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2025 DAILYLAW 34659 (JHR)

RAJESH KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND AND ANR

Cr.Rev./279/2015 · 2025-04-28

Sanjay Prasad

Criminal Appealbody2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

2025:JHHC:14226 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr. Rev. No. 279 of 2015 …. Rajesh Kumar Singh son of R. N. Singh residing at C/o Shailesh Kumar Singh R/o-C/8 ‘B’ Block Pardesi Para, PO & PS- Adityapur, District- East Singhbhum …… Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. Kanchan Tiwari, son of Late Janki Tiwary proprietor of M/s A. K. Associates, R/o Road No. -13, Behind Jharkhand State Housing Board, PO and PS- Adityapur, District- Saraikella -Kharsawan …… Opp. Parties ----- CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD ----- For the petitioner : Mr. Saurav Shekhar, Advocate For the State : Mr. Saket Kumar, A. P. P. For the O. P. No. 2 : Mr. Jitendra S. Singh, Advocate ….. C.A.V. On 21.02.2024 Pronounced On 28/04/2025 The present Criminal Revision No. 279 of 2015 has been filed by the petitioner challenging the judgment dated 05.02.2015 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 2013 by Sri Deepak Nath Tiwari, learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Jamshedpur whereby learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Jamshedpur has allowed the Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 2015 filed by the accused-opposite party no. 2 by setting aside the judgement of conviction and order of sentence dated 23.01.2013 passed by Ms. K. M. Prasad, learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur in connection with C/1 Case No. 3242 of 2010, by which the opposite party no. 2, Kanchan Tiwari had been convicted for the offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act in connection with C/1 Case No. 3242 of 2010 and had been sentenced to undergo S. I. for a period of one (1) year and has further been directed to pay a sum of Rs. 6,50,000/- (Rupees Six Lac Fifty Thousand Only) by way of compensation to the complainant-petitioner. 2025:JHHC:14226 -2- 2. The complainant’s case, in brief, is that in order to discharge his liability created vide Undertaking dated 23.02.2010, towards the complainant (i.e. the petitioner), i.e. the opposite party no. 2 had issued cheque no. 566793, dated 30.04.2010 for an amount of Rs.3,25,000/- only payable on CABUS A/c no. 008905005492 maintained by the opposite party no. 2 with ICICI Bank Ltd. Jamshedpur Branch, Natraj Mansion, Bistupur Road, Jamshedpur in favour of the complainant. The aforesaid cheque, on presentation by the complainant for encashment within its validity period, was returned unpaid vide cheque return memo dated 26.08.2010 for the reason "insufficient fund" in said account and which was received by the complainant-petitioner on 27.08.2010. Thus, the complainant demanded the amount from the O. P. No. 2 vide legal notice dated 01.09.2010 sent to the opposite party no. 2 by Registered Post with A/D on 03.09.2010 and the said legal notice was received by the opposite party no. 2 on 14.09.2010, which is evident from the reply of the O. P. No. 2 dated 14.09.2010. However, in spite of the receipt of notice of demand by the O. P. No. 2, the O. P. No. 2 had failed to pay the amount within the stipulated period. Hence, the complaint case was filed. 3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for opposite party no. 2. 4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned judgment dated 05.02.2015 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge-II, Jamshedpur is illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in law. It is submitted that two Agreements had been executed between the Opposite Party No. 2 and the Petitioner. But both the agreements could not be concluded on the 2025:JHHC:14226 -3- part of Opposite Party No.-2, though consideration amount had been paid by the Petitioner on taking loan from the Bank. It is submitted that due to failure of these two agreements, liability had arisen which called for the action of payment of the amount that was promised to be paid by the Opposite Party No. 2 vide the said cheque which had bounced. It is submitted the Opposite Party No.2 has got a firm, namely A.K. Associates, of which the Opposite Party No.2 is the Proprietor having its office at IBP Petrol Pump Campus, Tata Kandra Main Road, Adityapur-1. The Opposite Party No. 2 had entered into an agreement of sale on 13.07.2007 with the purchaser ( i.e. the petitioner) and his wife Mrs. Alish Singh. The agreement was in relation to purchasing of one flat that would come up as a result of construction that was to be done by the opposite party no. 2. This agreement was regarding 2-BHK Flat measuring 950 sq.ft. to be constructed and developed on a piece and parcel of land situated at Mauza Dindih, Thana No.128, P.S. - Adityapur, Sub Registrar Office at Seraikela Municipality of Jamshedpur Notified Committee for a total consideration amount of Rs.9,95,750/-. It is submitted that thereafter the petitioner got sanctioned housing loan from SBI, Personal Banking Branch, Bistupur, Jamshedpur to the tune of Rs,9,46,000/-. The petitioner paid the Opposite Party No.2 a total amount of Rs.8,95,000/- out of which Rs.8.00 Lakhs was paid directly by State Bank of India to the Opposite Party No.2 and the balance amount of Rs.95000/- was paid in cash. It is submitted that the Opposite Party No.2 had received a total amount of Rs.8,95,000/- from the petitioner pursuant to the Agreement dated 13.07.2007. It is submitted that due to some commercial reason, the Agreement dated 13.07.2007 could not be 2025:JHHC:14226 -4- complied by the Opposite Party No.2. Therefore at the instance of Opposite Party No. 2 on 03.11.2008 both the parties again entered into another agreement for sale with a commitment on part of Opposite Party No. 2 to sell 3-BHK flat bearing 1230 sq.ft, being constructed and developed over the same piece of land for increased consideration amount of Rs. 12,71,550/-. It is submitted that even the second agreement could not have been fulfilled, and it is also an accepted fact that no further payment had been made in relation to the Second Agreement, except for the amount that had already been paid earlier i.e. Rs.8,95,000/- which was in relation to the first agreement. It is submitted that the amount that was to be paid to the petitioner and to be submitted in the Bank was to the tune of Rs. 12,50,000/-, and the amount had to be paid by four different cheques that was to be issued by the Opposite Party No.2 in accordance with the commitment undertaken by him. As per the Undertaking, four different cheques were issued. Of these four cheques, payment was secured in relation to first cheque only, while the other three cheques had bounced. The fourth cheque, the details of which are- Cheque No.566793 dated 30.04.2010 for Rs.3,25,000/- bounced, is subject matter in the instant case. However, additionally, the cheque that had been issued on 30.03.2010, cheque No.566791 to the tune of Rs.3.00 lakhs and another cheque bearing Cheque No.566792 