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2025 DAILYLAW 3487 (HP)

State of Himachal Pradesh v. Parkash Chand

2025-09-19

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 28.07.2012 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirmour, District at Nahan (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the charges framed under Sections 325 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 325 of the IPC. It was asserted that informant Parminder Singh (PW-2) and his uncle Sarwan Kumar (PW-3) were going to their home on 22.08.2010 at about 9:30 p.m. They met Parkash Chand (accused) on the way. The informant and the accused had a dispute over the land. The accused gave beatings to the informant Parminder Singh (PW-2) and Sarwan Kumar (PW-3), who sustained injuries. The matter was reported to the police. An entry (Ext.PW8/A) in the daily diary was recorded in the Police Station. An application (Ext.PW-5/A) was filed for the medical examination of the injured. Dr. Pankaj Gaur (PW-7) conducted the medical examination of Parminder Singh (PW-2) and found that he had sustained multiple injuries. He advised an X-ray. A fracture of the mandible was detected after the X-ray. Hence, an MLC (Ext.PW7/A) was issued stating that the informant had sustained grievous injuries. Dr. Pankaj Gaur also examined Sarwan Kumar (PW-3) and found that he had sustained multiple injuries. No fracture was detected in the X-ray. The nature of the injury was simple, which could have been caused within 24 hours of the examination by a blunt weapon. He issued MLC (Ext.PW7/B). F.I.R. (Ex.PW-5/B) was registered in the Police Station. HC Gurdial Singh (PW-5) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared a site plan (Ex.PW-5/C). The accused produced as tick (Ext.P-1), which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW-1/A). The statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version. After completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 325 and 323 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version. After completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 325 and 323 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case. LHC Surender Pal (PW-1) is the witness to the recovery. Parmidner Singh (PW-2) and Sarwan Kumar (PW-3) are the victims. Ranjeet Singh (PW-4) is the eyewitness. HC Gurdial Singh (PW-5) conducted the investigation. Dr. D.D.Sharma (PW-6) examined the X-ray and issued the reports. Dr. Pankaj Gaur (PW-7) conducted the medical examination of the injured. HC Om Pal (PW-8) proved the entry in the daily diary. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.,denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that the informant had forcibly created a path over his land. He made a complaint to the Gram Panchayat. The informant stopped the work but filed a false case. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the incident had occurred during the night, and the identification of the accused was not established. Ranjeet Singh (PW-4) admitted in his cross-examination that the victims had consumed liquor on the date of the incident, and the possibility of their sustaining injuries by fall in the state of intoxication could not be ruled out. Ranjeet Singh (PW-4) was not an eyewitness as he was present in his home. There was no corroboration of the victims’ testimonies; therefore, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the commission of the charged offences. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the prosecution’s evidence. The testimonies of the victims were ignored for hypothetical reasons. The statements of the victims were corroborated by the statement of Ranjeet Singh (PW-4), an eyewitness. Learned Trial Court ignored his evidence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr. Sarvedaman Rathore, learned counsel, for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr. Learned Trial Court ignored his evidence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr. Sarvedaman Rathore, learned counsel, for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence. The victims categorically stated that the accused had given them beatings with a stick. Their testimonies were corroborated by the statement of Ranjeet Singh (PW-4), the recovery of the stick from the accused and the medical examination of the victims. Learned Trial Court wrongly acquitted the accused. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. Sarvedaman Rathore, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view of the matter and this Court should not interfere with it. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. The incident occurred on 22.08.2010 at about 9:30 p.m. and the entry (Ext.PW-8/A) was recorded on 23.08.2010 at 9:35. Thus, there was a delay in reporting the matter to the police. Copy of the F.I.R. shows that the place of the incident was at a distance of 10 KM from the Police Station. The victims have not given any explanation for the delay in reporting the matter to the police. 15. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and therefore, the Court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8." 16. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: - “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: - “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114 ; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1 ].” 17. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N., (2024) 2 SCC 176 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653, wherein it was observed at page 182: “14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version. 15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.” 17. Therefore, the prosecution’s evidence was to be seen with due care and caution because of the delay in reporting the matter to the police. 18. Ranjeet Singh (PW-4) stated in his cross- examination that he was at his home located at a distance of 200 meters from the place of the incident. The accused had not given any beatings to Parminder Singh (PW-1) and Sarwan Kumar (PW-3) in his presence. Parminder Singh (PW-1) and Sarwan Kumar (PW-3) had consumed liquor on the date of the incident. He also admitted that the accused had filed a complaint against the informant party regarding the forcible construction of a path through his land. 19. This witness was not declared hostile, which means that the prosecution accepted his testimony as correct. His cross-examination shows that he was not an eyewitness. He was present at his home located at a distance of 200 meters. Hence, his testimony in the examination-in-chief that he was going ahead of Parminder Singh (PW-2) and Sarwan Kumar (PW-3) cannot be accepted, and the learned Trial Court was justified in discarding his testimony. 20. Parmidner Singh (PW-2) admitted in his cross- examination that it was pitch dark at the place of the incident. This admission made the identification of the accused doubtful. Learned Trial Court rightly held that in the absence of any evidence as to how the victims could have identified the accused in the pitch darkness, the identification of the accused was not established. 21. Ranjeet Singh (PW-4) stated that Parminder Singh (PW-2) and Sarwan Kumar (PW-3) had consumed liquor on the date of the incident; however, Parminder Singh (PW-2) and Sarwan Kumar (PW-3) denied this fact in their cross- examination, which means that they were making incorrect statements before the Court. Dr. Pankaj Gaur (PW-7) stated, in his cross-examination, that the injuries noticed by him could be caused by a fall on a hard surface. Since the victims were intoxicated on the date of the incident, therefore, the possibility of their sustaining injuries from a fall could not be ruled out. 22. Parminder Singh (PW-2) admitted in his cross- examination that the accused had filed a complaint against him regarding the forcible construction on his land. Ranjeet Singh (PW-4) also admitted in his cross-examination that the accused had made a complaint to the Gram Panchayat against the victim. 22. Parminder Singh (PW-2) admitted in his cross- examination that the accused had filed a complaint against him regarding the forcible construction on his land. Ranjeet Singh (PW-4) also admitted in his cross-examination that the accused had made a complaint to the Gram Panchayat against the victim. This shows that the relationships are strained, and this will put the Court on guard regarding the false implication. 23. The prosecution did not examine any independent witness to the incident,and there was no corroboration of the testimonies of the victims from independent sources. 24. All these circumstances made the prosecution’s case suspect, and the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution’s case. This was a reasonable view which could have been taken based on the material on record, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 25. No other point was urged. 26. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and it is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 27. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in an event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 28. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.