HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT JAMMU CRM(M) No. 302/2020 CrlM No. 1576/2021, 2123/2021, 1364/2021, 1097/2020, 388/2021 1. Sukhbinder Singh alias Labba Aged 19 years, S/O Sawarn Singh R/O Ranjari, Tehsil Vijaypur, District, Samba. 2. Balwinder Singh, alias Goru Aged 13 years (Minor) S/O Swaran Singh, Th. His father Sawarn Singh, R/O Ranjari, Tehsil Vijaypur, District Samba …..Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s) Through: Mr. K. S. Johal, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Karman Singh Johal, Advocate. vs .…. Respondent(s) 1. Union Territory of J&K Th. Police Station, Vijaypur 2. Vishal Kumar S/O Ram Pal R/O Village Ranjari, Tehsil Vijaypur, District Samba Through: Mr. Vishal Bharti, Dy. AG Mr. Vivek Matoo, Advocate Mr. Mohd. Aslam, PSI, Police Station, Vijaypur. Coram: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE ORDER 15.04.2025 1. The petitioners have challenged FIR No. 29/2020 for offences under Sections 307/506/342/341 IPC registered with Police Station, Vijaypur, District Samba. 2. As per the impugned FIR, the petitioners were having old rivalry with the complainant/respondent No. 2 and they were threatening to eliminate him. On 19.02.2020 at about 4.08 P.M. petitioner No. 2 Serial No. 57 2 CRM(M) No. 302/2020 contacted the complainant and asked him to come out of his residence. At about 4.15 P.M. when the complainant came out of his residence for collecting fire-wood, upon reaching Teri Baba, both the petitioners who had set an ambush, obstructed the way of the complainant and petitioner No. 2 inflicted injuries upon the head of the complainant with Kirpan, whereas petitioner No. 1 inflicted injuries on his head with a Kara. After inflicting injuries upon the head of the complainant, the petitioners/accused fled away from the spot and extended threats to him. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, the impugned FIR came to be registered and investigation of the case was set into motion. During investigation of the case, the petitioners moved this Court by invoking its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C. for quashing the impugned FIR primarily on the ground that during the pendency of the investigation, the petitioners and respondent No. 2 have settled the matter with intervention of Panchayat and that respondent No. 2/complainant does not want to pursue the case against the petitioners. A copy of the Panchayatnama was also placed on record. The parties also placed on record a copy of the compromise deed dated 01.08.2021 executed between the petitioners and respondent No. 2 before the Notary Public, whereby respondent No. 2/complainant has admitted that he has settled the dispute with the petitioners and that he has undertaken to facilitate quashment of the FIR. 4. With a view to ascertain the veracity of execution and contents of the aforesaid compromise deed, the statements of the petitioners and 3 CRM(M) No. 302/2020 respondent No. 2 were directed to be recorded by this Court in terms of order dated 21.05.2022. Accordingly, the petitioners as well as respondent No. 2 made their statements before the Registrar Judicial of this Court, whereby respondent No. 2 admitted having executed compromise deed dated 01.08.2021. He further stated that he has no grievance against the petitioners and that he has no objection in case the impugned FIR is quashed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case including the case diary produced by the counsel for the official respondent. 6. So far as execution of compromise deed dated 01.08.2021 by the petitioners and respondent No. 2 and veracity of its contents is concerned, the same is not in dispute. The question that falls for determination is as to whether offence under Section 307 IPC for which the petitioners have been booked by virtue of the impugned FIR, can be compounded by this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. 7. The offence under Section 307 IPC for which the petitioners have been booked is non-compoundable in nature, as such, there is no question of its compounding even if settlement has taken place between the petitioners and respondent No. 2. But there is difference between compounding of an offence on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim and quashment of criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement. This difference has been 4 CRM(M) No. 302/2020 explained by the Supreme Court in case titled as Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 in the following words: "57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal Offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. 58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable. it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored: securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc, or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, 5 CRM(M) No. 302/2020 particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled al disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed." 8. From the above analysis of law on the subject, it is manifest that High Court while exercising its powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is vested with jurisdiction of quashing criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between the offender and the victim if it appears to the Court that it would be an exercise in futility to continue the proceedings. The Supreme Court has further made it clear that in respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity etc. or offences under special statues like Prevention of Corruption Act etc. cannot be quashed even if a settlement has taken place between the offender and victim, as such, a settlement will not have any legal sanction. It is only those offences which predominantly have civil flavour or offences pertaining to commercial transactions or offences relating to matrimonial or family dispute, which can be quashed by the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. even if the said offences are non-compoundable in nature. 