dated 15.04.2010 to the tune of Rs.3,25,000/- had also bounced due to insufficient fund. It is submitted that the Opposite Party No.2 had issued cheque i.e. the cheque bearing No.566793 dated 30.04.2010 to the tune of Rs.3,25,000/- which had bounced, and is subject matter of 2025:JHHC:14226 -5- instant case. It is submitted that the legal liability has not been discharged on part of Opposite Party No.2, but the learned Appellate Court has found that the cheque which bounced, issued to discharge the liability of the Opposite Party No. 2 as promised in terms of the undertaking dated 23.02.2010, does not constitute the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, merely on the basis that the Petitioner failed to prove for what legal liability the cheque was issued in favour of the Petitioner. It is submitted that two agreements were concluded between the parties, as a result of which the Opposite Party No.2 being Builder had to provide the petitioner with the flat, and for this the petitioner had taken a Housing Loan from the Bank to the tune of Rs.8,00,000/- (Rs. Eight Lakh), and the same had been paid to the Opposite Party No.2, but the first agreement could not be concluded as because the Opposite Party No.2 did not deliver the flat and instead, offered the petitioner a second agreement in which on the same piece of land, 3-BHK flat of area 1230 sq.ft. had to be provided, and an extra amount was charged, that would include the previous amount of Rs, 8,95,000/- already paid, to the total of Rs.12,71,550/-, but, even the second agreement could not be concluded. It is submitted that there was clear fault on the part of the Opposite Party No.2 in not providing the Flat to the petitioner, and this has caused the petitioner to remain at loss as because he had to return the principal amount of Rs.8,00,000/-, and in addition to the interest that is being charged by the Bank at the rate of 12.50% per annum. It is submitted that the Opposite Party No.2 had agreed to pay a total amount of Rs. 13,50,000/- which would count for the principal amount to be paid to the bank as well as the interest charged and loss caused due to breach of the 2025:JHHC:14226 -6- contract. It is submitted that the Petitioner has been paying the interest that has been accumulating over the years on the principal loan amount since 16.09.2007. But contrary to the agreement, the Opposite Party No. 2 never delivered the flats as promised and agreed, and hence the entire amount that was sanctioned by the Bank against housing loan in favour of the Petitioner went in vain. Thus, it is evident that having not been delivered with the flat, the Petitioner has been at loss as because the principal amount of Rs. 8,00,000 had already been paid to the Opposite Party No.2 as consideration amount and interest on it is being charged on continuous basis and the amount to be paid back to the Bank is a total of more than Rs.11,00,000/-. It is submitted that CW.-1 i.e. the complainant has fully supported his case and documents marked as Ext.-1 to Ext.-6 respectively fully support the case of the complainant- petitioner. However, the learned Appellate Court below has wrongly allowed the Criminal Appeal filed by the O. P. No. 2. Thus, the impugned judgment dated 05.02.2015 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 2013 by Sri Deepak Nath Tiwari, learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Jamshedpur may be set aside and the Criminal Revision Application may be allowed by directing the opposite party no. 2 to undergo S. I. for a period of one (1) year and to pay compensation of Rs. 6,50,000/- (Rupees Six Lac Fifty Thousand Only) to the petitioner. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has opposed the prayer and has submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court below is fit and proper and no interference is required from this Court. It is submitted that learned Trial Court had wrongly convicted the opposite party no. 2 for the offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act and had 2025:JHHC:14226 -7- sentenced him to undergo imprisonment of S. I. for a period of one (1) year and to pay compensation of Rs. 6,50,000/- (Rupees Six Lac Fifty Thousand Only) to the petitioner. It is submitted that the learned Appellate Court has considered the case of the petitioner and the O. P. No. 2 in detail. Thus, no illegality has been committed by the learned Appellate Court below and hence, this Criminal Revision Application is devoid of merit and as such, this Criminal Revision Application may be dismissed. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2, after adopting the submission of the learned counsel for the State, has submitted that this Criminal Revision Application is devoid of merit. It is submitted that complainant had lodged the second complaint case to harass him i.e. the O.P. No. 2. It is submitted that the complainant had not gone to learned Court below with clean hands as has been observed by the learned Appellate Court. It is submitted that the Undertaking of the O. P. No. 2, marked as Ext.-2, cannot be relied upon. It is submitted that onus was upon the complainant as per the Ext.- 2/2 that the cheque in question was received by him and which was deposited in his Housing Loan Account and it was dishonoured to make him liable to the O. P. No. 2, but it is evident from Ext.-I that the complainant had deposited the cheque in question in his bank account and therefore the cheque in question was not presented in the loan account of the complainant. It is submitted that the complainant has admitted during his cross-examination in para-17 to the effect that the legal notice sent by the O. P. No. 2 does not show anywhere that the Builder is going to deposit the loan amount in the Bank Account of the petitioner. It is submitted that 2025:JHHC:14226 -8- the Builder had given four cheques of different amounts total amounting to Rs. 12,50,000/- only in terms of settlement, although, it was bounced back. It is submitted that the opposite party no. 2 was ready to make payment with the conditions that the petitioner should have returned the Agreements of two Flats, Allotment Letters, NOC from the Bank, mortgaging the flats to the Bank at the time of payment before filing of the case by the complainant. It is submitted that the opposite party no.2 has succeeded in rebuttal to the presumption of preponderances of probability. It is submitted that Ext.-I and Ext.-2 mainly show certain Undertakings on behalf of the builder-opposite party no. 2, but it does not show that the opposite party no. 2 had promised to pay the amount. It is submitted that the opposite party no. 2 has tried to pay the amount in question but due to bad market conditions and precarious situation, the flat in question could not be constructed and as such, at best, this is a case of breach of contract, which invites civil liability only. It is further submitted that in view of the above facts, this Criminal Revision Application may be dismissed. 7. Perused the Lower Court Records and considered the submission of both the sides. 