1 2025:CGHC:35310-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 518 of 2025 M/s T.S. Traders Through Proprietor Shri Vijay Ghoshal, S/o Shri Paritosh Ghoshal, Guarantor Smt. Anita Ghoshal Both Proprietor And Guaranter R/o E.W.S.- 32, Housing Board Colony, Bandhapara, Ward Kondagaon, Tehsil - Kondagaon, District - Kondagaon (C.G.) ... Appellant versus 1 - Indian Overseas Bank Through Authorized Officer Rajesh Kumar Yadav S/o Shri Lal Mani Yadav, Aged About - 44 Years, Office At - Regional Office, Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.) 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Revenue And Disaster Management Department, Atal Nagar, Mahanadi Bhawan, Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.) 3 - The Collector Cum District Magistrate, Kondagaon, District - Kondagaon (C.G.) 4 - The Tehsildar, Tehsil - Kondagaon, Kondagaon, District - Kondagaon (C.G.) SOURABH BHILWAR Digitally signed by SOURABH BHILWAR Date: 2025.07.25 18:52:40 +0530 2 5 - The Superintendent Of Police, Kondagaon, District - Kondagaon (C.G.) 6 - The Sub Divisional Magistrate, Kondagaon, District - Kondagaon (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause title is taken from CIS) For Appellant : Mr. Rajesh Kumar Kesharwani, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Saket Pandey, Advocate For Respondents/ State : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Dy. Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 23 .07.2025 1. Heard Mr. Rajesh Kumar Kesharwani, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Saket Pandey, learned counsel for respondent No.1 as well as Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Dy. Advocate General appearing for the respondents/ State. 2. The present writ appeal preferred by the appellant/ writ petitioner/ review petitioner against the order dated 05/05/2025 passed in WPC No. 2276/2025 and the order dated 04.07.2025 passed in REVP Petition No. 165/2025 by the learned Single Judge of this Court. For the sake of convenience the parties would be referred as per the status in the writ petition. 3. The instant writ appeal has been filed by the appellant/ respondent No.6 seeking for the following relief :- “i. This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the writ appeal; quashing the impugned 3 order, dt. 04/07/2025 passed by the learned Single Bench in REVP PETITION No. 165/2025 and order dt. 05.05.2025 passed in WPC No.2276 of 2025 [ANNEXURE - P/1 COLLY] ii. Any other relief as the Hon'ble Court may be deemed fit and proper. iii. Cost of appeal may kindly be allowed.” 4. (a) Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.6/ appellant herein would submit that WPC No. 2276/ 2025 filed by the writ petitioner/ respondent No.1 herein and sought a direction towards the respondents No.2 to 5 therein to conclude the proceeding under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, “the Act of 2002”) and assist in granting the physical possession of the mortgaged properties to the petitioner bank in Revenue Case No. 202303200100017/B- 121/2022-2023. He would submit that the said writ petition was disposed of by the writ Court by order dated 05/05/2025. (b) Learned counsel would submit that thereafter the respondent No.6 / appellant preferred a review petition and sought review of the order dated 05/05/2025 passed in WPC No. 2276/2025 with the contention that the writ petitioner has already approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) and despite the said fact the same has not been disclosed in the writ petition. (c) According to the learned counsel, the learned Single Judge 4 while passing the orders dated 05/05/2025 in WPC and 04/07/2025 in Review has not appreciated the facts and circumstances of the case in its true perspective. He would submit that Section 34 of the Act of 2002 evidently bars the Jurisdiction of Civil Courts when the DRT and the DRAT are empowered by the said Act to determine. According to the appellant the learned Single Judge ought to have allowed the review petition by recalling the order passed in the writ petition, though a cost of Rs. 10,000/- has been imposed upon the bank for the said non-disclosure about the pendency of the matter before DRT but rejected the review petition filed by the appellant herein. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant/ respondent No.6 and perused the pleadings and the documents. 6. For the sake of convenience, it would be appropriate to quote Paras No. 1 to 6 of the order dated 05/05/2025 passed in WPC No. 2276/2025 :- “1. By the present writ petition, the petitioner is seeking direction towards respondent No. 2 to 5 to conclude the proceeding under Section 14 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 2002’) and assist in granting the physical possession of the mortgaged properties to the petitioner bank, in Revenue Case (e-court) No. 202303200100017/B-121/2022-2023. 5 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on the application under Section 14 of the Act, 2002, the Collector-cum-District Magistrate passed an order dated 08.04.2024 (Annexure-P/1) for handing over the possession of the questioned mortgaged property to the petitioner in Revenue Case (e-court) No.202303200100017/B-121/2022-2023, however, the Tahsildar is not proceeding in pursuance of the said order and no initiatives have taken place in accordance with the Act, 2002 for granting possession of the mortgaged property to the petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the State would submit that necessary steps will be taken by the Tahsildar for handing over the possession of the mortgaged property. 