JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 85 of 2025, dated 07.07.2025, registered at Police Station Dehra, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Section 65 (1) and 137 (2) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Section 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the present FIR. The petitioner is the sole earner of the family, and his family is suffering due to his incarceration. No recovery is to be made from the petitioner. The victim did not raise any hue and cry regarding the incident. The condition of the petitioner’s father is critical. The surgery on the petitioner’s wife’s uterus is necessary. The presence of the petitioner is necessary to look after his father and his wife. Gram Panchayat has also expressed its no objection to releasing the petitioner. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the court may impose; hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant and her husband had gone to their work on 7th July 2025 at 8 AM. The informant’s son told her that the victim was crying in her room. The informant went to the room where the informant disclosed that the petitioner had dragged her inside the room and raped her. She identified the petitioner, who disclosed his name as Virender. The police registered the FIR and arrested the petitioner. The victim and the petitioner  were  medically  examined. Their  samples  were preserved. The police also seized the case property. Samples and case property have been sent to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory (RFSL), and the result of the analysis is awaited. The police also checked the CCTV footage and found the petitioner dragging the victim. The petitioner would influence the investigation and abscond in case of his release on bail. The petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous crime. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard M/s Rajendra Singh Gulati and Anil Kumar Manget, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr. The petitioner would influence the investigation and abscond in case of his release on bail. The petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous crime. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard M/s Rajendra Singh Gulati and Anil Kumar Manget, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr. Rajendra Singh Gulati, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime. The petitioner’s father is ill, and the petitioner’s wife requires the removal of the uterus. The presence of the petitioner is necessary in his home. He will abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was involved in the commission of a heinous crime. The investigation is continuing, and the petitioner would influence the investigation, if released on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:- (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the wit- nesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, how- ever, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application can- not undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if re- leased on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an in- dividual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  held  in  State  of  Rajasthan  v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, but the gravity and heinousness of the crime should weigh with the Court while considering the bail petition. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The status report shows that the petitioner had dragged the victim inside the room and raped her. The police checked the CCTV footage and found the petitioner dragging the victim. This prima facie corroborates the victim’s version that she was dragged to a room. 11. The status report shows that the petitioner had dragged the victim inside the room and raped her. The police checked the CCTV footage and found the petitioner dragging the victim. This prima facie corroborates the victim’s version that she was dragged to a room. There is no reason to disbelieve the victim’s testimony at this stage. The victim was a minor aged 13 years. Hence, the petitioner is prima facie involved in the commission of offences punishable under Section 65(1) and 137(2) of BNS and Section 4 of the POCSO Act. 12. It was submitted that there is no corroboration of the victim’s testimony. The victim did not shout for help, which falsifies her version. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanwar Singh Meena v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 12 SCC 180 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 614: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 872 that the High Court is to see a prima facie case while granting bail and not to undertake meticulous examination of the material. It was observed at page 185: “10. Thus, Section 439 of the Code confers very wide powers on the High Court and the Court of Session regarding bail. But, while granting bail, the High Court and the Sessions Court are guided by the same considerations as other courts. That is to say, the gravity of the crime, the character of the evidence, position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and witnesses, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and repeating the offence, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and obstructing the course of justice and such other grounds are required to be taken into consideration. Each criminal case presents its own peculiar factual scenario and, therefore, certain grounds peculiar to a particular case may have to be taken into account by the court. The court has to only opine as to whether there is a prima facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake a meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the police and comment on the same. Such assessment of evidence and premature comments are likely to deprive the accused of a fair trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. The court has to only opine as to whether there is a prima facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake a meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the police and comment on the same. Such assessment of evidence and premature comments are likely to deprive the accused of a fair trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. It was held in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the Court has to see the broad probabilities of the case and not the discrepancies. It was observed at page 138: 15. As held in Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124, while considering the question of grant of bail, the court should avoid consideration of details of the evidence as it is not a relevant consideration. While it is necessary to consider the prima facie case, an exhaustive exploration of the merits of the case should be avoided. We, therefore, consciously refrain from considering the merits of the materials/evidence collected by the prosecution. xxxx 21….The probability or improbability of the prosecution version has to be judged based on the materials available to the court at the time when bail is considered and not on the basis of discrepancies.” 