JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 61 of 2024 , dated 08.05.2024, registered at Police Station Dhalli, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short NDPS Act). 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was falsely implicated in FIR No. 61 of 2024 , dated 08.05.2024, registered at Police Station Dhalli, District Shimla, H.P. He was granted bail by the learned Special Judge, Shimla, on 17.10.2024. He failed to appear before the Court, and his bail bonds were cancelled. He was arrested. He filed a bail application, but it was dismissed on 20.08.2025. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the petition. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party were on patrolling duty on 08.05. 2024 . They received a secret information that the petitioner was selling heroin, and a huge quantity of heroin could be recovered during the search of his Kiosk (Dhara). The police reduced the information to writing and sent it to the Supervisory Officer. The police associated Rajinder Negi and Kamlesh Sharma and went to the Dhara of the accused. The police found the petitioner Dhan Singh and Vikas Kumar in Dhara. The police searched the Dhara in the presence of the witnesses and recovered a pouch containing 9.93 grams of heroin and a digital weighing machine. The police seized the heroin and the digital weighing machine and arrested the petitioner and the co- accused. The heroin was sent to SFSL, Junga and was confirmed to be Diacetyal morphine. FIR No. 144/2017, FIR No. 262/23, FIR No. 82/11, FIR No. 150/2015 and FIR No.06/2024 are registered against the petitioner under various provisions of the NDPS Act. The charge sheet was filed before the Court, and the matter is listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses on 20.11.2025. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Kunal Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Kunal Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent. He was granted bail by the Court. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Kunal Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Kunal Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent. He was granted bail by the Court. He could not appear before the Court because of his ailment, and his bail bonds were cancelled and forfeited to the State of H.P. He would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of heroin, which is adversely affecting the society. No leniency should be shown to the petitioner. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P. , : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: “57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by the grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. The status report shows that the police had checked the dhara of the petitioner and recovered 9.93 grams of heroin. Therefore, prima facie, the petitioner was found involved in the commission of the offence. 11. The status report shows that five FIRs registered for the commission of offences punishable under various Sections of the NDPS Act are pending against the petitioner. This shows that the he has criminal antecedents. This Court exhaustively dealt with the relevance of criminal antecedents in Aminodin vs State of H.P. 2024 : HHC : 6091 and held, after referring to various judgments, that a Judge must consider the criminal antecedents of the accused, the nature of offences and his general conduct while considering the bail petition. Bail should not be generally granted to an accused with criminal antecedents when there is a likelihood of the commission of the crime. 12. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand , (1977) 4 SCC 308 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 594 : 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail except where the circumstances suggest creating trouble by repeating the offence. It was observed at page 308: 2. 12. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand , (1977) 4 SCC 308 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 594 : 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail except where the circumstances suggest creating trouble by repeating the offence. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 13. It was held in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P. , (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 that where the person seeking bail has criminal antecedents, he is not entitled to bail. It was observed: “9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 14. It was held in V. Senthil Balaji v. Enforcement Directorate , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626, that where the petitioner can become a threat to society because of her criminal antecedents, he should not be released on bail. It was observed: “27…..An exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary.” 15. It was observed: “27…..An exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary.” 15. Similarly, it was held in Union of India v. Barakathullah , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019, that where the persons were involved in the commission of similar offences, they should not be released on bail. It was observed: - “20. … So far as the respondents in the instant appeals are concerned, they are in custody for hardly one and a half years, apart from the fact that all the respondents are shown to have been involved in previous cases. There are about 8 to 9 previous cases shown in the chargesheet against the respondents, except accused Nos. 1, 4 and 6, who are shown to have been involved in two cases. Considering the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and considering their criminal antecedents, in our opinion High Court should not have taken a lenient view, more particularly when there was sufficient material to show their prima facie involvement in the alleged offences under the UAPA. 16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P. , : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781 that the liberty of a person has to be balanced with peace and harmony in society. Liberty cannot be elevated to such a high pedestal as would bring in anarchy or disorder in society. It was observed at page 384: “65. We are absolutely conscious that the liberty of a person should not be lightly dealt with, for the deprivation of the liberty of a person has an immense impact on the mind. Incarceration creates a concavity in the personality of an individual. Sometimes it causes a sense of emptiness. Needless to emphasise, the sacrosanctity of liberty is paramount in a civilised society. However, in a democratic body polity which is wedded to the rule of law, an individual is expected to grow within the social restrictions sanctioned by law. Individual