JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. Heard 2. By way of this Revision Petition, filed under Section 25 (5) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (for short the Act), the petitioner/landlord has laid challenge to judgment dated 29.5.2023, passed by the learned Appellate Authority-II, Kangra at Dharmshala in Rent Appeal No.3-D/XIV/2023, whereby the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller-I, Kangra at Dharmshala in Rent Case No. 6 of 2013 dated 22.2.2023, has been set aside and reversed. 3. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the petition are that the petitioner herein is the landlord in respect of residential premises in MIG Plot No. 56, Housing Board Colony, Cheelgari at Dharmshala (for short the demised premises). The said premise is in occupation of respondents No. 1 and 2 herein. 4. It is the case of the parties that respondents No. 1 and 2 herein are the wife and daughter of respondent No.3 respectively. Respondents No.1 and 3 had strained matrimonial relation. Respondent No.3 has taken the demised premises on rent for accommodating respondents No. 1 and 2. 5. The landlord filed the petition for eviction of respondents on the ground that the demised premises was bonafide required by him for his personal use. The petition was filed on 6.8.2013 with the averments that the landlord was going to retire from the office of Printing and Stationary Department, H.P. Shimla, as a Mono Operator on 31.1.2014 and since, he was not having any other accommodation  at  Dharmshala  for  his  residence,  the demised premises was bonafide required by him for his own residence. 6. The petition was amended in the year 2019 and the factum of retirement of the petitioner having taken place on 31.1.2014 was incorporated. 7. The prayer of the landlord was contested by respondents No. 1 and 2 herein by filing reply. Objections were raised as to the maintainability of the petition. It was stated that the landlord had no cause of action. The landlord was also accused of not having approached the Court with clean hands. A narration was made that MIG Plot No. 56 was consisting of six residential sets of three bed rooms each. One of these sets was rented to the respondents and another set was stated to have been rented out to one Amrish Sharma before filing of the petition. A narration was made that MIG Plot No. 56 was consisting of six residential sets of three bed rooms each. One of these sets was rented to the respondents and another set was stated to have been rented out to one Amrish Sharma before filing of the petition. Remaining four sets were alleged to have remained vacant till last about six months prior to filing of reply. The bonafide of the landlord in filing the petition were also challenged. It was contended that the landlord had sufficient residential accommodation at Kangra and was comfortably residing there after the retirement. 8. Learned Rent Controller framed the following issues: - i) Whether the premises in dispute are bonafide required by the petitioner for his personal use and occupation, as prayed? OPP ii) Whether the present petition is not maintainable, as alleged? OPR. iii) Whether the applicant has no cause of action and locus standi to file the present petition, as alleged? OPR iv) Whether the petitioner has suppressed material facts and has not approached this forum with clean hands, as alleged? OPR v). Whether the petition is barred by his act, conduct and acquiescence of petitioner? OPR. vi) Whether the petition has not been properly valued for the purposes of Court fee & jurisdiction? OPR. vii) Relief. 9. By answering issue No.1 in affirmative, the learned Rent Controller ordered the eviction of the respondents on the ground that the demised premises were bonafide required by the landlord for his own use. 10. Respondents No. 1 and 2 herein assailed the order passed by the learned Rent Controller by filing appeal under Section 24 (1) of the Act, which came to be decided by the learned Appellate Authority-II, Kangra vide impugned judgment. The learned Appellate Authority did not find the bonafide of landlord established and thus allowed the appeal by setting aside the eviction order. 11. It has been established on record that the structure raised by the landlord on plot No.56 MIG Housing Board Colony, Cheelgari at Dharmshala has six residential sets in totality. 12. The stand taken by respondents No. 1 and 2 in their reply was that four residential sets were lying vacant but had been let out by the landlord to the students about six months prior to filing of the reply. The reply by respondents 1 and 2 had been filed in September, 2019. 13. 12. The stand taken by respondents No. 1 and 2 in their reply was that four residential sets were lying vacant but had been let out by the landlord to the students about six months prior to filing of the reply. The reply by respondents 1 and 2 had been filed in September, 2019. 13. The landlord while appearing as his own witness (PW-3) had also made a categoric admission that four of the residential sets in his building were lying vacant since considerable time. He, however, had clarified that the residential sets had been vacated by the tenants after the filing of the petition. The statement of landlord was recorded before the learned Rent Controller on 15.10.2022. 14. Thus, inference that can be drawn is that other residential sets in the building of the landlord had been vacated and let out of and on. Noticeably, when respondents No. 1 and 2 had filed their reply in September, 2019, the vacant sets, as alleged in the reply, had already been let out and later when the deposition of the landlord came to be recorded in October, 2022, again four sets were admitted by him to be lying vacant. 