JUDGMENT : Ranjan Sharma, J. Petitioner, Bhupinder Kumar Mehta, a retired Honorary Head Constable, initially filed CWP No. 6911 of 2010, which was transferred to Learned State Administrative Tribunal and has now been transferred to this Court as CWPOA No. 347 of 2019, praying for the following reliefs:- (i) that the Respondent No. 2 may please be directed to induct and absorb the Petitioner in ECC [Executive Clerical Cadre] Accounts Branch since 1983. (ii). Further directed to place the petitioner in its right position in the seniority list in accordance with his seniority countable on the basis of joining of service in the Police Department w.e.f. 21.04.1980 which is due since 1983 till date with all consequential benefits. (iii). That the interest at the rate of 9% p.a. on the difference amount as will be calculated on the withheld monetary benefits, in case the prayer clause 2 is allowed in favour of the petitioner. FACTUAL MATRIX: 2. Grievance of the petitioner is that petitioner was appointed-recruited as Constable in the Police Department on 21.04.1980. It is averred that in 1982 petitioner applied for induction in the ECC [Executive Clerical Cadre] in Account’s Wing/Branch and his name was forwarded by the Commandant 1st Battalion, HPAP Battalion, Junga, District Shimla to Deputy Inspector General of Police, Armed Police and Training, H.P., Shimla on 02.03.1983 [Annexure P-1]. It is further averred that on 22.07.1991 [Annexure P-2] the name of the petitioner was again forwarded by the Superintendent of Police, Kinnaur at Rekong-Peo to the Director General of Police for being considered for absorption in the Executive Clerical Cadre in the Accounts Wing. It is further averred that on 06.03.1993 [Annexure P-3], name of the petitioner was again forwarded for being considered for absorption in the said cadre but the juniors were inducted in the said cadre which is clear from the RTI information so furnished to the petitioner. 2(i). Feeling aggrieved against the non- consideration and non-absorption in the Executive Clerical Cadre in the Accounts Wing in response to the communications dated 02.03.1983 [Annexure P-1], 22.07.1991 [Annexure P-2], 06.03.1993 [Annexure P-3], the petitioner submitted a representation on 05.03.1993 [Annexure P-4] to the respondent. Thereafter, the petitioner made another representation on 10.05.1995 [Annexure P-5] but in vain. 2(ii). 2(i). Feeling aggrieved against the non- consideration and non-absorption in the Executive Clerical Cadre in the Accounts Wing in response to the communications dated 02.03.1983 [Annexure P-1], 22.07.1991 [Annexure P-2], 06.03.1993 [Annexure P-3], the petitioner submitted a representation on 05.03.1993 [Annexure P-4] to the respondent. Thereafter, the petitioner made another representation on 10.05.1995 [Annexure P-5] but in vain. 2(ii). It is further averred that though the case of the petitioner had been forwarded by the Commandant as well as Superintendent of Police, Kinnaur for being considered for absorption in the Executive Clerical Cadre in Account’s Wing during 1983, 1991 and 1993 but despite service of 30 years benefit of absorption has not been granted to the petitioner, whereas, the private respondents who were junior to the petitioner were absorbed in the Executive Clerical Cadre in Accounts Branch. 2(iii). Feeling aggrieved against the non absorption the petitioner submitted another representation on 22.04.2010 [Annexure P-9] to Director General of Police and had enclosed the Commendation Certificate given for distinguished services vide Annexure P-20 to Annexure P-26. In response to the representation 22.04.2010 [Annexure P-9] the Director General of Police rejected the claim for absorption on 15.05.2010 [Annexure P-10]. In this background, the petitioner has prayed for absorbing him in the Executive Clerical Cadre in the Accounts Branch since 1983. STAND OF RESPONDENT-STATE AUTHORITIES IN REPLY-AFFIDAVIT: 3. Pursuant to the issuance of notice, the State Authorities have filed the Reply-Affidavit dated on 03.01.2011 of Director General of Police, Himachal Pradesh. 3(i). Perusal of Paras 8 and 15 [B] of the Reply- Affidavit indicates that during the year 1982-1983, the petitioner never applied for absorption in the Executive Clerical Cadre [Accounts Branch]. Reply-Affidavit states that petitioner applied for absorption in Executive Clerical Cadre during 1986 and his case was considered but on account of his lower seniority, he could not be absorbed in Executive Clerical Cadre. Reply-Affidavit states that during the year 1990, only SC/ST Category Candidates were approved for absorption in Executive Clerical Cadre and not the petitioner. Reply-Affidavit indicates that during the year 1995-96, the petitioner applied for absorption in Executive Clerical Cadre but he did not appear in typing test, which was pre-requisite for induction/absorption as per the Standing Orders of the Department. 3(ii). Reply-Affidavit indicates that during the year 1995-96, the petitioner applied for absorption in Executive Clerical Cadre but he did not appear in typing test, which was pre-requisite for induction/absorption as per the Standing Orders of the Department. 