2025:HHC:36136 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 161 of 2024 Date of Decision: 30.10.2025. Parshotam Lal .....Appellant Versus Chiri Lal (deceased) through LRs. …..Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Appellant : Mr. Raman Jamalta, Advocate. For the respondents: Ms. Pooja Thakur, Advocate, vice Mr. R.S. Chandel, Advocate. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral). The present appellant has filed this appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, CPC), assailing the judgment and decree dated 18.01.2020 passed by the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala in Civil Appeal No. 48-D/XIII/2019, titled Parshotam Lal vs. Chiri Devi, whereby the judgment and decree dated 27.06.2019, passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Kangra at 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? YES 2 Dharamshala in Civil Suit No. 16 of 2012, titled Chiri Devi vs. Parshotam Lal has been upheld. 2. For the sake of convenience, hereinafter in this judgment, the parties shall be referred in the same manner in which they were referred before learned Trial Court. The plaintiff filed a suit for possession of the suit land, comprised in Khata No. 321 min, Khatauni No. 415, Khasra No. 458, situated in Mauza Sidhbari, Tehsil Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. The plaintiff averred that being a co-sharer in the Shamlat- Deh land, the suit land was recorded in her name and she was in possession until the defendant forcibly occupied it in the second week of November 2011. It was further stated that the defendant, who owned the adjoining land (Khasra No. 457), constructed a septic tank, latrine, and bathroom on the suit land without the plaintiff's consent. Upon discovery, the plaintiff's requests for removal were ignored, leading her to apply for demarcation. The demarcation report dated 09.12.2011, conducted by a retired Tehsildar, confirmed the defendant's constructions on the suit land, prompting the lawsuit. 3 3. The defendant contested the suit, raising preliminary objections regarding maintainability, cause of action, locus standi, limitation, and estoppel, and alternatively claimed ownership through adverse possession. On merits, the defendant admitted the suit land was recorded in the plaintiff's name but asserted that in April 1992, an oral agreement to sell was entered into for 1 Kanal and 6 Marlas of land, which included the suit land and Khasra No. 457. The defendant claimed that he paid an initial Rs. 2,000/- and later the entire sale consideration, and possession was delivered to him. 4. The plaintiff allegedly delayed executing the sale deed and, in 2001, refused to do so but executed a gift deed for Khasra No. 457, promising to transfer the suit land later. The defendant contended that he constructed his house after procuring a bank loan in 2002 and that the bathroom and toilet were built about ten years prior. He pleaded that his possession since 1992 constituted adverse possession and that the plaintiff, along with her family members, had worked as labourers during the construction, 4 estopping her from filing the suit. The defendant also denied knowledge of the demarcation process. 5. The plaintiff filed a replication, denying the defendant's assertions and reasserting the plaint's averments. On the pleadings of the parties, the ld. Trial Court framed the following issues: - 1. Whether plaintiff is entitled for decree of possession as prayed for? OPP. 2. Whether suit in the present form is not maintainable? OPD. 3. Whether plaintiff has no cause of action? OPD. 4. Whether plaintiff has no locus-standi?OPD. 5. Whether suit is time barred? OPD. 6. Whether plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct? OPD 7. Whether defendant has become owner of the suit land by way of adverse possession as alleged? OPD. 8. Relief. 6. After evaluating the evidence, the Trial Court decided all issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. Thereafter the appellant/defendant filed a regular first appeal wherein he argued that the Trial Court gravely erred in deciding all issues against him. He contended that the court failed to appreciate the evidence regarding the oral agreement to sell from 1992, the payment of the entire sale consideration, and the delivery of possession. It was argued that the plaintiff's execution of a gift deed for Khasra No. 457 5 and the deferment of the sale deed for the suit land (Khasra No. 458) supported his claim. 7. The appellant further asserted that the Trial Court did not properly consider the evidence that the plaintiff and her family members worked as labourers during the construction of the bathroom and toilet, which demonstrated her acquiescence. It was also argued that the Trial Court failed to discuss the entire evidence on record, leading to an erroneous decree. The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal therefore, the present appeal. 8. Heard counsels for the parties and perused the impugned judgments. 9. The core of the defendant's case rests on an unsubstantiated oral agreement to sell allegedly entered into in 1992. The defendant claimed that possession of the suit land was delivered to him pursuant to this agreement and that the plaintiff subsequently executed a gift deed only for the adjoining Khasra No. 457, deferring the transfer of the suit land, Khasra No. 458. This assertion has been rightly disbelieved by the learned Trial Court. 6 10. A transfer of immovable property of this nature can only be effected through a registered instrument, and the defendant failed to produce any such document conferring any right, title, or interest in the suit land upon him. His own testimony revealed that the construction of his house was on Khasra No. 457, and he admitted during cross-examination that the disputed latrine and bathroom, as confirmed by the demarcation report, were situated on the suit land, Khasra No. 458. 11. The plea of adverse possession raised by the defendant is legally untenable and was correctly rejected. A claim of adverse possession requires clear and specific pleadings and proof that the possession was hostile to the true owner, continuous, open, and uninterrupted for the statutory period. The defendant's case was self-contradictory, as he simultaneously claimed possession based on a permissive agreement and, in the alternative, as being adverse. 12. His pleadings were deficient in specifying the crucial dates when his possession allegedly became adverse and when his title was perfected. 7 Furthermore, his own evidence suggested that the constructions were raised only about ten years prior, which falls short of the requisite period. An act of forcible encroachment, as appears to be the case here, does not, by itself, mature into a claim of adverse possession without satisfying the stringent legal requirements. 13. The defendant's challenge to the demarcation report, Ex. PW3/A, conducted on 09.12.2011, is without merit. The report was prepared by a retired Tehsildar in a quasi-judicial capacity, and the defendant, despite claiming an earlier demarcation, failed to produce any evidence to rebut the ofÏcial findings. The report conclusively established that the defendant had encroached upon the suit land and raised constructions thereon. 14. A demarcation, once conducted, attains finality unless challenged through the appropriate statutory mechanism under the H.P. Land Revenue Act, which the defendant failed to do. Consequently, the learned Trial Court was justified in relying upon this crucial piece of documentary evidence to conclude that 8 the plaintiff was the rightful owner seeking possession of her encroached-upon property. 15. In view of the aforesaid, there arises no question of law much less a substantial question of law for the consideration of the Court. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge 30th October, 2025 (Susheel/T.B.)