4. I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the order passed by the Collector dated 08.04.2024. 5. From perusal of the order passed by the Collector and provisions of the Act, 2002, it appears that the provision of Section 14 of the Act, 2002 is very specific that the Collector shall assist the Bank or the Financial Institution for taking over the possession of the mortgaged property within a stipulated period, but the same has not been followed in the present case till date, though one year has already lapsed. 6. Hence, the Collector, Kondagaon as well as the Tahsildar, Kondagaon are directed to take appropriate and necessary steps in compliance of the provisions of Sections 14 of the Act and in pursuance of the order dated 08.04.2024 (Annexure-P/1) to hand over the possession of the mortgaged property to the petitioner 6 within a period of 25 days from today. 7. With the aforesaid direction, the writ petition is disposed of.” 7. After disposal of the writ petition, when the fact about concealment of fact regarding suppression of pendency of proceedings before the DRT came to know to the knowledge of the learned Single Judge in review petition filed by the respondent No.6, the learned Single Judge took very serious note regarding suppression of material fact by the writ petitioner/ bank with regard to the pendency of proceedings before the DRT, imposed a cost of Rs. 10,000/- against the bank. For the sake of convenience, the order dated 04/07/2025 passed in REVP No. 165 of 2025 is quoted below : “8. This Court, after taking note of all the relevant aspects of the matter, had arrived at a finding that the provision of Section 14 of the Act of 2002 is very specific and the Collector shall assist the Bank or the Financial Institution for taking over the possession of the mortgaged property within a stipulated period, but the same has not been followed in the present case till date, though one year has already lapsed and hence, the Collector, Kondagaon as well as the Tahsildar, Kondagaon was directed to take appropriate and necessary steps in compliance of the provisions of Sections 14 of the Act of 2002 and in pursuance of the order dated 08.04.2024 (Annexure-P/1 to the writ petition) to hand over the possession of the mortgaged 7 property to the petitioner within a period of 25 days from the date of the order. 9. There is no error apparent on the face of the record and the attempt of the review petitioner is to re-agitate the issue which has already been considered and decided by this Court. Even otherwise, the law with regard to review of an order is well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by a Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision in the case. Normally the principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so, which is missing in this case. 10. It is well settled principle of law that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope of ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Even in exercise of review jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the review petitioner has not produced any ground for review. It appears that the review petitioner, by presentation of this review petition seeks an opportunity to argue the entire case afresh on merits under the garb of the review petition, which is not permissible and tenable in law. 11. It is well settled principle that under the garb of the review petition, the review petitioner should not be permitted to argue the entire case afresh which would amount to convert the review petition into an appeal and the same is not sustainable in law as held by the 8 Supreme Court in case of Meera Bhanjan v. Smt. Nirmal Kumar Choudhary reported in AIR 1995 SC 455, Lily Thomas etc. v. Union of India & Others reported in AIR 2000 SC 1650, Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa & Others reported in AIR 2000 SC 85, Government of T.N. & Others v. M. Ananchu Asari & Others reported in (2005) 2 SCC 332 and in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd & Others reported in (2005) 6 SCC 651. 12. For the foregoing reasons, this review petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. However, if so advised, the petitioner may approach before the authority concerned in respect of the proceedings, which has already been initiated. 13. At this juncture, learned counsel for the review petitioner submits that he is ready and willing to deposit the loan amount, as such, this aspect of the matter may be directed to be considered by the authority concerned. Accordingly, the concerned authorities may consider this aspect that the petitioner is ready to deposit the loan amount in question. 14. So far as suppression of material facts are concerned time and again the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court has warned the litigants not to suppress the material facts. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of K. Jayaram and Others vs. Bangalore Developmenet Authority and Others reported in (2022) 12 SCC 815 has held in paras 10 & 14 as under:- “10. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is 9 extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands and put forward all facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything. A litigant is bound to state all facts which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds some vital or relevant material in order to gain advantage over the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud with the court as well as with the opposite parties which cannot be countenanced. 