3(ii). Reply-Affidavit indicates that in the year 2001, the petitioner did not appear for typing test but made a request for granting him exemption from typing test on 07.10.2001, which was turned down by the respondents in view of the fact, that requirement of typing test stipulated in the standing orders cannot be dispensed with. Moreover, instant petition claiming induction/ absorption in Executive Clerical Cadre [Accounts Branch], since 1983 and induction of junior in 1995 was filed before this Court in 2010, which suffers from delay and laches. 3(iii). In Para 15(D) of the Reply-Affidavit, the respondents have stated that there are no R & P Rules governing the induction/absorption in the Executive Clerical Cadre. In order to streamline the functioning of the said cadre a standing order was issued in the year 1999. Prior to issuance of the Standing Order the induction in the said cadre was made on the basis of recommendations of the DPC on the basis of seniority reckoned from the date of appointment, after obtaining their consent. Thus the averment made in this para are not tenable. In the above background, the State Authorities have prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition. REBUTTAL BY PETITIONER: 4. Petitioner filed a rejoinder placing reliance on the benefit of absorption-induction in Executive Clerical Cadre in Account’s Wing given to one Shri Joginder Singh and Ram Gopal on 23.03.2001 [Annexure P-39]. Petitioner also placed on record the Commendation Certificates [Annexure P-40 colly]. 5. Heard Mr. Y.K.Thakur, Learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Sumit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, for respondents-No. 1 to 5 [State] and Mr. Sandeep K. Pandey, Advocate and Ms. Monika Sharma, Advocate for Respondents No. 6, 12, 17, 22, 30 and 31. ANALYSIS: 6. Taking into account the entirety of the facts and circumstances and the material on record, this Court is of the considered view, that the prayer of the petitioner for induction and absorption in the Executive Clerical Cadre in Accounts Branch since 1983 does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny, for the following reasons: 6(i). ANALYSIS: 6. Taking into account the entirety of the facts and circumstances and the material on record, this Court is of the considered view, that the prayer of the petitioner for induction and absorption in the Executive Clerical Cadre in Accounts Branch since 1983 does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny, for the following reasons: 6(i). Firstly, for appreciating the claim of the petitioner, it is necessary to have a recap the rejection orders dated 15.05.2010 [Annexure P-10], which reads as under: Office of the Director General of Police Himachal Pradesh Police Headquarters Shimla – 171002. To The Director General of Police, SV & ACB, Shimla – 171002. No.P-II(7) Induction/2006-II dated 15.05.2010 Sub.: Request for absorption in Executive Clerical Cadre-Accounts Branch in Police Department. Sir, An application dated 22.04.2010, received from HHC Bhupinder Kumar of SV & ACB on the subject cited above. 2. In this connection, it is stated that request of HHC/Bhupinder Kumar has been thoroughly examined. As per record of this office HHC Bhupinder Kumar had never been applied for absorption in ECC/AB during 1982-83. He had applied for absorption in ECC/AB during 1986. His request was considered by the PHQ and he was not considered for approval as Extra hand in ECC/AB on the basis of seniority. After that during year 1990, Constables belonging to SC/ST category were approved as Extra Hands in ECC. 3. During year 1995-96, he had again applied for the absorption in ECC/AB while he was posted in Kinnaur District. But he did not appear in typing test. Again during 2001, he had submitted an application before the Screening Committee, which was constituted for the induction of constables in ECC/EB&AB for typing test to be held in PHQ on 7.10.2001, requesting therein that he may be exempted from the typing test and absorbed in ECC. His request was examined in PHQ and he was informed through SP Shimla that typing test is mandatory and to qualify the typing test was essential prerequisite for selection as Extra hand in ECC as per the provisions of Standing order dated 18.12.1999. However, he may be directed to appear in the typing test as and when it is held at PHQ in near future for his induction in Executive Clerical Cadre. The applicant may be informed accordingly. Sd. For Director General of Police, . 6(ii). However, he may be directed to appear in the typing test as and when it is held at PHQ in near future for his induction in Executive Clerical Cadre. The applicant may be informed accordingly. Sd. For Director General of Police, . 6(ii). Secondly, so far as the claim of the petitioner for absorption in Executive Clerical Cadre in the Accounts Branch during the year 1982-1983 it is borne out that the petitioner has never applied for absorption. Para 3 of the Reply-Affidavit states that the petitioner did not submit any application for absorption during the year 1983. Para 15(D) of the Reply-Affidavit negates the claim of the petitioner when the induction in the Executive Clerical Cadre [Accounts Branch] before the issuance of Standing Orders on 18.12.1999, was to be made on recommendation of DPC on the basis of seniority reckoned from the date of appointment after obtaining their consent. Once the petitioner had never submitted an application revealing his consent for induction-absorption in 1983, therefore, in absence of any consent the claim of the petitioner was not tenable for absorption in Executive Clerical Cadre [Accounts Branch] during the year 1982-83, which was rightly disallowed. 