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2025 DAILYLAW 3453 (HP)

Anil Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-11-22

Ranjan Sharma

body2025
Judgment : Ranjan Sharma, J. Petitioner, Anil Kumar, had initially filed CWP No. 9281 of 2011, and upon establishment of State Administrative Tribunal the matter was transferred to Tribunal and now after its abolition, the matter stands transferred to this Court, as CWPOA No.620 0f 2019, seeking the following relief(s):- “(i). For issuing a writ of Mandamus to the respondents for appointing the petitioner as a Clerk on Compassionate Grounds instead of his present compassionate appointment as Beldar, with all consequential benefits. FACTUAL MATRIX: 2. Grievance of the petitioner is that his father Late Shri Chanan Singh, died during service on 21.05.2004 while working as Beldar on work charge basis, in Irrigation and Public Health Department. Petitioner applied for compassionate appointment on 04.05.2006 [Annexure P-2]. He was appointed as Beldar on daily wage basis on 02.09.2006 [Annexure P-3], and he joined on 11.09.2006 as Beldar [Class-IV] on daily wage basis and continued as such on daily wage basis. 2(i). It is averred that the petitioner came across the judgment dated 05.03.2011 [Annexure P-4] passed in CWP No.972 of 2011 and connected matters, in the case of Ram Chander versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Others to assert that the State Authorities have granted the benefit of change in post to Ram Chander from daily wage Beldar [Class-IV] to Clerk [Class-III] on daily wage basis as per Orders dated 16.05.2011 [Annexure P-5]. It is further averred that similar change in post was granted to one Shri Neter Singh, who had filed O.A. No.1025 of 2007 by the State Authorities on 17.05.2010 [Annexure P-5, Colly]. In the light of the judgments in the case of Ram Chander and Neter Singh (supra), the petitioner submitted a representation on 01.09.2011 [Annexure P-6], seeking similar benefit by changing his post from daily wage Beldar [Class-IV] to daily wage Clerk [Class-III] in the Department. In this background, the petitioner had filed the instant petition, claiming appointment as a Clerk [Class-III] on daily wage basis from the post of Daily Wage Beldar [Class-IV] on the analogy on which change in post was granted to other persons, including Ram Chander and Neter Singh, as referred to above, with all consequential benefits. STAND OF STATE AUTHORITIES: 3. Pursuant to the issuance of notice by this Court on 04.11.2011, Respondents No.1 to 3 have filed Reply-Affidavit dated 27.02.2012 of Superintending Engineer, IPH Circle, Nahan. 3(i). STAND OF STATE AUTHORITIES: 3. Pursuant to the issuance of notice by this Court on 04.11.2011, Respondents No.1 to 3 have filed Reply-Affidavit dated 27.02.2012 of Superintending Engineer, IPH Circle, Nahan. 3(i). Perusal of the Reply-Affidavit indicates that the father of the petitioner died on 21.05.2004 and thereafter the petitioner-Anil Kumar applied for job on compassionate grounds in May 2006 and while his application was pending, the State Government issued the modified policy vide OM dated 16.08.2005 [Annexure R-1], stipulating that, in case, the deceased employee was work charge employee or was a daily wager having rendered more than 07 year of daily wage service then in such cases, the appointment was to be offered on daily wage only. In Para 2(c) of Reply-Affidavit, the State Authorities have distinguished the cases of Ram Chander and Netar Singh by stating that respective fathers of Ram Chander and Netar Singh died while working as regular Beldar(s) and therefore, Ram Chander and Netar Singh were appointed on regular basis, on compassionate grounds as per norms and the judgments in case of Ram Chander and Netar Singh were distinguishable. 3(ii). In Para 2(d) & (i) of the Reply-Affidavit, the State Authorities have stated that the petitioner was appointed as a daily wage Beldar on 11.09.2006 whereas the instant petition was filed belatedly in the year 2011, after 5 years. In these circumstances, a prayer is made for dismissing the writ petition. SHORT AFFIDAVIT BY STATE AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSE THERETO BY PETITIONER: 4. Pursuant to the orders dated 31.07.2012 passed by this Court, the State Authorities have filed an affidavit dated 15.10.2012, stating therein, that no Class-III post was vacant in the Respondent No.2- Department. The affidavit stated the petitioner had applied for job in May 2006 but while the application was pending, the modified policy dated 16.08.2005 [Annexure R-I] was issued, providing for giving appointment on daily wage basis, in case, the deceased employee was work charge employee, as in this case. 4(i). Petitioner filed response to the Affidavit dated 15.10.2012 stating therein, that various Class-III posts of Clerks were vacant. However, the petitioner had not filed any response regarding entitlement based on modified policy dated 16.08.2005, [Annexure R-I] in the said affidavit. 5. Heard, Mr. Shivalik Bhaik, Learned Vice Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Sumit Sharma, Learned Deputy Advocate General and have gone through the material available on record. ANALYSIS: 6. However, the petitioner had not filed any response regarding entitlement based on modified policy dated 16.08.2005, [Annexure R-I] in the said affidavit. 5. Heard, Mr. Shivalik Bhaik, Learned Vice Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Sumit Sharma, Learned Deputy Advocate General and have gone through the material available on record. ANALYSIS: 6. Taking into account entirety of the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the petitioner for change of post from post of Beldar (Class-IV) on daily wage basis to post of Clerk [Class-III] on daily wage basis, is not tenable, for the following reasons: NEITHER ANY LOCUS NOR RIGHT FOR SEEKING CHANGE IN POST DEHORS POLICY: 6(i). Indisputably, the father of the petitioner, namely Late [Chanan Singh] died on 21.05.2004 while working as Work Charge Beldar and being the dependant of work charge employee; the petitioner applied for job on 04.05.2006. The State Government issued the modified policy on 16.08.2005 [Annexure R-1], providing that in case the deceased employee was work charge then in such cases, the dependent alike the petitioner was to be given appointment on daily wage basis. Based on aforesaid policy, once petitioner was validly appointed as Beldar (Class-IV) on daily wage basis on 02.09.2006 [Annexure P-3] and had joined on 11.09.2006 in terms of applicable policy dated 15.08.2005 [Annexure R-I] therefore, the petitioner has neither any locus nor right to claim change in post by appointing him as Clerk (Class-III) dehors the policy dated 16.08.2005 [Annexure R-I], in view of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan versus Chandra Narain Verma (1994) 2 SCC 752 ; in State of Himachal Pradesh and another versus Shashi Kumar (2019) 3 SCC 653 ; in State of Himachal Pradesh and another versus Parkash Chand (2019) 4 SCC 285 , reiterated in State of Uttar Pradesh and Others versus Prem Lata (2022) 1 SCC 30 . POLICY DATED 16.08.2005 [ANNEXURE R-1] NOT ASSAILED: 6(ii). Stand of the State Authorities in giving appointment to the petitioner as Beldar [Class-IV] on daily wage basis originates from the modified policy dated 16.08.2005 [Annexure R-1] and Clause (2) (b) (ii) thereof, which provides for giving employment to a dependent on daily wage basis, in case, the deceased employee had died while serving as Work Charge Beldar, as in this case. Petitioner has not laid a challenge to the Policy dated 16.08.2005 [Annexure R-1]. Not laying a to the policy dis-entitles the petitioner for seeking change in appointment from post of Beldar [Class-IV on daily wage basis] to post of Clerk [Class-III on daily wage basis]. PARITY WITH RAM CHANDER AND NETAR SINGH NOT MADE OUT: 6(iii). Perusal of the material on record and the stand of the State Authorities reveals that the fact- situation in case of Ram Chander and Netar Singh, [as per Annexures P-4 & P-5, Colly] is entirely different vis-à-vis the case of the petitioner. Reply-Affidavit indicates that the respective father of Ram Chander and Netar Singh were regular employees and therefore, the aforesaid dependants were appointed as Clerk on daily wage basis whereas the petitioners father namely Chanan Singh was a work charge employee at the time of his death. In these circumstances, once the petitioner was validly appointed on post of Beldar [Class-IV on daily wage basis] in accordance with the policy dated 16.08.2005 [Annexure R-I] and no parity exists in case of petitioner vis-à-vis Ram Chander and Netar Singh (supra) and “no parity cannot be granted with unequals” therefore, the appointment of petitioner does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. CLAUSE 11 OF THE POLICY DATED 18.01.1990 DIS-ENTITLES PETITIONER FOR SEEKING CHANGE IN POST: 6(iv). Learned State Counsel submits that Clause 11 of the Policy dated 18.01.1990 goes on to show that if a person had been appointed on compassionate grounds, then, such an employee has no right to seek change in appointment/post from Class-IV to Class- III or otherwise, as the case may be. In instant case, once the petitioner was appointed as Beldar [Class-IV] on 02.09.2006 and had accepted his post and joined on 08.09.2006 [Annexure P-3], therefore, petitioner has no right to seek change in appointment from post of Beldar (Class- IV) on Daily Wage to post of Clerk (Class-III) on daily wages in view of the embargo in Clause 11 of the Policy of Compassionate Appointment dated 18.01.1990 and thus, the claim of the petitioner for change of appointment-post is disallowed in view of Clause 11 (supra). PLEA OF DISCRIMINATION IN ABSENCE OF ANY VESTED RIGHT IMPERMISSIBLE: 6(v). PLEA OF DISCRIMINATION IN ABSENCE OF ANY VESTED RIGHT IMPERMISSIBLE: 6(v). The claim of the petitioner for change in appointment is without merit in view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Surinder Kumar versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Others , CWP No.9094 of 2013, decided on 06.10.2015 wherein, the issue and claim of a dependent for change in post alleging discrimination, was negated by this Court, in the following terms: “76. The discretion to offer appointment on compassionate ground is vested with the respondents/Authorities and it is for the said Authorities to see whether a person is to be appointed against a Class-IV or Class-III post or on daily wage basis and that discretion cannot be questioned on the ground of discrimination, and that too, when a person has accepted the offer of appointment and joined without any demur and enjoyed the benefits. However, there is also no quarrel about the proposition that the Authority, who is vested with the discretion of making appointment on compassionate ground, is expected to exercise the discretion vested in it judiciously and without being influenced, strictly in accordance with the provisions envisaged in the Policy, so that the avowed object sought to be achieved by the State, by framing such a policy, is achieved. 77. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that the incumbents, who have been appointed on a particular post and have joined to the said post without expressing any reluctance or protest, such incumbents are precluded from claiming that they should either be appointed to a higher post or should have been given appointment on regular basis, instead of employment on contract basis, or have been discriminated viz. a viz. similarly paced persons.” 6(v-a). While following the decision of the Division Bench Judgment in case of Surinder Kumar (supra) another Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Anupam Thakur versus State of Himachal Pradesh and another , CWP No.6154 of 2024, on 23.06.2025, has negated the claim for change in post-appointment after having accepted the appointment without demur and enjoyed benefits over a period of years in the following terms: “2(ii). Petitioner being son of late Sh. Ishwar Dass-a daily wage employee, applied for compassionate employment. The respondent- Department considered petitioner’s case and offered appointment to him on 31.07.2013 against the post of Clerk on daily wage basis on compassionate grounds. Petitioner being son of late Sh. Ishwar Dass-a daily wage employee, applied for compassionate employment. The respondent- Department considered petitioner’s case and offered appointment to him on 31.07.2013 against the post of Clerk on daily wage basis on compassionate grounds. Petitioner accepted the offer and joined his duties as daily waged Clerk on 14.08.2013. 4(i). ....... ......The above observations are applicable to the facts of instant case. Petitioner had accepted the given offer of compassionate appointment and joined as Clerk on daily wage basis on 14.08.2013 without any demur and enjoyed the benefits over period of more than ten years. At this stage, he is precluded from claiming that he should have been given appointment on regular basis instead of daily wage basis. Endeavour of learned counsel for the petitioner in seeking applicability of Compassionate Employment Policy dated 07.03.2019 is otherwise also misplaced as petitioner’s appointment does not relate to this policy. He was appointed on 31.07.2013 under the policy then in force. 4(ii). The second relief prayed for by the petitioner is dependent upon grant of first relief. Since first relief has not been allowed to the petitioner, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to the second relief as well. 5. For the foregoing reasons, the instant petition fails and is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. In the light of the judgment, in the case of Surinder Kumar and Anupam Thakur (supra) claim of a dependant for compassionate appointment on a post, be it Class-IV or Class-III lies within the discretion of the State Authorities and a person has no vested right to claim appointment as of right. Even compassionate appointment is not a source of recruitment. The intent of offering appointment is to enable the dependent family to tie over the sudden crises, with the object to provide succour to dependant family. Plea of discrimination cannot be entertained in cases of compassionate appointment, except in a case of glaring and patent illegality; where, the claimants-dependants are broadly similarly placed in all respects [death relates to same period; the status of deceased employees is same; the eligibility of dependants-claimants is same; the post for which they apply and are eligible is same; they are governed by same norms applicable at time of death and/or on date of consideration] but have been treated differently. A bald plea of discrimination cannot be entertained/ accepted, unless and unless wholesome parity accruing from the applicable policy or norms is apparently established. Entertaining or accepting the plea of discrimination casually in making compassionate employment on bald averments/assertions cannot sustain, for the reason, that Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India are neither attracted nor applicable while making compassionate appointment(s). Even otherwise, the plea alleging discrimination is to be examined/tested by the Employer-State Authorities. Judicial assessment is not to be casually resorted to except in a situation, when, despite wholesome similarity, the State Authorities have failed to consider- examine the relevant factors or had taken into account extraneous factors negating parity or had acted dehors the Policy-Scheme. In