JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 86 of 2023, dated 29.07.2023, registered at Police Station Dharampur, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (in short “ IPC ”). 2. It has been asserted that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, which is violative of Article 22 of the Constitution of India; hence, the petitioner is entitled to bail. F.I.R. No. 50 of 2004, dated 04.04.2004 and F.I.R. No. 121 of 2013, dated 01.10.2013, have been registered against the petitioner. No witness has been examined by the prosecution. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, the present petition. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police station received a call on 29.07.2023 that one person was lying near the Yug Homestay. The police went to the spot and found one person lying dead, whose name was found to be Kashmir s/o Ishar. He had suffered multiple injuries, and his clothes were blood-stained. Informant, Yugal Thakur, made a statement to the police that he is running Yug Homestay. He had stayed in the Homestay on 28.07.2023. He heard some noise at about 01:00-01:30 am. He came out and saw that Hira Lal @ Golu and Puran Chand (petitioner) were beating Kashmir with sticks. Kashmir stated that his arm was fractured. He rescued Kashmir from the petitioner and the co-accused. The petitioner disclosed that Kashmir was teasing his mother and wife. The petitioner and the co-accused dragged Kashmir towards Subathu. He found in the morning that someone was lying unconscious at 300 meters from the Homestay. He went to the spot and identified the person as Kashmir. Virender informed the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The petitioner and the co- accused produced the sticks with which the beatings were given to Kashmir. The samples were collected and sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Junga. As per the result of analysis, human blood stains were found on the stones/concrete, Nail clippings, Shirt, Pyjama, T-shirt and lower of Kashmir Chand. The result of the DNA analysis is awaited. The charge- sheet was filed before the Court on 16.08.2025. The samples were collected and sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Junga. As per the result of analysis, human blood stains were found on the stones/concrete, Nail clippings, Shirt, Pyjama, T-shirt and lower of Kashmir Chand. The result of the DNA analysis is awaited. The charge- sheet was filed before the Court on 16.08.2025. The matter was listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses on 17.09.2025. No FIR has been lodged against the petitioner. The petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous crime. F.I.R. No. 50 of 2004, dated 04.04.2004, for the commission of offences punishable under Section 382 read with Section 34 of IPC was registered against the petitioner, in which the petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender on 17.07.2008. The petitioner was convicted in F.I.R. No.121 of 2013 dated 01.10.2013, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 457 and 380 of the , at Police Station Dharampur, District Solan, H.P. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4. I have heard Mr Pavinder, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Pavinder, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner and the constitutional right of the petitioner has been violated. The prosecution has not examined any witnesses, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was involved in the commission of a heinous offence and he was declared a proclaimed offender earlier. His previous conduct shows that there is no chance of his appearing during the trial in case of his release on bail. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P. , (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: - (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P. , (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: - (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P. , (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. …It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumarv. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35.While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, and the petitioner’s constitutional right was violated. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356, that the communication of the grounds of the arrests in all the offences would apply prospectively from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. It was observed: “58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or binding requirement mandating the written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern arrests henceforth.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Therefore, the non-supply of grounds of arrest will not make any difference. 12. The status report mentions that the petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender by the learned Judicial First Class, Theog, District Shimla, H.P., which shows that there is no reasonable certainty that he would appear before the Court in case of his release on bail. It was held by Hon’ble Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re , 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 318: 1924 Cri LJ 732: AIR 1924 Cal 476 that the primary purpose of granting bail is to secure the presence of the accused during the trial. It was observed: “It is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld merely as a punishment. It was observed: “It is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld merely as a punishment. The requirements as to bail are to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial: R. v. Rose [(1898) 18 Cox. 717. The proper test to be applied in the solution of the question, whether bail should be granted or refused, is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his, trial: Re Robinson [(1854) 23 L.J.Q.B. 286: 2 W.R. 424.], R. v. Scaife [(1841) 9 Dowling P.C. 553: 5 Jurist 700.]