14. It was held in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that the Court should not evaluate a detailed assessment of merits. It was observed at page 334: “33. Before dealing with the case at hand, we may, at the cost of repetition, emphasise that a court, while deciding an application for bail, should refrain from evaluating or undertaking a detailed assessment of evidence, as the same is not a relevant consideration at the threshold stage. While a court may examine prima facie issues, including any reasonable grounds, whether the accused committed an offence or the severity of the offence itself, an extensive consideration of merits, which has the potential to prejudice either the case of the prosecution or the defence, is undesirable. It is thus deemed appropriate to outrightly clarify that neither have we considered the merits of the case nor are we inclined to comment on the evidence collected by the SIT in the present case.” 15. It is thus deemed appropriate to outrightly clarify that neither have we considered the merits of the case nor are we inclined to comment on the evidence collected by the SIT in the present case.” 15. The victim’s statement is prima facie sufficient to show the petitioner’s involvement in the crime. 16. The offence alleged against the petitioner is heinous and is punishable with life imprisonment. It involves the safety of the minor girls in society, and any leniency would bring disorder in society by jeopardising the safety of the minors. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781 that the liberty of a person has to be balanced with peace and harmony in society. Liberty cannot be elevated to such a high pedestal as would bring in anarchy or disorder in society. It was observed at page 384: “65. We are absolutely conscious that the liberty of a person should not be lightly dealt with, for the deprivation of the liberty of a person has an immense impact on the mind. Incarceration creates a concavity in the personality of an individual. Sometimes it causes a sense of emptiness. Needless to emphasise, the sacrosanctity of liberty is paramount in a civilised society. However, in a democratic body polity which is wedded to the rule of law, an individual is expected to grow within the social restrictions sanctioned by law. Individual liberty is restricted by larger social interests, and its deprivation must have due sanction of law. In an orderly society, an individual is expected to live with dignity, having respect for the law and also giving due respect to others' rights. It is a well-accepted principle that the concept of liberty is not in the realm of absolutism but is a restricted one. The cry of the collective for justice, its desire for peace and harmony and its necessity for security cannot be allowed to be trivialised. The life of an individual living in a society governed by the rule of law has to be regulated, and such regulations, which are the source of law, subserve the social balance and function as a significant instrument for the protection of human rights and the security of the collective. The life of an individual living in a society governed by the rule of law has to be regulated, and such regulations, which are the source of law, subserve the social balance and function as a significant instrument for the protection of human rights and the security of the collective. This is because, fundamentally, laws are made for their obedience so that every member of the society lives peacefully in a society to achieve their individual as well as social interests. That is why Edmond Burke, while discussing liberty, opined, “it is regulated freedom”. 66. It is also to be kept in mind that individual liberty cannot be accentuated to such an extent or elevated to such a high pedestal that it would bring in anarchy or disorder in society. The prospect of greater justice requires that law and order prevail in a civilised milieu. True it is, there can be no arithmetical formula for fixing the parameters in precise exactitude, but the adjudication should express not only application of mind but also exercise of jurisdiction on accepted and established norms. Law and order in a society protect the established precepts and see to it that contagious crimes do not become epidemic. In an organised society, the concept of liberty basically requires citizens to be responsible and not to disturb the tranquillity and safety which every well-meaning person desires. Not for nothing, J. Oerter stated: “Personal liberty is the right to act without interference within the limits of the law.” 67. Thus analysed, it is clear that though liberty is a greatly cherished value in the life of an individual, it is a controlled and restricted one, and no element in the society can act in a manner by consequence of which the life or liberty of others is jeopardised, for the rational collective does not countenance an anti-social or anti-collective act. (See: Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9 SCC 446 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1172.). 17. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. 18. It was submitted that the petitioner’s father and wife require his presence because of their medical conditions. This is not sufficient to release the petitioner on bail. (See: Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9 SCC 446 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1172.). 17. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. 18. It was submitted that the petitioner’s father and wife require his presence because of their medical conditions. This is not sufficient to release the petitioner on bail. He is at liberty to approach the learned Trial Court and bring these facts to the knowledge of  the  learned  Trial  Court,  which  can  pass  an appropriate order to take care of the needs of the petitioner’s wife and his father. 19. No other point was urged. 20. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 21. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.