14. In order to check multiplicity of proceedings pertaining to the same subject-matter and more importantly to stop the menace of soliciting inconsistent orders through different judicial forums by suppressing material facts either by remaining silent or by making misleading statements in the pleadings in order to escape the liability of making a false statement, the parties have to disclose the details of all legal proceedings and litigations either past or present concerning any part of the subject- matter of dispute which is within their knowledge. In case, according to the parties to the dispute, no legal proceedings or court litigations were or are pending, they have to mandatorily state so in their pleadings in order to resolve the dispute between the parties in accordance with law.” 15. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of All India EPF Staff Federation vs. Union of India and Others reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1629 has held in para 4 that :- 10 “4. The present Special Leave Petitions challenging the orders dated 20th March, 2024 and 25th April, 2024 was filed on 14th June, 2024. The Delhi High Court's website shows that on 3rd May, 2024, the petitioner moved an application being CM Application No. 26033/2024 for early hearing of the Petition. It was obvious that the prayer for early hearing was made as the interim relief was refused and a longer date in September, 2024 was fixed. The order dated 3rd May, 2024 passed on the said application shows that the Advocate appearing for the petitioner, after arguing the matter for some time, did not press the said application and, therefore, the same was dismissed. Therefore, the High Court directed that the case shall be listed on 5th September, 2024. Most importantly, in these Special Leave Petitions, which are filed on 14th June, 2024, the material fact of filing CM Application No. 26033/2024 was suppressed and even the order dated 3rd May, 2024 passed on the said application was suppressed.” 16. Therefore where, material facts are suppressed, then the Court can refuse to exercise its equitable jurisdiction. In the case at hand, respondent No.1-Bank (petitioner of WPC No.2276 of 2025) was under obligation to state correct facts of the case, which he has deliberately suppressed, which is serious matter of concern. The proceeding pending before the DRT must be stated in clear terms. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the suppression of material fact by the respondent No.1-Bank, who is petitioner in WPC No.2276/2025) is a misconduct and this Court takes a serious note of the aforesaid conduct with regard to 11 suppression of material fact and in order to discourage such practice, this Court deems it proper to impose an cost upon the respondent No.1-Bank to the tune of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) for acting mischievously with the Court. The respondent No.1- Bank is directed to deposit a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) before the Registry of this Court within a period of one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order, failing which the Registrar General shall not only initiate proceedings for recovery of cost, but shall also register a case for contempt of Court. 17. A copy of this order be placed before the Registrar General for necessary action and compliance.” 8. From perusal of the order dated 05/05/2025 passed in WPC No. 2276/2025 filed by the Bank, it appears that the learned Single Judge has directed the Collector, Kondagaon to take appropriate steps in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Act of 2002. As far as the contention of the appellant herein and before the learned Single Judge in review petition regarding the fact that pendency of proceeding before the DRT is concerned, it was for the appellant to bring the fact regarding pendency of proceeding before the DRT to the Collector or to move an application before the DRT to question the proceeding under Section 14 of the Act of 2002 by the Collector, however, without approaching the DRT, the appellant herein preferred a review petition and subsequently after decision rendered in the said review, the instant writ appeal has been filed. 9. For the sake of convenience, Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 12 2002 is quoted below :- "14. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate to assist secured creditor in taking possession of secured asset.-(1) Where the possession of any secured assets is required to be taken by the secured creditor or if any of the secured assets is required to be sold or transferred by the secured creditor under the provisions of this Act, the secured creditor may, for the purpose of taking possession or control of any such secured assets, request, in writing, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate within whose jurisdiction any such secured asset or other documents relating thereto may be situated or found, to take possession thereof, and the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or, as the case may be, the District Magistrate shall, on such request being made to him-- (a) take possession of such asset and documents relating thereto; and (b) forward such assets and documents to the secured creditor: 1[Provided that any application by the secured creditor shall be accompanied by an affidavit duly affirmed by the authorized officer of the secured creditor, declaring that- i. The aggregate amount of financial assistance granted and the total claim of the Bank as on the date of filing the application; ii. The borrower has created