2025:UHC:3059 IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Criminal Misc. Application No.1350 of 2017 (Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) Ander Arwaja Alwarej & Another ............. Applicants Versus State of Uttarakhand & others ............. Respondents With Criminal Misc. Application No.41 of 2018 (Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) Ander Arnaja Alwarej ............. Applicants Versus State of Uttarakhand & others ............. Respondents Presence: Mr. Shakti Swaroop Nigam, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Vikas Kumar Guglani, learned counsel for the Applicants Ms. Rangoli Purohit, learned Brief Holder, for the State of Uttarkhand. Hon’ble Ashish Naithani, J (Oral) 1. The present application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has been filed by the applicants Ander ArwajaAlwarej (Director) and Pradeep Barik (Manager), both associated with Mahindra CIE Automotive Ltd., Pantnagar, District Udham Singh Nagar, through their authorized attorney. The applicants seek quashing of the summoning order dated 13.07.2017 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Udham Singh Nagar, Rudrapur in Criminal Complaint Case No. 3482 of 2017 titled State vs. Ander Arwaja and others under the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 as well as Criminal Complaint Case No. 5555 of 2017 titled State vs. Ander Arnaja Alwarej and others. 1 2025:UHC:3059 2. The controversy in the present case arises from a surprise inspection conducted by the Labour Enforcement Officer (Respondent No. 3) on 24.07.2017 at the Mahindra CIE Automotive Ltd. factory. During this inspection, it was allegedly found that contract labourers were operating machines, specifically noting that one Sompal was operating a press machine and one Gangaram was performing welding work. 3. The Labour Enforcement Officer considered these activities to be in violation of Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, and subsequently filed a formal complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Udham Singh Nagar. Based on this complaint, the Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the matter and issued summons to the applicants, Ander Arwaja (Director) and Pradeep Barik (Manager) of Mahindra CIE Automotive Ltd. 4. In response to these allegations, Pradeep Barik had earlier submitted a reply on behalf of Mahindra CIE Automotive Stamping Division, denying any violation of Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. 5. The reply stated that contract labourers were assigned work by their respective employers in strict accordance with the terms and conditions of the licenses issued by the relevant licensing authority. 6. It was contended that the contract labourers were deployed solely for loading, unloading, and shifting materials, consistent with applicable government notifications. 7. The reply specifically explained that Sompal was working as a temporary worker, and Gangaram was working as a helper in the weld shop, where his duties were limited to material shifting. 8. The learned counsel for the applicants has raised several legal contentions in support of the prayer for quashing the summoning order: 2 2025:UHC:3059 9. Firstly, it is argued that the complaint is legally defective as it has been filed only against the Directors of the company and does not include the company itself as a party to the proceedings. It is submitted that in cases involving statutory violations by companies, the company itself should be the primary accused, and the directors or managers can be made vicariously liable only if specific averments are made regarding their role in the commission of the offense. 10. Secondly, it is contended that the complaint lacks specific allegations detailing the individual roles and responsibilities of the applicants within the company. The learned counsel has emphasized that there is nothing in the complaint to establish that the applicants were responsible for the day-to-day operations of the company or to demonstrate how they could be held liable for the alleged offense. It is specifically denied that the applicants are the principal employer as required under the Act. 11. Thirdly, it is submitted that the allegations in the complaint are false and frivolous. The applicants have asserted that contract labourers were not engaged in operating machines as alleged but were only involved in loading, unloading, and shifting of materials as permitted under the government notifications. 12. It is further argued that the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the complaint without proper application of judicial mind, which would warrant interference by this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 13. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Respondent has countered these arguments by submitting that the inspection was conducted in accordance with the statutory provisions, and several workers, including Pramod Kumar, Ram Gopal Sharma, Luv Kush, Sahadat Ali, Prem, Vagesh, Ramandeep Singh, Ram Khiladi, Ugrasain, and Kashi Ram, were indeed found working on machines. This, it is argued, is in violation of a government 3 2025:UHC:3059 order dated 24.04.1990, which prohibits contract labour from working on machines in all units of the engineering industry. 14. It is further submitted on behalf of the Respondent that ,during the inspection, the factory manager identified the applicant as the occupier/owner, a fact not denied by the applicant or any competent authority. It is contended that this failure to deny implies that the applicant is indeed the occupier/owner and is directly involved and responsible for the factory's daily affairs. The Respondent concludes that the Chief Judicial Magistrate acted correctly and with due diligence in summoning the applicant, and there is no illegality in the summoning order. 15. This Court has considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the applicants, Mr. Shakti Swaroop Nigam, Mr. Vikas Kumar Guglani, and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, Ms. Rangoli Purohit; and has also perused the material placed on record. 16. The primary grievance raised by the applicants is that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate committed a serious legal error in taking cognisanceand summoning the applicants without impleading the company Mahindra CIE Automotive Ltd. as an accused party. 17. On the other hand, the Labour Enforcement Officer has placed reliance on the inspection conducted on 24.07.2017, during which it was found that several contract labourers were working on machinery in the establishment of Mahindra CIE Automotive Ltd., which, as per the relevant Government Order dated 24.04.1990, is impermissible in engineering industries. 18. It is stated that the Manager of the factory, when confronted, acknowledged the applicants' roles as being responsible for the establishment and did not deny that they were the principal employers within the meaning of the Act. 4 2025:UHC:3059 19. The material placed on record reflects that the Labour Enforcement Officer had not acted arbitrarily or in excess of authority, but had proceeded in the discharge of her statutory duties. 20. The inspection report prepared contemporaneously with the site visit is a public document that records the presence and functional roles of several labourers who, despite being categorized as contract workers, were allegedly found performing core manufacturing tasks, such as welding, operating press machines, and working on saw machines. 21. The names of the individuals and the specific machinery they operated are mentioned clearly in the inspection note. 22. The allegations levelled in the complaint are neither vague nor unfounded. They are substantiated by the inspection report prepared contemporaneously, which details specific acts constituting alleged violations. If proved in accordance with law, such acts may attract penal provisions under Section 23 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. 23. This section provides for penal consequences where any person who contravenes provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder shall be punishable. 24. While the applicants claim that the labourers named were either temporary employees or helpers engaged in non-core activities like shifting or loading of material, such factual assertions cannot be conclusively verified without a trial. 25. The limited jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not extend to conducting a mini-trial or evaluating the veracity of the complaint as if in a full-fledged proceeding. 26. It shall remain open to the applicants to place such factual contentions before the trial court at the appropriate stage, including by availing remedies provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5 2025:UHC:3059 27. The Court is not persuaded by the argument that the summoning order is void merely because the company was not impleaded as an accused. In matters involving statutory violations by companies, it is certainly a settled principle that vicarious liability must be founded on specific averments. 28. However, in the present case, the complaint refers to the factory of Mahindra CIE Automotive Ltd., and it is the admitted position that the applicants are functionaries of the said company. 29. More importantly, the Manager present during the inspection explicitly referred to the applicants as the person(s) in charge. There is no material on record to show that the applicants disclaimed this role at the relevant time. In the absence of a denial contemporaneous with the inspection or thereafter, a presumption can reasonably arise regarding their control over the operations of the factory. 30. The contention that the complaint should have been dismissed for want of detailed evidence or documentation also lacks substance. 31. At the stage of summoning, the standard to be applied is whether prima facie material exists to indicate the commission of an offence. The trial court is not required to record evidence or establish guilt at this stage. It is sufficient that the complaint discloses commission of an offence and that the allegations are not inherently absurd or manifestly improbable. 32. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised with restraint and sparingly. It is not a substitute for a trial, nor is it intended to stifle legitimate prosecution unless it can be shown that the process is manifestly attended with mala fides or intended only to harass. 33. No such case is made out here. The Labour Enforcement Officer is a statutory authority performing a quasi-judicial function. Her act of filing a complaint after inspection, in accordance with the 6 2025:UHC:3059 obligations imposed under labour laws, cannot be characterized as an abuse of process. 34. The summoning order, although brief, refers to the complaint and the inspection report. It reflects the trial court's application of judicial mind to the material placed before it. Judicial reasoning is not to be measured by the length of the order alone. So long as the Magistrate has acted within his jurisdiction and has applied mind to the material before him, the summoning order does not call for interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 35. It is also pertinent to note that the applicants have not availed the alternate remedy available under the Code to appear before the Magistrate and seek discharge or raise preliminary objections. This procedural recourse is appropriate in a case where the accused wishes to contest the maintainability or sufficiency of the complaint on factual or legal grounds. ORDER In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no infirmity or perversity in the proceedings initiated pursuant to the complaint filed by Respondent No. 3. The summoning orders dated 13.07.2017 and 23.10.2017 does not suffer from any manifest illegality warranting interference in exercise of this Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the present Criminal Miscellaneous Applications are dismissed. No order as to costs. (Ashish Naithani, J) Dated: 08.04.2025 NR/ 7