fact-situation of a case, the petitioner has failed to establish the violation of any fundamental right or legal right or infraction of any Scheme-Policy disentitling him for mandamus, in view of the mandate of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa versus Parsana Kumar (2007) 15 SCC 129 [Para 20] and thus, the instant petitioner has to fail. Ordered accordingly. DELAYED FILING OF PETITION DIS-ENTITLES PETITIONER FOR RELIEF: 6(vi). Petitioner was appointed as Beldar [Class-IV] on 02.09.2006 and he joined on 11.09.2006 [Annexure P-3], the petitioner had raised a claim for seeking change in appointment from post of Beldar [Class-IV on daily wage basis] to the post of Clerk [Class-III on daily wage basis] and the cause had arisen on 11.09.2006 but, the petitioner failed to invoke legal remedies within the period of limitation before State Administrative Tribunal, which was in force at the relevant time. In case, petitioner had a valid cause, then, the petitioner was bound to invoke the jurisdiction under Sections 20 & 21 of Administrative Tribunals Act within stipulated period. The inaction of the petitioner, in sleeping over the rights/remedies available under Administrative Tribunals Act dis-entitles the petitioner for relief, when the instant petition was filed belatedly after about 5 years and that too, without rendering any valid explanation for the delay. 6(vi-a). Petitioner filed the instant petition on 15.10.2011 after a delay of 5 years. It is settled law, that the claim, in respect of service matters cannot be permitted to be agitated by an employee endlessly. 6(vi-a). Petitioner filed the instant petition on 15.10.2011 after a delay of 5 years. It is settled law, that the claim, in respect of service matters cannot be permitted to be agitated by an employee endlessly. Reasonableness is a core principle in case of service disputes and negligence or inaction cannot be made the basis for entertaining a stale or dead claim as in this case. Inaction, negligence and lethargy of the petitioner in sleeping over the matter from 2006 to 2011 dis-entitles the petitioner for relief, in view of the above discussion. 6(vi-b). While dealing with the issue as to whether mere filing of representation will give rise to fresh cause of action and even belated consideration and/or its pendency or the decision on stale-dead cause shall not be a ground, to ignore limitation or delay and laches in service matters, as per the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others versus C. Girija and others (2019) 15 SCC 633 , in the following terms: 17. This Court again in the case of Union of India and Others Vs. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59 on belated representation laid down following, which is extracted below:- “15. When a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or “dead” issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the “dead” issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court’s direction. Neither a court’s direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.” 18. Again, this Court in State of Uttaranchal and Another Vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 179 had occasion to consider question of delay in challenging the promotion. The Court further held that representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance does not give rise to a fresh following was laid down:- “19. Again, this Court in State of Uttaranchal and Another Vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Others, (2013) 12 SCC 179 had occasion to consider question of delay in challenging the promotion. The Court further held that representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance does not give rise to a fresh following was laid down:- “19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix.Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time. 23. In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC 137 , this Court, testing the equality clause on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of service benefit, has ruled thus: (SCC p. 145, para16) “16. … filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.” 19. This Court referring to an earlier judgment in P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152 noticed that a person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. In Paragraph No. 26 and 28, following was laid down:- “26. Presently, sitting in a time machine, we may refer to a two-Judge Bench decision in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 , wherein it has been laid down that: (SCC p. 154, para 2) “2. … A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. … A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.” 28.Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable inall circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits definitely should not have been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court.” 