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2025 DAILYLAW 34547 (RAJ)

ANIL KUMAR DHARENDRA S/O SH. SATYANARAYAN v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

CRLMP/7999/2023 · 2025-07-25

Sameer Jain

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[2025:RJ-JP:27780] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 7999/2023 Anil Kumar Dharendra S/o Sh. Satyanarayan, Resident Of House No. 163, Near Aadrash Vidhya Mandir School, Police Station Town Hanumangarh, District Hanumangarh (Retd. Senior Police Medical). ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Public Prosecutor 2. Sh. Sundar Singh S/o Sh. Om Prakash, Resident Of Village Bagla, Police Station And Tehsil-Mandi Aadampur, District- Hissar (Haryana). ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Satish Chandra Mittal For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rishi Raj Singh Rathore, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN Judgment Reserved on: 04/07/2025 Pronounced on: 25/ 0 7/2025 1. By virtue of the present petition, filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a challenge is raised against the order dated 18.09.2023, passed by the Court of Special Judge-Prevention of Corruption Act No. 2, Jaipur Metro II in F.I.R. No. 191/2023 whereby cognizance has been taken against the petitioner as well as the co-accused for the offences under Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code 1860. Moreover, vide order impugned dated 18.09.2023, directions have also been issued to the Director General, Anti-Corruption for conducting further investigation in the alleged offence by an officer of the rank of Additional Superintendent of Police or higher, for determining the role of the public servants of RPSC or any other institution. [2025:RJ-JP:27780] (2 of 11) [CRLMP-7999/2023] 2. Prior to penning down the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondents, this Court deems it appropriate to take a brief note of the factual matrix of the instant matter, crucial for the fair analysis of the lis at hand. The concise facts, are noted herein-under:- 2.1 That on 07.07.2023, the complainant/respondent no.2 i.e. Mr. Sundar Singh, submitted a written report before the concerned Police Station stating that the nephew of the complainant, namely Vikas, appeared in the recruitment examination of E.O./R.O., conducted by RPSC in the Year 2023. During this time, the petitioner/accused, who happened to be an acquaintance of the complainant, demanded an amount to the tune of Rs. 40 lakh for ensuring his nephew’s selection in the recruitment process by changing the OMR Sheet, at the behest of the RPSC Chairman/Member, namely Manju Sharma. 2.2 That pursuant to receiving the aforesaid complaint, the D.S.P. Anti-Corruption Bureau Sikar got its contents verified, following which, a trap was conducted at Sikar and Jaipur. As a result, recovery was effectuated from the petitioner/accused along with other co-accused. 2.3 That on completion of the investigation, the Anti- Corruption Bureau Sikar, submitted a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court of Special Judge, Anti- Corruption, Jaipur Metro II against the petitioner/accused and the co-accused Braham Prakash, Ravindra Sharma and Gopal Kesawat for the offense under Section 420 and 120B of the IPC. [2025:RJ-JP:27780] (3 of 11) [CRLMP-7999/2023] 2.4 That subsequent to the submission of the aforesaid report, one Hardeep Singh Sunderia (Advocate) filed an application before the court under Sections 190, 156 and 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Simultaneously, another application was preferred by the co-accused Gopal Kesawat for dropping the proceedings citing incompetent jurisdiction. 2.5 That after analyzing the said applications, vide order impugned dated 18.09.2023, the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption took cognizance against the four accused, including the petitioner, for having committed offences under Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120 of the IPC. Additionally, directions were also issued for conducting further investigation, by an officer not below the rank of Additional Superintendent of Police, for determining the role of public servants of the RPSC in the alleged offences. 2.6 That having been aggrieved of the order impugned dated 18.09.2023, the petitioner has preferred the instant petition seeking relief in the form of quashing of proceedings pending against the petitioner in the court of Special Judge-Prevention of Corruption Act, Metro II Jaipur arising from F.I.R. No. 191/2023 lodged at Pradhan Police Station, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Jaipur. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, whilst being aggrieved of the order impugned dated 18.09.2023, has submitted that the same was passed on an application preferred under Sections 190, 156 and 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by one Hardeep Singh Sunderia (Advocate), who is not a complainant in the case. Therefore, he had no locus standi to file [2025:RJ-JP:27780] (4 of 11) [CRLMP-7999/2023] the said application in the matter and resultantly, the learned Special Judge has committed grave illegality in entertaining and deciding the application preferred by Mr. Hardeep Singh Sunderia. In support of the said contention, learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated that the sole complainant in the instant proceedings was Mr. Sunder Singh only, as is evident from his signatures on all relevant documents during the investigation conducted by the concerned authorities. 4. Furthermore, learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the petitioner, along with the co-accused in the matter, are private individuals who do not hold any position in government office(s). Therefore, by the virtue of not being a public servant, the petitioner ought not to be tried for the alleged offense by the learned Special Judge Anti-Corruption, as the latter lacks jurisdiction to do the same. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the learned Special Judge, by virtue of Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, can only preside in the trial of those offenses as specifically mentioned under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. However, since the report submitted by the investigation authorities under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only prima facie made out offences under Sections 420 and 120B of IPC, trial by the Special Judge lacks jurisdiction, especially when the evidence collected during investigation makes it abundantly clear that the petitioner did not try to obtain any undue advantage to induce a public servant. [2025:RJ-JP:27780] (5 of 11) [CRLMP-7999/2023] 5. Therefore, relying upon the said submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner conclusively prayed that the order impugned dated 18.09.2023 be quashed and set aside. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has strongly opposed the contentions put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the order impugned dated 18.09.2023 has been passed after duly taking into consideration the evidence on record. Therefore, no interference is warranted with the order impugned dated 18.09.2023. Furthermore, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 makes it abundantly clear that an offence under the said provision can be committed not only by a public servant, but also a private person or a combination of the two. Therefore, the arguments put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner lack merit and as a result, the instant petition ought to be dismissed at the threshold. 7. Heard and considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both the sides and scanned the record of the instant petition. 8. It is trite law that the exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter, Cr.P.C.) is an exception and not the Rule and it is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. 9. In consonance with the underlying aim of the provision, it is established law that if a FIR and the materials collected in furtherance of which disclose a cognizable offense and the final [2025:RJ-JP:27780] (6 of 11) [CRLMP-7999/2023] report filed under Section 173(2) or 173(8), depending on whether further investigation was conducted, reveals that the ingredients to constitute the offense as alleged are prima facie made out against the accused, then in such an eventuality, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence so collected shall not be matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and consequently, they shall undoubtedly be matters to be dealt with by the learned trial court at the time of the trial. In this regard, reliance can be placed upon the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court as enunciated in Criminal Appeal No. 1874/2022 titled as State of Maharashtra and Ors. vs. Maroti decided on 02.11.2022. 10. Therefore, in order to assess the contentions put forth by the petitioner in furtherance of the prayer for quashing the criminal proceedings against him altogether, this Court is duty bound to assess whether the learned Special Judge whilst passing the impugned order dated 18.09.2023, duly took into consideration the ingredients of Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 (hereinafter, Act of 1988) and their prima facie applicability qua the petitioner, in sync with the evidence so presented on record. 11. For ready reference, Section 7A of the Act of 1988 is reproduced herein-under:- “7A. Taking undue advantage to influence public servant by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of personal influence Whoever accepts or obtains or attempts to obtain from another person for himself or for any other person any [2025:RJ-JP:27780] (7 of 11) [CRLMP-7999/2023] undue advantage as a motive or reward to induce a public servant, by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of his personal influence to perform or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or to cause to forbear such public duty by such public servant or by another public servant, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.” 12. Having perused through the wording of the provision, it is imperative to note that Section 7A of the Act of 1988, as it stands today, was inserted into the Act of 1988 w.e.f. 26.07.2018 vide Notification No. SO3664(E) in order to further codify law specifically dealing with scenarios where an individual, regardless of whether or not they are public servants, accepts or obtains or attempts to accept or obtain any undue advantage as a motive or reward to induce a public servant to improperly or dishonestly perform or refrain from performing a public duty. Therefore, it is assertively discernible that Section 7A of the Act of 1988 stands as a natural extension of Section 7 of the Act of 1988 which further broadens the umbrella to include not only public servants under the scope of the Act, but also individuals who adopt unfair means to an unfair end, at the behest of and/or for a public servant in a position to assert unfair methods for their personal gratification. 13. Therefore, it is clear that while Section 7 stipulates the public servant directly taking a bribe, Section 7A broadens its scope to include those individuals influencing a public servant through improper means, which naturally includes within its ambit [2025:RJ-JP:27780] (8 of 11) [CRLMP-7999/2023] even those non-public servants, who intend to induce a public servant to perform their duty improperly with the greed/incentive of an undue advantage. Hence, it is unequivocally clear that any individual, regardless of their position as a public servant or not, can be charged with an offense under Section 7A of the Act of 1988, as long as the allegation of inducement is evidenced, as required by law. 14. Accordingly, having established the fact that the status of the petitioner/accused i.e. Mr. Anil Kumar Dharendra as a non- public servant is irrelevant for escaping the scrutiny attracted by the provisions of Section 7A of the Act of 1988, this Court now must assess whether any due rationale was adopted by the learned Special Judge for taking cognizance against the petitioner under the said provision, without going into the correctness or truthfulness of the allegations levelled, which lies outside the narrow scope of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. as defined in Maroti (Supra). 