Page No.# 1/12 GAHC030005842025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/156/2025 Sh. Nigel Singson S/o Ronald Singson, R/o Zemabawk Lungbial, Aizawl, presently residing at Dimapur, Nagaland VERSUS Sh. Denis T. Singson (now dead) Represented by his wife Veronica Singson W/o Denis Singson (L), R/o Lengrijan, House No. 109, Sector 3, Lane 3, Dimapur, Nagaland Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr Zoramchhana Advocate for the Respondent : In RFA/38/2025 Sh. Nigel Singson S/o Ronald Singson R/o Zemabawk Lungbial Aizawl presently residing at Dimapur Nagaland VERSUS Sh. Denis T. Singson (now dead) Represented by his wife Veronica Singson W/o Denis Singson (L) R/o Lengrijan Page No.# 2/12 House No. 109 Sector 3 Lane 3 Dimapur Nagaland Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr Zoramchhana Advocate for the Respondent : Mr Lalfakawma for R1 B E F O R E HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR SHARMA ORDER 10.06.2026 Heard Mr. Zoramchhana, learned counsel for the applicant/appellant, and Mr. Lalfakawma, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This I.A. has been preferred seeking condonation of delay of 2552 days in preferring the connected appeal. The appeal has been preferred challenging an Order dated 29.05.2018, as well as the Heirship Certificate No. 555 of 2018, passed and issued by the Learned Court of the Senior Civil Judge-III, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl in Heirship Certificate Case No. 555 of 2018. 3. The aforesaid order is an ex parte one. 4. It is stated and submitted that due to bona fide and inadvertent reasons, Page No.# 3/12 the applicant is unable to file the said appeal within time, the reasons of which are explained herein below: “a) That the Applicant had come to learn of the impugned Heirship Certificate No.555 of 2018 issued to his uncle Denis T. Singson in respect of the land and building covered by LSC No.103/101/01/741 of 2009 located at Zemabawk Lungbial, Aizawl, Mizoram. As a result of a subsequent Heirship Certificate Application No.937 of 2024 filed by Veronica Singson, who is the wife of the said Denis T. Singson before the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) - V, Aizawl District, Aizawl only on 31.09.2024 and the applicant being a minor had submitted his objection through his mother on 1/10/2024 before the said Trial Court. Hence, when the applicant had gained knowledge, there is already a delay of 2226 days.” 5. As against the aforesaid contention, the respondent by filing objection has taken the following stand: “a) That in reply to the content of para 2(a) of the application, it is submitted that the applicant has not mentioned that date and/ or time when he came to learn of the issuance of the Heirship Certificate No. 555 of 2018 for reasons best known to him. That the applicant has also failed Page No.# 4/12 to account for the number of days that had fallen between his alleged date of knowledge and the date of filing his objection in Heirship Case No. 937 of 2024, i.e., 01.10.2024. That it is also surprising that the applicant was unaware of the issuance of Heirship Certificate No. 555 of 2018 to Shri. Denis T. Singson inspite of the fact that the applicant has clearly mentioned that Shri. Denis T. Singson is his uncle. As such, the unexplained period of 2226 (two thousand two hundred twenty six) days, i.e., a period of more that 6 (six) years could not have been condoned by this Hon'ble Court.” 6. The stand of the respondent that the applicant has not mentioned the date and/ or time as to when he came to learn of the issuance of the impugned Heirship Certificate for reasons best known to him is factually incorrect. The applicant in his application, at para 2A thereof has clearly stated the date of knowledge as 31.09.2024. Therefore, the only contention of the respondent with regard to the aforesaid part of the delay is that it is not believable that the applicant had no knowledge of the fact of issuance of Heirship Certificate No. 555 of 2018, since the same was issued in favour of the uncle of the applicant. 7. It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that at the time of issuance of the impugned order, the applicant was a minor and he along with his mother Page No.# 5/12 lived in Nagaland, which is the original place of residence of the mother of the applicant and she had returned there along with the applicant after the death of her husband and therefore, they had no knowledge about the impugned certificate or the proceedings in respect thereto since the paper publication was made in newspapers circulating in the state of Mizoram. The aforesaid contention has not been disputed by learned counsel for the respondent. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the plea of lack of knowledge on the part of the applicant, who was a minor at that time, cannot be discarded merely because the certificate has been issued in favour of his uncle. 8. As regards the subsequent delay, that is after having gathered the knowledge regarding the issuance of the impugned certificate, which according to the applicant was on 31.09.2024, it is stated that an objection was submitted in the subsequent case, i.e., Heirship Certificate Application No. 937 of 2024, filed by Veronica Singson, i.e., wife of late Denis T. Singson, which however was subsequently withdrawn on 05.02.2025, whereafter, a fresh Heirship Certificate Application No. 1 of 2025 was instituted by Alvin Singson, son of Veronica Singson and Dennis T Singson, on 26.05.2025, wherein the applicant was arrayed as a defendant. During this time the applicant attained majority and he had consulted his counsel on 11.06.2025. Page No.