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2025 DAILYLAW 3449 (HP)

Ram Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-11-03

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 08.07.2014 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (III), Kangra at Dharamshala camp at Palampur, (learned Appellate Court), vide which judgment of conviction and order of sentence, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class (I), Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court), were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338, and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act).It was asserted that the informant Krishan Chand was returning to his home in the vehicle bearing registration number HP- 53-3822 on 9th February 2007. The accused was driving the vehicle. 20-21 people were travelling in the vehicle. The accused could not control the vehicle due to its high speed, and the vehicle fell into a gorge. The informant and other occupants sustained injuries. Brahmu Ram died on the spot. The accident occurred due to the negligence and high speed of the vehicle. Intimation was given to the police. The police recorded an entry in the daily diary (Ex. PW5/A) and sent Sub Inspector Duni Chand (PW-6), ASI Brahm Dass (PW7), HC Ishwar Dass, Constable Ajay Kumar, HHC Ravinder Chand and HHC Ajay Kumar to verify the correctness of the information. ASI Brahm Das recorded the statement (Ex. PW1/A) of Krishan Chand (PW1), which was sent to the police station where FIR (Ex. PW7/A) was registered. ASI Brahm Das prepared the site plan (Ex PW7/C). He seized the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-53-3822 vide seizure memo (Ex. PW7/D). Rajinder Kumar (PW3) mechanically examined the vehicle but did not find any defect in it which could have led to the accident. He issued a report (Ex. PW3/A). Photographs of the spot (Ex. PA1 to Ex. PA4) were taken. The MLCs of the injured (Ex. PA1 to Ex. PA11) were taken. The autopsy report of Brahmu Ram (Ex. PC) was issued, stating that the injured died because of multiple ante-mortem injuries and fractures of ribs, leading to the rupture of the spleen. Statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version. PA1 to Ex. PA4) were taken. The MLCs of the injured (Ex. PA1 to Ex. PA11) were taken. The autopsy report of Brahmu Ram (Ex. PC) was issued, stating that the injured died because of multiple ante-mortem injuries and fractures of ribs, leading to the rupture of the spleen. Statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version. After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case. Krishan Chand (PW-1) is the victim/informant. Sushma Devi (PW-2), Santosh Kumar (PW-4), Duni Chand (PW-6) and Prem Kumar (PW-8) are the eyewitnesses. Rajinder Kumar (PW-3) mechanically examined the vehicle. HHC Swaroop Chand (PW5) proved the entry in the daily diary. ASI Brahm Dass (PW-7) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was driving the vehicle. He stated that another vehicle came from the wrong side of the road. He swerved his vehicle to avoid the collision, which led to the accident. He admitted that the police had seized the vehicle and mechanically examined it. He denied the rest of the prosecution’s case. He stated that he was innocent and was falsely implicated. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6 Learned Trial Court held that the accused did not dispute that he was driving the vehicle which had met with an accident, and its occupants had sustained multiple injuries. The prosecution’s witnesses admitted that the accused drove the vehicle towards the wrong side of the road. The plea taken by the accused that he swerved the vehicle to avoid the collision was not probable. The MLCs proved that the informant /victim had sustained multiple injuries. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. Therefore, the accused was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279,337, 338 and 304-A of IPC and was sentenced as under:- 7. The MLCs proved that the informant /victim had sustained multiple injuries. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. Therefore, the accused was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279,337, 338 and 304-A of IPC and was sentenced as under:- 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal. Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, which met with an accident, causing injuries to its occupants. The prosecution witnesses proved that the accused had driven the vehicle towards the wrong side of the road, and it fell into the gorge, which showed that he was unable to control the vehicle. The negligence of the accused was duly proved. The MLCs proved that the occupants had sustained multiple injuries. The accused was rightly convicted and sentenced by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the petitioner/accused preferred the present revision, asserting that the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are based upon conjectures and surmises. There was no evidence of rashness or negligence of the accused. Krishan Chand (PW1) did not support the prosecution’s case, and he was declared hostile. Sushma Devi (PW 2) stated that she was not aware of the cause of the accident. Santosh Kumar (PW 4) gave a different version of the accident. Duni Chand (PW6) did not support the prosecution’s case. There was no legal evidence to prove that the accused was driving the vehicle rashly or negligently, which led to the accident. Learned Trial Court convicted the accused without any evidence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed, and the judgments and order passed by the learned courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Rajesh Mandhotra, learned Counsel, for the petitioner, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr Rajesh Mandhotra, learned Counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that all the occupants turned hostile and there is no evidence of the negligence of the accused. Learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. 9. I have heard Mr Rajesh Mandhotra, learned Counsel, for the petitioner, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr Rajesh Mandhotra, learned Counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that all the occupants turned hostile and there is no evidence of the negligence of the accused. Learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He submitted in the alternative that the accused has suffered the agony of trial for a long time and the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court be reduced. 11. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the accused admitted that he was driving the vehicle which had met with an accident. The vehicle left the road and fell into the gorge, which showed the petitioner’s negligence. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13 It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. The terms rashness or negligence were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahadev Prasad Kaushik v. State of U.P., (2008) 14 SCC 479 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 834: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1551, at page 487: - 26. Though the term “negligence” has not been de- fined in the Code, it may be stated that negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do. 25. Though the term “negligence” has not been de- fined in the Code, it may be stated that negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do. 25. In Empress of India v. Idu Beg [ILR (1881) 3 All 776] Straight, J. made the following pertinent observations which have been quoted with approval by various courts, including this Court: (ILR p. 780) “… criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury, but without intention to cause injury, or knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted.” 19. It is undisputed that the accused was driving the vehicle, which had met with an accident. The accused explained in his statement, recorded under section 313 CrPC, that a vehicle came from the opposite side, and he tried to swerve the vehicle to avoid the collision. This shows that the accident is also not disputed. The site plan (Ex. PW7/C) shows that the vehicle left its side and fell into the gorge from the right side of the road. Krishan Chand (PW1) admitted in his cross-examination, after he was declared hostile, that the vehicle had left its road and fallen into the gorge from the other side. Santosh Kumar (PW4) stated that the accused was driving the vehicle at a high speed and could not control it. Duni Chand (PW6) stated that the vehicle fell off the road into a gorge. He admitted, after he was declared hostile, that the vehicle fell into the gorge from the right side of the road. Santosh Kumar (PW4) stated that the accused was driving the vehicle at a high speed and could not control it. Duni Chand (PW6) stated that the vehicle fell off the road into a gorge. He admitted, after he was declared hostile, that the vehicle fell into the gorge from the right side of the road. Prem Kumar (PW8) admitted that the vehicle fell into the gorge from the wrong side of the road, and it would not have fallen into the gorge had it remained on its own side. 20. Thus, all the witnesses admitted that the vehicle had left its own side and was driven towards the right side of the road. Rule 2 Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. Thus, driving a vehicle towards the right side of the road amounts to a breach of the duty imposed by the Rules of Road Regulations. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the wrong side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 21. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, that where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, that where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.” 22. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 23. It is undisputed that the vehicle had left the road. The vehicles do not usually leave the road, and when they do, the driver has to explain the circumstances leading to the accident. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 23. It is undisputed that the vehicle had left the road. The vehicles do not usually leave the road, and when they do, the driver has to explain the circumstances leading to the accident. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syed Akbar versus State of Karnataka 1980 (1) SCC 30 , that the burden of proving everything essential to establish the charge against the accused rests on the prosecution. However, where the facts of the accident are such that the accident could not have been caused except for the negligence of the accused, the principle of res ipsa loquitor can be applied. It was observed:- “29. However, shorn of its doctrinaire features, understood in the broad, general sense, as by the other line of decisions, only as a convenient ratiocinative aid in the assessment of evidence, in drawing permissive inferences under S. 114, Evidence Act, from the circumstances of the particular case, including the constituent circumstances of the accident, established in evidence, with a view to come to a conclusion at the time of judgment, whether or not, in favour of the alleged negligence (among other ingredients of the offence with which the accused stands charged), such a high degree of probability, as distinguished from a mere possibility has been established which will convince reasonable men with regard to the existence of that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Such harnessed, functional use of the maxim will not conflict with provisions and the principles of the Evidence Act relating to the burden of proof and other cognate matters peculiar to criminal jurisprudence. 30. Such simplified and pragmatic application of the notion of res ipsa loquitur, as a part of the general mode of inferring a fact in issue from another circumstantial fact, is subject to all the principles, the satisfaction of which is essential before an accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone. There are: Firstly, all the circumstances, including the objective circumstances constituting the accident, from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, must be firmly established. Secondly, those circumstances must be of a determinative tendency pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused. There are: Firstly, all the circumstances, including the objective circumstances constituting the accident, from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, must be firmly established. Secondly, those circumstances must be of a determinative tendency pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused. Thirdly, the circumstances should make a chain so complete that they cannot reasonably raise any other hypothesis save that of the accused's guilt. That is to say, they should be incompatible with his innocence and inferentially exclude all reasonable doubt about his guilt. 