20. On the preposition as noticed above, it is clear that the claim of the applicant for inclusion of her name in the panel, which was issued on 09.01.2001 and for the first time was raked up by her, by filing representation on 25.09.2007, i.e., after more than 06 and half years. The claim of inclusion in the panel had become stale by that time and filing of representation will not give any fresh cause of action. Thus, mere fact that representation was replied by Railways on 27.12.2007, a stale claim shall not become a live claim. Both Tribunal and High Court did not advert to this important aspect of the matter. It is further to be noted from the material on record that after declaration of panel on 09.01.2001, there were further selection under30% promotion by LDCE quota, in which the applicant participated. In selection held in 2005 she participated and was declared unsuccessful. With regard to her non-inclusion in panel in 2005 selection, she also filed O.A. No. 629of 2006 before the Tribunal, which was dismissed. In selection held in 2005 she participated and was declared unsuccessful. With regard to her non-inclusion in panel in 2005 selection, she also filed O.A. No. 629of 2006 before the Tribunal, which was dismissed. After participating in subsequent selections under 30%quota and being declared unsuccessful, by mere filing representation on 27.09.2007 with regard to selection made in 2001, the delay and laches shall not be wiped out. 6(vi-c). Negligence or inaction cannot be made the basis for condoning the delay in availing legal remedies in view of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh versus Ram Kumar Choudhary , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 in the following terms: 5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In MajjiSannemma v. Reddy Sridevi , it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram wherein, it was held as follows: "13.This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [ (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: “15. The law on the issue can be summarisedto the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.......... 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case. 36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.” Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733 ). 8. Accordingly, we dismiss this Special Leave Petition with costs of Rs.1,00,000/- to be deposited by the State within a period of two weeks from today with the Supreme Court Mediation Centre and file proof thereof. If the said amount, as directed, is not deposited by the State, the Registry shall take necessary steps for recovery of the same, in accordance with law 6(vi-d). While negating the claim relating to denial of service benefits which accrued in the year 2008 against which the remedy was invoked in the year 2017; the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chief Executive Officer and others versus S. Lalitha and others , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 916, held that an unexplained delay and laches in service disputes which were triable within the limitation prescribed under Administrative Tribunals Act cannot be permitted to be ventilated belatedly or beyond limitation, in the following terms:- 21. One of us (Rajesh Bindal, J.), speaking for the coordinate Bench inState of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das, had the occasion to consider the effect that unexplained delay and laches wouldhave in availing remedies. The Court in that casewas concerned with a challenge to finally published record of rights. One of us (Rajesh Bindal, J.), speaking for the coordinate Bench inState of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das, had the occasion to consider the effect that unexplained delay and laches wouldhave in availing remedies. The Court in that casewas concerned with a challenge to finally published record of rights. Taking note of multiple precedents in the field on the subject of delayor laches disentitling a party to relief, it was held that a writ petition filed 46 (forty-six) years after final publication was grossly belated and that no relief could have been made available to the respondents/writ petitioners. 24. The self-imposed restrictions in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, which have evolved from judicial precedents of this Court, need not be restated here. Suffice to say, unexplained delay or laches is considered one of the factors which could assume significance in denying relief when the discretionary writ remedy is invoked. In an appropriate case,a writ court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if the applicant’s negligence or omission to assert his right combined with undue delay or laches and prejudice to the other party warrants such refusal. 