# 6/12 9. The delay thereafter has been explained as follows: “d) That the counsel for the applicant had studied the case of the applicant and since the previous Heirship Certificate Case No.555 of 2018 was not disclosed to the applicant, the counsel for the applicant had applied for certified copy of the said Heirship Certificate Case No.555 of 2018 on 18/7/2025 and he was issued a copy on 21/7/2025. Hence, when the record of the Heirship Certificate Case No.555 of 2018 was issued to the counsel for the applicant, there is already a delay of 2520 days. e) That the counsel for the applicant had studied the case of the applicant and advised him to file an appeal against the impugned Heirship Certificate Case No.555 of 2018 along with the impugned Order dt.29/5/2018. However, the applicant was also not in possession of the records of the Heirship Certificate Application No.937 of 2024 filed by Veronica Singson. Accordingly, the counsel for the applicant had again applied for certified copy of the records of the said Heirship Certificate Application No.937 of 2024 on 1/8/2025 and he was issued a copy on 11/8/2025. Thus, when the counsel for the applicant had obtained all the required documents, there is already a delay of 2531 days. f) That thereafter, the counsel for the applicant had prepared a Page No.# 7/12 necessary drafting and took necessary steps for filing an appeal which took approximately 11 days. Hence, the appeal can be filed after a lapse of 2552 days.” 10. As against the aforesaid cause shown by the applicant, it is the contention of the respondent that during the period between 01.10.2024 and 05.02.2025, i.e., the date of filing of objection in Heirship Certificate Case No. 937 of 2024 and the date of disposal of the said case on withdrawal, the applicant failed to take any steps for challenging the Heirship Certificate No. 555 of 2018 for a period of 128 days, for which no explanation is provided and that thereafter also, the applicant has willfully refused to take step for challenging the said certificate, even after having received knowledge of the same. And as such, the plea that the applicant was in a position to consult a lawyer, only after he attained the age of majority, after institution of Heirship Case No. 1 of 2025 cannot be considered as a reasonable explanation. 11. It is not disputed that the applicant attained majority only after institution of the Heirship Case No. 1 of 2025 and it appears that after consulting his advocate, the matter was in the hands of the advocate and having regard to the tender age of the petitioner who was still a teenager at that time, it cannot be said that there was any willful or deliberate delay on the part of the applicant Page No.# 8/12 and nothing in that regard is discernible from the material on record. In any case, it would hardly be to the benefit of the applicant to willfully or deliberately delay the matter, since his right to the landed property of his grandfather was involved. 12. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. Page No.# 9/12 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest republicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Page No.# 10/12 Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality". 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 13. In the present case also, the explanation given by the applicant in the given facts and circumstances does not indicate any malafide or any dilatory strategy on the part of the applicant, whether to gain time or otherwise. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Ajay Dabra Vs. Pyare Ram and Others, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 92, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: Page No.# 11/12 “5. What we have here is a pure civil matter. An appeal has to be filed within the stipulated period, prescribed under the law. Belated appeals can only be condoned, when sufficient reason is shown before the court for the delay. The appellant who seeks condonation of delay therefore must explain the delay of each day. It is true that the courts should not be pedantic in their approach while condoning the delay, and explanation of each day's delay should not be taken literally, but the fact remains that there must be a reasonable explanation for the delay. In the present case, this delay has not been explained to the satisfaction of the court. The only reason assigned by the appellant for the delay of 254 days in filing the First Appeal was that he was not having sufficient funds to pay the court fee! This was not found to be a sufficient reason for the condonation of delay as the appellant was an affluent businessman and a hotelier. In any case, even it is presumed for the sake of argument that the appellant was short of funds, at the relevant point of time and was not able to pay court fee, nothing barred him from filing the appeal as there is provision under the law for filing a defective appeal, i.e., an appeal which is deficient as far as court fee is concerned, provided the court fee is paid within the time given by the Court. We would refer to Section 149 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 which reads as under:- "Section 149: Power to make up deficiency of Court Fees.-Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to court fees has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court-fee; and upon such payment the document, Page No.# 12/12 in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance." 15. As is discernible from a plain reading of the aforesaid paragraph, the same was rendered in the context of the facts of that case, where the reason for the delay cited was the financial condition of the appellant. In fact, it has been specifically held that belated appeals can be condoned when sufficient reason is shown to the Court for the delay. The aforesaid decision does not help the respondent in any way. 16. Having regard to the above, I am of the considered view that the explanation tendered in the present case appears to be sufficient and bonafide and the delay has been satisfactorily explained. As already observed, there does not appear to be any willful delay or dilatory tactics on the part of the applicant which does not benefit him in any way. 17. Accordingly, the delay stands condoned and the Interlocutory Application stands allowed and disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant