2025:JHHC:28300 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P (S). No. 1546 of 2015 With W.P.(S). No. 214 of 2019 ------- Swami Bibhu Deo, son of late Janardan Singh, resident of Officer Colony of Road Construction Department, Godda, P.O. and P.S. Godda, Dist. Godda/Jharkhand. ……….. Petitioner (in both the cases) Versus 1. State of Jharkhand. 2. The Principal Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur, Dist. Ranchi. 3. The Special Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur, Dist. Ranchi. 4. The Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur, Dist. Ranchi. ……….. Respondents (in both the cases) ---- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN For the Petitioner : Mr. Saurav Arun, Advocate Mr. Bhanu Kumar No. 1, Advocate Ms. Ayushi, Advocate For the Respondents: Mr. Shishir Suman, AC to AAG-IV Mr. Shubham Mishra, AC to SC(M)-II ---- 17/ 16.09.2025 Since identical issues are involved in both these writ applications, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. In W.P.(S). No. 1546 of 2015, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 01.07.2014 and reminder dated 23.02.2015 (Annexures- 7 & 7/1 respectively), as the same is in violation of and in teeth of the judgment and the ratio decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court and also the verdict passed by this Court in W.P.(S). No. 1248 of 2013. Petitioner has further prayed for direction upon the respondents not to give effect the impugned order dated 01.07.2014 and reminder 2025:JHHC:28300 2 dated 23.02.2015, as it is clear-cut violation of the order passed by this Court as well as the Hon’ble Apex Court, as the law is very well settled that the reason has to be assigned at first when differing with the finding of the Inquiry Officer and the tentative reason has to be given to the delinquent to give his reply. 3. In W.P.(S). No. 214 of 2019, prayer has been made for direction upon the respondents to make payment of gratuity and leave encashment which has not been paid to the petitioner till date. Petitioner has further prayed for quashing the order dated 03.05.2019 and 09.05.2019, by which order of recovery has been passed in violation of principles of substantial natural justice as well as Rule 43(b) and 139 of Jharkhand Pension Rule and also on the ground that the petitioner has been exonerated in the departmental proceeding and without differing with the report of Inquiry Officer, the order of recovery has been issued. The order of punishment has already been challenged by the petitioner in W.P.(S). No. 1546 of 2015, which is pending for adjudication. 4. Briefly stated, an FIR was lodged by Central Bureau of Investigation under various sections of Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act, alleging therein that the petitioner being an Executive Engineer in the Road Construction Department entered into a criminal conspiracy with some construction Company and submitted bogus invoice showing procurement of bitumen for execution of contractual work which caused wrongful gain to the Contractor and wrongful loss to the Government. 5. From record it appears that a departmental proceeding was initiated and the petitioner was exonerated by the Inquiry Officer vide its report dated 29.06.2012. As a matter fact, the petitioner earlier came before this Court challenging the order dated 06.10.2012, whereby a fresh Inquiry Officer was appointed with regard to the allegation as shown in letter dated 17.02.2012. This Court vide order 2025:JHHC:28300 3 dated 29.11.2013, passed in W.P.(S). No. 1248 of 2013, allowed the writ application and quashed the order dated 06.10.2012. For brevity relevant paragraphs of the order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(S). No. 1248 of 2013 is extracted herein below: “10. I further find that the contention raised by the respondents in the counter-affidavit cannot be considered in the present proceeding. In view of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others”, reported in AIR 1978 SC 851, it is not open to the respondents to support the impugned order by supplementing reasons through counter-affidavit filed in the present proceeding. 11. In view of the aforesaid, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 06.10.2012 is hereby quashed. It would be open to the respondents to pass fresh order in the matter, in accordance with law.” 6. Thereafter, the respondents chose to continue with the earlier departmental proceeding and issued a memo being 4891 dated 01.07.2014, whereby though the subject was 2nd show-cause, however, the said notice was notice of disagreement with the finding of the Inquiry Officer. As a matter of fact, in the departmental proceeding initially the Inquiry Officer exonerated the petitioner and since, the petitioner came before this Court against the appointment of fresh Inquiry Officer for the same charge, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held the action of the respondents as not proper and gave liberty to the respondents to pass fresh order in accordance with law and as aforesaid, in the 2nd round, the respondents issued notice dated 01.07.2014, claiming to be as the 2nd show-cause notice but the said notice appears to be notice of disagreement with the finding of the Inquiry Officer. 7. As a matter of fact, when the petitioner did not appear, the respondents also gave a paper publication and even prior to the paper publication, a reminder (Annexure-8) was given to the petitioner but there is nothing on record to suggest that a proper 2nd show-cause notice was issued for the purpose of inflicting punishment. 