APHC010541632022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] MONDAY, THE EIGHTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 926/2022 Between: THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH STATION HOUSE OFFICER, VEMPALLI PS, KADAPA DISTRICT, REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P., AT AMARAVATI. ...PETITIONER AND 1.THALLAPALLI MAHESWARA REDDY, S/O RAMA CHANDRA REDDY, AGED 44 YEARS, R/O NAGULAGUTTAPALLI VILLAGE, CHAKRAYAPET MANDAL, YSR KADAPA DISTRICT. 2.PUTHA YELLA REDDY, S/O LOKESWAR REDDY, AGED 32 YEARS, R/O SAMBATUR VILLAGE, R/O SAMBATUR VILLAGE, KAMALAPURAM MANDAL, YSR KADAPA DISTRICT 3.KOMMERA HARIHARANATH, S/O RAM PRASAD, AGED 30 YEARS, R/O KOMMADDI VILLAGE, V.N.PALLI MANDAL, YSR KADAPA DISTRICT. 4.PAYYALA PAVAN KUMAR CHINNA, S/O MANOHAR, AGED 27 YEARS, R/O RAMACHANDRAPURAM VILLAGE, KAMALAPURAM MANDAL, YSR KADAPA DISTRICT. 5.PUTHA PAVAN KUMAR REDDY, S/O SIVA REDDY, AGED 25 YEARS, R/O SAMBATUR VILLAGE, KAMALAPURAM MANDAL, YSR KADAPA DISTRICT. 6.NAGELLA ANJANEYULU REDDY, S/O BAYAPU REDDY, AGED 42 YEARS, R/O KOMMADDI VILLAGE, V.N.PALLI MANDAL, YSR 2 KADAPA DISTRICT. 7.POLICHERLA VENKATA SUBBA REDDY, S/O PEDDA VENKATA SUBBA REDDY, AGED 71 YEARS, R/O D.NO. 37/1052-2, NEHRU NAGAR, KADAPA TOWN, YSR KADAPA DISTRICT. 8.SABHAVATH SAILAJA, W/O SANKAR NAIK, AGED 31 YEARS, R/O KALLURUPALLI THANDA, CHAKRAYAPET MANDAL, YSR KADAPA DISTRICT, PRESENTLY AT HOUSING BOARD COLONY, KADAPA TOWN, YSR KADAPA DISTRICT. ...RESPONDENT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner: 1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1.SHAIK MOHAMMED ISMAIL The Court made the following: ORDER: Criminal Revision Case has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) feeling aggrieved by the order of discharging the Respondents/Accused Nos.1 to 8, vide order dated 20.03.2020 in Crl.M.P.No.612 of 2019 in Spl.S.C.No.74 of 2018 on the file of the learned IV Additional District & sessions Judge, Kadapa (for short the Trial Judge) for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(vi) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for brevity ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’). 2. Ms. P.Akhila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor while reiterating the grounds of the Revision, argued that the impugned order dated 20.03.2020 passed by the learned IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kadapa in 3 Crl.M.P.No.612/2019 is liable to be set aside as being legally unsustainable, factually erroneous, and procedurally improper. The discharge of the accused persons therein was affected without due appreciation of the material facts and without a proper application of judicial mind to the contents of the charge sheet and the consequent circumstances of the case. 2.1. The learned Trial Judge failed to consider that the charge sheet was filed by the Assistant Superintendent of Police, a competent authority, after due investigation and application of mind. The said charge sheet contains prima facie material implicating the accused persons, which ought to have been evaluated in its entirety before arriving at any conclusion regarding discharge. Further, the learned Trial Judge erred in disregarding the legal position that, for the invocation of Section 3(2)(v) of ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’, it is sufficient that the accused had knowledge of the caste of the victim. The requirement of specific intent or motive is not a precondition for the applicability of the said provision, and the facts on record clearly indicate that such knowledge was present. 2.2. Moreover, the learned Trial Judge failed to appreciate the gravity of the allegations against Accused No.8, who is the wife of the deceased and is alleged to have conspired with Accused Nos.1 to 7 in committing a premeditated and cold-blooded murder. The act was purportedly camouflaged as an accidental death to mislead the investigating agency and conceal her illicit relationship with Accused No.1. Such allegations, supported by circumstantial evidence, warranted a full-fledged trial rather than a premature 4 discharge. The discharge order suffers from non-application of mind and a lack of judicial scrutiny. The learned Judge did not engage with the factual matrix or the legal implications arising therefrom, and the reasons assigned in support of the discharge are vague, obligatory, and devoid of legal substance. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be interfered with and set aside. 3. Sri P.Adinarayana Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Shaik Mohammed Ismail, learned Counsel for the Respondents would argue that the learned Trial Court had rightly appreciated the material available on record. There was no flagrant miscarriage of justice. There were no perverse findings. There was no irregularity let alone material irregularity. The order impugned is not vitiated by manifest error of law or procedure which had resulted in miscarriage of justice. The impugned order doesn’t suffer from any illegality or infirmity. 3.1. Sri P.Adinarayana Rao, the learned Senior Counsel further argued that there was no material to establish that the alleged offence was taken place against the deceased just on the sole ground that deceased belonged to a Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, the learned Trial Judge has rightly appreciated the discharge petition on correct perspective and allowed it. It is also further submitted that the investigation was not conducted by specified rank officer as per Section 7 of the SC/ST (POA) Rules, 1995 (for brevity ‘the Rules’). It was initially conducted by an officer in the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police and later by the Inspector of Police. Only one witness was examined by the specified rank officer. There was neither re-recording of the statements of the witnesses 5 by the Assistant Superintendent of Police nor conducting a fresh investigation by the Assistant Superintendent of Police as mandated under Rule 7 of ‘the Rules’. Hence, it is urged to dismiss the Criminal Revision Case. 4. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 5. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the order in Crl.M.P.No.612 of 2019 in Spl.S.C.No.74 of 2018 dated 20.03.2020, passed by the learned IV Additional District & Sessions Judge, Kadapa, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 6. In this regard, it is apposite to refer some of the important decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court about interpretation of Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ in discharge of an accused. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal1, wherein at para Nos.7 to 10 it is held as under: “7.Section 227 of the Code runs thus:-"If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing." The words 'not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused' clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post-office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. 1 AIR 1979 SC 366 6 8.The scope of Section 227 of the Code was considered by a recent decision of this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1978) 1 SCR 257 : (AIR 1977 SC 2018) where Untwalia J. speaking for the Court observed as follows (at p. 2019):-"Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stages is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial."This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge in order to frame a charge against the accused. Even under the Code of 1898 this Court has held that a committing Magistrate had ample powers to weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a case of commitment to the Sessions Judge has been made out. 9.In the case of K. P. Raghavan v. M. H. Abbas, AIR 1967 SC 740 this Court observed as follows (at p. 742):-"No doubt a Magistrate enquiring into a case under S. 209, Cr. P. C. is not to act as a mere Post Office, and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session".To the same effect is the later decision of this Court in the case of Alamohan Das v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 520 : (AIR SC 863) where Shah, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows (at p. 866) :-"A Magistrate holding an enquiry is not intended to act merely as a recording machine. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is his duty to discharge the accused : if there is some evidence on which a conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case."In the aforesaid case this Court was considering the scope and ambit of Section 209 of the Code of 1898. 10.Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge:(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out;(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.(3) The test of determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two 7 views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Court cannot act merely as a Post-Office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.” 7. While interpreting Section 227 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ the Hon’ble Apex Court in P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala2, at para No.11 held as under: “11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.” 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao3, at para Nos.7 & 10 it is held as under: “7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial Judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on basis of charge-sheet material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that the accused has committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed. 10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that 2 (2010) 2 SCC 398 3 (2023) 17 SCC 688 8 the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged.” 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap4, at para No.11.1 it is held as under: “11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] , this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.” 10. Keeping in view of the above ratio laid down in the above judgments, this Revision Case has to be appreciated and decided. Coming to the facts of the instant case, as per the version of the prosecution, Sabhavath Shankar Naik (the deceased) and Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 were married about 11 years prior to the alleged incident and had two children. Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 was employed as an Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM). In 2009, during an election campaign, Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 developed acquaintance with Respondent No.1/Accused No.1, who subsequently extended assistance for the medical treatment of her son 4 (2021) 11 SCC 191 9 Jaswanth Naik, including arranging a surgery at no cost. Thereafter, Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 and Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 developed illicit intimacy. 11. Since the deceased was often away on work until 2015, Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 also became acquainted with deceased. During this period, the deceased and Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 entrusted an amount of Rs.6,50,000/- with Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 for purchase of a house site. Subsequently, when the deceased came to know of the illicit relationship and questioned Respondent No.8/Accused No.8, she lodged a criminal case against him and his family in Cr.No.184/2015 under Section 498-A of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, at Vempalli Police Station. Conversely, on the complaint of deceased, Cr.No.185/2015 under Sections 452, 324 read with 34 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ was also registered against Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 and her family members. Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 extended support to Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 in her case. 12. Thereafter, the deceased demanded for return of Rs.6,50,000/-. Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 claimed part of the money as her own from her salary savings. In a village panchayat, it was resolved that Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 should pay Rs.2,00,000/- to Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 and Rs.4,50,000/- to the deceased and his children, and accordingly cheques were issued. Subsequently, Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 lived separately with her mother for about eight months while the deceased shifted 10 to Nandalur along with the children. During this separation, Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 and Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 continued their closeness. Eventually, on elders’ intervention, Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 and the deceased reunited at Kadapa. As Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 delayed repayment of the balance, in February 2016 the deceased approached the Superintendent of Police, Kadapa. The matter was referred to DSP, SC/ST Cell and was settled outside, wherein Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 agreed to pay Rs.50,000/- in cash and Rs.1,50,000/- by cheque. Though settlement was reached, Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 allegedly felt insulted and subjected to mental distress because of the deceased. 13. During this period, Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 came into contact with Respondent No.2/Accused No.2 through Respondent No.7/Accused No.7. Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 confided to Respondent No.2/Accused No.2 regarding his illicit intimacy with Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 and about the deceased’s harassment. As the deceased became an obstacle to their relationship, Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 expressed his intention to eliminate him by vehicular assault. With this objective, Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 purchased a Tata Spacio vehicle (No. AP02-U-6614) for Rs.1,15,000/- and got it registered in the name of A. Siva Dhanunjaya Reddy. He entrusted the murder plan to Respondent No.2/Accused No.2, showing him the deceased’s photograph on WhatsApp and providing details. Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 also financed Respondent No.2/Accused 11 No.2 through Respondent No.7/Accused No.7 with Rs.1,00,000/- and directed him to develop acquaintance with the deceased. 14. Meanwhile, Respondent No.8/Accused No.8, who travelled regularly for duty, shared with Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 her inability to bear the deceased’s harassment. She expressed apprehension about her children, to which Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 assured lifelong responsibility for her and the children. Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 cautioned Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 to execute the plan discreetly. Accordingly, Respondent No.1/Accused No.1, Respondent No.2/Accused No.2, and Respondent No.7/Accused No.7 conspired. Respondent No.2/Accused No.2 sought assistance of Respondent No.6/Accused No.6, who introduced Respondent No.3/Accused No.3 as willing to act for consideration. Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 paid amounts through Respondent No.2/Accused No.2 to Respondent No.3/Accused No.3 and also arranged further sums via Respondent No.7/Accused No.7. Respondent No.2/Accused No.2 additionally induced Respondent No.4/Accused No.4 with money and a bike promise. Respondent No.5/Accused No.5 was also roped in. 15. The conspirators attempted on several occasions to execute the plan by intoxicating the deceased with liquor and thereafter making it appear as an accident but failed when the deceased arrived with friends. Finally, on 24.01.2018, events unfolded. On that day, Respondent No.2/Accused No.2 and Respondent No.4/Accused No.4 met the deceased at Kadapa, consumed liquor, and later proceeded in the deceased’s Scorpio vehicle, with 12 Respondent No.4/Accused No.4 driving, the deceased sitting in the middle seat, and Respondent No.2/Accused No.2 accompanying. Respondent No.2/Accused No.2 contacted Respondent No.3/Accused No.3 and Respondent No.5/Accused No.5, who were waiting with the Tata Spacio and a motorcycle. They proceeded towards Kommadi fields where the deceased was made to consume liquor until he became heavily intoxicated. Around 10.15 PM near Ramireddypalli–Muthukur road, Respondent No.3/Accused No.3, driving the Tata Spacio, deliberately dashed the deceased, who had been made to sit on the roadside. Respondent No.3/Accused No.3 reversed the vehicle and struck him again, ensuring death. Thereafter, Respondent No.2/Accused No.2 to Respondent No.5/Accused No.5 concealed the vehicle. 16. At midnight, police informed Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 about the deceased’s death in a supposed accident. Although aware of the conspiracy, she feigned ignorance and lodged a complaint the next day, 25.01.2018, alleging hit-and-run, leading to registration of Cr.No.23/2018 under Section 304-A of ‘the I.P.C.,’ at Vempalli Police Station. Investigation commenced with seizure of the deceased’s Scorpio, collection of evidence, and witness statements. On 03.02.2018, police received information of extra-judicial confessions by Respondent No.2/Accused No.2 to Respondent No.4/Accused No.4 before the Tahsildar. Accordingly, the section of law was altered from Section 304-A of ‘the I.P.C.,’ to Section 302 read with 34 of ‘the I.P.C.’ On interrogation, Respondent No.2/Accused No.2 to Respondent No.4/Accused 13 No.4 made voluntary confessions, their statements were recorded, and their mobile phones were seized under panchanama. 17. Pursuant to the confessional statements of the accused, the Sub- Inspector of Police, Vempalli Police Station, accompanied by mediators and the arrested individuals, proceeded to the dumping yard at Pandillapalli Village, Kamalapuram Mandal, whereat they seized a Tata Spacio vehicle bearing mismatched registration plates AP21-BM-8467 on the front and APOZ-U-6614 on the rear, along with a Yamaha Fazer motorcycle. Both vehicles were documented under a Panchanama and rough sketch prepared between 4:30 PM and 5:15 PM. Further investigation led the police team to the barren lands of Ramireddy Anjaneya Reddy, where they recovered liquor bottles, cardboard boxes, and used water packets. These items were seized under a Panchanama drafted between 6:15 PM and 7:15 PM, with a corresponding sketch. 18. On 04.02.2018, the Circle Inspector arrested accused Respondent No.1/Accused No.1, Respondent No.5/Accused No.5, and Respondent No.6/Accused No.6 near Gandi Temple, Chakrayapet, recorded their confessions, and seized two mobile phones. Later that morning, a tractor bearing registration number AP27-AB-4955 was seized based on further confession. Around noon, accused Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 was apprehended in front of her residence at Kallurupalli Thanda and, along with Respondent Nos.1/Accused Nos.1 to Respondent Nos.6/Accused Nos.6, was remanded to judicial custody. 14 19. On 06.02.2018, Respondent No.7/Accused No.7 was arrested and his confession recorded. A Xiaomi Redmi Note 4 mobile phone with two SIM cards was seized from his possession. He was also remanded. On 10.02.2018, the Sub-Inspector received the post-mortem certificate of the deceased, which indicated death due to multiple injuries. The Circle Inspector forwarded all seized materials to the RFSL, Kurnool, through the Judicial Magistrate for forensic examination. Receipt books related to fuel and battery purchases for the Sumo vehicle were also seized. An identification parade was conducted on 24.02.2018 regarding the deceased’s belongings, and the registration certificate of the Tata Spacio vehicle was seized to complete the evidentiary chain. 20. A motor vehicle inspection report dated 03.04.2018 noted mechanical issues with the crime vehicle but concluded that the accident was not due to any mechanical defect. The Circle Inspector also collected and analyzed call detail records of all accused and the deceased. Caste certificates obtained from respective Tahsildars confirmed that the deceased and Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 belonged to the Sugali (Scheduled Tribe) community, while the remaining accused belonged to various castes including Kapu (Forward), Vadde (Backward), and Mala (Scheduled Caste). Based on this, a memo was filed before the Judicial Magistrate to invoke Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’. 