8. It transpires from the Lower Court Records that the complaint-petitioner had filed the complaint case C/1 Case No. 3242 of 2010 before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur against M/s A. K. Associates represented by its proprietor Mr. Kanchan Tiwari and also against Mr. Kanchan Tiwari son of Janki Tiwari in his personal capacity as the opposite party nos. 1 and 2 respectively on 04.10.2010 as cheque no. 566793 dated 30.04.2010 for an amount of Rs. 3,25,000/- had 2025:JHHC:14226 -9- bounced on 27.08.2010 which had been executed by the opposite party no. 2 for discharging of his liability created vide ‘Undertaking’ dated 23.02.2010. It is also stated in the complaint- petitioner that the complainant had sent the legal notice, on 01.09.2010 to the opposite party no. 2 by Registered Post with A/D on 03.09.2010 and the said notice was received by the opposite party no. 2 on 14.09.2010 in light of the reply sent by the counsel of the opposite party no. 2. The Acknowledgement receipt of notice on 14.09.2010. However, the payment was not made and hence, the complaint case was filed. 9. The complainant-petitioner, Rajesh Kumar Singh in support of his case, got examined himself as C.W.-1. 10. It transpires that the following documents have been marked the Exhibits on behalf of the complainant-petitioner, which are as follows:- (i) Ext-1 is cheque bearing its no.566793 issued on dated 30.04.2010 by the ICICI Bank, Jamshedpur Branch, (ii) Ext.2 is signature of the O. P. No. 2 on the certified copy of Undertaking dated 23.02.2010. (iii) Ext.3 & 3/1 are cheque return memos dated 26.08.2010 and 17.05.2011 respectively. (iv) Ext-4 is Legal notice dated 01.09.2010. (v) Ext.- 5 & 5/1 are postal receipts, posted on 03.09.2010 on two different address of the O. P. No. 2. (vi) Ext.- 6 is reply dated 14.09.2010 on behalf of the O. P. No. 2 to the legal notice. 11. It transpires that statement of the opposite party no. 2 had been recorded under Section 313 of the Cr. P. C. by the learned Court below on 30.08.2011 and to which the opposite party no. 2 2025:JHHC:14226 -10- denied the circumstances put forth against him. 12. Neither any defence witness was examined nor have any documents had been marked as the Exhibits as defence on behalf of the opposite party no. 2. 13. Thereafter Ms. K. M. Prasad, then learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur vide judgement of conviction and order of sentence dated 23.01.2013 had convicted the opposite party no. 2-Kanchan Tiwari for the offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act in connection with C/1 Case No. 3242 of 2010 and had sentenced him to undergo S. I. for a period of one (1) year and had further directed to pay a sum of Rs. 6,50,000/- (Rupees Six Lac Fifty Thousand Only) by way of compensation to the complainant-petitioner. However, the opposite party no. 2 has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 2013, which was allowed by the learned Court below vide judgment dated 05.02.2015 and hence the present Criminal Revision Application has been filed. 14. From securitizing the evidence of C.W.-1, Rajesh Kumar Singh i.e. the complainant-petitioner, it would appear that he has stated that the O. P. No. 2-Kanchan Tiwari in discharge of his liability created an Undertaking dated 23.02.2010 executed by him to the complainant the O. P. No. 2, had issued a cheque no. 566793 dated 30.04.2010 for a sum of Rs. 3,25,000/-payable on CABUS A/C No. 008905005492 maintained by the O. P. No. 2 with ICICI Bank Ltd. Jamshedpur Branch. The Cheque has been marked as Ext.-I. The complainant further identified the signature of the opposite party on certified copy of ‘Undertaking’ dated 23.02.2010 marked as Ext.-2. He further proved return memo dated 17.05.2010 and 26.08.2010, which were marked as Ext.-3 and 2025:JHHC:14226 -11- Ext.-3/1 respectively. He further proved the legal notice sent through his counsel marked as Ext. -4. He further proved postal receipt of notice marked as Ext.- 5 and Ext.-5/1 respectively and he further proved the reply to the legal notice marked as Ext.-6 sent by the O. P. No. 2. 15. During cross-examination, he stated that he had booked Flat of 950 Sq. Ft. with Kanchan Tiwari i.e. the O. P. No. 2, which was valued Rs. 9.70 Lakh at that time and for which he has taken loan from the Bank and has also deposited Rs. 95,000/- as margin money in the account of A. K. Associates and the Bank has treated the said money receipt of Rs. 95,000/- as margin money of the flat in question. He had taken finance from the State Bank of India to the extent of Rs. 9,46,000/- and his margin money of Rs. 95,000/- had remained with the ‘Builder’. The flat was not constructed and as per the Agreement and thereafter one Another flat was prepared of 1265 Sq. Ft. He further stated that Rs. 8,00,000/- was released by the SBI, PB to the Builder A. K. Associates. He also admitted that he made the another agreement with the ‘Builder’ for the flat of 1230 Sq. Ft., but he had not given any amount to the ‘Builder’. However, the Builder could not provide him the flat of 1230 Sq. Ft. also on the basis of 2nd Agreement costing of Rs. 12.70 Lakh and he was to pay difference amount at the time of hand over of the said flat and since flat was also not handed over to him and as such, difference amount was not paid by him to the ‘Builder’. He further asserted that the Bank had paid Rs. 8,00,000/- to the ‘Builder’ and he had paid Rs. 95,000/- to the ‘Builder’ i.e the O. P. No. 2 and in total the Builder has received Rs. 8,95,000/- and thereafter there was an another agreement between them got executed and the ‘Builder’ 2025:JHHC:14226 -12- had given four cheques of total Rs. 12,50,000/-. He was also to pay Rs. 1,00,000/- to the ‘Builder’ after NOC of the Bank. Hence, he had to deposit the loan amount to the Bank by four cheques, which were given by the ‘Builder’ of Four cheques to the amount of Rs. 12,50,000/- as the cheque was issued in his name. He also stated that the ‘Builder’ had deposited Rs. 90,000/- cash in the Bank and Rs. 3,00,000/- was transferred from his account to the Bank (the Bank of the owner-petitioner) and thus Rs. 3,00,000/- was transferred from his Bank Account. 16. He also denied the suggestion that when he has not paid Rs. 3,00,000/- to the Bank, then the Bank had tried to seize the flat of the ‘Builder’ and then ‘Builder’ had deposited Rs. 90,000/- in the Bank. He has not been informed in reply notice that the Builder has stated and informed to pay the amount of the Bank himself and he will settle the dispute. He has denied the suggestion that at the time of finance, he got both the flats mortgaged. However, he admitted that the paper of Agreement of First Flat is deposited with the Bank and he had also handed over the Agreement and NOC of 2nd Flat to the Bank for enhancement of loan. He denied the suggestion that the cheques were given by the accused for repayment of loan. 17. Thus, from securitizing the evidence of CW.