2025:UHC:1641 SL. No. Date Office Notes, reports, orders or proceedings or directions and Registrar’s order with Signatures COURT’S OR JUDGE’S ORDERS WPMS No. 713 of 2025 Hon’ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J 1. Mr. Nikhil Bhatt, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. Petitioner is plaintiff, who filed a suit of perpetual injunction in which he also filed a temporary injunction application. His prayer for temporary injunction has been rejected by the trial court vide order dated 11.09.2024. Feeling aggrieved, he preferred a miscellaneous appeal. His appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC was dismissed by District Judge, Rudraprayag vide judgment dated 21.02.2025. Feeling aggrieved by trial court’s order, as affirmed by Appellate Court, petitioner has approached this Court. 3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 4. Learned trial court has considered the facts and circumstances of the plaint case and also the three relevant factors, namely, prima facie case, balance of convenience & irreparable injury and has come to the conclusion that petitioner has not been able to make out a prima facie case for grant of temporary injunction. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is a family settlement, according to which, the courtyard would be enjoyed by plaintiff as well as husband of respondent no. 2, however, learned trial court has erred in not 2025:UHC:1641 considering the family settlement. 6. Law is well settled that grant of temporary injunction is discretionary and this Court normally does not interfere with the discretionary order passed by court of competent jurisdiction. The family settlement, relied by the petitioner, has been disputed by the defendants to the suit, thus, it is a triable issue as to whether there was any family settlement between the parties to the suit. This aspect has been dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha Ekta Appartments CHS Limited v. Municipal Corporation of Mumbai reported in (2012) 4 SCC 689. Para 19 & 20 of the said judgment are reproduced below:— “19. We have considered the respective submissions and carefully scrutinized the record. The scope of the appellate Court's power to interfere with an interim order passed by the Court of first instance has been considered by this Court in several cases. In Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. 1990 Supp SCC 727, the Court was called upon to consider the correctness of an order of injunction passed by the Division Bench of the High Court which had reversed the order of the learned Single Judge declining the respondent's prayer for interim relief. This Court set aside the order of the Division Bench and made the following observations: “In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court 2025:UHC:1641 below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion.” 20. In Skyline Education Institute (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.L. Vaswani, (2010) 2 SCC 142, the 3-Judge Bench considered a somewhat similar question in the context of the refusal of the trial Court and the High Court to pass an order of temporary injunction, referred to the judgments in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. (supra), N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corpn., (1996) 5 SCC 714 and observed: “The ratio of the above noted judgments is that once the court of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grant relief of temporary injunction and the said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of the material placed before the court and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate court will be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter it is possible for the appellate court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity.” 7. In such view of the matter, learned trial court was justified in not accepting the case of the plaintiff on its face value, which was based on a family settlement. Upon perusal of trial court’s order, this Court is of the opinion that petitioner had not been able to make out a prima facie case so as to claim temporary injunction. Learned Appellate Court thus was right in not interfering with trial court’s order. 2025:UHC:1641 8. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court declines to interfere in the matter. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J) 10.03.2025 Aswal