21. As the deceased was a Scheduled Tribe member, the investigation was transferred to the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Pulivendula, following 15 approval from the Superintendent of Police, Kadapa. A memo was filed to invoke Section 3(2)(vi) of ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’. The RFSL report was received on 27.04.2018, and cognizance was taken under Sections 302, 201, 120-B read with 109 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and Section 3(2)(vi) of ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act.’ The charge sheet reveals that accused Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 to Respondent No.8/Accused No.8 conspired to murder Shankar Naik, who had become an obstacle to the illicit relationship between Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 and Respondent No.8/Accused No.8. In execution of the conspiracy, Respondent No.3/Accused No.3 intentionally struck the deceased with a vehicle to simulate a road accident. Upon confirmation of the deceased’s tribal status, the relevant provisions of ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’ were invoked. 22. The learned Trial Judge, upon careful scrutiny of the record and submissions by both sides, observed that the investigation in respect of the offences under ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’, was not conducted in accordance with Rule 7 of ‘the Rules’. It noted that all material witnesses were examined by the Sub-Inspector and the Circle Inspector of Police. Though one witness was stated to have been examined by the Assistant Superintendent of Police, that witness was not produced before the Court, and there was no documentary evidence to establish that further investigation was undertaken by an officer of the requisite rank. The learned Trial Judge further held that the appointment of the Assistant Superintendent of Police as Investigating Officer was made only at the final stage of investigation, after the caste certificate of the deceased 16 was obtained. The charge sheet revealed that the said officer did not examine any witnesses and merely verified the investigation already conducted by the Circle Inspector. The learned Trial Court found such verification to be mechanical and insufficient to satisfy the statutory mandate under Rule 7 of ‘the Rules’. 23. It was also observed that the prosecution failed to establish the essential ingredients required to attract the provisions of Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(vi) of ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’. The learned Trial Judge held that the mere fact that the deceased belonged to a Scheduled Tribe was not sufficient to invoke the provisions of ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’. The prosecution was required to demonstrate that the offence was committed on account of the victim’s caste. In the present case, the motive attributed to the accused was that the deceased had become an impediment to the illicit relationship between Respondent No.1/Accused No.1 and Respondent No.8/Accused No.8, and not that the offence was committed due to his tribal status. 24. In view of the above findings, the learned Trial Court concluded that the investigation under ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’ was vitiated and the invocation of Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(vi) was legally unsustainable. Accordingly, the petition filed by the accused/Respondents for discharge was allowed, and they were discharged from the offences under the provisions of ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’, as added pursuant to the memo dated 24.11.2020. 25. Sri P.Adinarayana Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri Shaik Mohammed Ismail, learned Counsel for Respondents relied on the 17 decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra5, wherein at paragraph No.9 it is held as under: “9. Section 3(2)(v) of the Act provides that whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, commits any offence under the Penal Code, 1860 punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine. In the present case, there is no evidence at all to the effect that the appellant committed the offence alleged against him on the ground that the deceased is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. To attract the provisions of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the sine qua non is that the victim should be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and that the offence under the Penal Code, 1860 is committed against him on the basis that such a person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In the absence of such ingredients, no offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act arises. In that view of the matter, we think, both the trial court and the High Court missed the essence of this aspect. In these circumstances, the conviction under the aforesaid provision by the trial court as well as by the High Court ought to be set aside.” 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Dashrath Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh6, another decision relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents, at paragraph Nos.8 to 10 it is held as under: “8. A plain reading of the section makes it clear that the offence of outraging the modesty should be committed with the intention that the victim belonged to the Scheduled Caste category. 