. The test is applied by reference to the following considerations: (a) The nature of the accusation: R. v. Barronet [(1852) 1 E. & B. 1: Dearsley 51.], R. v. Butler [(1861) 14 Cox. 530: 8 L.R. (Ir.) 39.]; (b) The nature of the evidence in support of the accusation: Re Robinson [(1854) 23 L.J.Q.B. 286: 2 W.R. 424.], R. v. Butler [(1861) 14 Cox. 530 : 8 L.R. (Ir.) 39.] , R. v. McCormick; [(1864) 17 Ir. C.L.R. 411.] (c) The severity of the punishment which conviction will entail: Re Robinson [(1854) 23 L.J.Q.B. 286: 2 W.R. 424.], and this explains the reluctance of Courts to grant bail on charges of murder: Re Barthelemy [(1852) 1 B. & B. 8: Dearsley 60.], R. v. Andrews [(1844) 2 D. & L. 10: 13 L.J.M.C. 113.]. In this connection, we may recall that in England, bail in treason or felony is discretionary in the High Court or Courts having jurisdiction to try the offence: R. v. McCartie [(1859) 11 Ir. C.L.R. 188, 192.], R. v. Platt [(1777) 1 Leach 157.]; on the other hand, bail in misdemeanour is said to be of right at Common Law: R. v. Spilsbury [[1898] 2 Q.B. 615.]; R. v. Badger [(1843) 4 Q.B. 468, 472: D. & M. 375: 4 St. T.N.S. 1387.]; Re Frost [(1888) 4 T.L.R. 757.]; see also R. v. Crowe [(1829) 4 C. & P. 251.]; R. v. Beardmore [(1836) 7 C. & P. 497.] ; R. v. Osborn [(1837) 7 C. & P. 799.] King v. Fortier [(1902) 13 Quebec K.B. 251: 9 Canada Cr. Cas. 191: 1 Ann. Cas. 10.] . T.N.S. 1387.]; Re Frost [(1888) 4 T.L.R. 757.]; see also R. v. Crowe [(1829) 4 C. & P. 251.]; R. v. Beardmore [(1836) 7 C. & P. 497.] ; R. v. Osborn [(1837) 7 C. & P. 799.] King v. Fortier [(1902) 13 Quebec K.B. 251: 9 Canada Cr. Cas. 191: 1 Ann. Cas. 10.] . This distinction is reflected in sections 496 and 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which respectively treat of the grant of bail in cases of what are described in the phraseology of the Indian Legislature as bailable and non-bailable offences.” 13. A similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI , (2012) 1 SCC 40 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397 : 2011 SCC OnLine SC 1502, wherein it was observed at page 52: “21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by a reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.” 14. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail on this consideration as well. 15. The status report shows that one FIR was registered against the petitioner, and he was convicted in another FIR. This shows that the petitioner has criminal antecedents. This Court exhaustively dealt with the relevance of criminal antecedents in Aminodin vs State of H.P. 2024: HHC: 6091 and held, after referring to various judgments, that a Judge must consider the criminal antecedents of the accused, the nature of offences and his general conduct while considering the bail petition. Bail should not be generally granted to an accused with criminal antecedents when there is a likelihood of the commission of the crime. 16. Bail should not be generally granted to an accused with criminal antecedents when there is a likelihood of the commission of the crime. 16. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand , (1977) 4 SCC 308 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 594 : 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail except where the circumstances suggest creating trouble by repeating the offence. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 17. It was held in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P. , (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 that where the person seeking bail has criminal antecedents, he is not entitled to bail. It was observed: “9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 18. It was held in V. Senthil Balaji v. Enforcement Directorate , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626, that where the petitioner can become a threat to society because of her criminal antecedents, she should not be released on bail. It was observed: “27…..An exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary.” 19. It was observed: “27…..An exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary.” 19. Similarly, it was held in Union of India v. Barakathullah , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019, that where the persons were involved in the commission of similar offences, they should not be released on bail. It was observed: - “20. … So far as the respondents in the instant appeals are concerned, they are in custody for hardly one and a half years, apart from the fact that all the respondents are shown to have been involved in previous cases. There are about 8 to 9 previous cases shown in the chargesheet against the respondents, except accused Nos. 1, 4 and 6, who are shown to have been involved in two cases. Considering the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and considering their criminal antecedents, in our opinion High Court should not have taken a lenient view, more particularly when there was sufficient material to show their prima facie involvement in the alleged offences under the UAPA. 