security interest over various properties and that the Bank or Financial Institution is holding a valid and subsisting security interest over such properties and the claim of the Bank or Financial Institution is within the limitation period; iii. the borrower has created security interest over various properties giving the details of properties referred to in sub-clause (ii) above; iv. The borrower has committed default in repayment of the financial assistance granted aggregating the specified amount; v. consequent upon such default in repayment of the financial assistance the account of the borrower has been classified as a nonperforming asset; 13 vi. affirming that the period of sixty days notice as required by the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 13, demanding payment of the defaulted financial assistance has been served on the borrower: vii. the objection or representation in reply to the notice received from the borrower has been considered by the secured creditor and reasons for non-acceptance of such objection or representation had been communicated to the borrower; viii. the borrower has not made any repayment of the financial assistance in spite of the above notice and the Authorised Officer is, therefore, entitled to take possession of the secured assets under the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 13 read with section 14 of the principal Act; ix. that the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder had been complied with: Provided further that on receipt of the affidavit from the Authorised Officer, the District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall after satisfying the contents of the affidavit pass suitable orders for the purpose of taking possession of the secured assets within a period of thirty days from the date of application.] [Provided [also] that if no order is passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate within the said period of thirty days for reasons beyond his control, he may, after recording reasons in writing for the same, pass the order within such further period but not exceeding in aggregate sixty days.] Provided also that the requirement of filing affidavit stated in the first proviso shall not apply to proceeding pending before any District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, on the date of commencement of this Act.] [(1A) The District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate may authorise any officer subordinate to him,- (i) to take possession of such assets and documents relating thereto; and (ii) to forward such assets and documents to the secured creditor.] (2) For the purpose of securing compliance with the 14 provisions of sub-section (1), the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate of the District Magistrate may take or cause to be taken such steps and use, or cause to be used, such force, as may, in his opinion, be necessary. (3) No act of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate [any officer authorised by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate] done in pursuance of this section shall be called in question in any court or before any authority." 10. It is the trite law that when the statutory remedy available under the DRT Act and the Act of 2002 the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised because the same have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. Even such practice has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions (Union Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors. [2010] 8 SCC 110). 11. By placing reliance upon the decision rendered in Satyawati Tondon (supra), recently the Supreme Court in the matter of PHR Invent Educational Society vs. UCO Bank & Ors. reported in (2024) 6 SCC 579 held that the High Court should not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution particularly when an alternative remedy is available. The Supreme Court held thus at Paras 37, 38 and 41 :- “37. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out certain exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy. Some of them are thus: (i) where the statutory authority has not 15 acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question; (ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; (iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and (iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles. of natural justice. 38. It has however been clarified that the High Court will not entertain a a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. xxxxx xxxxx 41. While dismissing the writ petition, we will have to remind the High Courts of the following words of this Court in Satyawati Tondon³ since we have come across various matters wherein the High Courts have been entertaining petitions arising out of the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act in spite of availability of an effective alternative remedy: (SCC p. 128, para 55) "55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act d and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse 16 impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection." 12. Applying the well settled principles of law to the facts of the present case and for the reasons mentioned above and also the fact that the matter is pending before the DRT, which has been filed by the appellant herein, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error while passing the orders in WPC and in Review. 13. As a sequel, the writ appeal, sans substratum, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice S.Bhilwar/ Jyoti