24. In Keshavamurthy versus State 2002 Cri. L.J 103, a car left the road and hit a tree. It was held that the accident prima facie showed that the driver was negligent, and he had to explain the circumstances leading to the accident. It was observed: - “It could therefore be seen that, at about 1.00 a.m. in the night, on a road of a total width of 19ft with 6ft kacha road on either side, with no other vehicles in the area, the car hits the roadside tree. As the Supreme Court points out in Mohammed Aynuddin @ Miyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2000 (3) Crimes 119 (2000 Cri LJ 3508 (SC)), an accident of such a nature would prima facie show that it cannot be accounted other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may create a presumption, and in such a case, the driver has to explain how the accident was for a reason other than his negligence. This is what the Supreme Court states in paragraph6 of the judgment:- "It is a wrong proposition that for any motor accident, negligence of the driver should be presumed. An accident of such a nature as would prima facie show that it cannot be accounted to anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may create a presumption, and in such a case, the driver has to explain how the accident happened without negligence on his part." In light of this ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court, the facts of the present case could be seen. Here is a car proceeding from Bangalore to Shimoga. At the place concerned, there are no other vehicles on the road. There is no obstruction. The road is of a width of 19 ft. of cement and tar road, with 6 ft. kacha road on either side. Here is a car proceeding from Bangalore to Shimoga. At the place concerned, there are no other vehicles on the road. There is no obstruction. The road is of a width of 19 ft. of cement and tar road, with 6 ft. kacha road on either side. Still, the vehicle hits a roadside tree. Added to that, there is a report of IMV Inspector at Ex.P5 to the effect that the accident is not due to any mechanical defect in the vehicle. In such a situation, an accident of this nature would prima facie show that the same could not be accounted for anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle, i.e., the petitioner. A presumption in that regard thus arises. In such a case, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, it was for the petitioner driver to explain how the accident occurred without negligence on his part. What the petitioner has done in the course of his examination under S.313 Cr. P.C. is simply denying everything. He does not say anything, and even to the general question that is asked at the end as to whether he has got anything to say, he did not choose to say anything, nor did he care to explain the manner in which the accident occurred, i.e., in order to rebut the above said presumption as regards the accident occurring due to his negligence, and in order to show that accident occurred for a particular reason not attributable to his negligence. This was, therefore, an appropriate case wherein, on the basis of a presumption that the Supreme Court was speaking about a conviction that could be based. 25. In Thakur Singh versus State of Punjab (2003) 9 SCC 208 , the accused admitted that he was driving the bus, which left the road and fell into the canal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the principle of res ipsa loquitur will apply and the burden will shift upon the accused to explain how the accident had taken place. It was observed:- “4. It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge, and then it fell into the canal. It was observed:- “4. It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge, and then it fell into the canal. In such a situation, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play, and the burden shifts onto the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part.” 26. Thus, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, where the facts speak for themselves and there can be no explanation for the accident except the negligence of the accused, the Court can apply the principle of res ipsa loquitur, and the burden will shift upon the accused to show how the accident took place. 27. The accused asserted that a vehicle came from the opposite side, and he swerved the vehicle to avoid the accident. This explanation does not show why the accused had not applied the brakes, and even if he had swerved the vehicle, why the vehicle fell into the gorge. Thus, the explanation provided by the accused is not sufficient, and he was rightly held guilty of driving the vehicle negligently. 28. The accused did not dispute the MLC of the victims and the postmortem report of the deceased Brahmu Ram. The MLC of Sushma Devi (Ex.PA1), Lachchi Devi (Ex.PA2), Moni Devi (Ex.PA3), Krishan Chand (Ex.PA4), Prem Kumari (Ex.PA5), Ram Piari (Ex.PA6), Santosh Kumar (Ex. PA7) and Dumnu Ram (Ex. PA8) show that they had sustained simple injuries. MLC of Gilmo Devi (Ex. PA9) and Punni Devi (Ex.PA 11) show that they had sustained grievous injuries. All the injuries could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. The post-mortem report of Brahma Ram showed that he died due to the multiple injuries and fractures of ribs, leading to the rupture of the spleen. These injuries could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused; therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was guilty of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338, and 304 A of the IPC. 29. These injuries could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused; therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was guilty of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338, and 304 A of the IPC. 29. Learned Trial Court imposed maximum sentence of rigorous imprisonment of six months. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of IPC. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country", the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly in- form himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 30. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held: - 13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 31. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to ob- serve that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 32. Learned Trial Court had already taken a lenient view in the present matter, and it is not permissible to reduce the sentence further. 33. No other point was urged. 34. In view of the above, the present revision fails and the same is dismissed. 35. The records of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of this judgment for the information.