-1, Rajesh Kumar Singh, it is evident that though he had taken loan from the Bank for the first flat by paying Rs. 8,00,000/- to the ‘Builder’ i.e. the opposite party no. 2 through the Bank. Consequently he further entered into an another agreement with the ‘Builder’ (i.e. on 03.11.2008) and had deposited paper with the Bank for enhancement of the loan amount. He also asserted that after failure of the agreement for delivery of the flat in question to him by the 2025:JHHC:14226 -13- Builder i.e the O. P. No. 2, the opposite party no.2 had also issued four cheques to him for a sum of total amounting to Rs. 12,50,000/-, which were deposited by him in the Bank to clear the dues of the Bank, but the same was dishonoured due to insufficient funds. It is also a fact that in case of obtaining housing loan from the Bank by any person in respect of flat, the said flat remains mortgaged with the Bank till the EMI is cleared by the person taking Housing Loan from the Bank. Even the opposite party no.2 has not disputed liability vide Agreement dated 28.02.2010 marked as Ext.-2 which is his own Undertaking of the opposite party no. 2 and in which he has given undertaking to the effect that he is morally and legally obliged to return the amount of Rs. 8,95,000/- to the complainant- petitioner, which has been received from the Purchaser towards Agreement. Therefore, the evidence of CW-1 i.e. the complainant- petitioner shows that that he has fully supported his case. 18. So far as the documentary evidence is concerned, Ext.-1 is the cheque no. 566793 dated 30.04.2010 issued by Kanchan Tiwari as Proprietor to the complainant-petitioner i.e. Rajesh Kumar Singh for a sum of Rs. 3,25,000/-. 19. Ext.- 2 is the Undertaking dated 23.02.2010 executed by Kanchan Tiwari i.e. opposite party no. 2 in favour of the complainant-petitioner stating therein that he is the Proprietor of M/s A. K. Associates and he is engaged in the construction of building of sale and he had entered into an agreement for sale on 13.07.2007 with the purchaser Rajesh Kumar Singh Son of Shri R. N. Singh and Mrs. Alish Singh W/O Shri Rajesh Kumar Singh in respect of two (02) room BHK Flat measuring 950 Sq. Ft. situated 2025:JHHC:14226 -14- at 2nd Floor of Janaki Apartment for consideration amount of Rs. 9,95,750/- (Rupees Nine Lakh Ninety Five Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty) and the Purchaser (i.e. the petitioner) after taking loan from the Bank had paid Rs. 8,95,000/- and he also admitted to have received Rs. 8,95,000/- from the Purchaser i.e. the petitioner and admitted proof the receipt of Rs. 8,00,000/- in Bank Account of his firm i.e. M/s A. K. Associates through the Bank. He had also admitted that due to some commercial reasons, he could not fulfilled his commitments made by him through the Agreement for sale dated 13.07.2007 and therefore, he had entered into an another Agreement for sale on 03.11.2008 with the aforesaid purchasers for three (03) BHK flats bearing Unit No. 6 on the 1st Floor measuring 1230 Sq. Ft. construction over the same piece of land for consideration amount of Rs. 12,71,550/-. However, he could not fulfil his obligation towards the said agreement dated 03.11.2008 hence, in the said background he is morally and legally obliged to return the amount, which has been received from the purchasers towards agreement referred to above with reasonable interest and thus, he undertakes to make payment an amount of Rs. 13,50,000/- to the purchasers and for which he had issued four post dated cheques total for an amount of Rs. 12,50,000/- in the name of first purchaser Sri Rajesh Kumar Singh i.e. the petitioner and details of same have been given, which are as follows:- S. No Cheque Number Date Amount 1. 566790 15.03.2010 Rs. 3,00,000.00 2. 566791 30.03.2010 Rs. 3,00,000.00 3. 566792 15.04.2010 Rs. 3,25,000.00 4. 566793 30.04.2010 Rs. 3,25,000.00 Total Rs. 12,50,000.00 2025:JHHC:14226 -15- The O. P. No. 2 had given further undertaking to make payment of balance of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the Purchasers i.e. the petitioner and his wife on their production of NOC issued by State Bank of India, Personal Banking Branch, Bistupur, Jamshedpur. 20. Thus, Ext-2 clearly shows that the opposite party no. 2 in his personal capacity as well as in the capacity of Proprietor of M/s A. K. Associates has admitted to make payment of Rs. 12,50,000/- through four cheques including chque no. 566793 of Rs. 3.25 Lakh which is the subject matter of the instant Criminal Revision Application and he also admitted to pay further balance amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- on producing NOC from the Bank by the petitioner. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court committed grave illegality by observing that the petitioner has failed to prove the legal liability of the O. P. No. 2. 21. Ext. 3 & 3/1 are the return memos dated 26.08.2010 and 17.05.2011 issued by the ICICI Bank Ltd. Jamshedpur in respect of Cheque No. 566793 with endorsement “fund insufficient” which also supported the case of the petitioner. 22. Ext-4 is legal notice dated 01.09.2010 sent by the Advocate of M/s A. K. Associates and Mr. Kanchan Tiwary for payment of due amount of Rs. 3,25,000/- as Cheque No. 566793 for a sum of Rs. 3,25,000/- issued by the opposite party no. 2 to the petitioner had been returned by the Bank with the reason “fund insufficient”. 23. Ext.- 5 & 5/1 are the postal receipts dated 15.06.2011. 24. Ext.- 6 is legal notice dated 14.09.2010 sent by S. K. Swain (Advocate of O. P. No. 2) to Miss Shweta Singh, Advocate, i.e. Advocate of the complainant-petitioner. 2025:JHHC:14226 -16- 25. From perusal of the Ext.-6, it is evident that the O. P. No. 2 also admitted for having issued cheque no. 566793 dated 30.04.2010 for a sum of Rs. 3,25,000/- of ICICI Bank Ltd. Jamshedpur and further stated that due to recession in the market his client faces some financial difficulty and could not arrange the fund in their account and as a result of which, the said cheque was dishonoured on his representation. Thus, the Ext. -6 also shows admission on the part of the O. P. No. 2 for paying Rs. 3.25 Lakh by Cheque No. 566793 dated 30.04.2010. This Ext.-6 was sent by the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 on his admission. 26. The learned counsel for the O. P. No. 2 has further conveyed the Undertaking of his client i.e. the O. P. No. 2 that payment against the aforesaid dishonoured cheque shall be made within seven days. However, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 had also requested for returning of the agreement of two Flats, Allotment Letters and NOC from the Bank mortgaging the flats for settlement of the account. 27. Thus, even from perusal of the legal notice dated 14.09.2010 marked as Ext.-6, it is evident that it was also further admitted by the learned counsel for opposite party no.2 that his client (i.e. the O. P. No. 2) is ready to pay the said liability against the dishonoured cheque within seven days. Thus, Ext.-6 further corroborates and supports the case of the petitioner. 28. However, while being examined under Section 313 of the CrPC on 30.08.2011 before the learned Court below the opposite party no. 2 has given evasive reply. 