2025:JHHC:32523-DB 1 THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 263 of 2024 1. The State of Jharkhand. 2. Director General cum Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, Ranchi, Police Headquarters, HEC, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, DistrictRanchi. 3. Deputy Inspector General of Police (Personnel), Ranchi, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand. 4. Senior Superintendent of Police, Jamshedpur, P.O. and P.S. Sakchi, Jamshedpur, District East Singhbhum. 5. Superintendent of Police, Palamau, P.O. and P.S. Daltonganj, Palamau, Jharkhand … Appellants Versus Rajendra Sahu, aged about 41 years, Son of Wakil Sahu, resident of Village + P.O. Makka, P.S.-Burmu, Dist- Ranchi. … Respondent ---------- Coram: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI ----- For the Appellants: Mr. Manish Kumar, Sr. S.C.-II For the Respondent: ----- Order No.08/Dated:17.10.2025 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad J. 1. This appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 10.11.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 2514 of 2022 whereby and whereunder while allowing the writ petition, the order issued vide Memo No. 60/D dated 31.03.2022 has been quashed and set aside and 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 2 further direction has been passed upon the respondents (appellants herein) to immediately reinstate the writ petitioner (respondent herein) in service with benefits of continuity in service, seniority and all other consequential benefits. Factual Matrix 2. The brief facts of the case as per pleadings made in the writ petition, as incorporated in the memo of appeal and discussed in the order impugned reads as under: (i) According to petitioner, an advertisement for selection of Police Constable was floated vide Advt. No. 01/2004, dated 13.01.2004. The petitionerhad applied for the said post and submitted the form on 15.02.2004. At the time of filling up of the form, no criminal case was pending against him. (ii) After filling up of the application form, all of a sudden, petitioner was arrested on 21.08.2005 in connection with Burmu P.S. Case No. 21/2004, dated 24.05.2004, registered against 12 named accused and 5–6 unknown persons, for the offences under Sections 147/ 148/ 149/ 307/ 353 of the Indian Penal Code, under Section 25(1-b)a/ 26/ 27/ 35 of the Arms Act and under Section 17 of the CLA Act. 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 3 (iii) Later on, bail was granted to the petitioner vide order dated 05.12.2005 passed in B.P. No. 1405 of 2005. (iv) After his release and after successfully qualifying in all the tests, he was appointed to the post of Constable on 14.12.2005 and was posted in Palamau District Police having Constable No. 1436. After his selection, petitioner was discharging his duties to the satisfaction of the Department. (v) On 08.01.2007, on the basis of Character Verification Report, sent by the SSP, Ranchi to the S.P. Palamau, the petitioner was immediately suspended and was asked to submit his showcause reply against the charge that he suppressed material fact regarding his implication in Burmu P.S. Case No. 21/2004. (vi) Petitioner submitted his reply on 12.01.2007 and thereafter, his suspension was revoked vide order dated 16.10.2007 and departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner (respondent herein). (vii) Petitioner was served with the charge sheet dated 12.07.2008 alleging therein that he had furnished false information in the application form. (viii) However, the Enquiry officer – cum – Sergeant Major, Palamau, after completion of enquiry, submitted 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 4 his report on 04.10.2008 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition), exonerating the petitioner from the alleged charges. (ix) Petitioner was also honorably acquitted in the criminal case pending against him vide Session Trial No. 109/2007, vide order dated 11.05.2009, passed by the Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVII, Ranchi. (x) After submission of enquiry report dated 04.10.2008 and the fact that the petitioner was duly exonerated in the criminal proceeding on 11.05.2009, the disciplinary authority kept mum for almost five years and suddenly in the year 2013, disagreeing with the previous enquiry report, appointed a new Enquiry Officer – cum – SDPO, Hussainabad to enquire into the matter afresh. (xi) The new Enquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty and enquiry report was submitted on 26.02.2013. (xii) Thereafter, the petitioner was transferred to Jamshedpur District Police on 21.11.2017 andafter lapse of around six years since submission of second enquiry report way back in the year 2013, the disciplinary authority i.e. S.P. Palamau, slapped the petitioner with second show-cause notice vide Memo 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 5 No. 3225/Ra.Ka. dated 21.07.2019, whereby and