6(iii). Thirdly, so far as the claim for absorption in Executive Clerical Cadre in Accounts Branch in the year 1986 is concerned, it is borne out from the rejection orders dated 15.05.2010 [Annexure P-10] and the Reply-Affidavit that the case of the petitioner was considered at PHQ level but his candidature was not approved as an extra hand in the said category in view of his seniority. Petitioner has not placed anything on record that during the year 1986, his juniors [belonging to UR-General Category] were absorbed in Executive Clerical Cadre in Accounts Branch, by ignoring the seniority of the petitioner. In these circumstances, the non induction of the petitioner during the year 1986 in view of his lower seniority does not warrant any interference. 6(iv). Fourthly, so far as the claim for induction in Executive Clerical Cadre [in Accounts Branch] during the year 1990, a perusal of the rejection orders dated 15.05.2010 and Reply-Affidavit unambiguously point out that the Constables belonging to ST-SC category were approved as extra hands in Executive Clerical Cadre in 1990. 6(iv). Fourthly, so far as the claim for induction in Executive Clerical Cadre [in Accounts Branch] during the year 1990, a perusal of the rejection orders dated 15.05.2010 and Reply-Affidavit unambiguously point out that the Constables belonging to ST-SC category were approved as extra hands in Executive Clerical Cadre in 1990. Once no post was meant for the petitioner who belongs to general category during the year 1990, then, the petitioner cannot have any legal tenable grievance unless the petitioner shows that the action of filling the post of Executive Clerical Cadre from SC-ST category was not in accordance with law. 6(v). Fifthly, so far as non induction of the petitioner in Executive Clerical Cadre [in Accounts Branch] during the year 1995-96 is concerned, the claim is misconceived, in view of the specific stand taken in Para 14 and Para 15(D) of the Reply-Affidavit stating that after issuance of Standing Orders on 18.12.1999, for induction-absorption, passing of typing test, was pre-requisite. Perusal of rejection order dated 15.05.2010 [Annexure P-10] indicates that though the petitioner had applied for absorption in 1995-96 but he did not appear in the typing test. Non-appearance in typing test which was sine qua non disentitles petitioner for induction-absorption in Executive Clerical Cadre [in Accounts Branch] in 1995-96. Non-including/non- induction/non-absorption for not appearing in the typing test, is an act attributable to the petitioner solely for which the respondent-State Authorities cannot be implicated. In these circumstances, the rejection orders dated 15.05.2010 [Annexure P-10] disallowing the non- induction/non-absorption of petitioner in Executive Clerical Cadre [in Accounts Branch] during the year 1996 is valid and the same does not suffer from any perversity or illegality. 6(vi). Sixthly, so far as the non-induction of the petitioner in the Executive Clerical Cadre in Accounts Branch during the year 2001, rejection order dated 15.05.2010 [Annexure P-10] and the Reply-Affidavit clearly indicates that instead of appearing in the typing test which was held on 07.10.2001 the petitioner requested for exemption from typing test. As per the Standing Order dated 18.12.1999, once passing of typing test was a sine qua non for induction-absorption in the Executive Clerical Cadre [in Accounts Branch] but the petitioner despite having been granted an opportunity to appear in the typing test on 01.10.2001 chose not to appear, but sought an exemption, therefore, such exemption was validly refused so that the required standards for induction/absorption were maintained and not diluted. Even otherwise, issue regarding grant or denial of exemption is a matter, falling within the exclusive domain of State Authorities. Exemption or relaxation can neither be claimed nor sought for by the petitioner as of right. Nothing has been placed on record to show that during 2001, exemption from typing test as in Standing Orders of 1999 was given to other and not to the petitioner. In these circumstances the non-induction/non-absorption of petitioner in Executive Clerical Cadre [Accounts Branch] for having not appeared in typing test on 07.10.2001 disentitles and renders the petitioner ineligible for absorption during the year 2001 also. 6(vii). Lastly, the petitioner does not deserve any relief in instant proceedings, for the reason that the rejection orders dated 15.05.2010 [Annexure P-10] has not been assailed in the instant proceedings. Not laying a specific challenge to rejection orders, disentitles the petitioner for the relief(s), if any. Claim of the petitioner against his non induction in 1983, 1986, 1990, 1995 and then in 2001 by making representation which were rejected on 15.05.2010 [Annexure P-10] will not give a cause of action. Pendency of representation or decision thereon cannot revive stale claim. DELAY AND LACHES: 7. Facts reveal that non-selection of the petitioner in the Executive Clerical Cadre [in Accounts Branch] during the 1982-83 and then again in 1986 and then again in 1990 cannot be interfered at this stage for the reason that the cause of action accrued to the petitioner against his non-induction or non-absorption during 1982-83 and then in 1986 and then in 1990 whereas the instant petition was filed after 10 years in the year 2010. Delay and laches disentitles the petitioner for relief his non induction into the said cadre, which is not tenable. 