15. At this juncture it will be relevant to reproduce the relevant extract of Section 14 of the Act which reads as under: - “14. Eviction of tenants. - “(3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession: (a) in the case of a residential or non-residential building, if- (i) he requires it for his own occupation: Provided that he is not occupying another residential or non-residential building owned by him in the urban area concerned: Provided further that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause within five years of the filing of the application, in the said urban area.” 16. As per requirement of Act, the landlord should not have any other residential accommodation occupied by him in the same urban area at the time of filing of the petition for eviction and further he should not have vacated such an accommodation within five years prior to filing of the petition. If the landlord is found wanting in any of aforesaid conditions, his plea for eviction on the ground of bonafide personal requirement cannot be entertained. If the landlord is found wanting in any of aforesaid conditions, his plea for eviction on the ground of bonafide personal requirement cannot be entertained. However, in the facts of the case at hand, it has not been established that the landlord at the time of filing of petition in August, 2013, was in occupation of any other residential premises in the urban area of Dharmshala or had vacated such premises within five years before filing of the petition. 17. Nonetheless, the landlord has been found to have been put in vacant possession of other residential sets in the same building during the pendency of the proceedings. On the strength of this fact, learned Appellate Authority has found lack of bonafide in the case of the landlord. It has been held that since the landlord had got vacant possession of other residential sets in the same building, he was disentitled from claiming eviction of the respondents. 18. It cannot be ignored that the eviction petition was filed by the landlord in the month of August, 2013. Even after lapse of twelve years, the proceedings have not finally culminated and after crossing different hierarchical stages have come up for final adjudication before this Court. In the meanwhile, lot of facts have undergone change. The things cannot be expected to remain stand- still. The course of change does not freeze and keeps treading its own path. Keeping this in view, a three Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hasmat Rai &another vs. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711 has laid down a principle that the landlord is not only required to prove his bonafide requirement for personal use at the time of filing of the petition for eviction but it should be established to exist even at the final culmination of the litigation. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment reads as under: - “14. ……. If a landlord bona fide requires possession of a premises let for residential purpose for his own use, he can sue and obtain possession. He is equally entitled to obtain possession of the premises let for non-residential purposes if he wants to continue or start his business. The relevant extract of the aforesaid judgment reads as under: - “14. ……. If a landlord bona fide requires possession of a premises let for residential purpose for his own use, he can sue and obtain possession. He is equally entitled to obtain possession of the premises let for non-residential purposes if he wants to continue or start his business. If he commences the proceedings for eviction on the ground of personal requirement he must be able to allege and show the requirement on the date of initiation of action in the Court which would be his cause of action. But that is not sufficient. This requirement must continue throughout the progress of the litigation and must exist on the date of the decree and when we say decree we mean the decree of the final court. Any other view would defeat the beneficial provisions of a welfare legislation like the Rent Registration Act. If the landlord is able to show his requirement when the action is commenced and the requirement continued till the date of the decree of the Trial Court and thereafter during the pendency of the appeal by the tenant if the landlord comes in possession of the premises sufficient to satisfy his requirement, on the view taken by the High Court, the tenant should be able to show that the subsequent events disentitled the plaintiff, on the only ground that here is tenant against whom a decree or order for eviction has been passed and no additional evidence was admissible to take note of subsequent events. When a statutory right of appeal is conferred against the decree or the order and once in exercise of the right an appeal is preferred the decree or order ceases to be final. What the definition of 'tenant' excludes from its operation is the person against whom the decree or order for eviction is made and the decree or order has become final in the sense that it is not open to further adjudication by a court or hierarchy of courts. An appeal is a continuation of suit. Therefore, a tenant against whom a decree for eviction is passed by Trial Court does not lose protection if he files the appeal because if appeal is allowed the umbrella of statutory protection shields him. An appeal is a continuation of suit. Therefore, a tenant against whom a decree for eviction is passed by Trial Court does not lose protection if he files the appeal because if appeal is allowed the umbrella of statutory protection shields him. Therefore, it is indisputable that the decree or order for eviction referred to in the definition of tenant must mean final decree or final order of eviction. Once an appeal against decree or order of eviction is