whereunder, he was show-caused as to why not he be inflicted with major punishment enshrined within Rule 824 of the ‘Jharkhand Police Manual’ and was asked to submit second show cause reply within seven days of receipt of said letter, which was duly replied by him on 30.07.2019. (xiii) However, without considering the reply, the disciplinary authority i.e. Superintendent of Police, Palamau, held the petitioner guilty of the alleged charges and passed an order of major punishment vide Memo No. 3558/Ra.Ka. dated 19.08.2019, inflicting the punishment of forfeiture of increment for one year without cumulative effect which will be equivalent to two black marks. (xiv) It is further case of the petitioner that during his posting at Jamshedpur, he again contested the election of Jharkhand Police Mens’ Association (Jamshedpur Branch) and was elected to the post of President on 12.12.2020 by defeating his rival which led to publication of fake and defamatory news against him in the daily newspaper without considering the fact that petitioner was honorably acquitted in the alleged case. 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 6 (xv) Resultantly, the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Personnel), Ranchi recommended for revision/enhancement of punishment order inflicted upon the petitioner by the disciplinary authority on the ground of it being disproportionate. (xvi) Thereafter, pursuant to Memo No. 60/D, dated 31.03.2022, the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, taking recourse of provisions as contained in Rule 853-A(a) of the Jharkhand Police Manual, quashed the earlier punishment order dated 19.08.2019 bearing Memo No. 3558/Ra.Ka and inflicted the petitioner with the punishment of dismissal from service with immediate effect under Rule 673(C) of the Jharkhand Police Manual. (xvii) Being aggrieved, petitioner has preferred the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 2514 of 2022 to this Court. The aforesaid writ petition was allowed by the learned writ Court vide order dated 10.11.2023 and direction was passed upon the respondentsto immediately reinstate the petitioner in service with benefits of continuity in service, seniority and all other consequential benefits. 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 7 3. It is evident from the factual aspect that the writ petitioner has participated in the process of selection in pursuant to Advertisement No. 01/2004 floated on 13.01.2004 for recruitment of Constable in the Jharkhand Police.The petitioner has participated in the selection process and has been declared successful. 4. He being successful was called upon to give some disclosure of the factual aspect, one of it was the accusation in the criminal case. The writ petitioner has answered the said column in negative. 5. The writ petitioner has joined the service and started discharging the duty. Subsequent thereto, the disciplinary authority has come to know about one pending case arising out of Burmu P.S. Case No. 21 of 2004 registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 353 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 25(1-b)a/26/27/35 of the Arms Act and Section 17 of the CLA Act. The writ petitioner was put under suspension in contemplation of the departmental proceeding.The departmental proceeding has been initiated. The following charges were levelled: vkjksi& iqfyl 1436 jktsUnz lkgw ds fo:) ?kksj vuq'kklughurk] iqfyl foHkkx dks /kks[kk esa j[kdj ukSdjh izkIr djuk ,oa vijkf/kd pfj= ds O;fDr gksus dk fuEu vkjksi yxk;k tkrk gS fd & ;s fu;qfDr foKkiu la0&01@04 ds vUrxZr fnukad 14-12-05 dks vLFkk;h iqfyl ds in ij fu;qfDr dh xbZ gSA mYys[kuh; gS fd ;s fu;qfDr gsrw vkosnu i= esa ;g ?kks"k.kk fd;k Fkk fd esjs fo:) fdlh izdkj dk QkStnkjh dk ekeyk 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 8 ekuuh; U;k;ky; esa yafcr ugha gSA v/kksgLrk{kjh ds dk;kZy; dk Kkiakd&26@j0dk0 fnukad 22-11-06 ds }kjk pfj= lR;kiu gsrw ojh; iqfyl v/kh{kd] jkWaph ds ek/;e ls Hkstk x;k rks ik;k x;k fd buds fo:) cqM+ew Fkkuk jkWaph dkaM la0& 21@04 fnuakd 24-05-04 /kkjk&147@148@149@307@353 Hkk0n0fo0 ,oa 25 ¼1&ch½ 26@27@35 vkElZ ,DV ,oa 17 lh0,y0,0 ,DV ds vfHk;qDr gSA buds fo:) vkjksi i= la0& 65@05 ekuuh; U;k;ky; esa lefiZr gSA 6. The petitioner has participated in the enquiry proceeding. The Enquiry Officer has found the charge to be not proved. The State, appellant herein, has not taken any final decision on the said finding of the Enquiry Officer, rather kept mum.The writ petitioner, in consequence thereof, has been allowed to continue in service. The criminal case in the meanwhile resulted into acquittal of the writ petitioner. 7. The respondent has again initiated a fresh enquiry sometime in the year, 2013. But without furnishing a fresh charge, meaning thereby, on the basis of the first charge in which the Enquiring Officer has not found the charge proved, the fresh departmental enquiry has been initiated.The second show cause notice was issued on 21.07.2019. Reply was furnished on 30th July, 2019 by the petitioner. The State-appellant has inflicted the punishment of forfeiture of one increment which is equivalent to two black marks, which as per the Police Manual, is a major punishment. 