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P. , (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781 that the liberty of a person has to be balanced with peace and harmony in society. Liberty cannot be elevated to such a high pedestal as would bring in anarchy or disorder in society. It was observed at page 384: “65. We are absolutely conscious that the liberty of a person should not be lightly dealt with, for the deprivation of the liberty of a person has an immense impact on the mind. Incarceration creates a concavity in the personality of an individual. Sometimes it causes a sense of emptiness. Needless to emphasise, the sacrosanctity of liberty is paramount in a civilised society. However, in a democratic body polity which is wedded to the rule of law, an individual is expected to grow within the social restrictions sanctioned by law. Individual liberty is restricted by larger social interests, and its deprivation must have due sanction of law. Needless to emphasise, the sacrosanctity of liberty is paramount in a civilised society. However, in a democratic body polity which is wedded to the rule of law, an individual is expected to grow within the social restrictions sanctioned by law. Individual liberty is restricted by larger social interests, and its deprivation must have due sanction of law. In an orderly society, an individual is expected to live with dignity, having respect for the law and also giving due respect to others' rights. It is a well-accepted principle that the concept of liberty is not in the realm of absolutism but is a restricted one. The cry of the collective for justice, its desire for peace and harmony and its necessity for security cannot be allowed to be trivialised. The life of an individual living in a society governed by the rule of law has to be regulated, and such regulations, which are the source of law, subserve the social balance and function as a significant instrument for the protection of human rights and the security of the collective. This is because, fundamentally, laws are made for their obedience so that every member of the society lives peacefully in a society to achieve their individual as well as social interests. That is why Edmond Burke, while discussing liberty, opined, “it is regulated freedom”. 66. It is also to be kept in mind that individual liberty cannot be accentuated to such an extent or elevated to such a high pedestal that it would bring in anarchy or disorder in society. The prospect of greater justice requires that law and order prevail in a civilised milieu. True it is, there can be no arithmetical formula for fixing the parameters in precise exactitude, but the adjudication should express not only application of mind but also exercise of jurisdiction on accepted and established norms. Law and order in a society protect the established precepts and see to it that contagious crimes do not become epidemic. In an organised society, the concept of liberty basically requires citizens to be responsible and not to disturb the tranquillity and safety which every well-meaning person desires. Not for nothing, J. Oerter stated: “Personal liberty is the right to act without interference within the limits of the law.” 67. In an organised society, the concept of liberty basically requires citizens to be responsible and not to disturb the tranquillity and safety which every well-meaning person desires. Not for nothing, J. Oerter stated: “Personal liberty is the right to act without interference within the limits of the law.” 67. Thus analysed, it is clear that though liberty is a greatly cherished value in the life of an individual, it is a controlled and restricted one, and no element in the society can act in a manner by consequence of which the life or liberty of others is jeopardised, for the rational collective does not countenance an anti-social or anti-collective act. (See: Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9 SCC 446 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1172.). 21. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail because of his criminal antecedents. 22. The status report shows that the informant had seen the petitioner and co-accused beating the Kashmir Chand (since deceased), who died subsequently. These allegations, prima facie, show the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of murder. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 that where a person is charged with an offence punishable with capital punishment, there is a presumption that he is likely to abscond and no amount of bail would secure his presence during the trial. It was observed:- “6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such a possibility is plausible in the case. As Erle. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such a possibility is plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated, when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [ Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51] “I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.” 7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 23. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial; the petitioner is not entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission cannot be accepted. A perusal of the order-sheets shows that an adjournment was sought on behalf of the petitioner on 15.05.2024. 23. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial; the petitioner is not entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission cannot be accepted. A perusal of the order-sheets shows that an adjournment was sought on behalf of the petitioner on 15.05.2024. It was asserted on behalf of the petitioner on 04.07.2024 that a supplementary charge-sheet was not filed, and the charges should be framed only after the receipt of a supplementary charge-sheet. Supplementary charge-sheet was filed, and copies were supplied on 03.10.2024. Thereafter, the matter was listed for consideration of the charge, and the charges were ultimately framed on 02.07.2025. These order-sheets show that the framing of the charges was stalled till 02.07.2025, and since a person cannot take advantage of his own wrongs, therefore, the plea regarding the delay in the progress of the trial is not available to the petitioner. 24. Considering the gravity of the offence and severity of the punishment, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail. 25. No other point was urged. 26. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed 27. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.