9. We have gone through the FIR and the sworn testimony of the prosecutrix/complainant as extracted in the judgments of the High Court as well as that of the trial Court. The case as projected in the FIR and the sworn testimony of the prosecutrix would reveal that the prosecutrix/complainant was engaged for doing household jobs in the house of the accused appellant who tried to outrage her modesty while the prosecutrix/complainant was doing the household chores. Apparently thus, even from the highest allegations of the prosecutrix, the offending act was not committed by the accused with the intention that he was doing so upon a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. This issue was dealt with by this Court in the case of Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra1 wherein it was held as below:— “9. Section 3(2)(v.) of the Act provides that whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, commits any offence under the Penal Code, 1860 punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the 5 (2000) 3 SCC 557 6 2024 SCC OnLine SC 72 18 ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine. In the present case, there is no evidence at all to the effect that the appellant committed the offence alleged against him on the ground that the deceased is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. To attract the provisions of Section 3(2)(v.) of the Act, the sine qua non is that the victim should be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and that the offence under the Penal Code, 1860 is committed against him on the basis that such a person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In the absence of such ingredients, no offence under Section 3(2)(v.) of the Act arises. In that view of the matter, we think, both the trial court and the High Court missed the essence of this aspect. In these circumstances, the conviction under the aforesaid provision by the trial court as well as by the High Court ought to be set aside.” 10. In the said judgment, this Court dealt with a case involving offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. The language of Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC/ST Act is pari materia as the same also provides that the offence must be committed upon a person belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes with the intention that it was being done on the ground of caste.” 27. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of M.P. v. Babbu Rathore7, at paragraph Nos.4, 5, 9 & 10 it is held as under: “4. During the proceedings in Special Case No. 37/11, statement of the material witnesses PW 2 Narsu, PW 4 Kamla Prajapati and PW 5 Uparia Bai, wife of the deceased Baisakhu were recorded. It appears from the record that at the advanced stage of the trial, a grievance was raised by the respondents that they had been charged under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act and since the investigation has been conducted by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, which is the mandate of law as provided under Section 9 of the 1989 Act read with Rule 7 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter being referred to as “the 1995 Rules”), the very investigation is faulty and illegal and that deserves to be quashed and set aside and in consequence thereof, further proceedings in trial does not hold good and the respondents deserve to be discharged. 5. The learned trial court, while taking note of Section 9 of the 1989 Act and Rule 7 of the 1995 Rules held that the investigation has been conducted by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and is without authority and illegal and in consequence thereof, discharged the respondents not from the charges levelled against them under the provisions of the 1989 Act, but also from the provisions of IPC for which there was no requirement of the investigation to be conducted by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police under judgment dated 24-7-2015, which came to be challenged before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and dismissed by a cryptic order dated 9-5-2019 [State of M.P. v. Babbu Rathore, 2019 SCC OnLine MP 4457] . 7 (2020) 2 SCC 577 19 9. By virtue of its enabling power, it is the duty and the responsibility of the State Government to issue notification conferring power of investigation of cases by notified police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Rule 7 of the 1995 Rules provides rank of investigation officer to be not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. An officer below that rank cannot act as investigating officer in holding investigation in reference to the offences committed under any provisions of the 1989 Act but the question arose for consideration is that apart from the offences committed under the 1989 Act, if the offence complained are both under IPC and the offence enumerated in Section 3 of the 1989 Act and the investigation being made by a competent police