2025:HHC:37545 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No.129/2025 Date of Decision: 07.11.2025 Veena Devi .....Appellant. Versus Lekh Ram and another …..Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Appellant : Mr. Devender K. Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondents : Mr. Amar Deep Singh, Advocate, for respondent No.1. : Respondent No.2 ex parte vide order dated 24.7.2025. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral). The appellant, by filing this appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, CPC), has assailed the judgment and decree dated 10.12.2024 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin District Bilaspur H.P. in Civil Appeal No. 21-13 of 2023 arising out of the judgment and decree dated 23.05.2022 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Court No.-3, Ghumarwin District Bilaspur H.P. passed in Civil Suit No.RBT No.191-1-2021 of 2015 titled as Veena Devi vs. Lekh Ram and another. 2. For the sake of convenience, hereinafter in this judgment, the parties shall be referred in the same manner in which 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? YES 2 they were referred before learned Trial Court. The plaintiff filed a civil suit for permanent prohibitory injunction before the Learned Trial Court, seeking to restrain the defendants from interfering with, raising construction on, removing construction material from, or changing the nature of her land, specifically khasra no.118 in Village Bhater. She asserted herself as the absolute owner in possession of this suit land and claimed the defendants, who owned adjoining land, were strangers to it with no right, title, or interest. 3. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had previously tried to forcibly occupy the land, leading to a compromise brokered by the local Panchayat on 17-11-2003. This compromise stipulated that no construction would be raised by either party until a demarcation was conducted and boundaries were fixed. The plaintiff subsequently got the land demarcated and boundaries fixed, but the defendants forcibly removed the boundary marks, an act for which contempt proceedings were initiated and which the defendants admitted to. An appeal was then preferred before the Learned SDM, Ghumarwin, and the matter was remanded for fresh demarcation. The plaintiff contended that the defendants, taking undue advantage of the situation, began interfering with the suit land again around 21-12-2015, attempting to destroy construction material and threatening occupation, leading to the filing of the suit. 4. The defendant No. 1 resisted the suit by filing a written statement, raising preliminary objections that the suit was not 3 maintainable in its present form, that the plaintiff had no cause of action or locus standi, and that the plaintiff was estopped by her own conduct and had not come to the Court with clean hands, having concealed material facts. 5. On merits, the defendant denied any concern with the suit land, asserted his rights as an adjoining owner to enjoy his own property, and stated that demarcation had been conducted by revenue authorities. He claimed that it was the plaintiff who was dissatisfied with the demarcation and was attempting to occupy the defendant's land, and he denied ever interfering with the suit land, praying for the suit's dismissal. Defendant No. 2 did not appear and was proceeded against ex-parte. 6. The plaintiff filed a replication reaffirming the plaint's assertions and denying the counter-allegations in the written statement. 7. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned trial Court on 19-09-2018:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief of permanent prohibitory injunction, as prayed for? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief of mandatory injunction, as prayed? ...OPP 3. In alternative, whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of possession and damages, if the defendants during the pendency of the suit forcibly occupy the suit land or raise any construction or remove and destroy the construction material of the plaintiff in the suit land, as prayed for? OPP. 4 4. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable, as alleged? ...OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit, as alleged? ..OPD 6. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit, as alleged? ..OPD 7. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the present suit by her own acts, conducts, commissions, omissions, and as alleged? ...OPD 8. Whether the plaintiff has not come before the court with clean hands and suppressed the material facts, as alleged? ...OPD 9. Relief? 8. The parties led their evidence. The plaintiff examined herself and another witness, Sher Singh, and exhibited documents including the jamabandi and a spot report. The defendant No. 1 examined his power of attorney holder and exhibited documents including a copy of an order and an application. After evaluating the evidence, the Learned Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove any interference by the defendants over the suit land or a cause of action for the suit. It decided the issues concerning injunctive relief and possession against the plaintiff, the issues of maintainability and cause of action against the plaintiff, and the issues of locus standi, estoppel, and clean hands against the defendant. 9. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred a first appeal, asserting that the Trial Court's judgment was against the facts, law, and procedure, and that it had erroneously held that interference 5 was not proved. The appellant argued that the Trial Court wrongly ignored the defendants' non-compliance with the compromise terms, that interference was indeed proved, and that the defendants had occupied the plaintiff's vacant land. The appellant prayed for the appeal to be allowed and the Trial Court's judgment set aside. 10. Before the First Appellate Court, the Learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the Trial Court had misread the evidence and wrongly dismissed the suit, reiterating that the defendant had caused interference and the plaintiff had successfully proved her cause of action. In response, the Learned Counsel for the defendant No. 1 supported the Trial Court's judgment and decree and urged that no interference was required. 11. Heard Counsels for the parties and perused the impugned judgements. 12. The case of the plaintiff was that she is a co-owner in possession of the suit land and that the defendants, being strangers, interfered on 21.12.2015 by forcibly occupying the land and destroying construction material. In support of her case, the plaintiff testified as PW-1, affirming the contents of the plaint and specifically alleging the defendants' actions on that date. However, in her cross-examination, she admitted that the defendants are adjoining owners and that they are in possession of the land at the back and side of her house, which they claim as their own. She further admitted that a prior demarcation was set aside by the SDO, 6 Ghumarwin, and that a fresh demarcation had not yet been conducted. PW-2, Sher Singh, corroborated the plaintiff's account of the incident but also admitted to being her brother and to the existence of a common boundary with the defendant No. 1. 13. In rebuttal, the defendant No. 1 examined his GPA holder, DW-1, who denied any interference and stated that the plaintiff had already covered her own land. DW-1 asserted that the plaintiff wishes to encroach upon the defendant's land but also admitted that she has no objection if the plaintiff constructs her own land. It was further admitted that following an appeal, the matter was remanded for fresh demarcation, which was never completed. 14. The plaintiff placed reliance on the jamabandi for the year 2011-12, Ex. P-1, which records her as the absolute owner in possession of the suit land, while the defendants are strangers to it. A presumption of truth attaches to this revenue record under Section 45 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act. The defendants did not claim any right, title, or interest over the suit land in their pleadings, and the plaintiff's testimony regarding her ownership and possession remained unrebutted. Therefore, it is established that the plaintiff holds rights over the suit land as its absolute owner and the defendants have no such rights. 15. However, the grant of injunction is not automatic. The plaintiff, as the absolute owner, undoubtedly has the right to raise construction on her own land, a point to which even DW-1 raised no 7 objection. The core question is whether the defendants have interfered with this right over the suit land. The testimony of PW-1 reveals a critical ambiguity: she admits that the defendants are in possession of and claim ownership over the land at the back of her house. In the absence of a fresh and legally valid demarcation following the remand by the SDO, the exact boundaries of the suit land remain unascertained. 16. Consequently, the assertion that the defendants are preventing construction on the plaintiff's land cannot be sustained without definitive proof that the area in question falls within her demarcated property. The plaintiff's own admissions regarding the defendants' possession on the land behind her house create a fatal ambiguity, making it impossible to conclude, on a preponderance of probability, that the defendants have threatened or invaded her rights over the suit land. The plaintiff has therefore failed to prove a substantive threat or an enforceable cause of action for the grant of injunction. 17. In light of the foregoing, the findings of the Courts below are upheld. The plaintiff failed to prove interference over the suit land. 18. In view of the aforesaid, there arises no question of law much less a substantial question of law for the consideration of the Court. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed, so 8 also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge 7th November, 2025 (tarun/T.B)