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 9 8. The said order, on its own, has been revived on the motion made by the Director General of Police-cum- Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand in exercise of power conferred under Rule 853 A(a) of the Jharkhand Police Manual and has enhanced the punishment to that of dismissal. 9. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the order of dismissal, has challenged the same by filing writ petition being, W.P.(S) No. 2514 of 2022. 10. The learned Single Judge has passed the order and accordingly quashed and set- aside the order impugned on the ground that the principle of natural justice has not been followed and such action has been taken against the writ petitioner after a lapse of 18 years i.e. the writ petitioner has been allowed to continue in service for 18 years, which is the subject matter of the present appeal. Submission of the learned counsel for the appellants 11. Mr. Manish Kumar, the learned State counsel appearing for the appellants has taken the following ground in assailing the impugned judgment: (i) It has been contended that the learned Single Judge has considered the non-observance of the principle of natural justice, but the same is not applicable as the proceeding against the petitioner was initiated in 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 10 compliance of provisions of natural justice and there is no fault on part of the department. The charges against the petitioner (respondent herein) are grievous in nature and as such, he has rightly been punished with dismissal from the service. (ii) It has been contended that even after initiation of the second departmental proceeding, the second show cause notice has been issued which is also to follow the principle of natural justice. (iii) It has been contended that it is a case where the writ petitioner has suppressed the fact about his accusation by giving wrong declaration in the specific column furnished at the time of submitting the verification report. 12. The learned State Counsel has submitted that suppression of fact by a candidate who is to enter into the public service cannot be said to be simplecrime in nature and if in that pretext the department has initiated a departmental proceeding, it cannot be said to be improper, but the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the aforesaid fact, hence, the impugned judgment needs interference. 13. The notice has been issued to the respondent. The appearance has been made. The vakalatnama has been 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 11 filed by the office of Mrs. M.M. Pal, learned Senior Advocate who has represented the respondent, as would be evident from the order dated 01.05.2025. Today, there is no appearance. Analysis 14. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the appellant-State. 15. This Court before appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the State-appellant needs to refer herein the factual aspectswhich are relevant for the purpose of consideration of the propriety of the decision of dismissal of the respondent-writ petitioner from service. 16. It is admitted case of the State-appellant that a departmental proceeding was initiated initially by putting the writ petitioner under suspension on 08.01.2007 and in consequent upon the same the charge sheet was also issued on 12.07.2008. The Enquiry Officer was also appointed. The Enquiry Officer has submitted its detailed report dated 04.10.2008 in which the charge, as has been framed against the delinquent, the writ petitioner, respondent herein, has not found to be proved. 17. The disciplinary authority has not taken any endeavour either by accepting the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer or by showing difference by giving 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 12 difference of opinion as per the law settled in the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors.Vrs. Kunj Behari Misra, (1998) 7 SCC 84. 18. The criminal case, the pendency of the same, which has been said to be suppressed has proceeded and the writ petitioner has been acquitted honorably by the judgment passed in the Session Trial Case No. 109 of 2007 vide order/judgment dated 11.05.2009. 19. The admitted case is that the acquittal of the writ petitioner in the said session case has not been assailed by the State by filing appeal before the higher forum. The disciplinary authority, has again initiated a fresh enquiry in the year, 2013, but no fresh charge has been issued. The obvious reason is that in the year, 2013 there cannot be any charge, since, the accusation so made against the writ petitioner, based upon that the criminal case has proceeded and ended in acquittal, meaning thereby, in the year, 2013 there was no accusation upon the writ petitioner. 