29. Therefore, the learned Trial Court below had convicted 2025:JHHC:14226 -17- the O. P. No. 2 for the offence under Section 138 of the Cr. P. C. and sentenced him to undergo S. I. for a period of one (1) year and to pay compensation of Rs. 6,50,000/- to the complainant- petitioner. 30. However, the learned Appellate Court below has reversed the findings of the learned Trial Court below, although, the Appellate Court has himself observed that presumption under Section 118 (a) of the N. I. Act is available in favour of the complainant-petitioner, but surprisingly the learned Appellate Court has reversed the finding of the Trial Court mainly on the ground that the petitioner had not given him ‘No Dues Certificate’ in favour of the accused-opposite party no. 2 and which was not to be issued by the petitioner without receiving the amount of Rs. 12.50 Lakh and Rs. 1.00 Lakh i.e. Rs. 13.50 Lakh as per Undertaking dated 23.02.2010 (i.e. Ext. -2) by the O. P. No. 2. 31. Thus, the Appellate Court below has committed grave error of record by observing that the complainant during cross- examination has denied the fact that four cheques including cheque in question were given to him for payment of Bank Loan and wrongly observed that the complainant has not come with clean hand. Both the finding of the learned Appellate Court are perverse and vitiated. 32. It is evident from the pleadings of the parties and evidence led on behalf of the complainant-petitioner that the complainant had to give NOC to the opposite party no. 2 i.e. Builder only after payment of Rs. 12,50,000/- to the Bank and for which he has issued four cheques of different denomination total amounting to Rs. 12,50,000/-. Secondly, the learned Appellate Court below has observed that during cross-examination, the 2025:JHHC:14226 -18- complainant has denied the fact that four cheques were given to him for bank loan. This observation is also wrong and perverse as it was merely the suggestion put to the complainant-petitioner by the defence counsel appearing on behalf of the accused-opposite party no. 2. 33. The suggestion recorded by the learned Trial Court below in para-20 is being referred here- “ ,slh ckr ugha gS fd psdl vfHk;qDr us cSad ds yksu ds Repayment djus ds fy, fn;k FkkA”” 34. They may be some fallacy or missing link in recording the suggestion of the petitioner put forward by the learned defence counsel before the learned Court below. However, the learned Appellate Court below has failed to consider the cross- examination made by him from the complainant-petitioner in which he himself admitted at para-12 that Rs. 8,00,000/- was released to ‘Builder’ M/s A. K. Associates from SBI (PB) i.e. Personal Banking. It was also referred in para-14 of his cross- examination of complainant-petitioner that the Builder has paid cheque of Rs. 12,50,000/- by him in the loan account. However, it is common fact that mere non-depositing the said cheque in the loan account by the petitioner would have make a case different. The petitioner bonafidely has deposited the cheque of Rs. 3,25,000/- apart from another cheque in Bank Account as the cheque was issued in his personal name and not in the name of the Bank, which was also not possible to the complainant-petitioner to deposit the said Cheque before the Bank in the concerned Bank Account of the Bank. The petitioner was to get deposited the cheque in his own personal Bank Account and not the other Bank Account. Thus, reasoning given by the learned Appellate Court is absurd, illegal and arbitrary and cannot be taken into 2025:JHHC:14226 -19- consideration. 35. It has been held in the case of Bir Singh Versus Mukesh Kumar reported in (2019) 4 SCC 197, para-6, 22 to 26, 32, 33, 38 and 40 as follows:- “Para-6:- The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to infuse credibility to negotiable instruments including cheques and to encourage and promote the use of negotiable instruments including cheques in financial transactions. The penal provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques without serious intention to honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same. Para-22:- In Laxmi Dyechem vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., this Court reiterated that in view of Section 139, it has to be presumed that a cheque was issued in discharge of a debt or other liability but the 5 (2005) 5 SCC 294 6 (2007) 1 SCC 70 7 (2012) 13 SCC 375 presumption could be rebutted by adducing evidence. The burden of proof was however on the person who wanted to rebut the presumption. This Court held “however, this presumption coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act leads to the conclusion that by countermanding payment of a post dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get away from the penal provision of Section 138 of the Act”. Para-23:- In Kumar Exports vs. Sharma Carpets, this Court reiterated that there is a presumption that every negotiable instrument duly executed, is for discharge of a debt or liability, but the presumption is rebuttable by proving the contrary. In the facts and circumstances of the case it was found that the cheque in question was towards advance for purchase of carpets, which were in fact not sold by the payee of the cheque to the drawer, as proved from the deposition of an official of the Sales Tax Department, who stated that the payee had admitted that he had not sold the 2025:JHHC:14226 -20- carpets. Para-24:- In K.N. Beena vs. Muniyappan and Another, this Court held that in view of the provisions of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with Section 118 thereof, the Court had to presume that the cheque had been issued for discharging a debt or liability. The said presumption was rebuttable and could be rebutted by the accused by proving the (2009) 2 SCC 513 9(2001) 8 SCC 458 contrary. But mere denial or rebuttal by the accused was not enough. The accused had to prove by cogent evidence that there was no debt or liability. This Court clearly held that the High Court had erroneously set aside the conviction, by proceeding on the basis that denials/averments in the reply of the accused were sufficient to shift the burden of proof on the complainant to prove that the cheque had been issued for discharge of a debt or a liability. This was an entirely erroneous approach. The accused had to prove in the trial by leading cogent evidence that there was no debt or liability. Para-25:- In R. Vijayan vs. Baby and Another this Court observed that the object of Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act is both punitive as also compensatory and restitutive. It provides a single forum and single proceeding for enforcement of criminal liability by reason of dishonour of cheque and for enforcement of the civil liability for realization of the cheque amount, thereby obviating the need for the creditor to move two different fora for relief. This Court expressed its anguish that some Magistrates went by the traditional view, that the criminal proceedings were for imposing punishment and did not exercise discretion to direct payment of compensation, causing considerable difficulty to the complainant, as invariably the limitation for filing civil cases would expire by the time the