36. On such premise as explained above, the respondent should have, if shefelt aggrieved by the action of the appellants of granting her benefits of financial upgradation under the MACP Scheme instead of the ACP Scheme, availed the remedy before the Tribunal immediately after herrights were affected. She ought notto have waited for so long for ventilating her grievance through a belated representation. Filing of such belated representation, which was rejected in no time, did not have the effect of postponing the cause of action and stretching the period of limitation so as to render the O.A. as filed within time. 6(vi-e). While negating the belated claim in service matters, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in H. Guruswamy & Ors. Versus A. Krishnaiah since deceased by LRs, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54, in the following terms: “16. The length of the delay is definitelya relevant matter which the courtmust take into consideration while considering whether the delay shouldbe condoned or not. From the tenorof the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want tofix their own period of limitation for the purpose ofinstituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. The length of the delay is definitelya relevant matter which the courtmust take into consideration while considering whether the delay shouldbe condoned or not. From the tenorof the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want tofix their own period of limitation for the purpose ofinstituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time. In the light of the principles mandated in C. Girija, Ram Kumar Chaudhary, S. Lalitha and H. Guruswamy (supra), the petitioner after having accepted the appointment on post of Beldar on 11.09.2006 remained silent and dormant and has allowed the claim for change in post [though not made out on facts of instant case] to become stale and dead and even in the absence of any valid and cogent explanation for delay; the alleged stale and dead claim cannot be permitted to be reopened after 5 years, by making a representation belatedly on 01.09.2011 and then in filing the petition in October 2011, belatedly. COMPASSIONATE APPOINTMENT NOT A SOURCE OF RECRUITMENT: 7. COMPASSIONATE APPOINTMENT NOT A SOURCE OF RECRUITMENT: 7. Once the petitioner was appointed as Beldar [Class-IV] on daily wage basis and had joined on 11.09.2006 then, the claim of the petitioner raised for switching over or changing his appointment from post of Beldar [Class-IV] to post of Clerk [Class-III] on daily wage basis after 05 years can neither furnish fresh cause nor extend or revive a dead or stale cause, for the reason, that the appointment on compassionate grounds is to enable the family in distress to tie over the sudden situation which had arisen on account of sudden demise of deceased employee. Compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a right. Even, the compassionate appointment cannot be a source of recruitment in terms of mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Hydroelectric Power Corporation and another versus Nanak Chand and another , (2004) 12SCC 487, in the following terms: “5. It is to be seen that the appointment on compassionate ground is not a source of recruitment but merely an exception to the requirement regarding appointments being made on open invitation of application on merits. Basic intention is that on the death of the employee concerned his family is not deprived of the means of livelihood. The object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crises.” THERE CANNOT BE ENDLESS COMPASSION-CLAIM IMPERMISSIBLE: 8. The intent and object of compassionate appointment is to provide a succour to the family in distress on account of death of deceased employee. In facts of this case, once the petitioner was granted the employment on compassionate grounds on 02.09.2006 [Annexure P-3] and he had accepted the employment on 11.09.2006 then, the petitioner cannot turn around by making a representation on 01.09.2011 [Annexure P-6] after about 05 years to seek change in post from Beldar [Class-IV] on daily wages to Clerk [Class-III] on daily wage basis, on the ground that pleading that providing employment as Clerk would enable the petitioner to fulfill the needs or compassionate effectively. The above contention is without merit, in view of the fact, that once petitioner stood appointed and the crises were over therefore, petitioner has no right to seek change in post, for the reason, that there cannot be endless compassion in view of the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Eastern Coalfields Limited versus Anil Badyakar and others , (2009) 13 SCC 112 , in the following terms:- 20. The principles indicated above would give a clear indication that the compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over. 9. No other point was raised/argued. DIRECTIONS: 10. In view of above discussion and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the instant petition is dismissed, in the following terms: (i). Claim of the petitioner for seeking change in post from Class-IV Beldar to Class-III Clerk on daily wage basis cannot be granted dehors the Policy dated 16.08.2005 [Annexure R-1]; (ii). Claim of the petitioner as in direction No.(i) suffers from delay and laches and is turn down; (iii). Claim of the petitioner for change in appointment/post cannot be granted dehors Clause 11 of the Policy of Compassionate dated 18.01.1990; (iv). Plea for change in post alleging discrimination [not made out on facts in instant case] is declined, in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Surinder Kumar (supra) and the judgment by the Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Anupam Thakur (supra); (v). Costs made easy. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.