2025:JHHC:28300 4 8. It is true that the respondents have taken pain to issue notice dated 01.07.2014 which was actual a notice of disagreement which was perfectly in accordance with law; the respondents also gave a reminder to that to which the petitioner did not respond. Ultimately, they published about the said notice but the petitioner did not respond. 9. However, there is nothing on record to suggest that there is actually any 2nd show-cause notice before imposing the punishment. In other words, there is no show-cause notice with regard to the proposed punishment. 10. In the case of Central Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Anguri Khatoon1 the Division Bench of this Court has held that notice disagreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, cannot be termed as 2nd show-cause notice. For brevity paras-9 to 11 of the said order is quoted herein below: “9. A careful reading of the decisions on supply of notes of disagreement, which is the issue involved in this case, would indicate that after the enquiry report is submitted and before the disciplinary authority passes the final order, at two stages separate notices have to be given to the delinquent employee. If the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings recorded by the enquiring officer he must record his tentative opinion and serve a copy of the notes of dis- agreement upon the delinquent employee so as to provide him an opportunity to represent. Second show-cause notice is a distinct stage in the disciplinary proceeding. It is a requirement under the first provise to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. It has been held mandatory in "Union of India vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan" (1991) 1 SCC 588. There a question arose whether in view of the 42nd Amendment it is necessary to give a second show-cause notice to the delinquent employee, that is, another show-cause notice on the proposed punishment. Before the disciplinary authority passes a final order, either imposing punishment or exonerating the delinquent employee, he has to apply his mind at two intermediate stages and to form two opinions; whether the charge has been proved or not, and the proposed punishment. Both are two distinct stages and at both the stage the opinion formed by the disciplinary authority is considered tentative. It is not linal because the delinquent employee has a right to represent persuade the disciplinary authority to take a favourable view in the matter. After the 42nd Amendment, the requirement to give notice on the proposed punishment has been done away with but another dimension to the departmental enquiry has been added by the decision in "Kunj Behari Misra". It has been held that if the disciplinary authority dis- agrees with the enquiry report exonerating the delinquent employee 1 2019 (3) JBCJ 179 2025:JHHC:28300 5 of the charges framed against him, the disciplinary authority must record the reasons and give a copy of the notes of dis-agreement to the delinquent employee so as to provide him an opportunity to represent against the tentative discordant note struck by the disciplinary authority. 10. What has been done by the disciplinary authority in the present case is that he has recorded his dis-agreement with the enquiry report in the second show-cause notice itself. 11. Supply of notes of dis-agreement and an opportunity of hearing must be distinguished from the second show-cause notice.” 11. In the case in hand, as stated herein above, Annexure-7 though it contains subject 2nd show-cause, but the content of the said notice is of disagreeing with the view of Inquiry Officer. Even reminder is not the 2nd show-cause notice; rather, reminder is only with regard to the earlier notice dated 01.07.2014. 12. As a matter of fact, in such type of cases where Inquiry Officer exonerates the delinquent, there shall be two stages of notice; firstly, at the stage when the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer, he must record his tentative opinion and serve a copy of notes of disagreement upon the delinquent and thereafter, issue a 2nd show-cause notice, which is not present in the instant case and the impugned order of punishment has been passed bye-passing the issuance of 2nd show-cause notice, by deeming the notes of disagreement as 2nd show-cause. 13. 13. During course of arguments, the respondents have also taken a ground of alternative remedy that the petitioner should have filed an Appeal against the order of punishment but that argument is not acceptable to this Court for the simple reason that this ground was not raised at the preliminary stage and the instant application was filed on 15.04.2015 and much water has been flown in the last 10 years and relegating the petitioner back to the Appellate Authority would not suffice interest of justice in view of the fact that the interference with the impugned order is with regard to principle of natural justice and not with regard to the findings given by the Disciplinary Authority. 14. Having regard to the aforesaid discussions, the impugned orders; order dated 01.07.2014 and reminder dated 23.02.2015 2025:JHHC:28300 6 (Annexures- 7 & 7/1 respectively), in W.P.(S). No. 1546 of 2015; & order dated 03.05.2019 and 09.05.2019 in W.P.(S). No. 214 of 2019, are hereby, quashed and set aside. 15. Since W.P.(S). No. 214 of 2019 has been preferred by the petitioner for his retiral benefits and in view of quashing of the impugned orders; the respondent-State shall verify the records of the case and pass an appropriate order with regard to consequential benefits within a period of 16 weeks. 16. Accordingly, both the writ applications stand allowed. 17. Pending I.As., if any, stand closed. (Deepak Roshan, J.) 16th September, 2025 Kunal