criminal case was decided. Para-26:- In R. Vijayan vs. Baby this Court observed that unless there were special circumstances, in all cases of conviction, the 2025:JHHC:14226 -21- Court should uniformly exercise the power to levy fine up to twice the cheque amount and keeping in view the cheque amount and the simple interest thereon at 9% per annum as the reasonable quantum of loss, direct payment of such amount as compensation. This Court rightly observed that uniformity and consistency in deciding similar cases by different courts not only increases the credibility of the cheque as a Negotiable Instrument but also the credibility of the Courts of Justice. Para-32:- The proposition of law which emerges from the judgments referred to above is that the onus to rebut the presumption under Section 139 that the cheque has been issued in discharge of a debt or liability is on the accused and the fact that the cheque might be post dated does not absolve the drawer of a cheque of the penal consequences of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Para-33:- A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted. Para-38:- In the absence of any finding that the cheque in question was not signed by the respondent-accused or not voluntarily made over to the payee and in the absence of any evidence with regard to the circumstances in which a blank signed cheque had been given to the appellant-complainant, it may reasonably be presumed that the cheque was filled in by the appellant-complainant being the payee in the presence of the respondent-accused being the drawer, at his request and/or with 2025:JHHC:14226 -22- his acquiescence. The subsequent filling in of an unfilled signed cheque is not an alteration. There was no change in the amount of the cheque, its date or the name of the payee. The High Court ought not to have acquitted the respondent-accused of the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Para-40:- The appeals are allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The conviction of the respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is confirmed. However, the respondent-accused is sentenced only to fine, which is enhanced to Rs.16 lakhs and shall be paid as compensation to the appellant- complainant. The fine shall be deposited in the Trial Court within eight weeks from the date, failing which the sentence of imprisonment of one year as imposed by the Trial Court shall revive. There shall be no order as to costs.” 36. It has been held in the case of P. Rasiya Versus Abdul Nazer and Another reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1131, para-7 and 9 as follows:- “Para-7:- Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and orders passed by the Appellate Court affirming the conviction of the accused under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the accused preferred three different Revision Applications before the High Court. By the impugned common judgment and order, the High Court has reversed the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below and has acquitted the accused on the ground that, in the complaint, the Complainant has not specifically stated the nature of transactions and the source of fund. However, the High Court has failed to note the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. As per Section 139 of the N.I. Act, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Therefore, once the initial burden is discharged by the 2025:JHHC:14226 -23- Complainant that the cheque was issued by the accused and the signature and the issuance of the cheque is not disputed by the accused, in that case, the onus will shift upon the accused to prove the contrary that the cheque was not for any debt or other liability. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a statutory presumption and thereafter, once it is presumed that the cheque is issued in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which is in favour of the Complainant/holder of the cheque, in that case, it is for the accused to prove the contrary. The aforesaid has not been dealt with and considered by the High Court. The High Court has also failed to appreciate that the High Court was exercising the revisional jurisdiction and there were concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below. Para-9:- Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court acquitting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is hereby quashed and set aside and the order passed by the learned trial Court convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act confirmed/modified by the learned Sessions Court is hereby restored. Now, the accused be dealt with as per the order passed by the first Appellate Court/Sessions Court. 37. It has been held in the case of Rajesh Jain Versus Ajay Singh reported in (2023) 10 SCC 148, para-54, 55, 56, 61, 62 and 63 as follows:- “Para-54:- As rightly contended by the appellant, there is a fundamental flaw in the way both the Courts below have proceeded to appreciate the evidence on record. Once the presumption under Section 139 was given effect to, the Courts ought to have proceeded on the premise that the cheque was, indeed, issued in discharge of a debt/liability. The entire focus would then necessarily 2025:JHHC:14226 -24- have to shift on the case set up by the accused, since the activation of the presumption has the effect of shifting the evidential burden on the accused. The nature of inquiry would then be to see whether the accused has discharged his onus of rebutting the presumption. If he fails to do so, the Court can straightaway proceed to convict him, subject to satisfaction of the other ingredients of Section 138. If the Court finds that the evidential burden placed on the accused has been discharged, the complainant would be expected to prove the said fact independently, without taking aid of the presumption. The Court would then take an overall view based on the evidence on record and decide accordingly. Para-55:- At the stage when the courts concluded that the signature had been admitted, the Court ought to have inquired into either of the two questions (depending on the method in which accused has chosen to rebut the presumption): Has the accused led any defense evidence to prove and conclusively establish that there existed no debt/liability at the time of issuance of cheque? In the absence of rebuttal evidence being led the inquiry would entail: Has the accused proved the non-existence of debt/liability by a preponderance of probabilities by referring to the ‘particular circumstances of the case’? Para-56:- The perversity in the approach of the Trial Court is noticeable from the way it proceeded to frame a question at trial. According to the trial Court, the question to be decided was 'whether a legally valid and enforceable debt existed qua the complainant and the cheque in question (Ex. CWI/A) was issued in discharge of said liability/debt'. When the initial framing of the question itself being erroneous, one cannot expect the outcome to be right. The onus instead of being fixed on the accused has been fixed on the complainant. Lack of