9. The question that poses itself before this Court in the present case is as to whether the proceedings for offence under Section 307 IPC, which 6 CRM(M) No. 302/2020 is a serious offence can be quashed by this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. This question was considered by the Supreme Court in case titled as Narinder Singh vs State of Punjab reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466. It would be apt to refer to the observations made in para 29.6 and 29.7 of the judgment which are reproduced as under: 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injuries sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction or remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this Stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the 7 CRM(M) No. 302/2020 charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime." 10. Again the Supreme Court in case of State of M. P. vs. Laxmi Narayan reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 observed as under: “15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate-parts of the body, nature of weapons used, 8 CRM(M) No. 302/2020 etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove: 15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non- compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.” 11. From the foregoing analysis of law on the subject, it is clear that before deciding as to whether proceedings in respect of offence under Section 307 IPC can be quashed on the ground of settlement, it has to be ascertained whether there is any evidence to support the allegations constituting the said offence. If it is found that the allegations are not backed by the material collected by the investigating agency during investigation of the case or from the nature of injuries sustained by the victim or nature of weapon used by the offender does not make it a case of attempt to murder, the High Court would be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings on the basis of settlement between the offender and the victim even though the offender may have been booked for offence under Section 307 IPC. It is also clear that timing of settlement between the offender and the victim is important in deciding as to whether the criminal proceedings 9 CRM(M) No. 302/2020 in respect of offence under Section 307 IPC deserves to be quashed. It has been held that if the settlement is arrived at immediately after the commission of the alleged offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. Similarly, where the charge-sheet is at initial stage, the Court can exercise its powers favourably, whereas if the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 12. In light of the aforesaid legal position, let us now advert to the facts of present case. As already stated, the allegations made in the impugned FIR are that the victim/respondent No. 2 was attacked by the petitioners on his head. While petitioner No. 2 inflicted injuries on head of the victim with Kirpan, petitioner No. 1 inflicted injuries on his head with a Kara. When we have a look at the medical report of the injured, which is on record of the case diary, it appears that the victim has received three injuries; one in the occipital region, second in temporal region and the third in parietal region. All the three injuries are simple in nature with lacerated wounds. The injured has not received any incised wound, meaning thereby the injuries which he has received are possible by blunt object and not by a sharp edged weapon like Kirpan. In fact, the case has remained under investigation for the last about five years, but the investigating agency has not been able to recover the weapon of offence i.e. Kirpan till date. The material 10 CRM(M) No. 302/2020 collected by the investigating agency during the investigation of the case when read in conjunction with the medical record of the injured shows that the injured has received simple injuries on his head which were possible by a blunt object like a Kara. Thus the use of Kirpan in inflicting injuries upon the head of the victim has not been established during investigation of the case. 13. Having regard to the fact that assailants/petitioners herein have used a Kara which is a blunt object, in inflicting injuries on head of the victim and the injuries are simple in nature, it can safely be stated that the petitioners did not intend to cause death of the victim/respondent No. 2. Thus, it cannot be stated that offence under Section 307 IPC is made out against the petitioners, but it appears to be a case in which the petitioners have committed offences under Section 323 and 341 IPC, which are compoundable in nature. 14. As already stated the petitioners and the victim have settled the dispute between them. They reside in the same locality and in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties, there is hardly any chance of securing conviction against the petitioners. Continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners in these circumstances would be an exercise in futility and it would amount to abuse of process of law. Having regard to the fact that the petitioners and respondent No. 2 have approached this Court for quashment of the impugned FIR and criminal proceedings at the stage of investigation itself, this Court has to exercise its discretion in quashing the impugned proceedings in a liberal manner. 11 CRM(M) No. 302/2020 15. For the foregoing reasons, the instant case is a fit one where this Court should exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. to quash the impugned proceedings to secure the ends of justice. Accordingly the petition is allowed and the impugned FIR as well as the proceedings emanating therefrom are quashed. 16. Case diary be returned to learned counsel for the official respondent against proper receipt. (SANJAY DHAR) JUDGE Jammu 15.04.2025 Sahil Padha Whether the order is speaking: Yes/No. Whether the order is reportable: Yes/No. Sahil Padha 2025.04.22 03:22 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document