7(i). At the relevant time during 1983, 1986, 1990, 1995 and then in 2001 the State Administrative Tribunal was established in the Respondent-State. As per the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, the petitioner had a right to raise a grievance within a period of one year on each such occasion under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act. Petitioner slept over the matter and permitted the cause to become stale. In these circumstances, mere pendency of representation or a decision conveyed in 2010, will not revive a stale and dead claim as per the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as detailed hereinbelow:- 7(ii). Petitioner slept over the matter and permitted the cause to become stale. In these circumstances, mere pendency of representation or a decision conveyed in 2010, will not revive a stale and dead claim as per the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as detailed hereinbelow:- 7(ii). Negligence or inaction cannot be made the basis for condoning the delay in availing legal remedies in view of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh versus Ramkumar Choudhary , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 in the following terms: 5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi , it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram wherein, it was held as follows: "13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [ (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.......... 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case. 36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.” Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733 ). 8. Accordingly, we dismiss this Special Leave Petition with costs of Rs.1,00,000/- to be deposited by the State within a period of two weeks from today with the Supreme Court Mediation Centre and file proof thereof. If the said amount, as directed, is not deposited by the State, the Registry shall take necessary steps for recovery of the same, in accordance with law 10(ii). While dealing with the issue as to whether mere filing of representation will not give any fresh cause of action and consideration thereof and the restriction of limitation or delay and laches cannot obliterate in service matters as per the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others versus C.Girija and others (2019) 15 SCC 633 , in the following terms: 17. This Court again in the case of Union of India and Others Vs. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59 on belated representation laid down following, which is extracted below:- “15. When a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or “dead” issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the “dead” issue or time-barred dispute. When a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or “dead” issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the “dead” issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court’s direction. Neither a court’s direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.” 18. Again, this Court in State of Uttaranchal and Another Vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 179 had occasion to consider question of delay in challenging the promotion. The Court further held that representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance does not give rise to a fresh following was laid down:- “19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time. 23. In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC 137 , this Court, testing the equality clause on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of service benefit, has ruled thus: (SCC p. 145, para 16) “16. … filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.” 19. This Court referring to an earlier judgment in P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.” 19. This Court referring to an earlier judgment in P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152 noticed that a person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. In Paragraph No. 26 and 28, following was laid down:- “26. Presently, sitting in a time machine, we may refer to a two- Judge Bench decision in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 , wherein it has been laid down that: (SCC p. 154, para 2) “2. … A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.” 28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable in all circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits definitely should not have been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court.” 20. We may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable in all circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits definitely should not have been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court.” 