20. The argument has been advanced on behalf of the State-appellant that the reason for dismissal is the suppression of fact. There is no dispute that the day when the first enquiry was initiated the allegation was there, but admittedly the same was not proved. The disciplinary 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 13 authority was having two options, first, either to accept enquiry report and to exonerate the writ petitioner or to differ with the finding by giving reason thereof which was to be communicated to the writ petitioner in the line of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vrs. Kunj Behari Misra (supra). But no such endeavour has been taken. The second enquiry was initiated sometime in the year, 2013 but very surprisingly the fresh enquiry is on the basis of the first memorandum of charge, meaning thereby, the second enquiry isin furtherance to the first memorandum of charge in which the Enquiry Officer has not found the charge to be proved. 21. The legal question which requires consideration as to whether in such circumstances was it available for the disciplinary authority to initiate the fresh departmental proceeding without taking any final decision on the basis of the memorandum of charge issued in which the Enquiry Officer has found the charge to be not proved? 22. The answer of this Court will be negative, in view of the settled position of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K.R. Dev Vs. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong reported in (1971) 2 SCC 102 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 14 wherein it has been laid down thatthere cannot be fresh enquiry rather further enquiry is permitted. 23. Further the consecutive enquiry is not permissible otherwise the enquiry proceeding will be unending process and the enquiry will be allowed to continue so long as the charge is not being proved therefore, to deal with such situation the disciplinary authority having no remedy, rather in such situation remedy ought to have been availed in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vrs. Kunj Behari Misra (supra) by differing with the opinion of the Enquiry Officer. 24. This Court, therefore, is of the view that as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of K.R. Dev Vs. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong (supra) coupled with the law settled in the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors.Vrs. Kunj Behari Misra (supra), the disciplinary authority has got no jurisdiction to initiate a fresh enquiry for the same cause in a case where the charge has found not to be proved. 25. Moreover, in the meanwhile, the writ petitioner has been acquitted from the charges, then the question is that where is the accusation? 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 15 26. It is the total lack of prudence of the disciplinary authority in inviting such situation, reason best known to the State-appellant. This Court is constrained to make this comment since the law is already available and if law is available, then it cannot be permitted to the disciplinary authority to flout the law and to act on their own, which is exactly the case herein. 27. The further fact is that initially punishment was imposed of forfeiture of one increment which is equivalent to two black marks, which, as per the Police Manual is a major punishment. Subsequent thereto, the Director General of Police-cum- Inspector General, Jharkhand has revisited the order of punishment by taking aid of Clause 853 A(a) of the Police Manual where the power has been vested upon the Inspector General to call for the files in any case even when no appeal lies and pass such order as he may deem fit. There is no dispute that the power has been vested upon the Inspector General which has now been redesignated as Director General of Police-cum- Inspector General, but such conferment of power is to be exercised within the four corners of the prudence. The punishment of dismissal is amajor punishment in the matter of disciplinary proceeding. If such punishment has been inflicted by the Director General of Police-cum- 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 16 Inspector General,then the question is that why such power was not exercised under the supervisory jurisdiction available to Director General of Police-cum-Inspector General the day when the enquiry proceeding has been culminated in not proving the charge. 28. There is no averment in the appeal that any action has been taken against the erring officials as to why no such final decision has been taken by taking recourse as available in the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors.Vrs. Kunj Behari Misra (supra). 