preferred the appeal being a continuation of suit, landlord's need must be shown to continue to exist at appellate stage. If the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the Court including the appellate court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same. Otherwise, the landlord would derive an unfair advantage. An illustration would clarify what we want to convey. A landlord was in a position to show he needed possession of demised premises on the date of the suit as well as on the date of the decree of the trial court. When the matter was pending in appeal at the instance of the tenant, the landlord built a house or bungalow which would fully satisfy his requirement. If this subsequent event is taken into consideration, the landlord would have to be non-suited. Can the court shut its eyes and evict the tenant? Such is neither the spirit nor intendment of Rent Restriction Act which was enacted to fetter the unfettered right of re- entry. Therefore, when an action is brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the ground of personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of the appellate decree, or the date when a higher court deals with the matter. During the progress and passage of proceeding from court to court if subsequent events occur which if noticed would non-suit the plaintiff, the court has to examine and evaluate the same and mould the decree accordingly. During the progress and passage of proceeding from court to court if subsequent events occur which if noticed would non-suit the plaintiff, the court has to examine and evaluate the same and mould the decree accordingly. This position is no more in controversy in view of a decision of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu (supra) where Justice Krishna Iyer speaking for the Court observed as under: - "We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningfully as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautions cognisance of events and development subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously observed…." 19. The analogy of aforesaid exposition cannot be denied to the landlord. Not only that changed circumstances benefitting the tenant can be taken into consideration, the same principle can also be applied to the landlord. 20. Learned counsel for the landlord made a submission that the landlord required the demised premises as it was the only premises suited to his condition. The landlord had submitted his examination-in- chief before the learned Rent Controller by way of affidavit, which inter-alia contained a statement that the demised premises were required by the landlord for personal use and occupation as the said premises was along the roadside and it was convenient for the landlord in his old age as also for his family members. No cross-examination has been conducted on this aspect. 21. It is not in dispute that the entire building in MIG Plot No.56 at Cheelgari at Dharmshala is multi storied with two residential sets on ground floor and all other sets on upper floors. It is in this contest that the landlord appears to have shown his inclination to occupy the demised premises only. No doubt, another residential premises exists on the same floor in which the demised premises is, but it has not been established that the said premises also was one of those premises which were vacated by the tenants during the proceedings. 22. Respondent No.1 in her cross-examination had admitted that the demised premises were on the road side and at the level of the road. She had further admitted that the landlord required the demised premises for himself in old age. 23. 22. Respondent No.1 in her cross-examination had admitted that the demised premises were on the road side and at the level of the road. She had further admitted that the landlord required the demised premises for himself in old age. 23. The  landlord  has  retired  in  January,  2014. More than eleven years have elapsed thereafter and he has also advanced in age. The bonafide requirement of landlord cannot be assessed solely on the averments as asserted in the petition. The subsequent events also have to be taken into consideration. In the circumstances where the landlord has gained in age, his specific requirement for demised premises cannot be said to be adversative to the requirements laid down in the Act. 24. It is more than settled that the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant as to choice of the premises. The said view has once again been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(C) No. 21965 of 2022, titled as Kanhaiya Lal Arya vs. MD Ehshan & others, decided on 25.2.2025, in which it has been observed as under:- “10. The law with regard to eviction of a tenant from the suit premises on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord is well settled. The need has to be a real one rather than a mere desire to get the premises vacated. The landlord is the best judge to decide which of his property should be vacated for satisfying his particular need. The tenant has no role in dictating as to which premises the landlord should get vacated for his need alleged in the suit for eviction.” 25. The learned Appellate Authority has omitted to take into consideration aforesaid facts and hence the impugned judgment passed requires interference. 26. In result, the petition is allowed. Judgment dated 29.5.2023, passed by the learned Appellate Authority-II, Kangra at Dharmshala in Rent Appeal No.3- D/XIV/2023 is set aside and the order passed by the learned Rent Controller-I, Kangra at Dharmshala in Rent Case No. 6 of 2013 dated 22.2.2023, is affirmed. 27. No order as to costs. 28. The petition is disposed of, so also the pending application(s), if any. 29. Record be sent back forthwith.