at high speed. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. 18. Reema Katoch (PW2) and Kuldeep Chand (PW3) claimed that the bus was being driven at a high speed, which led to the accident. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the accused that the use of the term 'high speed' is not sufficient to infer negligence. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 19. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 19. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493 , wherein it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 20. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2005 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 21. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 22. Hence, the statements that the accused was driving the bus at a high speed are not sufficient to infer the negligence of the accused. 23. It was submitted that the accused had taken the bus towards the right side of the road, which shows his negligence. The accused has explained that a van full of children overtook the bus and suddenly stopped in front of the bus. He turned the bus towards the right side to avoid a collision with the van, which led to the accident. This defence is made probable by Banwari Lal (DW1), who stated that he was travelling in the bus. A van overtook the bus. The driver of the van suddenly stopped the van. The driver turned the bus towards the right. The bus was being driven at a normal speed. He stated in his cross- examination that only one bus could have passed on the road. He admitted that the accused turned the bus towards its left side when the van was overtaking it. The driver of the van stopped the van suddenly. The bus was towards the left side. 24. It was submitted that the testimony of this witness is highly contradictory. He stated in his examination-in-chief that the bus was taken towards the right side and claimed in the cross-examination that the bus was towards its left side. These two contradictory versions shatter his credibility. This submission is not acceptable. Banwari Lal (DW1) stated in his examination- in-chief that the bus was driven towards the right side to avoid a collision with the van and stated in his cross- examination that the bus was taken towards the left side when the van was overtaking it. Thus, there is no contradiction in his statement. This submission is not acceptable. Banwari Lal (DW1) stated in his examination- in-chief that the bus was driven towards the right side to avoid a collision with the van and stated in his cross- examination that the bus was taken towards the left side when the van was overtaking it. Thus, there is no contradiction in his statement. He was deposing about the direction of the bus in the examination-in-chief when the driver of the van had suddenly applied the brakes, and the direction of the bus in the cross-examination, when the van was overtaking the bus. These are two different events. Hence, the submission that the testimony of this witness has to be discarded because of the contradiction cannot be accepted. 25. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adambhai Sulemanbhai Ajmeri v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 7 SCC 716 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 312: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 465 that equal weightage must be given to the defence witnesses. It was observed at page 829: “219. It has been held by this Court in a catena of cases that while examining the witnesses on record, equal weightage shall be given to the de- fence witnesses as that of the prosecution witnesses. In Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar [ (2002) 1 SCC 351 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 175], this Court held as un- der: (SCC p. 356, para 3) “3. … Before drawing the curtain on this score, however, we wish to clarify that the evidence tendered by the defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one by reason of the factum of the witnesses being examined by the defence. The defence witnesses are entitled to equal respect and treatment as that of the prosecution. The issue of credibility and the trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses on a par with that of the prosecution — a lapse on the part of the defence witnesses cannot be differentiated and be treated differently from that of the prosecutors' witnesses.” (emphasis supplied) 220. Further, it has been held in State of Haryana v. Ram Singh [ (2002) 2 SCC 426 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 350] as under: (SCC p. 439, para 19) “19. Further, it has been held in State of Haryana v. Ram Singh [ (2002) 2 SCC 426 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 350] as under: (SCC p. 439, para 19) “19. … Incidentally, be it noted that the evidence tendered by defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one — the defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment and equal respect as that of the prosecution. The issue of credibility and trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses on a par with that of the prosecution. Rejection of the defence case on the basis of the evidence tendered by the defence witness has been effected rather casually by the High Court. Suggestion was there to the prosecution witnesses, in particular PW 10 Dholu Ram that his father Manphool was missing for about 2/3 days prior to the day of the occurrence itself—what more is expected of the defence case: a doubt or a certainty—jurisprudentially a doubt would be enough: when such a suggestion has been made the prosecution has to bring on record the availability of the deceased during those 2/3 days with some independent evidence. Rejection of the defence case only by reason thereof is far too strict and rigid a requirement for the defence to meet — it is the prosecutor's duty to prove beyond all reasonable doubts and not the defence to prove its innocence — this itself is a circumstance, which cannot but be termed to be suspicious in nature.” 