15. Upon an assiduous scrutiny of the order impugned dated 18.09.2023, the following pertinent facts have come to light, namely:- (i) That the initial charge-sheet in the matter was prepared against the petitioner/accused along with the co-accused under Section 420 and 120B of IPC after the accused’s mobile phones, conversations, memory cards were retrieved and sent for FSL for extracting their harsh value and for extracting the Whatsapp chats and calls, including those deleted. However, whilst [2025:RJ-JP:27780] (9 of 11) [CRLMP-7999/2023] the said charge-sheet was prepared, the FSL report determining the said chats/calls of the accused was awaited. (ii) That the investigation report on record, makes it abundantly clear that the complainant Sunder Singh and Mr. Hardeep Singh, who is claimed to be a non-party by the petitioner, jointly lodged a complaint in the ACB, wherein it was averred that the petitioner/accused had demanded Rs. 40 lakhs for their relative Vikas to get selected in the recruitment for E.O./R.O. The said complaint was in the handwriting of Mr. Sunder Singh, which was presented by Mr. Hardeep Singh. (iii) That the averments incorporated in the complaint so presented by the parties were verified during investigation by the ACB, and the facts of the complaint were found to be true. Thereafter, due trap proceedings were conducted by TLO on 14.07.2023 and the complainant Sundar Singh and his nephew Vikas were trapped for giving a bribe of Rs. 18.50 lakh to the accused/petitioner Anil Kumar Dharendra at HDFC Bank Sikar. Moreover, during interrogation, as is placed on record, it was further revealed that the said amount was to be further given by the accused/petitioner i.e. Mr. Anil Kumar Dharendra to one Gopal Keshav through Ravindra Sharma. Therefore, steps were taken to trap Ravindra Sharma, who was the mediator of Gopal Keshav, through the petitioner Anil Kumar Dharendra. Accordingly, the role of the accused/petitioner was duly established by the trap proceedings conducted by the ACB in furtherance of a larger criminal conspiracy along with the co-accused. [2025:RJ-JP:27780] (10 of 11) [CRLMP-7999/2023] (iv) That the order impugned, so far as the issuance of directions for further investigation of the RPSC officers is concerned, has categorically recorded the fact that pursuant to the lodging of the FIR against the petitioner/accused as well as the co- accused on 16.07.2023 under Section 7A of the Act of 1988, on the same day, the Additional Director General of ACB held a press conference and told that no role of any RPSC member has come to light, which to this Court is absurd and shocking, as the investigation had not even been conducted yet, which is clear from the fact that the investigator only received the file the next day i.e. on 17.07.2023. Therefore, the circumstances within which the Additional Director General of ACB brushed off the involvement of any RPSC member, without any investigation into the matter at all, seemed murky and therefore, further investigation was deemed necessary to further assess and connect the trap findings of the recoveries effectuated from the accused/petitioner and the co-accused with the members of the RPSC. 16. Therefore, in light of the foregoing findings recorded by the learned Special Judge in the order impugned dated 18.09.2023, the learned Special Judge took cognizance against the petitioner/accused and the co-accused for hatching a criminal conspiracy, as revealed by the trap proceedings, for getting the selection of the complainant’s nephew in the E.O/R.O. recruitment examination. Moreover, as far as the involvement of RPSC officer was concerned, at whose behest the unfair advantage was promised, in order to ascertain that especially after having taken [2025:RJ-JP:27780] (11 of 11) [CRLMP-7999/2023] note of the lack of investigation conducted by the by ACP qua RPSC members, as exhibited above, the learned Special Judge directed further investigation in sync with the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court as enunciated in Criminal Appeal No. 1685/2007 titled as Sakiri Vasu vs. State of UP and Anr., wherein it was held that a magistrate, on receiving an application under Section 156, as is filed in the present case by Mr. Hardeep Singh, when satisfied that proper investigation has not been done by the concerned authorities, can issue directions for conducting further and proper investigation, in order to satisfy the tenets of justice. 17. Hence, in light of the following observations read with the findings recorded by the learned Special Judge, as noted above, this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. deems it fit to refrain itself from interfering with the order impugned dated 18.09.2023, as the same has been passed after having duly considered the elaborate evidence on record and any interference, which shall prevent the said evidence from seeing the light of the day before the learned Special Judge during trial, shall not be an exercise done to secure the interests of comprehensive justice. 18. Accordingly, in light of the following observations, this Court deems it appropriate to dismiss the present petition. 19. As a result, the instant petition is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. (SAMEER JAIN),J Pooja /222