officer in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter being referred to as “the Code”), the offences under IPC can be quashed and set aside for non- investigation of the offence under Section 3 of the 1989 Act by a competent police officer. This question has been examined by a two- Judge Bench of this Court in State of M.P. v. Chunnilal [State of M.P. v. Chunnilal, (2009) 12 SCC 649 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 683] . Relevant para is as under: (SCC pp. 651-52, paras 7-8) “7. … By virtue of its enabling power it is the duty and responsibility of the State Government to issue a notification conferring power of investigation of cases by notified police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police for different areas in the police districts. Rule 7 of the Rules provided rank of investigating officer to be not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. An officer below that rank cannot act as investigating officer. 8. The provisions in Section 9 of the Act, Rule 7 of the Rules and Section 4 of the Code when jointly read lead to an irresistible conclusion that the investigation of an offence under Section 3 of the Act by an officer not appointed in terms of Rule 7 is illegal and invalid. But when the offence complained are both under IPC and any of the offence enumerated in Section 3 of the Act the investigation which is being made by a competent police officer in accordance with the provisions of the Code cannot be quashed for non-investigation of the offence under Section 3 of the Act by a competent police officer. In such a situation the proceedings shall proceed in an appropriate court for the offences punishable under IPC notwithstanding investigation and the charge-sheet being not liable to be accepted only in respect of offence under Section 3 of the Act for taking cognizance of that offence.” 10. Undisputedly, in the instant case, the respondents were charged under Sections 302/34, 404/34 IPC apart from Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act and the charges under IPC have been framed after the investigation by a competent police officer under the Code, in such a situation, in our view, the High Court has committed an apparent error in quashing the proceedings and discharging the respondents from the offences committed under the provisions of IPC, where the investigation has been made by a competent police officer under the provisions of the Code. In such a situation, the charge-sheet deserves to proceed in an appropriate competent court of jurisdiction for the offence punishable under IPC, notwithstanding the fact that the charge-sheet could not have proceeded confined to the offence under Section 3 of the 1989 Act.” 20 28. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Kalasika Prashanta Kumar v. State of A.P8 held at para No.7 thus: “It is not enough that an offence is committed against a member of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. Bare perusal of this provision shows that the offence should be committed against the person belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the ground that such a person was a member of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe.” 29. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Katkam Raajanna v. State of A.P.,9 at para No.7 it is held that "face that victim belongs to schedule caste / schedule tribe ipso facto cannot attract Sec.3(2) (V) of Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989". 30. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ambati Vykunta Rao v. State of A.P.,10 held that though the charge sheet was filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, he did not take up the investigation and recorded the statements of the witnesses. It is his evidence that he verified the investigation done by P.W.6. In view of the fact that the Deputy Superintendent of Police did not investigate the case, the trial was vitiated and therefore it was held that the additional district and sessions judge committed error in convicting the accused for the offence under Section 3(1)(v) of ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’ and hence the conviction and sentence is liable to be set aside. 8 2003 (2) ALD Cri 712 9 2010 SCC OnLine AP 1028 10 MANU/AP/1355/2003 21 31. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Kothapalli Sunil Kumar v. State of A.P.,11 at para No.14 held that "the accused was convicted for the offence under Section 3(1)(xi) of the S.C. & S.T. Act. Admittedly, the investigation was done by the Sub-Inspector of Police.” 32. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Viswanadhula Chittibabu v. State of A.P.,12 wherein at paragraph 25 it is held as under: “.....we have come to the conclusion that Rule 7 framed under Section 23 of the said Act is a mandatory and it has to be strictly complied with, which is not the procedural defect but it is Inherent defect in conducting the investigation under the said Act and we further hold that if the investigation is done by any other office below the rank of Dy. S.P., will vitiate the trial” 33. A learned Single Judge of this Court in E. Seshalah v. State of A.P.,13 held in paragraph 7 held as under: “It may be mentioned that Rule 7 of the Rules has made provision for appointment of Special Investigating Officers for investigating into the offences under the Act. Rule 7 of the Rules contemplates, firstly that an offence committed under the Act shall be investigated by a police officer not below the rank of the Deputy Superintendent of Police. It does not rest here. It further provides that the investigating officer shall be appointed by the State Government, Director General of Police, Superintendent of Police after taking into account his past experience, his sense of justice and his ability to perceive the implications of the case.” 34. This Court finds no infirmity in the reasoning adopted by the learned Trial Judge. The learned Trial Judge rightly concluded that the investigation under ‘the SC/ST (POA) Act’, was not conducted in accordance with Rule 7 of ‘the Rules’. The statutory mandate requires that such investigation be carried out by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. In the 11 2002 SCC OnLine AP 1102 12 2002 SCC OnLine AP 683 13 2000(1) ALD (Crl.) 709 (Α.Ρ.), 22 present case, the investigation was primarily conducted by the Sub-Inspector and Circle Inspector of Police. Although the Assistant Superintendent of Police was appointed at a later stage, it is evident from the record that he neither examined any fresh witnesses nor re-examined the witnesses already examined by the earlier Investigating Officers and merely verified the prior investigation. This course adopted by the Assistant Superintendent of Police is not in accordance with Rule 7 of ‘the Rules’. The learned Trial Judge correctly held that such verification does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 7 of ‘the Rules’ and renders the investigation under ‘the SC/ST (POA) Act’ legally defective. 35. The learned Trial Judge also rightly observed that the mere fact that the deceased belonged to a Scheduled Tribe does not, ipso facto, attract the provisions of Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(vi) of ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’. The prosecution failed to establish that the offence was committed on account of the victim’s caste. The motive, as reflected in the charge sheet, was personal in nature, stemming from the deceased’s interference in the illicit relationship between Accused No.1 and Accused No.8, and not caste-based animus. In the absence of any material to show that the offence was committed with the intention of targeting the deceased due to his tribal status, the invocation of the said provisions was rightly held to be unsustainable. 36. On a careful analysis and examination of the report lodged by Accused No.8/wife of the deceased, the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ other documents relied on by the prosecution and 23 more importantly the averments of the chargesheet laid by the Investigating Officer, it has came out that all the Accused/Respondents had committed alleged murder in order to do away the life of the deceased as it was felt by Accused Nos.1 and 8 that deceased had become an obstacle for their illicit relation. That is only the sole ground on which the life of the husband of Accused No.8 was taken away. The alleged offence was not committed just because the deceased belonged to ST (Sugali community). There is no record forthcoming that on the sole ground that Sabhavath Shankar Naik is a member of Scheduled Tribe the Respondents murdered him. In the absence of such allegation, material ingredients of Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(vi) of ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’ would not be applicable or made out or attract. There is no iota of reference emerging from the record that the alleged murder was committed against the deceased on the basis that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe. 37. In light of the above findings, this Court affirms the discharge of the accused under Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(vi) of ‘the SC/ST (PoA) Act’. The learned Trial Judge’s order is based on sound legal reasoning and supported by the record. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case is devoid of merit and is dismissed. 38. However, the learned Trial Judge may proceed with the trial for the offences under Sections 302 read with 34 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and other Sections of ‘the I.P.C.,’ if attracted. The trial shall be immediately taken up and concluded 24 as early as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order. 39. The learned Principal District Judge, Kadapa is directed either to make over this case to any learned Additional Sessions Judge in Kadapa or may try this case by the learned Principal District Judge, Kadapa himself within the above-mentioned time frame. 40. However, it is made clear that the observations made above were only confined to the disposal of this Revision Case and in no way be construed to have an expression on the merits of the case before the learned Trial Court. No order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed. _________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Dt: 08.09.2025 VTS