221. Also, in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram [ (2000) 4 SCC 515 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 845], this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 524-25, paras 21-23) “21. Shri N.P. Midha, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted written submissions over and above the oral arguments addressed by him. One of the contentions adverted to by the learned counsel is pertaining to the evidence of the defence witness (DW 1 Moharam Ali). The counsel contended that if the evidence of DW 1 Moharam Ali can be believed, it is sufficient to shake the basic structure of the prosecution’s evidence. Shri N.P. Midha invited our attention to the following observations contained in the decision of this Court in Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. [ (1981) 2 SCC 166 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 379] : (SCC p. 173, para 19) ‘19. Shri N.P. Midha invited our attention to the following observations contained in the decision of this Court in Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. [ (1981) 2 SCC 166 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 379] : (SCC p. 173, para 19) ‘19. … Defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment with those of the prosecution. And, courts ought to overcome their traditional, instinctive disbelief in defence wit- nesses.’ 22. We may quote the succeeding sentence also from the said decision for the sake of completion of the observations of Their Lordships on that score. It is this: ‘Quite often they tell lies, but so do the prosecution witnesses.’ 23. Depositions of witnesses, whether they are examined on the prosecution side or defence side or as court witnesses, are oral evidence in the case, and hence the scrutiny thereof shall be without any predilection or bias. No witness is entitled to get better treatment merely because he was examined as a prosecution witness or even as a court witness. It is judicial scrutiny which is warranted in respect of the depositions of all witnesses for which different yardsticks cannot be prescribed as for those different categories of witnesses.” (emphasis supplied) 26. Banwari Lal (DW1) has supported the version of the accused that a van overtook and stopped in front of the bus, and the accused turned the bus towards the right side to avoid the accident. This was a prudent move protected under Section 81 of IPC; otherwise, the bus would have hit the van, causing injuries to the children sitting in it. The accused turned the bus towards the right side, and the bus turned turtle. Section 81 of the Indian Penal Code provides an exception if he acts to avoid greater harm to others. The illustration to the Section deals with a similar situation and reads as under: A, the captain of a steam vessel, suddenly and without any fault or negligence on his part, finds himself in such a position that, before he can stop his vessel, he must inevitably run down a boat B, with twenty or thirty passengers on board, unless he changes the course of his vessel, and that, by changing his course, he must incur risk of running down a boat C with only two passengers on board, which he may possibly clear. Here, if A alters his course without any intention to run down the boat C, and in good faith for the purpose of avoiding the danger to the passengers in the boat B, he is not guilty of an offence, though he may run down the boat C by doing an act which he knew was likely to cause that effect, if it be found as a matter of fact that the danger which he intended to avoid was such as to excuse him in incurring the risk of running down the boat C. 27. It has been stated in the Indian Penal Code, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, 35th Edition, Lexis Nexis India, that the act done to avoid the evil consequences does not constitute an offence. It has been observed at page 141: An act which would otherwise be a crime may in some cases be excused if the person accused can show that it was done only in order to avoid consequences which could not otherwise be avoided, and which, if they had followed, would have inflicted upon him or upon others whom he was bound to protect inevitable and irreparable evil, that no more was done than was reasonably necessary for that purpose, and that the evil inflicted by it was not disproportionate to the evil avoided. As in self- defence so in the prevention of harm, the accused is faced with two choices, both resulting in some harm and of sheer necessity to avoid a greater harm, he has to commit an act which would otherwise be an offence. The test really is like this: there must be a situation in which the accused is confronted with a grave danger and he has no choice but to commit the lesser harm may be even to an innocent person, in order to avoid the greater harm. Here the choice is between the two evils, and the accused rightly chooses the lesser one. 28. Therefore, the accused cannot be held negligent because he has tried to avoid a collision with the van. 29. It was submitted that the witnesses deposed that the accused was driving the bus negligently, and these statements were ignored by the learned Appellate Court. This submission will not help the prosecution. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. 29. It was submitted that the witnesses deposed that the accused was driving the bus negligently, and these statements were ignored by the learned Appellate Court. This submission will not help the prosecution. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 30. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.” 31. Therefore, the statements of the witnesses that the driver was negligent by itself, without anything more, do not constitute legally admissible evidence upon which a reliance can be placed by the Court of law to base its judgment. 32. The evidence on record shows that the only negligence alleged against the accused was high speed, which is not sufficient, whereas the version of the accused that he took the bus towards the right side to avoid collision appears to be highly probable. Thus, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court while deciding the appeal against the acquittal. 33. No other point was urged. 34. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 35. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Courts below, is to be sent back forthwith.