29. This Court, therefore, is of the view that if there is negligence on the part of the disciplinary authority, the benefit is to be given to the delinquent employee, that too, in a case where the Enquiry Officer has not found the charge proved. Even, it could have been accepted that if at the subsequent stage the decision has been taken by initiating a departmental proceeding then there could have been by showing difference of opinion, but that should not have been taken after long lapse of time. 30. The reference at this juncture is required to made in the case of Kamal Nayan Mishra Vs. State of M.P. reported in (2010) 2 SCC 169, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that no term in the attestation form, nor 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 17 any consent given by a government servant, can take away the Constitutional safeguard provided to a government servant under Article 311 of the Constitution, for ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under: “20. The learned counsel for the respondents drew our attention to the instructions to the employees in the preamble to the attestation form and the undertaking contained in the verification certificate by the employee at the end of the attestation form, which puts him on notice that any false information could result in termination of his service without enquiry. It is contended that as the attestation form stated that an employee could be terminated without notice, if he furnishes false information, the employee is estopped from objecting to termination without notice. The said contention may merit acceptance in the case of a probationer, but not in the case of a confirmed government servant. 21. No term in the attestation form, nor any consent given by a government servant, can take away the constitutional safeguard provided to a government servant under Article 311 of the Constitution.” 31. It requires to refer herein that in the case of Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that once employer has the power to take a decision when at the time of filling verification form declarant has already been convicted/acquitted, in such a case, it becomes obvious that all the facts and attending circumstances, including impact of suppression or false information are taken into consideration while adjudging 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 18 suitability of an incumbent for services in question. In case the employer comes to the conclusion that suppression is immaterial and even if facts would have been disclosed it would not have adversely affected fitness of an incumbent, for reasons to be recorded, it has power to condone the lapse. However, while doing so employer has to act prudently on due consideration of nature of post and duties to be rendered. 32. It has further been observed that in case employee is confirmed, holding a civil post and has protection of Article 311(2), due inquiry has to be held before terminating the services and the verification of character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to assess suitability and it is open to employer to adjudge antecedents of the incumbent, but ultimate action should be based upon objective criteria on due consideration of all relevant aspects, for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under: 28. This Court has also opined that before a person is held guilty of suppression of a fact it has to be considered whether verification form is precise and is not vague, and what it required to disclose. In Daya Shankar [Daya Shankar Yadav v. Union of India, (2010) 14 SCC 103 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 439] it was held that in case verification form is vague no fault can be found on the ground of suppression. However, facts which have come to knowledge it has to be determined by employer whether antecedents of 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 19 incumbent are good for service, to hold someone guilty of suppression, query in the form has to be specific. Similarly, in B. Chinnam Naidu [Deptt. of Home, A.P. v. B. Chinnam Naidu, (2005) 2 SCC 746 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 323] when column in verification form required to disclose detention or conviction, it did not require to disclose a pending criminal case or fact of arrest, removal on the ground of material suppression of pending case and arrest was set aside as that was not required to be disclosed. 33. The fraud and misrepresentation vitiates a transaction and in case employment has been obtained on the basis of forged documents, as observed in M. Bhaskaran case [Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 100 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 162 : (1996) 32 ATC 94] , it has also been observed in the reference order that if an appointment was procured fraudulently, the incumbent may be terminated without holding any inquiry, however, we add a rider that in case employee is confirmed, holding a civil post and has protection of Article 311(2), due inquiry has to be held before terminating the services. The case of obtaining appointment on the basis of forged documents has the effect on very eligibility of incumbent for the job in question, however, verification of antecedents is different aspect as to his fitness otherwise for the post in question. The fraudulently obtained appointment orders are voidable at the option of employer, however, question has to be determined in the light of the discussion made in this order on impact of suppression or submission of false information. 