20. On the preposition as noticed above, it is clear that the claim of the applicant for inclusion of her name in the panel, which was issued on 09.01.2001 and for the first time was raked up by her, by filing representation on 25.09.2007, i.e., after more than 06 and half years. The claim of inclusion in the panel had become stale by that time and filing of representation will not give any fresh cause of action. Thus, mere fact that representation was replied by Railways on 27.12.2007, a stale claim shall not become a live claim. Both Tribunal and High Court did not advert to this important aspect of the matter. It is further to be noted from the material on record that after declaration of panel on 09.01.2001, there were further selection under 30% promotion by LDCE quota, in which the applicant participated. In selection held in 2005 she participated and was declared unsuccessful. With regard to her non-inclusion in panel in 2005 selection, she also filed O.A. No. 629 of 2006 before the Tribunal, which was dismissed. After participating in subsequent selections under 30% quota and being declared unsuccessful, by mere filing representation on 27.09.2007 with regard to selection made in 2001, the delay and laches shall not be wiped out. 10(iii). While negating the claim relating to denial of service benefits which accrued in the year 2008 against which the remedy was invoked in the year 2017 the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chief Executive Officer and others versus S.Lalitha and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 916, held that an unexplained delay and laches in service disputes which were triable within the limitation prescribed under the Administrative Tribunals Act cannot be permitted to be ventilated belatedly or beyond limitation, in the following terms:- 21. One of us (Rajesh Bindal, J.), speaking for the coordinate Bench in State of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das, had the occasion to consider the effect that unexplained delay and laches would have in availing remedies. The Court in that case was concerned with a challenge to finally published record of rights. One of us (Rajesh Bindal, J.), speaking for the coordinate Bench in State of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das, had the occasion to consider the effect that unexplained delay and laches would have in availing remedies. The Court in that case was concerned with a challenge to finally published record of rights. Taking note of multiple precedents in the field on the subject of delay or laches disentitling a party to relief, it was held that a writ petition filed 46 (forty-six) years after final publication was grossly belated and that no relief could have been made available to the respondents/ writ petitioners. 24. The self-imposed restrictions in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, which have evolved from judicial precedents of this Court, need not be restated here. Suffice to say, unexplained delay or laches is considered one of the factors which could assume significance in denying relief when the discretionary writ remedy is invoked. In an appropriate case, a writ court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if the applicant’s negligence or omission to assert his right combined with undue delay or laches and prejudice to the other party warrants such refusal. 36. On such premise as explained above, the respondent should have, if she felt aggrieved by the action of the appellants of granting her benefits of financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme instead of the ACP Scheme, availed the remedy before the Tribunal immediately after her rights were affected. She ought not to have waited for so long for ventilating her grievance through a belated representation. Filing of such belated representation, which was rejected in no time, did not have the effect of postponing the cause of action and stretching the period of limitation so as to render the O.A. as filed within time. 10(iv). While negating the belated claim in service matters, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in H. Guruswamy & Ors. Versus A. Krishnaiah Since deceased by LRs, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, in the following terms: “16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. Versus A. Krishnaiah Since deceased by LRs, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, in the following terms: “16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time. DIRECTIONS: 11. In view of above discussion and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant petition is dismissed in the following terms:- (i). Rejection Order dated 15.05.2010 [Annexure P-10] disentitling the petitioner for absorption in Executive Clerical Cadre [in Accounts Branch] is upheld; (ii). Non challenge to the Rejection Order dated 15.05.2010, disentitles petitioner for any relief; (iii). Delay and laches disentitles the petitioner for claiming absorption/induction in Executive Clerical Cadre [in Accounts Branch] during 1982-83, then in 1986 and then in 1990 by filing the instant petition after 10 years in the year 2010; (iv). Non challenge to the Rejection Order dated 15.05.2010, disentitles petitioner for any relief; (iii). Delay and laches disentitles the petitioner for claiming absorption/induction in Executive Clerical Cadre [in Accounts Branch] during 1982-83, then in 1986 and then in 1990 by filing the instant petition after 10 years in the year 2010; (iv). Non induction in Executive Clerical Cadre [Accounts Branch] during the year 1995- 95 and 2001 for not appearing in typing test, as required under Standing Order dated 18.12.1999, rendered petitioner as ineligible; which is valid needs no interference; (v). Parties to bear their respective costs. In aforesaid terms, the instant petition alongwith all pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of, accordingly.