proper understanding of the nature of the presumption in Section 139 and its effect has resulted in an erroneous Order being passed. Para-61:- The fundamental error in the approach lies in the fact that 2025:JHHC:14226 -25- the High Court has questioned the want of evidence on part of the complainant in order to support his allegation of having extended loan to the accused, when it ought to have instead concerned itself with the case set up by the accused and whether he had discharged his evidential burden by proving that there existed no debt/liability at the time of issuance of cheque. Para-62:- In the teeth of the aforesaid analysis, we have not the slightest of hesitation in concluding that this case calls for interference, notwithstanding that both the courts below have concurrently held in favour of the accused. Since we have answered point No:(i) in the negative, the need to examine point No:(ii) does not arise. Para-63:- Hence, we proceed to allow the appeal by setting aside the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh rendered in CRM-A No.148 of 2020 dated 01.02.2022 and allow the complaint filed under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and convict the respondent accused with fine of twice the amount of the cheque namely Rs.13,90,408/- (Rupees thirteen lakh ninety thousand four hundred and eight only) failing which he shall undergo simple imprisonment for one year.” 38. Thus, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Rasiya Versus Abdul Nazer and Another reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1131, it is evident that the presumption under Section 139 of the N. I. Act is statutory presumption and once, it is presumed that cheque is issued in whole or in part, of any debt or any other liability, which is in favour of the complainant/holder of the cheque, in that case it is for the accused to prove the contrary. 39. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held in the case 2025:JHHC:14226 -26- of Rajesh Jain Versus Ajay Singh reported in (2023) 10 SCC 148 that once the signature is admitted by the person issuing the cheque, then, the Court ought to have inquired into either of the two questions and had pointed out that whether the accused has led any defense evidence to prove and conclusively establish that there is no debt/liability at the time of issuance of cheque? Further in the absence of rebuttal evidence, the accused has to prove the nonexistence of debt/liability by a preponderance of probabilities by referring to the ‘particular circumstances of the case’? 40. It is evident that the opposite party no. 2, Kanchan Tiwari has himself admitted that the cheque was issued on 23.02.2010 to discharge his liability and issued four cheques and one cheque bearing no. 566793 dated 30.04.2010 for the amount of Rs. 3,25,000/- has been issued for the liability for not handing over the flat to the petitioner. No contrary evidence was led by the opposite party no. 2 in rebuttal. 41. Thus, the learned Appellate Court has committed grave error by reversing the findings of the learned Trial Court. It is evident that the opposite party no. 2 is the builder and also Proprietor of A.K. Associates and he has misused in the capacity of Builder/Proprietorship of the Company, thus in view of the Undertaking of the opposite party no. 2 i.e. the builder by issuing the cheque bearing no. 566793 dated 30.04.2010 for the amount of Rs. 3,25,000/-, it has been safely presumed that the opposite party no. 2 has promised to returned the amount of Rs. 3,25,000/- to the petitioner. It is further evident that the opposite party no. 2 i.e. the builder has misappropriated the amount of Rs. 12.50/- Lakh and cheated the petitioner only to earn more profit from the other customers for taking undue profit. It is evident that initially 2025:JHHC:14226 -27- opposite party no. 2 had obtained Rs. 8.95/- Lakh from the petitioner including the Bank loan of Rs. 8.00/- granted from the State Bank of India, Personal Banking Branch, Bistupur, Jamshedpur on behalf of the petitioner for handing over one 2-BHK Flat of an area measuring 950 Sq. Ft. but the opposite party no. 2 had failed to deliver the said flat within time pursuant to the agreement dated 13.07.2007 between the petitioner and his wife. 42. It is further evident that one another agreement was executed on 03.11.2008 between the petitioner and the opposite party no. 2 for delivering one another flat of 3-BHK area measuring 1230 Sq. Ft. and the opposite party no. 2 has further obtained Rs. 3.00/- Lakh from the petitioner through the Bank. The opposite party no. 2 in lieu of liability handing over four cheques bearing Cheque No. 566790 dated 15.03.2010 of Rs.3.00/- lakhs, Cheque No. 566791 dated 30.03.2010 of Rs.3.00/- lakhs, Cheque No. 566792 dated 15.04.2010 of Rs.3.25/- Lakh and Cheque No. 566793 dated 30.04.2010 of Rs.3.25/- Lakh respectively totalling amounting to Rs. 12.50/- Lakh and further promised to pay Rs. 1.00/- Lakh towards interest. Thereafter only first cheque bearing Cheque No. 566790 dated 15.03.2010 of Rs.3.00/- lakhs was paid whereas the last cheque was also remained unpaid, which was returned by the Bank with endorsement due to insufficient of fund in the account of the opposite party no. 2. Therefore, the opposite party no. 2 cannot escape from his liability. It is further evident that the builder i.e. the opposite party no. 2 was cunning enough and to make liaising with the Bank and got released the flat in question from the bank, which was sealed at the instance of the Bank without making 2025:JHHC:14226 -28- payment of Rs. 3.25/- Lakh in question. 43. It has been held in the case of Don Ayengia Versus State of Assam and Another reported in (2016) 3 SCC 1, at para-10 to 15 as follows:- “Para-10:- It is not in dispute that the execution of the promissory note and the endorsement made by the respondent has been satisfactorily proved at the trial. Concurrent findings recorded by the trial court and the first appellate court to that effect conclude the factual part of the controversy. The only question that survives in the above background is whether the cheques issued by the respondent were meant to discharge, in whole or part, “any debt or other liability” within the meaning of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Para-11:- We have no hesitation in answering that question in the affirmative. The facts as narrated above and as held proved by the trial court and the appellate court, leave no manner of doubt, that Nazimul Islam had received an amount of rupees ten lakhs from the complainant in connection with the agreement executed between the two. It is also not in dispute that upon termination of the agreement, the amount paid to Nazimul Islam was refundable to the complainant and that Nazimul Islam had agreed to refund the same within one month. The promissory note executed by Nazimul Islam contained an unequivocal acknowledgment of not only the debt/liability aforementioned but promised to liquidate the same within one month with interest at the bank rate. Five cheques handed over were to be returned but only upon payment of the amount