liberty is restricted by larger social interests, and its deprivation must have due sanction of law. In an orderly society, an individual is expected to live with dignity, having respect for the law and also giving due respect to others' rights. Individual liberty is restricted by larger social interests, and its deprivation must have due sanction of law. In an orderly society, an individual is expected to live with dignity, having respect for the law and also giving due respect to others' rights. It is a well-accepted principle that the concept of liberty is not in the realm of absolutism but is a restricted one. The cry of the collective for justice, its desire for peace and harmony and its necessity for security cannot be allowed to be trivialised. The life of an individual living in a society governed by the rule of law has to be regulated, and such regulations, which are the source of law, subserve the social balance and function as a significant instrument for the protection of human rights and the security of the collective. This is because, fundamentally, laws are made for their obedience so that every member of the society lives peacefully in a society to achieve their individual as well as social interests. That is why Edmond Burke, while discussing liberty, opined, “it is regulated freedom”. 66. It is also to be kept in mind that individual liberty cannot be accentuated to such an extent or elevated to such a high pedestal that it would bring in anarchy or disorder in society. The prospect of greater justice requires that law and order prevail in a civilised milieu. True it is, there can be no arithmetical formula for fixing the parameters in precise exactitude, but the adjudication should express not only application of mind but also exercise of jurisdiction on accepted and established norms. Law and order in a society protect the established precepts and see to it that contagious crimes do not become epidemic. In an organised society, the concept of liberty basically requires citizens to be responsible and not to disturb the tranquillity and safety which every well-meaning person desires. Not for nothing, J. Oerter stated: “Personal liberty is the right to act without interference within the limits of the law.” 67. Thus analysed, it is clear that though liberty is a greatly cherished value in the life of an individual, it is a controlled and restricted one, and no element in the society can act in a manner by consequence of which the life or liberty of others is jeopardised, for the rational collective does not countenance an anti-social or anti-collective act. (See: Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9 SCC 446 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1172.). 17. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail because of his criminal antecedents. 18. It was submitted that the petitioner was earlier released on bail. He could not appear before the Court due to his illness, and learned Trial Court erred in declining the bail to the petitioner. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar , 1958 SCC OnLine SC 81: 1958 SCR 1226 : 1958 CRI LJ 701: 1958 SCJ 672 : AIR 1958 SC 376 that a person cannot compromise a fair trial by absenting from the Court and if he does so, his bail is to be cancelled, even in a bailable offence. It was observed: “6. Now, it is obvious that the primary object of criminal procedure is to ensure a fair trial of accused persons. Every criminal trial begins with the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, and provisions of the Code are so framed that a criminal trial should begin with and be throughout governed by this essential presumption, but a fair trial has naturally two objects in view; it must be fair to the accused and must also be fair to the prosecution. The test of fairness in a criminal trial must be judged from this dual point of view. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that, in a criminal trial, witnesses should be able to give evidence without any inducement or threat, either from the prosecution or the defence. A criminal trial must never be so conducted by the prosecution as it would lead to the conviction of an innocent person; similarly, the progress of a criminal trial must not be obstructed by the accused so as to lead to the acquittal of a really guilty offender. The acquittal of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty are the objects of a criminal trial, and so there can be no possible doubt that if any conduct on the part of an accused person is likely to obstruct a fair trial, there is occasion for the exercise of the inherent power of the High Courts to secure the ends of justice. There can be no more important requirement of the ends of justice than the uninterrupted progress of a fair trial, and it is for the continuance of such a fair trial that the inherent powers of the High Courts are sought to be invoked by the prosecution in cases where it is alleged that accused persons, either by suborning or intimidating witnesses, are obstructing the smooth progress of a fair trial. Similarly, if an accused person who is released on bail jumps bail and attempts to run to a foreign country to escape the trial, that again would be a case where the exercise of the inherent power would be justified in order to compel the accused to submit to a fair trial and not to escape its consequences by taking advantage of the fact that he has been released on bail and by absconding to another country. In other words, if the conduct of the accused person subsequent to his release on bail puts in jeopardy the progress of a fair trial itself and if there is no other remedy which can be effectively used against the accused person, in such a case, the inherent power of the High Court can be legitimately invoked. In regard to non-bailable offences, there is no need to invoke such power because Section 497(5) specifically deals with such cases. The question which we have to decide in this case is whether the exercise of inherent power under Section 561-A against persons accused of bailable offences who have been released on bail is contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of Section 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. It was held by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 318: 1924 Cri LJ 732: AIR 1924 Cal 476 that the primary purpose of granting bail is to secure the presence of the accused during the Trial. It was observed: “It is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld merely as a punishment. The requirements as to bail are to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial: R. v. Rose [(1898) 18 Cox. 717. It was observed: “It is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld merely as a punishment. The requirements as to bail are to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial: R. v. Rose [(1898) 18 Cox. 717. The proper test to be applied in the solution of the question, whether bail should be granted or refused, is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his, trial: Re Robinson [(1854) 23 L.J.Q.B. 286: 2 W.R. 424.], R. v. Scaife [(1841) 9 Dowling P.C. 553: 5 Jurist 700.]