34. No doubt about it that verification of character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to assess suitability and it is open to employer to adjudge antecedents of the incumbent, but ultimate 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 20 action should be based upon objective criteria on due consideration of all relevant aspects. 33. After having discussed the aforesaid factual aspect and legal issues and adverting to the impugned judgment so far as its outcome is concerned wherein the learned Single Judge has come to conclusion of non-observance of the principle of natural justice, which according to our considered view, is a correct finding in view of the fact that when the fresh departmental proceeding has been initiated, then the fresh enquiry proceeding within the meaning of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules which provides that in a case of inflicting major punishment the proper course is to start from the day of issuance of the memorandum of charge and the delinquent employee to be given opportunity to cross examine the witnesses. 34. This process has not been followed and could not have been followed because there was no charge at the time of initiation of fresh departmental enquiry, rather it has been initiated in furtherance to the enquiry proceeding which was initiated way back in the year, 2007 where the charge has not been found to be proved. If the argument of the State Counsel will be accepted, then the question would be that what would happen to the finding so recorded by the Enquiry Officer in which the charge has 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 21 not been proved.The Enquiry Officer vested with the power to conduct an enquiry who has to exercise the quasi- judicial function and while giving the enquiry report it cannot be said to be a piece of paper only. 35. Further it needs to refer herein that learned writ Court has also taken note of the fact that petitioner was arrested on 21.08.2005 in connection with Burmu P.S. Case No. 21/2004, dated 24.05.2004 and later on granted bail by the Court. Petitioner, after fulfilling requisite criteria and being declared successful, was appointed on 14.12.2005. It was only on 08.01.2007, at the time of Character Verification, it was found that he was involved in a criminal case and was enlarged on bail. This fact was apparently concealed by the petitioner at the time of filling-up of the verification roll. Petitioner was proceeded departmentally for the same and upon enquiry, charge was not proved by the Enquiry Officer and report dated 04.10.2008 has been submitted. Subsequently, in the said criminal case also, petitioner was acquitted on 11.05.2009. For a period of five years, no initiative was taken by the department regarding further proceeding in the matter against the petitioner. It was only in the year, 2013 a new Enquiry Officer was appointed. The reasons though not assigned by the respondents but the action was against 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 22 the settled principles of law i.e. the respondents were precluded from fresh enquiry. 36. The learned writ Court has further taken note of the settled position of law that before snatching livelihood of an employee, which leads to civil and evil consequences, the cardinal principles of natural justice have to be followed. In the instant case, the Director General of Police did not consider it fit to even show-cause the petitioner as to why he should not be dismissed from the service. The said action of the respondent – Director General of Police could have been justified had the petitioner been in probation. In the instant case, after more than 16 years of continuous service, the livelihood of the person, even in the police force, could not have been snatched away arbitrarily taking shelter of Rules of the Police Manual. 37. Thus, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, it is considered view of this Court that there is negligence on the part of the disciplinary authority, as such the benefit is to be given to the delinquent employee, that too, in a case where the Enquiry Officer has not found the charge proved. 38. This Court, in entirety of the facts and circumstances and the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that 2025:JHHC:32523-DB 23 the instant appeal is having no merit, accordingly, hereby dismissed. 39. Pending I.As., if any, stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.) Dated: 17th October, 2025 Rajnish/R.K./A.F.R.