in question. Such being the fact situation, it cannot be said that the cheques had nothing to do with any debt or other liability. As a matter of fact, the existence of the debt or liability was never in dispute. On the contrary, it was acknowledged by Nazimul Islam who simply sought one month's time to pay up the amount. The cheques were post-dated, only to give to the drawer 2025:JHHC:14226 -29- the specified one month's time to pay the amount. There is thus a direct relationship between the liability and the cheques issued in connection therewith. Thus far there is no difficulty. Para-12:- The difficulty arises only because the promissory note uses the words “security” qua the cheques. This would ordinarily and in the context in which the cheques were given imply that once the amount of rupees ten lakhs was paid, the cheques shall have to be returned. There would be no reason for their retention by the complainant or for their presentation. In case, however, the amount was not paid within the period stipulated, the cheques were liable to be presented for otherwise there was no logic or reason for their having been issued and handed over in the first instance. If non-payment of the agreed debt/liability within the time specified also did not entitle the holder to present the cheques for payment, the issuance and delivery of any such cheques would be meaningless and futile, if not absurd. Para-13:- It is important to note that it was not a case where no debt or liability was determined or acknowledged to be payable. If cheques were issued in relation to a continuing contract or business where no claim is made on the date of the issuance nor any determinate amount payable to the holder, one could perhaps argue that the cheques cannot be presented or prosecution launched on a unilateral claim of any debt or liability. The present is, however, a case where the existence of the debt/liability was never in dispute. It was on the contrary acknowledged and a promise was made to liquidate the same within one month. Failure on the part of the debtor to do so could lead to only one result viz. presentation of the cheques for payment and in the event of dishonour, launch of prosecution as has indeed happened in the case at hand. Para-14:- The argument that the respondent had no liability to liquidate the debt owed by Nazimul Islam has not impressed us. What is important is whether the cheques were supported by 2025:JHHC:14226 -30- consideration. Besides the fact that there is a presumption that a negotiable instrument is supported by consideration there was no dispute that such a consideration existed inasmuch as the cheques were issued in connection with the discharge of the outstanding liability against Nazimul Islam. At any rate the endorsement made by the respondent on the promissory note that the cheques can be presented for encashment after 25-9-2007 clearly shows that the cheques issued by him were not ornamental but were meant to be presented if the amount in question was not paid within the extended period. The High Court in our view fell in error in upsetting the conviction recorded by the courts below who had correctly analysed the factual situation and applied the law applicable to the same. Para-15:- In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside the order passed by the High Court to the extent it allowed Criminal Revision No. 41 of 2012 filed by the respondent. Consequently, the order passed by the appellate court shall stand restored. We, however, do not see any reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court to the extent it dismissed Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 2012. No costs.” 44. Thus, the learned Appellate Court has committed grave illegality by reversing the findings of the learned Trial Court below by which the opposite party no. 2 has been sentenced to undergo S. I. for a period of one (1) year and has further been directed to pay a sum of Rs. 6,50,000/- [Rs. 6.50/- Lakh] due to illegal acts committed by the opposite party no. 2 with the petitioner and for which the petitioner has suffered huge loss also because the opposite party no. 2 has neither given the Flat in the year 2007 nor in the year 2008 or till date by opposite party no. 2, although the opposite party no. 2 appears to have completed the 2025:JHHC:14226 -31- project in the capacity of Builder and got released the Flat of the petitioner in his favour through the Bank in clandestine manner. Even learned counsel for the O. P. No. 2 while sending his reply dated 14.09.2010 to the legal notice dated 01.09.2010 sent by the learned counsel for the petitioner, has admitted to return the amount to the petitioner within one week and has admitted of the issuance of four cheques bearing Cheque No. 566790 dated 15.03.2010 of Rs.3.00/- lakhs, Cheque No. 566791 dated 30.03.2010 of Rs.3.00/- lakhs, Cheque No. 566792 dated 15.04.2010 of Rs.3.25/- Lakh and Cheque No. 566793 dated 30.04.2010 of Rs.3.25/- Lakh respectively totalling amounting to Rs. 12.50/- Lakh. 45. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the judgment dated 05.02.2015 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 2013 by Sri Deepak Nath Tiwari, learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Jamshedpur is set aside and the judgement of conviction dated 23.01.2013 passed by Ms. K. M. Prasad, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur in connection with C/1 Case No. 3242 of 2010 by which opposite party no. 2, Kanchan Tiwari has been convicted for the offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act is upheld. 46. However, so far as the order of sentence dated 23.01.2013 passed by Ms. K. M. Prasad, Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur in connection with C/1 Case No. 3242 of 2010 by which opposite party no. 2, Kanchan Tiwari sentenced to undergo S. I. for a period of one (1) year and has further directed to pay a sum of Rs. 6,50,000/- (Rupees Six Lac Fifty Thousand Only) by way of compensation to the complainant-petitioner is concerned, 2025:JHHC:14226 -32- the same is modified to the extent that the opposite party no. 2 is directed to make payment of compensation of Rs. 6,50,000/- (Rupees Six Lac Fifty Thousand Only) to the petitioner within ten (10) weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order, failing which the opposite party no. 2 will undergo S. I. for a period of one (1) year and also pay the compensation amount of Rs. 6.50/- Lakh to the petitioner. 47. However, liberty is given to the opposite party no. 2 to pay the said amount of Rs. 6.50/- Lakh (Rs. Six Lakh and Fifty Thousand) to the petitioner within ten (10) weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order failing which the petitioner will be at liberty to recover the same through the process of law by taking all possible measures against him and the learned Court below is directed to take all possible coercive steps for recovery of the said amount in favour of the petitioner from the O. P. No. 2. 48. This Criminal Revision Application No. 279 of 2015 is allowed to the extent as indicated above. (Sanjay Prasad, J.) Kamlesh/A.F.R.