. The test is applied by reference to the following considerations: (a) The nature of the accusation: R. v. Barronet [(1852) 1 E. & B. 1: Dearsley 51.], R. v. Butler [(1861) 14 Cox. 530 : 8 L.R. (Ir.) 39.] ; (b) The nature of the evidence in support of the accusation: Re Robinson [(1854) 23 L.J.Q.B. 286: 2 W.R. 424.], R. v. Butler [(1861) 14 Cox. 530 : 8 L.R. (Ir.) 39.] , R. v. McCormick; [(1864) 17 Ir. C.L.R. 411.] (c) The severity of the punishment which conviction will entail: Re Robinson [(1854) 23 L.J.Q.B. 286: 2 W.R. 424.], and this explains the reluctance of Courts to grant bail on charges of murder: Re Barthelemy [(1852) 1 B. & B. 8: Dearsley 60.], R. v. Andrews [(1844) 2 D. & L. 10: 13 L.J.M.C. 113.]. In this connection, we may recall that in England, bail in treason or felony is discretionary in the High Court or Courts having jurisdiction to try the offence: R. v. McCartie [(1859) 11 Ir. C.L.R. 188, 192.], R. v. Platt [(1777) 1 Leach 157.]; on the other hand, bail in misdemeanour is said to be of right at Common Law: R. v. Spilsbury [[1898] 2 Q.B. 615.]; R. v. Badger [(1843) 4 Q.B. 468, 472: D. & M. 375: 4 St. T.N.S. 1387.]; Re Frost [(1888) 4 T.L.R. 757.]; see also R. v. Crowe [(1829) 4 C. & P. 251.]; R. v. Beardmore [(1836) 7 C. & P. 497.] ; R. v. Osborn [(1837) 7 C. & P. 799.] King v. Fortier [(1902) 13 Quebec K.B. 251: 9 Canada Cr. Cas. 191: 1 Ann. Cas. 10.] . T.N.S. 1387.]; Re Frost [(1888) 4 T.L.R. 757.]; see also R. v. Crowe [(1829) 4 C. & P. 251.]; R. v. Beardmore [(1836) 7 C. & P. 497.] ; R. v. Osborn [(1837) 7 C. & P. 799.] King v. Fortier [(1902) 13 Quebec K.B. 251: 9 Canada Cr. Cas. 191: 1 Ann. Cas. 10.] . This distinction is reflected in sections 496 and 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which respectively treat of the grant of bail in cases of what are described in the phraseology of the Indian Legislature as bailable and non-bailable offences.” 20. A similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI , (2012) 1 SCC 40 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397 : 2011 SCC OnLine SC 1502, wherein it was observed at page 52: “21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by a reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.” 21. In the present case, the conduct of the accused shows that his presence cannot be secured in the Court by enlarging him on bail. Therefore, there was no error in the order passed by the learned Trial Court declining bail to the petitioner. 22. It was submitted that the petitioner was ill and could not appear before the Court. This was a circumstance beyond the control of the petitioner. This submission will not help the petitioner. He could have told his counsel about the ailment, who could have sought an exemption from the Court. However, he chose to remain absent and stall the progress of the trial. Therefore, he cannot be held entitled to bail. 23. It was submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of 9.93 grams of heroin as per the status report, which is an intermediate quantity, and the petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right. However, he chose to remain absent and stall the progress of the trial. Therefore, he cannot be held entitled to bail. 23. It was submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of 9.93 grams of heroin as per the status report, which is an intermediate quantity, and the petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Khushi Ram Gupta v. State of H.P. , 2022 SCC OnLine HP 3779, that the menace of drug addiction has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, and the release of an accused on bail in NDPS Act cases will send a negative signal to society. It was observed: “8. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril. 9. It is not a case where the investigating agency is clueless in respect of evidence against the petitioner. Though allegations against the petitioner are yet to be proved in accordance with the law, it cannot be taken singly as a factor to grant bail to the petitioner. Nothing has been placed on record on behalf of the petitioner to divulge as to how and in what manner he came in contact with the persons who were residents of the State of Himachal Pradesh. Thus, there is sufficient prima facie material to infer the implication of the petitioner in the crime. In such circumstances, the release of the petitioner on bail will send a negative signal in society, which will definitely be detrimental to its interests. 10. The prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the dangerous trade of contraband cannot be ignored merely on account of the fact that he has no past criminal history. It cannot be guaranteed that there will be re-indulgence by the petitioner in similar activities, in case he is released on bail.” 24. Similarly, it was held in Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P. , 2022 SCC OnLine HP 4996, that the bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right even though the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to a case. Each case has to be adjudged on its own facts. It was observed: “6. Similarly, it was held in Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P. , 2022 SCC OnLine HP 4996, that the bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right even though the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to a case. Each case has to be adjudged on its own facts. It was observed: “6. The quantity involved in the case is 89.89 grams of heroin and 3.90 grams of MDMA. Such quantity may not technically fall under the category of commercial quantity; nevertheless, such quantity cannot be termed to be less by any stretch of the imagination. The evident nature of commercial transactions and dealing with the contraband aggravates the situation for the petitioner. In a case where Section 37 of the NDPS Act is not applicable, the bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The fate depends on the facts of each and every case. 7. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril.” 25. Thus, the submission that the petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right cannot be accepted. 26. No other point was urged. 27. In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to bail. Hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 28. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.